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ABSTRACT
Voucher privatisation was designed to effect a rapid transfonnation of state-owned 
enterprises into private ownership with as limited state intervention as possible. 
Premised on neo-classical economic theory, the Czech government anticipated new 
private owners would emerge with greater incentives than the state to undertake 
restructuring and ensure the efficient operation of these firms. However, this thesis 
argues that for restructuring to occur, formal ownership patterns are less important 
than an ability to exercise control because of institutional influences. The de jure and 
de facto roles of owners, managers, and labour are discussed, showing how 
endogenous and exogenous factors affect their ability to dictate and control 
restructuring outcomes in voucher privatised firms.
The thesis argues that observed post-privatisation restructuring outcomes cannot be 
understood without considering the institutional environment within which firms are 
situated. Institutions are conceived to comprise formal, informal and enforcement 
aspects, but also with a temporal dimension encapsulated by the use of path- 
dependency and embeddedness. The explanatory framework offered here is a 
modified version of new institutionalism perspectives, termed “embedded
institutionalism”.
Case studies of seven firms privatised by voucher are presented in this study to 
demonstrate how the interaction of institutional influences, understood through 
embedded institutionalism, is the most appropriate framework for understanding post­
privatisation restructuring processes in post-communist countries. This approach
provides a synthesis between the theoretical expectations of neo-classical economic 
theory and the practical outworking of post-privatisation restructuring in Czech firms.
Voucher privatisation was a novel scheme, and became the central aspect of the Klaus 
government’s economic transformation. Important historical and contemporary 
institutional influences impacted on its design and implementation. However, it is 
argued that understanding privatisation and its effects on restructuring through 
embedded institutionalism negates the view that a unique Czech way of privatisation 
exists, and that observed outcomes are simply responses to the surrounding
institutional environment.
ii
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CSSR Ceskoslovenske Socialistike Republiky: Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic.
DLO District Labour Office.
IC Investment Company.
IPF Investment Privatisation Fund.
Konzem Vertically linked group of state-owned enterprises.
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Dialogue between the Social Partners.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
It is very easy to dismantle “explicit” socialism ... and to change some of the 
basic rules. But it is very difficult to dismantle the “implicit” socialism in us - 
the habits, prejudices and traditions built over the past decades in our political, 
social and economic system. The task as I understand it in my country, 
Czechoslovakia, is to create a normally functioning political system based on 
standard political parties. We have no wish to undertake new social 
experiments. We have had enough of such experiments in the past. ... We 
consider privatization to be a crucial precondition for the normal functioning of 
a market economy. ... This is the first basic pillar, the cornerstone of our 
reform strategy.1
Following the Velvet Revolution of November 1989 that brought an end to 
Communist rule in Czechoslovakia, the country embarked upon a programme of 
reforms to move from central planning to a market economy. Setting privatisation as 
the central catalyst to the new government’s economic reforms exemplified a neo­
classically inspired expectation that private owners would be more efficient than the 
state, and promote the desired economic growth during the post-communist reforms. 
This also, arguably, made the Czech reform distinct from reform strategies of other 
post-communist governments in the region where greater emphasis was placed on 
macroeconomic stability. However, this thesis does not support a conclusion that this
1 Vaclav Klaus, ‘Transition: An Insider’s View’, Problems of Communism, 41 (1-2) (1992), 73-75, pp. 
73-74.
1
indicates the existence of a unique Czech paradigm. Instead, it suggests that the 
policies of the Czech transformation, in particular privatisation, exhibit a rational 
response to the prevailing institutional environment, and that their design and 
appropriateness can only be appreciated by reference to this. Case studies are used to 
illustrate this conclusion in the study, and unlike neo-classical economics, validate the 
relevance of institutional influences on actually occurring restructuring.
Neo-classical economic theory guided the initial design of the Czech voucher 
privatisation programme, but restructuring outcomes manifested in formerly state- 
owned Czech enterprises appear to have diverged from those predicted. In this study, 
neo-classical economic theory is not regarded as adequate to predict and explain the 
outcome of reforms in Central and Eastern European countries because these are not 
simply economic processes, but have socio-political aspects as well. The alternative 
theoretical foundation adopted for this research, as explained later, is derived from the 
institutionalist tradition, to account for this.
Early studies of voucher privatisation were constrained to consider the technical 
design and introduction of this programme,2 but divergences in the outcomes from 
those anticipated now demands further study into the reasons why. This shift in 
emphasis is partly a consequence of time having elapsed since the Velvet Revolution, 
and implementation of the privatisation programme having been implemented. The 
need for such a shift in emphasis is partly a consequence of time having elapsed since
2 See for example Patrick Bolton and Gerard Roland, ‘Privatization Processes in Central and Eastern 
Europe’, Economic Policy 15 (1992), 275-309; Joseph C. Brada, ‘The Mechanics of the Voucher Plan 
in Czechoslovakia’, RFE/RL Research Report, 1 (17) (24 April 1992), 42-45; Olivier Bouin, 
‘Privatization in Czechoslovakia’, in Constraints and Impacts of Privatization, edited by V. V. 
Ramanadham (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 115-138; Roman Frydman, Andrzej Rapaczunski, John
2
the Velvet Revolution, as well as the privatisation programme having been 
implemented. This research therefore concentrates on restructuring processes 
occurring within firms after privatisation. In particular, it undertakes to demonstrate 
how enterprise insiders are impacted and constrained by institutional influences 
specific to their firms. It finds resonance with similar studies that also note 
discrepancies between the theoretical expectations of privatisation outcomes from 
neo-classical economic theory, and those seen in firms in transforming economies,3 
but has a more holistic approach. Rather than analysing a particular concept to 
determine how it relates to post-privatisation restructuring, this work considers 
empirically observed outcomes, and derives from these the various influences that 
give rise to them.
Stimuli to restructuring in this study are conceptualised broadly, and their impact in 
multiple spheres, which may be competing or overlapping, considered. This avoids a 
simplistic specification of the causes and mechanisms of restructuring after 
privatisation in former state-owned enterprises. With the changing institutional 
environment within which these firms operate in transformation, it is essential to 
develop a framework that can account for the historic and contemporary factors that
S. Earle et al, The Privatization Process in Central Europe, Central European University Privatization 
Reports, 1 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1993).
3 This approach appears in studies such as Michal Mejstrlk, ‘The Restructuring After Privatization in 
the Czech Republic’, Prague Economic Papers, 8 (1999), 233-260; Jirl VeCemlk, ‘Capitalist Renewal: 
Privatization and Business’, in Ten Years of Building Capitalism: Czech Society After 1989, edited by 
Jiff VeCernlk and Petr MatCjfi (Praha: Academia, 1999), pp. 70-93. Two notable studies that have 
adopted this approach but with a narrow focus on managerial influences on restructuring are Ed Clark, 
and Anna Soulsby, Organizational Change in Post-Communist Europe. Management and 
Transformation in the Czech Republic, (London: Routledge, 1999); Roderick Martin, Transforming 
Management in Central and Eastern Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Similarly, but 
taking their point of reference as networks and ties, works include Gerald A. McDermott, 
‘Renegotiating the Ties that Bind: The Limits of Privatization in the Czech Republic’, in Restructuring 
Networks in Post-Socialism: Legacies, Linkages and Localities, edited by Gemot Grabher and David 
Stark (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 70-106; David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, 
Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
dictate the changes seen. As perceptions over the nature and influence of these are, to 
some extent, subjective, it is also essential to have a balanced assessment of how these 
are perceived within the firm. Consequently, the case studies here include 
respondents from through the employment hierarchy to achieve this.
The conventional use of institutionalism in studying aspects of transformation4 is 
extended by this work that is not only considering the influence of the past on current 
changes,5 but explicitly recognising influences from the contemporary environment 
simultaneously. Observed restructuring in privatised, former state-owned enterprises 
indicates that both elements interact, and that these need to be reconciled when 
modelling change processes. Embedded institutionalism is therefore developed in this 
study as the analytical framework to understand the restructuring measures adopted 
after voucher privatisation in Czech enterprises, which draws on institutional theory in 
preference to neo-classical economics.6 Despite the neo-liberal rhetoric of Klaus that 
attributed priority to market forces in privatisation and restructuring in accordance
4 As exemplified by work such as Antoni Z Kaminski and Piotr Strzalkowski,‘Strategics of Institutional 
Change in Central and Eastern European Economies’, in Institutional Change: Theory and Empirical 
Findings, edited by Sven-Erik Sjostrand (Armonk: Sharpe, 1993), pp. 139-150; Paul Aligica, ‘The 
Institutionalists’ Take on Transition’, Transition, 3 (4) (1997), 46-49.
5 Examples of works that consider historical influences through path-dependency on contemporary 
transformation outcomes through path-dependency include Douglass C. North, ‘Transaction Costs, 
Institutions and Economic History’, in The New Institutional Economics: A Collection of Articles from 
the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, edited by Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter 
(Tubingen: Mohr, 1991), pp. 203-213; Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and 
Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Studies in Rationality and Social Change, 
edited by Jon Elster and Michael S. McPherson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991);
David Stark, ‘Path Dependency and Privatization Strategies in East Central Europe’, East European 
Politics and Societies, 6 (1992), 17-54; Bruno Dallago, ‘Between Spontaneity and Economic 
Engineering: Path Dependence in the Process of Economic Transition’, in Economic Developments and 
Reforms in Cooperation Partner Countries: The Social and Human Dimension, edited by Reiner 
Weichardt, Colloquium 1996 (Brussels: NATO Economic Directorate and Office of Information,
1997), pp. 73-86.
6 Douglass C. North, The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics to an Understanding of the 
Transition Problem, WIDER Annual Lecture, 1 (Helsinki: United Nations University/WIDER, 1997); 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson, ‘The Approach of Institutional Economics’, Journal of Economic Literature, 36 
(1998), 166-192; Anil Hira and Ron Hira, ‘The New Institutionalism: Contradictory Notions of 
Change’, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 59 (2) (2000), 267-282. Expanded Academic 
ASAP International Edition. 7 December 2000. <http://infotrac.galegroup.com/itweb/stand>, [n.p.].
4
with neo-classical economics, it is shown that in practice institutional influences 
impacted upon the design and outcomes of the privatisation programme as a reform 
strategy. This has implications for the outcomes and overall effectiveness of the 
Czech privatisation programme, as it is ineffective if adequate incentives for 
sustainable and appropriate restructuring of enterprises do not arise from it.7
Following a review of the specific restructuring issues that this thesis addresses in its 
analysis of the incentives of enterprise insiders to implement such changes given the 
institutional environment within which privatisation and restructuring occur, an 
overall summary of the thesis is presented. This shows how the concept of embedded 
institutionalism is developed throughout this study, as a framework for 
conceptualising the environment within which privatisation and restructuring occur 
and respond to generate the results now visible. A brief review is then given of the 
companies studied, from which empirical evidence to illustrate the discussion of 
actually observed restructuring is generated.
This chapter then turns to consider the construct of embedded institutionalism in more 
detail, defining institutions as composite of formal, informal, and enforcement 
aspects, showing the importance placed on the informal and enforcement elements in 
this work. A crucial aspect of embedded institutionalism is that historical and 
contemporary conditions are both accounted for as positively creating institutional 
constraints on change through path-dependency and embeddedness respectively, and
so the influence of each of these constructs on embedded institutionalism is discussed.
7 Nikolaos T. Milonas, Mass Privatization Methods and their Effects on Capital Market Institutions, 
Agency Relationships and Managerial Monitoring, Working Paper, 50 (Leuven: LICOS Centre for 
Transition Economics, 1995), p. 7.
5
Finally the chapter draws together the implications of path-dependency and
embeddedness in embedded institutionalism to illustrate the difference between
transition and transformation paradigms, showing that transformation is the preferred 
concept for describing the Czech reform process in this study, because path- 
dependency and embeddedness are integral to this perspective.
The particular focus of the thesis is on the response of, and interactions between, 
enterprise insiders; owners, managers, and workers, to the actually existing 
institutional environment within which they operate, in order to understand enterprise 
level restructuring responses that follow voucher privatisation of formerly state- 
owned Czech enterprises. Interviewees’ responses from case studies of seven firms 
are used to illustrate and develop an explanation for observed restructuring processes. 
By setting this empirical evidence against theoretical Western economic orthodoxy, 
divergences between outcomes and theory are made apparent, suggesting that neo­
classical economic theory is not valid for predicting restructuring outcomes in 
formerly state-owned enterprises under conditions of transformation in the Czech 
Republic. It is then argued that these disparities at the enterprise level arise because 
of institutional influences that impact on these in reality, implying difficulties with 
Klaus’s desire for privatisation to be the cornerstone of reforms. The stress on 
institutional influences through embedded institutionalism to explain distinct, 
observed restructuring outcomes, it is also argued, negates the view that a specific 
Czech path of privatisation and restructuring exists. Instead, embedded 
institutionalism provides an alternative explanation for how and why restructuring of 
Czech enterprises has not fulfilled the expectations raised by neo-classical economic 
models, independent of the component elements of the post-communist reform
6
process, by identifying the existence of potential institutional influences and the 
manner in which these interact in reality.
The basic premise for understanding restructuring that is held in this work is 
consistent with emergent institutionalism perspectives that perceive existing 
structures, norms, and behaviours to dictate the potential and actual behaviour of 
actors in response to change.8 Empirical evidence from the case study firms is used in 
conjunction with institutionalism within this work to illustrate and understand 
restructuring processes within privatised Czech enterprises, and from this the 
empirical framework of the study is developed. New institutionalism theory is the 
foundational premise for this research, providing an alternative starting point to neo­
classical economics. It is not intended however that this study details the implications 
of institutionalism theories, but rather situates itself within this broad tradition in 
preference to that of neo-classical economic theory because of its eclectic, inclusive 
conception of behavioural patterns and institutional influences from the surrounding 
environment. Specifically, strands from new social and economic institutionalisms 
are incorporated into embedded institutionalism. This diverges from the main 
approaches to new institutionalism by incorporating aspects from the political, 
economic and sociological institutionalisms because the factors that will interact and 
the extent to which any institutional conditions dominate in this thesis are not seen as 
determinable a priori.9 Embedded institutionalism therefore sets the focus of this 
study on the issues of path-dependency and embeddedness, ensuring that this work is
8 Jan VIddil, ‘Information About the Research’, in Politics, Skills and Industrial Restructuring, Institute 
of Sociology Working Paper: 8, edited by J. Vladil, I. Hradecka, I. Mazalkova and G. McDermott 
(Prague: Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, 1996), pp. 5-17, p. 5.
9 Peter A Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, 
Political Studies, 44 (1996), 936-957.
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sympathetic to perspectives that view transformation as a product of a broad mix of 
historical as well as contemporary economic, political, and socio-cultural conditions.10
This study gives an intertemporal, dynamic analysis of the privatisation process, and 
specifically endogenous restructuring processes in Czech enterprises. This study is 
therefore situated within the literature that views the post-communist reform process 
as an evolutionary transformation, rather than a transition with an overall blueprint to 
change and defined end point of the reform. As outlined below, two chapters are 
dedicated to the historical background of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic, 
and by implication those now involved in implementing privatisation and 
restructuring, as well as to understanding the theoretical basis for the entire Czech 
privatisation programme as an element of the country’s overall post-communist 
reform programme. Discussion of potential tensions between historical and 
contemporary institutional influences is continued throughout the thesis, because the 
dynamic and even contradictory influences facing those implementing restructuring 
within enterprises need to be identified in order to understand observed outcomes to 
restructuring processes. As economic systems and societies develop and mature, so 
the relative importance of goals shifts in response to the altered institutional 
environment. For enterprises in particular, this means that the success of their 
restructuring depends on its appropriateness to the prevailing conditions that will 
change over time. Whilst definable in part by economic criteria such as sustainable 
production and profits, there can also be satisficing conditions of either an economic
10 See for example Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of 
Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957); David Stark, ‘Path Dependency’, pp. 17-54; Douglass C. 
North, Institutions, Industrial Change and Economic Performance, Political Economy of Institutions 
and Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Douglass C. North, The Contribution 
of the New Institutional Economics to an Understanding of the Transition Problem (Helsinki: United 
Nations University/WIDER, 1997); David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways', Douglass
8
or non-economic nature that managers and owners aim to meet in the operation of 
their firms. The effectiveness of a firm’s restructuring strategy in this work is thus 
accorded to the wider context within which changes introduced and their 
appropriateness to their wider environment.
Until the end of 1992, the Czech and Slovak Republics existed as one political entity. 
Crucial to the post-communist history of Czechoslovakia has been that the differing 
histories, politics, and society of the Czechs and Slovaks generated important 
differences in the impact of Communism and the subsequent post-communist 
transformation in both lands.11 Despite constant efforts to create a “Czechoslovak” 
nation and identity from 1918, this was never fully realised, and the Velvet Divorce in 
1992 became inevitable once the political will to maintain this structure was lost.
Most significant for this study is that although what are now two separate countries 
share much of their history, they also differ in a number of important respects over the 
perception, detail, and impact of these legacies. Also, the political leaders of these 
two countries had different objectives for their post-communist development, as 
evidenced for example by the second wave of voucher privatisation only occurring in 
the Czech Republic. For the period from 1993, this study therefore focuses only on 
policy and its effects in the Czech Republic.
Since the privatisation programme under consideration has operated in
Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic, the use of terminology has to be clarified. 
Czechoslovakia is used as a generic term to cover all of the country’s historical
C. North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Occasional Paper, 106 (London: IEA,
1999).
9
territorial boundaries until the secession of the Slovak Republic, and the Czech 
Republic is used subsequently. In the post-communist era, for policies instigated in 
Czechoslovakia before 1993 and continued in the Czech Republic, reference is only 
made to the Czech Republic unless this is not evident from the context. The 
illustrative examples presented here are all of firms located in the Czech Republic, for 
only here did the privatisation programme designed for Czechoslovakia continue 
according to its original conception after the Czech and Slovak Republics became 
independent states on January 1 1993.11 2
1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS.
The extent to which privatisation is helping to create enterprises that are viable in a 
market economy and whether they are being restructured in ways that break the 
legacy of their Communist past and catalyse economic revitalisation of the Czech 
economy is reviewed throughout the rest of this work. Asset divestiture in the large- 
scale programme was mainly accomplished through a scheme of mass privatisation by 
voucher that “was untested and considered radical”13 at its inception, and was 
formally concluded in 1995. This study, through an assessment of the institutional 
environment within which the process has been occurring, is a reconsideration of the 
outcomes of this privatisation programme in light of its aim to not simply transfer 
property into private ownership, but to be the cornerstone of Klaus’ reforms.
11 Sharon L. Wolchik, ‘The Politics of Transition and the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia’, in The End of 
Czechoslovakia, edited by Jiff Musil (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 225­
244, pp. 238,240.
12 Dallago, ‘Between Spontaneity’, p. 82.
13 John S. Earle and Scott G. Gehlbach, Privatization Policy Design and Popular Support for Reform in 
the Czech Republic, 5th Nobel Symposium in Economics - The Economics of Transition, 10-12
10
An institutional perspective termed “embedded institutionalism” provides the 
methodological foundation for the discussion of institutional influences and their 
impacts in subsequent chapters. Inspired by, but distinct from neo-institutionalism, 
embedded institutionalism develops neo-institutionalism by explicitly accounting for 
historical and contemporary institutional influences through the notions of path- 
dependency and embeddedness. The underlying behavioural model incorporates 
socio-political and socio-economic aspects because an eclectic approach is assumed to 
provide the most appropriate framework for understanding restructuring processes for 
Czech companies. A fuller explanation of the construction and application of 
embedded institutionalism in this work is given later in section 1.2.
Potential constraints on the extent of restructuring firms undertake exist because all 
transactions occur within established spheres of exchange, and are conditioned by the 
norms and values that prevail within each one.14 This chapter demonstrates that the 
analysis of these will be made using embedded institutionalism. In the remainder of 
this work particular institutional influences relating to the design, organisation, and 
implementation of privatisation and subsequent restructuring are presented and 
assessed, so the thesis proceeds as follows.
September 1999 (Stockholm: SITE, 1999). 3 October 2000.
<http://www.hhs.se/site/Publications/Nol41web.pdf>, p. 8
14 Gunnar Myrdal, Political and Institutional Economics, (Dublin: Economic and Social Research 
Institute, 1978), p. 10; North, Structure and Change, pp. 5,11; Ed Clark and Anna Soulsby, 
‘Transforming Former State Enterprises in the Czech Republic’, Organization Studies, 16 (1995), 215­
242, p. 216; Grandori and Soda, Inter-Firm Networks, pp. 190-191; W. Richard Scott, Institutions and 
Organizations, (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1995), p. 151; Jens Beckert, ‘What is Sociological About 
Economic Sociology? Uncertainty and the Embeddedness of Economic Action’, Theory and Society, 
25 (1996), 803-840, p. 829; Carol Slappendel, ‘Perspectives on Innovation in Organizations’, 
Organization Studies, 17 (1996), 107-129, p. 123; Peter Clark, Organisations in Action: Competition 
Between Contexts (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 164.
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Institutional influences are intertemporal, so Chapter Two demonstrates the unique 
legacies and conditions under which the transformation began to provide the context 
for the reform strategy adopted. From this discussion it is shown that the 
transformation reflects both historical legacies as well as the prevailing conditions 
into which reforms are introduced. Understanding restructuring in Czech enterprises 
has to account for legacies from the past in formal structures as well as mentalities 
and expectations of the role of firms and employment in society. In the case studies, 
respondents frequently comment on how the contemporary situation differs from the 
past, and in some instances there is little evidence that these changes are accepted or
embraced.
In Chapter Three, the main focus is on voucher privatisation since this is the main and 
novel element of the Czech programme, and the privatisation technique used by each 
of the firms in the case studies. This chapter shows that neo-classical privatisation 
theory is inadequate to explain the processes of property transfers and subsequent 
restructuring processes in Czech firms after voucher privatisation. Ways in which the 
design and implementation of the privatisation programme have been influenced by 
the institutional environment into which it was applied, in particular the
underdeveloped character of institutions that prevented a mass privatisation 
programme of the type previously adopted in some developed market economies from 
being introduced, are shown. As the outcomes of the privatisation programme are 
only fully understood by reference to empirical evidence, the impressions of 
respondents of how this programme operated are given in this chapter to show how it 
is perceived in reality in its operation.
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In keeping with the neo-liberal justifications for privatisation and restructuring, Klaus 
intended owner-driven restructuring following privatisation, rather than state-led 
restructuring before privatisation.15 It was expected that this would generate a new set 
of incentives for the management to focus on efficiency in production, so the 
following three chapters address the issue of whether adequate incentives to 
restructure exist for actors with interests in voucher privatised enterprises. These 
chapters are illustrated extensively with the impressions of respondents to show where 
there are differences between theory and reality. These are consistently derived from 
path-dependency and embeddedness to institutional influences and in particular, the 
retained mentalities and informal behavioural institutions of agents involved in 
change.
By considering the development of corporate governance mechanisms and 
shareholder protection in Chapter Four, the incentives to restructure their firms facing 
different owners is reviewed. Bank and market-based corporate governance systems 
are explained, but the forms of corporate governance emerging in Czech enterprises 
does not seem to correlate with either of these archetypes because of institutional 
conditions arising from voucher privatisation. Corporate governance mechanisms in 
Czech enterprises are often incomplete, so it is shown that de jure shareholdings here
15 Vaclav Klaus, Ekonomicka Veda a Ekonomicka Reforma. State, Eseje (Praha: Gennex & TOP 
Agency, 1991), p. 230; Frydman et al, Privatization Process, p. 70; Thomas W. Hazlett, ‘The Czech 
Miracle: Why Privatization Went Right in the Czech Republic’, Reason, 26 (11) (1995), 28-35. 
Academic Search Elite. EBSCO Publishing. 17 June 1999.
<http://www.global.epnet.com/hosttrial/login.html>, [n.p.]; John Child with Andre P. Czegledy, 
‘Managerial Learning in the Transformation of Eastern Europe’, Organization Studies, 17 (1996), 167­
179, p. 170; John C. Coffee, ‘Institutional Investors in Transitional Economies: Lessons from the 
Czech Experience’, in Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia, 1: Banks, Funds and 
Foreign Investors, edited by Roman Frydman, Cheryl W. Gray and Andrzej Rapaczynski (Budapest: 
Central European Press, 1996), pp. 111-186, p. 120; Ariane Hegewisch, Chris Brewster and Josef 
Koubek, ‘Different Roads: Changes in Industrial and Employee Relations in the Czech Republic and 
East Germany Since 1989’, Industrial Relations Journal 27, (1996), 50-64, p. 52; Philippe Aghion and 
Olivier J. Blanchard, ‘On Privatization Methods in Eastern Europe and their Implications’, Economics 
of Transition, 6 (1998), 87-99, p. 88.
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do not necessarily correlate with de facto control. After voucher privatisation, owners 
often do not have the ability, or incentive, to restructure their firms, with effective 
control instead passing to the incumbent management. Chapter Five considers 
whether, from a restructuring perspective, this is a positive development within firms. 
It is argued that corporate governance mechanisms are weak and do not fully 
constrain managers in voucher privatised firms from acting in their own interests, but 
that managers remain influenced by other institutional factors. The experiences and 
expectations of managers from the period of central planning are shown to be strong 
institutional influences on the restructuring measures they introduce, where new 
patterns of behaviour are only adopted if there are expected gains to the managers 
from change.
However, the implementation of these measures within firms is also dependent upon 
their being embraced and adopted by workers. Labour is therefore considered in 
Chapter Six as another aspect of the institutional environment that determines whether 
desired restructuring occurs following privatisation. This is studied in the context of 
labour markets and the industrial relations structure, showing that there are incentives 
facing labour to adapt to change desired by the management and owners that 
influence the restructuring outcomes in firms. These also represent an institutional 
limitation determining the types of change managers and owners can introduce by 
defining the feasible range of restructuring measures that impact on labour. Another 
important aspect is that a unique phenomenon in the Czech transformation has been 
the low rates of unemployment, and so the chapter also considers whether this 
corresponds with low levels of restructuring after privatisation, arguing that there are 
conflicting institutional influences that determine these aggregate levels. Therefore,
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assessing whether restructuring is occurring can only be achieved from empirical 
evidence derived from individual enterprises.
The final chapter summarises the implications of the embedded institutionalism 
approach, and considers whether a Czech paradigm exists for the privatisation and 
restructuring of enterprises. Although the Czech voucher privatisation programme 
was a novel scheme uniquely adapted to its context, it is proposed that understanding 
its outcomes through an institutional framework rather than with a neo-classical 
economic perspective shows that the uniqueness arises from the existence of these 
institutional influences, rather than because the Czech transformation is inherently 
distinct from that of other Central and Eastern European countries. Whilst the Czech 
transformation experience could not be transplanted directly into another country and 
the same outcomes ensue, this chapter argues that this thesis demonstrates the need 
for an institutional approach to understand the design, implementation and 
interpretation of reforms is required if an effective transformation strategy, that 
permits sustainable long-term development of the economy, is to be designed and its
outcomes understood.
As explaining observed outcomes is central to this work, the theoretical aspect is 
supplemented by empirical findings from a complementary research project 
undertaken in seven Czech companies between February and September 2000. 
Located in Moravia, all are involved in light engineering and machine production. 
State-owned enterprises until 1989, each was subsequently transformed into a joint- 
stock company and privatised in the first wave of voucher privatisation. Empirical 
data on the processes and motivations behind enterprise restructuring was gained from
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these case studies. It is then used to illustrate how the impact of institutions, as 
conceptualised through embedded institutionalism, can be used to explain the 
restructuring processes observed for privatised Czech companies.
1.2 PRESENTATION OF THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH PROJECT.
The seven companies used for the case studies are intended to provide illustrative 
examples of restructuring processes and outcomes after voucher privatisation in 
Czech firms, as well as to illustrate the impact of institutional development on these. 
The manufacturing sector was selected because this is a well-established industrial 
branch in Moravia that has proved itself durable under the increasingly competitive 
environment of the transformation. The specific choice of companies was then 
determined by a number of criteria. As well as having been privatised by voucher, it 
was desired that the initial post-privatisation ownership was predominately by Czech 
individuals and firms. This was seen as important because the study is concerned 
with identifying as far as possible the domestic response to the altered institutional 
environment offered by the transformation. In firms that had been acquired by 
foreign owners, it is expected that these would be subject to the aims of the new 
owner. As these would not necessarily equate with those of Czech firms seeking to 
adapt and survive under the altered domestic conditions, the effects of direct foreign 
investment and ownership are outwith the remit of this study.
An element of comparability between the firms within their industrial branch was also 
sought. Four of the companies are now owned by one overall owner, Obchodni 
Cesta. Comparability between the companies in this group come from their shared
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overall ownership structure, as well as tight links between the present-day firms 
arising from their having all been members of two konzern during communism. 
Likewise, two other firms, Brodchmel and Cisaf, were part of the same konzern 
during most of their communist era production. Although the output of both firms is 
very similar, the restructuring strategies and overall success of these distinct 
enterprises is very different. Subsequent chapters argue that this is a direct 
consequence of their particular institutional environment. The final company studied, 
Drazitest, provides a contrast to these other two groups of firms, having been a large 
state-owned enterprise that has undergone dramatic downsizing and restructuring with 
privatisation, but which is the core of the original state-owned enterprise that has 
retained many of its staff and assets. The final selection of companies of course 
reflects an important pragmatic consideration, namely the willingness of appropriate 
companies to participate in the study.
Table 1.1 provides a summary comparison of the major features of the companies 
studied, and further details of the companies follow. Specific information on the 
interview methodology and the respondents are given in Appendix 3.
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Table 1.1: Summary of Companies Studied.
Rukopis Strojiny Rozdat Systems OdrazKM PFesnost KM
Business Area 2001
Commercial
reproduction
machinery.
Industrial measuring 
and distribution 
machinery.
Commerical cutting 
machinery.
Electronic and precision 
engineering tools.
Ownership 2001
78%: Obchodni Cesta. 
Remainder held by 
individuals.
Obchodni Cesta through 
parent Rukopis 
Strojimy.
Obchodni Cesta through 
parent Rukopis Strojimy.
42%: Obchodni Cesta.
6%: IPFs, 3%: NPF. 
Remainder held by 
individuals.
Structure 2001 Holding company with2 daughters.
Daughter company of 
Rukopis Strojimy.
Daughter company of 
Rukopis Strojimy.
Joint-stock company. 2 
branch plants and 1 co­
operation production 
plant.
Employees 1989 >2 000 >500 800 5 5001999 1 233 370 550 1 934
Turnover Million 
K6 1999 1 505 727 282 671
Markets 2001
Western Europe, 
Central Europe North 
America, South 
America, Asia.
Central and Eastern 
Europe, Middle East, 
Asia.
Europe, USA, Asia Europe, USA, Japan.
Information Flows 
and Decision 
Making
2001
Flows through long 
company hierarchy. 
Determined by ISO 
9001 norms.
Determined by ISO
9001 norms in Rozdat 
Systems. Barriers to 
communicating with 
Rukopis Strojimy.
Effective within Odraz 
KM. Often by-pass 
Rukopis Strojimy to deal
directy with Obchodni 
Cesta.
Some structural barriers 
to communication, but 
generally effective.
Prognosis for the future:
Strong product base and 
foreign distribution 
network.
Actively seeking new 
strategic investor, likely 
to bring needed 
restructuring.
More unemployment 
necessary. Facing strong 
competition globally.
Further co-operation 
production likely and 
necessary to sustain 
revenue and 
employment.
Drazitest CIsar Brodchmel
Business Area 2001 Exploratory and construction engineering. Precision metalworking. Precision metalworking.
Ownership 2001
18%: IPF. 39% held by 3 
Directors. Remaining shares 
held by company employees.
47%: NSmec - German 
financial consortium. 
Remaining shares held by 
IPFs and individuals.
Majority ownership by banks 
and IPFs.
Remainder held by individuals.
Structure 2001 Joint-stock company. Branch plants in 4 locations.
Holding company with 4 
daughters. Joint-stock company.
Employees 1989 1 600 > 10 000 3 0001999 170 1 230 2 264
Turnover Million 
KS 1999 272 510 972
Markets 2001 Czech Republic.
Germany, North America, 
South America, Africa, Asia, 
Australia.
Central and Eastern Europe, 
USA, Middle East.
Information
Flows and 
Decision Making
2001
Hierarchical, but effective. 
Determined by ISO 9001 
norms.
Very little information 
passed between owners, 
managers and employees.
Strong barriers to 
communication between 
owners, managers and 
employees.
Prognosis for the future:
Progressive firm competing on 
quality, not price, but with 
strong competition in Czech 
markets.
Declining firm. Very 
uncertain future. More 
unemployment and capital 
investment essential.
Seeking product diversification 
and new strategic owner. More 
unemployment necessary.
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1.2.1 Rukopis Strojirny, Presnost KM, Rozdat Systems and Odraz KM.
Four companies in the study, Rukopis Strojirny, Rozdat Systems, Odraz KM, and 
Presnost KM existed before privatisation as two state-owned enterprises, Rukopis 
Strojirny and Presnost KM.16 Each of these companies are involved in machinery 
manufacture, the Rukopis Strojirny group producing machinery for various industrial 
and commercial processing tasks, and Presnost KM producing precision engineering 
tools and electronic engineering products.
Rozdat Systems and Odraz KM came into existence as fully-owned subsidiaries of the 
Rukopis Strojirny state-owned enterprise in 1993, previously having been two 
divisions of this state-owned enterprise. Both had product lines distinct from that of 
Rukopis Strojirny before 1993 and were operating at separate locations, with these 
operations continued by the new companies.
Created through strategic restructuring processes, Rozdat Systems was originally 
separated from Rukopis Strojirny when a foreign investor expressed an interest in 
purchasing this production unit. Whilst the sale did not complete, Rozdat Systems 
remained a subsidiary of Rukopis Strojirny, although an alternative, preferably 
foreign, buyer is still actively sought by the management teams of both companies.
Rukopis Strojirny and Rozdat Systems are located in a small community 15 km 
outside the nearest large town, Petrov. Although the communication network to 
Petrov is poor, this location was chosen for political reasons as there is no other
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industry in this community. The company provided housing, an apprentice school, 
and a cultural centre in the town for the employees and their families.
Odraz KM and Presnost KM are situated a further 10 km away in the medium-sized 
town of Karstmesto, which has three main industrial employers. As a result, Odraz 
KM and Presnost KM are less tightly integrated into their local communities and their 
employees do not identify with their company to the same extent as those in Rukopis 
Strojimy and Rozdat Systems.
Interdependences still exist between the companies, with some of Rozdat Systems and 
Odraz KM’s output produced for Rukopis Strojimy, their parent company. The 
directors of the daughter companies resent this constraint to varying degrees though, 
as the daughter companies both desire as much independence as possible within this 
organisational structure. Linkages also extend to their ownership structure, with all of 
the companies of the Rukopis Strojimy group ultimately owned by Obchodni Cesta, a 
company based in Prague that has a 78% ownership stake in Rukopis Strojimy. 
Additionally, Rukopis Strojimy owns 42% of the shares of Presnost KM.
1.2.2 Cisar.
Cisar is one of a number of large employers in Petrov. Established to produce for the 
defence sector, it has undergone a number of shifts in its primary production from this 
to agricultural machinery and office equipment. Production now centres on fulfilling
16 Company names and locations have been changed to protect confidentiality and uphold this agreed 
condition of access.
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commercial defence and security contracts. Cisaf had over 70 production locations at 
its peak in the 1930s. Plant closures after privatisation led to a centralisation of 
production at the company’s main plant in Petrov, although much of this remains 
unoccupied and unused, and its workforce has now shrunk to around 1,230. Very 
little investment has been made into physical capital at the plant, with most of the 
production machinery around 30 years old and the buildings between 70 and 100 
years old. The structure of the workforce is heavily skewed, with the average age of 
employees 58 years, the majority of whom are skilled but narrowly focused
technicians.
Economically, the company is struggling for its continued survival, the combined 
result of disadvantages in the company’s physical and human capital resources and 
the ownership and management strategies in the firm. Following its establishment as 
an independent firm apart from the Cisaf konzern in 1989 and privatisation in 1992, 
the company adopted a new holding structure in July 2000, with each of the four 
production divisions transfonned into wholly-owned subsidiaries operating from the 
site in Petrov. This change came following the purchase of the firm by a German 
financial consortium that already owns several other privatised Czech factories 
involved in a variety of manufacturing processes. These structural changes were 
designed to rationalise the economic management of the firm and to decentralise 
decision-making to the particular business area. The effectiveness of this 
restructuring has not yet been quantified within the firm because of the small amount 
of time that has elapsed since its introduction. However, the extent of structural 
difficulties within the firm are potentially so great as to preclude any effective long­
term restructuring.
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1.2.3 Brodchmel.
Brodchmel was also part of the same konzem as Ci'sar until 1983 when it was 
incorporated into an agricultural producers konzern. In 1988 it became an 
independent state-owned enterprise, reverting to its original name that has been 
retained subsequent to privatisation. Producing similar products to CIsar, it differs by 
also manufacturing complementary tools and parts, as well as offering servicing and 
advice on its product range.
Located about 50 km away from Petrov in a predominately rural region, Brodchmel is 
one of two dominant employers in its locality. Consequently it is very tightly linked 
to the local community, both as an employer, and through the provision of cultural 
and social services to the local population. The closure in the early 1990s of two of 
its three plants in the town had a devastating effect on employment in the region, 
which was already above average because of limited alternative employment 
opportunities in other industries or agriculture. Changing from state to private 
financing of the firm has also resulted in a reduction of company sponsorship for 
community activities. That this has contributed to a worsening relationship between 
the enterprise and the local community is felt strongly by employees at all levels in 
the corporate hierarchy.
Over 70% of the firm’s shares are held by 13 investment privatisation funds (IPFs), 
but only two of these have holdings in excess of 10%. Nonetheless, these are clearly 
definable owners, and so the management is limited in its ability to exercise de facto 
control in decision-making. The main problem faced by the firm appears to be
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barriers to communication between the owners, management and employees that 
significantly hinder effective restructuring.
1.2.4 Drazitest.
Drazitest is the smallest company in the study, employing around 179 people, 
although it was formerly the core of a state-owned enterprise bearing the same name 
and with over 1,000 employees. Its business area is exploration and construction 
engineering. Drazitest is located on the outskirts of Petrov, and was historically the 
largest employer in the district. Upon privatisation, the Drazitest state-owned 
enterprise was divided into five separate companies along the lines of the five main, 
but distinct, business functions of the company. Today Drazitest occupies only the 
main building of the original plant and other small industries have been established in 
the vicinity, so Drazitest has lost some its dominance in the locality. Previously a 
monopoly in Moravia, it now has to compete for contracts against a number of 
smaller firms offering similar services throughout the Czech Republic. Many of these 
competitors were established by former employees of Drazitest.
Drazitest was the only part of the former Drazitest state-owned enterprise to be 
privatised by voucher. Most of the shares of the company were bought by employees, 
primarily in the hands of three directors, each with 14%. One investment 
privatisation fund has an 18% ownership stake but its practical influence on the 
operation of the firm is negligible. The way in which voucher privatisation has been 
effected in Drazitest, bringing tight co-operation between the owners and employees, 
is viewed very positively throughout the firm.
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1.3 EMBEDDED INSTITUTIONALISM.
According to neo-classical economic theory, compared to state ownership, greater 
efficiency results from private ownership. This is because private owners are 
assumed to have incentives to ensure profit maximisation since they personally bear 
the costs of economic inefficiency. Whilst modelling a frictionless, competitive 
environment may be assumed to provide a close approximation to the economic 
systems in developed market economies, this is not valid for transformational 
economies with underdeveloped institutions. An alternative understanding of how 
privatisation and restructuring processes occur under these conditions therefore needs 
to be developed, which is achieved by this work.
It is argued in this study that ownership does not necessarily correlate with control in 
newly privatised firms in the Czech Republic, and that formal and informal 
institutions interact and determine the outcomes of privatisation and restructuring 
within enterprises. This study demonstrates the influence of these institutions on 
observed restructuring processes, temporally and spatially. Consequently, an 
institutional approach is regarded as more legitimate than a neo-classical economic 
explanation for discerning their existence and impact. The analytical framework 
developed to capture the intertemporal dimension of institutions and their influence 
on restructuring, as well as on the behaviour of the actors introducing restructuring in 
this study, is embedded institutionalism. Formal justification for using embedded 
institutionalism to assess the impact of institutional influences on visible outcomes by 
reference to the interaction between internal company restructuring and the external 
environment that result from voucher privatisation is presented here.
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As no formal institutionalised structure from the previous system could re-assert its 
authority once political change had begun in Central and Eastern Europe, reformers 
faced an institutional tabula rasa11 with regard to tangible structures, but the neo­
classical axiom of an institutional void cannot be assumed. Institutions here are 
defined as “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”,17 8 so any 
attempts to identify Czech approaches to privatisation and restructuring necessitates a 
consideration of the full range of this institutional environment. Institutions in this 
study are not only important in determining and limiting the range of potential 
outcomes. Since they incorporate formal structures, informal behaviour, and 
legitimacy and enforcement aspects,19 in many cases existing institutions will reflect 
their Communist heritage in structure, function, and legitimacy, and so may be 
incompatible with the prevailing conditions.20
The extent of both formal and informal institutions in this study is seen as a constraint 
on restructuring that prevents outcomes as predicted by neo-classical economics from 
occurring. Formal institutional influences should not be neglected, but this study 
suggests that their influence within the transformation environment may be less 
significant than that of informal institutions. Insufficient time has elapsed for the 
emergence of all the necessary ancillary institutions of capitalism, and the absence of
17 Jon Eister, Claus Offe, Ulrich K. Preuss with Frank Boenker, Ulrike Goetting and Friedbert W. 
Rueb, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 25.
18 Douglass C. North, Institutions, p. 1.
19 Douglass C. North, ‘Transaction Costs, Institutions and Economic History’, in The New Institutional 
Economics: A Collection of Articles from the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 
edited by Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter (Tubingen: Mohr, 1991), pp. 203-213, p. 204; Carola 
M. Frege and Andras Toth, ‘Institutions Matter: Union Solidarity in Hungary and East Germany’, 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 37 (1999), 117-140, pp. 117-118.
20 Vaclav Klaus, ‘Monetary Policy in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 1980s and the Nature and 
Problems of the Current Economic Reform’, Communist Economies, 2 (1990), 61-71, p. 67; Irene 
McMaster, Privatisation and Transformation in the Czech Republic J989-1991, Unpublished PhD 
thesis, Department of Government, University of Strathclyde, 2000, p. 131.
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some can preclude the emergence of others.21 A simple imitation of the structures 
existing in the West is unlikely to result in the emergence of an optimal set of 
institutions, but allowing institutions to evolve and become embedded and valid 
within the Czech economy will take time.22 23Whether established de novo or adapted 
from previous institutions, formal structures are liable to only have limited 
effectiveness in the initial transformation period because of incongruence with their 
surroundings. Even when institutions exist, ensuring that they function effectively 
is also an issue to be resolved,24 for
[m]any Czech institutions looked like their market economy counterparts, but 
they do not operate in the same way. Institutional effectiveness in a market 
economy depends not only on the institutions themselves but also on their
interactions with the business environment and their know-how. Flaws in the
operation of financial institutions, capital markets, and the legal system visited 
hardships on many Czech companies and made their process of change more 
difficult.25
21 Richard R. Nelson, ‘Recent Evolutionary Theorizing About Economic Change’, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 33 (1995), 48-90, p. 82; Claus Offe, ‘Designing Institutions in East European 
Transitions’ in The Theory of Institutional Design, edited by Robert E. Goodin (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), pp. 199-226, pp. 216,217.
22 J. Mencinger, ‘Lessons from the Transition Process’, Empirica, 20 (1993), 189-204, p. 199; Mark 
Casson, ‘Enterprise Culture and Institutional Change in Eastern Europe’, in The Economies of Change 
in East and Central Europe: Its Impact on International Business, edited by Peter J. Buckley and 
Pervez N. Ghawi (London: Academic Press, 1994), pp. 33-53, p. 51; Roman Frydman and Andrzej 
Rapaczynski, Privatization in Eastern Europe: Is the State Withering Away?, (Budapest: Central 
European University Press, 1994), pp. 64-65.
23 Jan Winiecki, Political Economy of Reform and Change: A Case of Eastern Europe (New York: 
Nova Science, 1997), p. 130.
24 Hans J. Blommestein, Rainer Geiger and Paul G. Hare, ‘Privatising Large Enterprises: Overview of 
the Issues and Case Studies’, in Methods of Privatising Large Enterprises (Paris: OECD/CCEET, 
1993), 11-37, p. 20; Jozef M. van Brabant, The Political Economy of Transition: Coming to Grips with 
History and Methodology (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 250; Anderson Consulting, Reconnecting 
Europe: Towards a Common Future (1999). 4 August 2000.
<http://www.ac.com/ideas/perspect/showjp6r2sect5.html>, [n.p.].
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Informal institutions are therefore important as these can determine acceptable norms 
and standards of behaviour, and as a result influence the nature of formal institutions 
that will emerge in time.25 6 Privatisation, through the changes it implies in ownership 
and control structures, should be a strong institutional catalyst to organisational 
restructuring, yet precisely because those with the ability to effect change may also be 
those with the strongest interests to perpetuate the former system, inertia may arise 
within the emerging system.27 In keeping with current work on institutionalism, it is 
contended in this thesis that understanding restructuring demands a consideration of 
intangible factors such as the networks of power and influence that were developed 
under the old regime to circumvent some of the idiosyncrasies of the planned 
economy and how these remain influential and can be mobilised in the current time.28 
Behavioural patterns are “sticky” in the pace at which they can change because they 
are path-dependent, and also self-reinforcing, so this problem cannot be overcome 
simply by the passage of time. The entire culture in which individuals operate needs
25 Karen L. Newman and Stanley D. Nollen, Managing Radical Organizational Change (Thousand 
Oaks: Sage, 1998), p. 22.
26 Jens Blom-Hansen, ‘A ‘New Institutional’ Perspective on Policy Networks’, Public Administration, 
75 (1997), 669-693, p. 682; Martin Raiser, Informal Institutions, Social Capital and Economic 
Transition: Reflections on a Neglected Dimension, Working Paper 25 (London: EBRD, 1997), p. 1. 
Akos Rona-Tas and JozsefBorocz, The Formation of New Business Elites in Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland: Continuity and Change, Pre-Communist and Communist Legacies, 
Working Paper (San Diego: Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University 
of California, 1999), [n.p.].
27 Arthur L. Stinchcombe, ‘Social Structure and Organizations’, in Handbook of Organizations, edited 
by James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 142-193, p. 161; Stewart Ranson, Bob 
Hinings and Royston Greenwood, ‘The Structuring of Organizational Structures’, Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 25 (1980), 1-17, p. 7; Roman Frydman and Andrzej Rapaczynski, Privatization and 
Corporate Governace in Eastern Europe: Can a Market Economy be Designed?, Economic Research 
Reports, 52, C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics (New York: Department of Economics, New 
York University, 1991), p. 29; North, Institutions, p. 68.
28 Jan Winiecki ‘Obstacles to Economic Reform of Socialism: A Property Rights Approach’, Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 50 (Special Issue) (1990), 65-71, p. 65; Gemot 
Grabher and David Stark, ‘Organizing Diversity: Evolutionary Theory, Network Analysis, and Post­
socialism’, \x\. Restructuring Networks in Post-Socialism: Legacies, Linkages and Localities, edited by 
Gemot Grabher and David Stark (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 1-32, p. 8; Avner Greif, 
‘Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on 
Collectivist and Individualist Societies’, in The New Institutionalism in Sociology, edited by Mary C. 
Brinton and Victor Nee (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998), pp. 77-104, p. 79.
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to be altered in former socialist countries,29 with profound changes in institutions as 
well as regulation and behavioural patterns required.30
To provide a more accurate model of restructuring processes and the motivation 
driving change, embedded institutionalism has to overcome the limitations of neo­
classical economic models by considering institutional influences on behaviour. 
Neither the homo-economicus model from an economic institutionalism approach 
where individuals are assumed to act only in the pursuit of rational self-interest, or 
sociological institutionalism that conceives individuals acting as homo sociologicus 
with reference to culturally determined norms,31 are taken in this work to be 
appropriate conceptualisations of the behaviour of actors involved in post­
privatisation restructuring in Czech firms. Instead, convergence between these is 
sought by incorporating aspects of both perspectives. Following emerging 
institutionalism approaches, individuals are understood to act as homo socio- 
economicus, responding to both economic and social influences when taking 
decisions.32 In this study, therefore, no institutional influences are a priori perceived 
to have greater legitimacy in explaining given outcomes, with all of the impressions
29 Andrzej K. Kozminski, Catching Up? Organizational and Management Change in the Ex-Socialist 
Block (Albany: State University of New York, 1993), pp. 2,148; A. D. Jankowicz, ‘The New Journey 
to Jerusalem: Mission and Meaning in the Managerial Crusade to Eastern Europe’, Organization 
Studies, 15 (1994), 479-507, p. 483; Douglass C. North, Contribution of the New Institutional 
Economics, p. 17; Ed Clark and Anna Soulsby, Organizational Change in Post-Communist Europe. 
Management and Transformation in the Czech Republic (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 178; Rona-Tas 
and Borocz, Formation of New Business Elites, [n.p.].
30 Vaclav Klaus, Renaissance: The Rebirth of Liberty in the Heart of Europe (Washington: Cato 
Institute, 1997), p. 9; Demetrius S. Iatridis, ‘A Global Approach to Privatization’, in Privatization in 
Central and Eastern Europe: Perspectives and Approaches, edited by Demetrius S. Iatridis and June 
Gary Hopps (Westport: Praeger, 1998), pp. 3-25, p. 16; Marketa Sumpikova, ‘Vlastnictvi a Vykon 
Vlastnickych Prav a Povinnosti’, Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, 5 (5) (1997), 25-52, pp. 31, 32.
31 Blom-Hansen, ‘A ‘New Institutional’ Perspective’, p. 674.
32 Siegwart Lindenberg, ‘A New Push in the Theory of Organization: A Commentary on O. E. 
Williamson’s Comparison of Alternative Approaches to Economic Organization’, in The New 
Institutional Economics: A Collection of Articles from the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics, edited by Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter (Tubingen: Mohr, 1991), pp. 115-123, pp. 
116,117,127.
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and experiences of respondents assumed to be potentially influential on change. The 
embedded institutionalism approach consequently accounts for the impact of 
stochastic processes that do not have predictable influences on policy decisions and 
outcomes because of its inclusiveness regarding the source and influence of
institutions.
Understanding privatisation and restructuring in enterprises now occurring has to refer 
to the country’s past history as well as the contemporary environment, since both 
determine the conditions under which changes occur, impinging upon the policies 
implemented and on their outcomes.33 4 This necessitates an approach that accounts for 
the current observed outcomes as a product of complex and interconnected actions 
from the past and present. For assessing privatisation, this involves placing visible 
restructuring processes within enterprises as central and reflecting organisational 
reality, and from this, attempting to isolate the influences and motives that have 
resulted in these outcomes. Embedded institutionalism in this work gives primacy to 
path-dependency and embeddedness in understanding institutional influences, 
explaining both inertia and dynamism in organisational structures by differentiating 
institutional influences over time and space.35
33 Paul A. David, ‘Clio and the Economics of QWERTY’, American Economic Review, 75 (2) (1985), 
332-337, p. 332.
34 Michael W. Peng, Business Strategies in Transition Economies (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2000), pp.
14, 16.
35 Mark Granovetter, ‘Economic Actors and Social Structures: The Problem of Embeddedness’, 
American Journal of Sociology, 3 (1985), 481-510, p. 490; Gemot Grabher, ‘Rediscovering the Social 
in the Economics of Interfirm Networks’, in The Embedded Firm: On the Socio-Economics of 
Industrial Networks, edited by Gemot Grabher (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 1-31, p. 4; Anna 
Grandori and Guiseppe Soda, ‘Inter-firm Networks: Antecedents, Mechanisms and Forms’, 
Organization Studies, 16 (1995), 183-214, pp. 190-191; Brian Uzzi, ‘Social Structure and Competition 
in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of Embeddedness’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 42 (1997), 
35-67, pp. 35, 36.
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1.3.1 Path-dependency and Embeddedness.
“Path-dependency” refers to the idea that previously learned behaviour and historical 
experiences may influence, either positively or negatively, choices made in the 
present, as well as setting reforms on a trajectory that becomes increasingly difficult 
to alter as interests converge around a given reality.36 Institutionalism perspectives 
revolve around path-dependency since “[tjoday’s “institutions” almost always show 
strong connections with yesterday’s, and often those of a century ago, or earlier”.37 
Nonetheless, a pitfall that should be avoided with path-dependency is that of placing 
an incorrect weight on the role of history in analysis, for it is not a straightforward 
deterministic concept that dictates a certain finishing point because of the existence of 
specific conditions. Additionally, legacies from more recent periods do not 
necessarily impinge upon and condition economic and political thought in the 
immediate post-Communist period more intensely than earlier historical legacies as
[t]here is much remaining in Eastern Europe of political traditions dating from 
the interwar period and earlier, including elements of authoritarianism, 
bureaucratic dominance and intense nationalism [and] these countercultures had 
by the mid-1980s achieved an impressive degree of autonomy.38
36 Douglass C. North, ‘A Transaction Cost Approach to the Historical Development of Polities and 
Economies’, in The New Institutional Economics: A Collection ofArticles from the Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, edited by Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter (Tubingen: 
Mohr, 1991), pp. 253-260, p. 259; David Stark, ‘Path Dependency’, p. 20.
37 Nelson, ‘Recent Evolutionary Theorizing’, p. 82; North similarly expresses this idea. “Institutions 
are a set of rules, compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioural norms designed to 
constrain the behavior of individuals in the interests of maximizing the wealth or utility of principals ... 
[and though] ... some constraints are common to all societies ... others are specific to the interests of 
principals in different contextual settings.” Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic 
History (New York: Norton, 1981), pp. 201-202, 203.
30
Moving from central planning to a market economy is not “ replacing the state- 
centred model with a society-centred approach”,38 9 but rather is “a complex reworking 
of old social relations in the light of distinct processes ... to construct a form of 
capitalism on and with the ruins of the communist system”.40 Understanding the shift 
from central planning to a market economy necessitates consideration of the socio­
cultural environment, and not just visible economic and political obstacles that have 
to be surmounted.41 There are “differing paths of extrication from state socialism that 
shape the possibilities of transformation in the subsequent stage”.42 Consequently, 
path-dependency needs to be incorporated into an explanation of the design, 
implementation and outcome of policies of transformation because these build upon 
the resources remaining from the old system.
Explaining restructuring processes in Czech privatised enterprises requires a path- 
dependent element to be incorporated because multiple legacies with intertemporal 
aspects exist that influence restructuring strategies at the enterprise level.43 To 
account for path-dependency in enterprise restructuring, the conditions prevailing 
before privatisation and restructuring occur need to be identified to facilitate an 
appreciation of the nature of change according to the motives and factors contributing
38 Thomas A. Baylis, The West and Eastern Europe: Economic Statecraft and Political Change, 
Twentieth Century Fund Book (Westport: Praeger, 1994), p. 19.
39 Kazimierz Z. Poznanski, Poland’s Protracted Transition: Institutional Change and Economic 
Growth 1970-1994 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 77.
40 Adrian Smith and John Pickles, ‘Introduction: Theorising Transition and the Political Economy of 
the Transformation’, in Theorising Transition: The Political Economy of Post-Communist 
Transformations edited by John Pickles and Adrian Smith (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 1-22, p. 2.
41 Edmund Mokrzycki, ‘Eastern Europe After Communism’, Telos, 90 (1991), 129-136. Academic 
Search Elite. EBSCO Publishing. 8 May 1999. <http://www.global.epnet.com/hosttrial/login.html>, 
[n.p.].
42 Stark, ‘Path Dependency’, p. 20.
43 Karoly Balaton, Management in Different Phases of Organizational Transformation in Hungary, 
International Workshop on Transition and Enterprise Restructuring in Eastern Europe, 20-22 August 
1998 (Copenhagen: CEES/Copenhagen Business School, 1998). 25 September 2000.
<http://www.econ.cbs.dk/cees/institutes/cees/workshop/pdf/Balaton.pdf>, [n.p.].
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to their implementation.44 Accumulated resources will not necessarily be appropriate 
for the new conditions, and the actual and perceived range of available policy choices 
may now be limited because of decisions taken in the past or prevailing conditions.45 
Former elites will be instrumental in implementing and participating in the 
transformation, and this can be problematic if it reduces the perceived legitimacy of 
the reform measures or restricts the effectiveness of measures implemented, because 
previous behavioural patterns persist and are not superseded or re-leamt.
Historical contexts are partially responsible for contemporary outcomes as well as 
helping to determine the potential range of future choices.46 As a corollary, the 
contemporary environment generates institutional influences that can modify and 
negate these influences, as well as creating new incentives and patterns of behaviour, 
as explained by embeddedness. The concept of embeddedness employed here extends 
Polanyi’s expression of this47 by having a path-dependent and contemporary aspect.
In this study, because the contemporary external environment, as well as the character 
of actors undertaking restructuring influence the nature and effects of restructuring in 
privatising enterprises, embeddedness is understood to comprise “structural” as well
44 Dallago, ‘Between Spontaneity’, pp. 76-77; Peng, Business Strategies, pp. 14-16.
45 David F. Good, ‘The Economic Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe in Historical 
Perspective’, in Economic Transformation in East and Central Europe: Legacies from the Past and 
Policies for the Future, edited by David F. Good (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 3-24, p. 4; North, 
Institutions, pp. 6, 99; Dallago, ‘Between Spontaneity’, pp. 73-74, 83.
46 Grabher, ‘Rediscovering the Social’, pp. 1-31, pp. 4-5; Peng, Business Strategies, pp. 14,16.
47 “The market pattern [...] is capable of creating a specific institution, namely, the market. Ultimately, 
that is why the control of the economic system by the market is of overwhelming consequence to the 
whole organization of society: it means no less than the running of society as an adjunct to the market. 
Instead of economy being embedded in social relations social relations are embedded in the economic 
system. The vital importance of the economic factor to the existence of society precludes any other 
result. For once the economic systems is organized in separate institutions, based on specific motives 
and conferring a special status, society must be shaped in such a manner as to allow that system to 
function according to its own laws. This is the meaning of the familiar assertion that a market 
economy can function only in a market society.” Polanyi, The Great Transformation, p. 57.
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as “interpersonal” aspects.48 “Interpersonal” embeddedness refers to how the 
behaviour and expectations of individual actors links enterprises with their 
surroundings and history. “Structural” embeddedness considers how organisations 
reflect their institutional environment in their formal structures after privatisation, as 
well as the influence of institutions on the extent of change and feasible restructuring 
measures that can be introduced. There is considerable overlap between these aspects 
of institutions though, since their influences are not fully divisible,49 so a formal 
distinction between these aspects is not made in the discussion of embeddedness in 
the following chapters.
Despite former state-owned enterprises having operated under similar historical 
conditions and now sharing the same macro-economic and political environments, 
considerable diversity is observed in the restructuring processes of Czech firms. 
Embedded institutionalism explains this diversity by using the perspective of 
institutionalism that focuses on the particular linkages a firm develops in this shared 
institutional environment.50 As enterprise restructuring is understood as one element 
within the overall post-communist economic reform process, the use of embedded 
institutionalism to evaluate enterprise restructuring has implications for how these 
wider economic changes are understood. Path-dependency and embeddedness 
influence the trajectory of reform because there are institutional influences on the 
component parts. This dictates the need to conceptualise each of these processes in a
48 Richard Whitley, ‘The Internationalization of Firms and Markets: Its Significance and Institutional 
Structuring’, Organization, 1 (1994), 101-124, p. 109.
49 North, ‘Transaction Costs’, p. 204; Frege and T6th, ‘Institutions Matter’, pp. 117-118.
50 Vedat Milor, ‘Changing Political Economies: An Introduction’, in Changing Political Economies: 
Privatization in Post-Communist and Reforming Communist States, edited by Vedat Milor (Boulder: 
Lynne Reinner, 1994), pp. 1-23, p. 17; Royston Greenwood and C. R. Hinings, ‘Understanding Radical 
Organizational Change: Bringing Together the Old and the New Institutionalism’, Academy of 
Management Review, 21 (1996), 1022-1054, pp. 1023, 1025,1026-1027,1032; Gunnar Eliasson,
‘From Plan to Markets’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 34 (1998), 49-68, p. 50.
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comparable manner, so the section below considers which paradigm should be used to 
understand post-communist reform processes.
1.4 TRANSITION OR TRANSFORMATION?
Post-communist reform has increasingly been recognised by policy-makers in the 
region as a multifaceted process, encompassing a number of overlapping areas. 
However, an understanding of the implications of path-dependency and 
embeddedness did not characterise the majority of the policies devised in the initial 
post-communist period. The rejection of socialism was widely thought to be so 
complete that the past would have little bearing on the newly emergent social, 
political, and economic structures.51 The socialist model that failed to deliver 
economic and political systems to rival those premised on capitalist principles was 
rejected in favour of democratic market economies that were seen as the only feasible 
foundation for emerging post-communist societies.52
Guided predominantly by Western institutions and advisors, the new leaders in 
Central and Eastern Europe were encouraged to design and propose blueprints for 
reform in the early months after the collapse of communism when it was not thought 
that the former systems could, or should, be incorporated into the new economic,
51 Jan Adam, ‘Transformation to a Market Economy in the Former Czechoslovakia’, Europe-Asia 
Studies, 45 (1993), 627-645, p. 637; Herman W. Hoen, ‘ “Shock versus Gradualism” in Central Europe 
Reconsidered’, Comparative Economic Studies, 38 (1) (1996), 1-19. Academic Search Elite. EBSCO 
Publishing. 17 June 1999. <http://www.global.epnet.com/hosttriaVlogin.html>, [n.p.]; Rona-Tas and 
Borocz, Formation of New Business Elites, [n.p.].
52 Vaclav Klaus, A Road to Market Economy: Selected Articles, Speeches and Lectures Held Abroad 
(Prague: TOP Agency, 1991), p. 12; Ivan T. Berend, ‘The Collapse of State Socialism: Causes and 
Consequences’, in Economic Transformation in East and Central Europe: Legacies from the Past and 
Policies for the Future, edited by David F. Good (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 75-92, p. 77.
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social, and political structures being developed.53 Assigning property rights and 
transferring formerly state-owned property to the private sector through privatisation 
was to be the means by which new economic opportunities were to be realised.54 
Following a transitory period of initial adjustment, it was suggested that the whole 
process would take two to three years, with price and trade liberalisation, currency 
convertibility, removal of subsidies, and privatisation bringing market-driven growth 
in the future.55 This exemplifies the “transition paradigm” that assumes the end-point 
of the transition is not influenced by historical events but is fixed, or at least 
definable, so that divergences from the required reform trajectory can be measured 
and corrected.56
In reality, the time required for implementing reform policies and for their effects to 
be seen has taken much longer than the transition approach suggested, with numerous 
unanticipated outcomes.57 Looking at the failed attempts to impose paradigms of
53 This approach is epitomised in the Balcerowicz Plan in Poland. The perspective of the chief external 
advisor on this programme is given in Jeffrey Sachs, Poland’s Jump to the Market Economy 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994).
54 Barrie Stevens, ‘Prospects for Privatisation in OECD Countries’, National Westminster Quarterly 
Review, August 1992, 2-22, p. 12; Barbara Fakin, Financial Institutions, Enterprise Investment 
Behaviour and Industrial Restructuring in Transition Economies, Working Paper, 44 (Leuven: LICOS 
Centre for Transition Economics, 1995), p. 7; Andrzej Wojtyna and Jerzy Hausner, ‘Privatization as a 
Restructuring Device: Can it Substitute for Industrial Policy in the Transforming Economies? Some 
Lessons from Poland’, Journal of Socio-Economics, 22 (4) (1993), 417-443. Academic Search Elite. 
EBSCO Publishing. 22 June 1999. <http://www.global.epnet.com/hosttrial/login.html>, [n.p.].
55 Valtr Komarek, ‘Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: A New Approach’, in Economic
Transformation in Central Europe: A Progress Report, edited by Richard Portes (London: CEPR, 
1993), pp. 58-106, p. 62; Lajos H6thy, ‘Central and Eastern Europe: Economic Transformation, Social 
Cohesion and Social Dialogue’, in Economic Developments and Reforms in Cooperation Partner 
Countries: The Social and Human Dimension, edited by Reiner Weichardt (Brussels: NATO Economic 
Directorate and Office of Information, 1997), pp. 9-16, p. 9.
56 Stark, ‘Path Dependency’, p. 18; John E. Tedstrom, ‘Economic Developments and Reforms in 
Cooperation Partner Countries: The Social and Human Dimensions’, in Economic Developments and 
Reforms in Cooperation Partner Countries: The Social and Human Dimension, edited by Reiner 
Weichardt (Brussels: NATO Economic Directorate and Office of Information, 1997), pp. 313-316, p. 
313; Akos Rona-Tas, ‘Path-Dependence and Capital Theory: Sociology of the Post-Communist 
Economic Transformation’, East European Politics and Societies, 12 (1998), 107-131, p. 116.
57 Mokrzycki, ‘Eastern Europe’, [n.p.]; Sharon L. Wolchik, ‘The Politics of Transition in Central 
Europe’, Problems of Post-Communism, 42 (1) (1995), 35-40. Academic Search Elite. EBSCO 
Publishing. 8 May 1999. <http://www.global.epnet.com/hostfrial/login.html>, [n.p.]; Daniel Daianu, 
‘Judging Romania’s Way in a Comparative Framework’, in Economic Developments and Reforms in
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transition in Central and Eastern Europe shows the validity of considering the past 
histories of countries in transformation in policy design and implementation. The 
initially optimistic projections for rapidly constructing functioning market economies 
that would mirror those of Western Europe showed theory and practice to be 
incongruent. Transition reformers accepted that institutions take time to build and 
function, but by stressing the withdrawal of bureaucratic control over the economy to 
enable market forces to act, implicitly embodied an incorrect expectation that the 
market could, in an embryonic form, function before institutions were consolidated.58
By contrast is the “transformation paradigm” that recognises that there is a need for 
change but that such reforms do not have an agreed or definable end point, and 
account for past events as well as the contemporary setting in all spheres of change.59 
The literature on transformation stems from an awareness that no single transition 
blueprint can exist as all countries face unique conditions and difficulties in 
undertaking change.60 Adaptations to the actually existing conditions have to be 
made to policy instruments if successful reforms are to occur.61 There is only a vague 
understanding of what a market economy in these countries will or should look like 
once it has been achieved. Since the trajectory of reform changes occurring in Central 
and Eastern Europe is seen to incorporate path-dependent and embeddedness aspects, 
the term “transformation” is adopted in this work in preference to “transition”. This 
acknowledges that there are differences between both perspectives, whilst also
Cooperation Partner Countries: The Social and Human Dimension, edited by Reiner Weichardt 
(Brussels: NATO Economic Directorate and Office of Information, 1997), pp. 241-260, p. 243.
58 Sachs, Poland’s Jump, p. xiii; Daianu, ‘Judging Romania’s Way’, p. 246.
59 Tedstrom, ‘Economic Developments’, p. 313; Rona-Tas, ‘Path-Dependence’, p. 116.
60 Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: In A Letter Intended to Have Been Sent to 
a Gentleman in Warsaw 1990 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1990), p. 60; Stephen E. Hanson, 
‘Analyzing Post-Communist Economic Change: A Review Essay’, East European Politics and 
Societies, 12 (1998), 145-170, p. 167.
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representing an appreciation that the transformation paradigm offers a more accurate 
description of the process in the Czech Republic. This is because accounting for the 
social and political setting in which economic change occurs allows a meaningful 
understanding of the changes underway and the best ways for them to be achieved.61 2
In rhetoric at least, Klaus understood the validity and necessity of a transformation 
rather than a transition perspective on the reform process, likening the economic 
reform process in the Czech Republic to a game of chess where “[o]ne simply has to 
know how to play. One cannot know in advance the position on the chessboard after 
White’s 26th move.”63 Subsequently he recognised that the reforms do not occur 
within a vacuum, but instead are constrained by, and must adapt to, legacies of the 
past, stating that
we cannot isolate the present from history. For all our preoccupation with the 
difficult transformation tasks and challenges, it would be wrong and misleading 
to interpret our situation as a total discontinuity. ... We should neither 
demonize nor trivialize nor belittle [the past].64
Of direct relevance to this work is whether Klaus understood or responded to the 
implications of this distinction in the design of the privatisation programme. Klaus 
desired the re-creation of a market economy to help overcome the negative economic
61 Ed Clark, ‘The Role of Social Capital in Developing Czech Private Business’, Work, Employment 
and Society, 14 (2000), 439-458, p. 440.
62 Herman W. Hoen, The Transformation of Economic Systems in Central Europe (Cheltenham: Elgar, 
1998), pp. 19-20.
63 Klaus, ‘Transition’, p. 75.
64 Klaus, Renaissance, p. 34.
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legacies of the Communist economic model,65 but the influence of institutions that is 
critical in determining the outcomes appears to have been underestimated. The 
institutional environment prevented the privatisation programme generating the 
outcomes predicted by neo-classical economic theory that had provided the 
inspiration for Klaus’ approach. Neo-classical expectations for privatisation and 
restructuring outcomes in transformational economies are shown in this thesis to be 
fundamentally flawed. This is because its premises are inappropriate because they do 
not take sufficient account of the presence and effects of institutions, which can be 
non-economic and have a temporal impact on currently observed outcomes.
If former state-owned enterprises are to be restructured so that they can operate 
efficiently apart from the centrally planned economy, institutional changes are 
needed. The most significant change for the Czech Republic, as discussed in this 
work, is the privatisation programme, being a formalised change in the institutional 
environment and a catalyst to future institutional development as the transformation 
progresses.66 However, before looking at the appropriateness of privatisation in 
catalysing transformation overall, the following chapter presents a historical review of 
the development of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic to demonstrate the 
institutional context of the path-dependent and embedded aspects of the 
transformation from central planning to a market economy.
65 Vaclav Klaus, Ceska Cesta, p. 134.
66 Milonas, Mass Privatization Methods, p. 7.
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CHAPTER TWO
ESTABLISHMENT TO TRANSFORMATION
Communist rule in Czechoslovakia introduced central planning to the economy, 
representing a shift away from economic organisation according to market forces as 
had existed since 1918. From 1989 this trend began to be reversed with the collapse 
of the Communist regime and the election of a new government committed to 
establishing a democratic political and market economic system in its place. The 
formal dismantling of the previous system however is not the only necessary change 
for a successful transformation since informal and enforcement aspects of institutions 
persist over time and dictate the actual restructuring outcomes that occur. After 1989, 
reformers perceived communism to have been an aberration in the country’s 
development, with transformation offering an opportunity to “return to Europe”, but 
an institutional approach highlights the difficulty of achieving this because 
institutional influences preclude frictionless change. This chapter therefore considers 
the historical developments of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic to identify 
enduring institutional influences in the current transformation environment.
As discussed in the previous chapter, this thesis does not regard it possible to 
understand observed post-privatisation restructuring in enterprises without reference 
to historical legacies that are a combination of myth and reality, as well as institutions 
in the contemporary environment. Despite Klaus having claimed similarities in the 
transformation process with that of other post-communist countries,1 seeking a Czech
1 Vaclav Klaus, ‘Main Obstacles to Rapid Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe: The 
Czechoslovak View’, in Towards a Market Economy in Central and Eastern Europe, edited by Hebert
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solution to transformation is shown to have a historical precedent in the
“Czechoslovak way to socialism” of Benes, and Dubcek’s “socialism with a human 
face”.2 This historical review therefore contextualises the discussion of institutional 
influences on restructuring in the current transformation. It also highlights the source 
of institutional influences that are specific to the Czech transformation, and that 
generate different empirical outcomes here compared to other countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe. This strengthens the justification for, and position of, embedded
institutionalism taken in this work that holds that there is not a distinctive Czech
paradigm of transformation, but only the rational response of firms and actors to their
institutional environment.
In the first section below, an overarching description of the characteristics that relate 
to the emergence of Czechoslovakia and distinguish it from other countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe is given. This is then followed by the more detailed chronology 
of institutional influences in the pre-Communist and Communist periods that endure 
and can shape the current reform trajectory and policy outcomes because of the 
expectations and limits to change they generate. In the final section, the institutional 
nature of the post-communist transformation is presented. This chapter thus provides 
a foundation for understanding the institutional conditions to which privatisation in 
the Czech Republic had to respond and the institutional influences promoting 
observable restructuring outcomes that is discussed in the remaining chapters.
Giersch (Berlin: Springer-Verlag/Egon-Sohmen Foundation, 1991), pp. 77-91, pp. 85-87; Vaclav 
Klaus, Renaissance: The Rebirth of Liberty in the Heart of Europe (Washington: Cato Institute, 1997), 
p. 134.
* Alice Teichova, The Czechoslovak Economy: 1914-1918 (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 91-92.
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2.1 THE CZECH REPUBLIC: A UNIQUE LEGACY.
The events of 1989 and the transformation that began in the aftermath of the Velvet 
Revolution were without precedent, yet some inverted parallels can be drawn with the 
introduction of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia in the 1940s. This had path- 
dependent and embedded aspects, with the interwar period in particular directly 
impacting upon the adoption and implementation of the socialist model. Most notable 
was Czechoslovakia’s earlier commitment to democratic politics and its political and 
economic structures being comparable to those of developed countries of Western 
Europe until 1938. This intensified the impact of changes brought by the Soviet 
model because of its inherently contradictory nature in comparison to the country’s 
democratic traditions.3
Czechoslovakia in the 1940s represents the sole incidence of Communist rule having 
been introduced by some form of democratic elections in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Finding some resonance with the ideals of the population at the time, only after the 
1968 Soviet invasion did popular perception change to regard this as a foreign 
occupation.4 Amongst the satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe, 
Czechoslovakia was one of the closest adherents to the political and economic 
policies of the Soviet Union, with these links persisting in some form until the 
collapse of the Soviet bloc.5 Outside of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia was the
3 Sharon L. Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition: Politics, Economics and Society (London: 
RIIA/Pinter, 1991), p. 21.
4 Jiri Brodsky, ‘Little Czechs, Big Europe’, Central Europe Review, 2 (20) 22 May 2000. 26 May 
2001. <http://www.ce-review.org/00/20/brodsky20.html>, [n.p.].
5 Bijan B. Agheuli, Eduardo Borensztein and Tessa van der Willigen, Stabilisation and Structural 
Reform in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: First Stage, Occasional Paper: 92 (Washington: 
IMF, 1992), p. 1; Carol SkalnikLeff, The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation versus State (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1997), p. 63-64; Ivan T. Berend, Central and Eastern Europe 1944-1993: Detour 
from the Periphery to the Periphery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 146.
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first country of the socialist bloc to receive the designation “socialist”, reflected in the 
changes to the Constitution in 1960. This was at the cost of declining living standards 
and a subsequent stagnation of economic growth in the early 1960s as the first 
manifestation of the failing of this model as an economic development strategy here.6 
Nevertheless, Czechoslovakia maintained the advantages of its initial starting 
conditions throughout its Communist existence, with one of the highest recorded GNP 
rates amongst all the socialist bloc countries until 1989.7 The industrial legacy of a 
pre-war market economy based on capitalist principles in 1989 positively shaped the 
expectations of reformers and the wider population that re-introducing a market 
economy would be less problematic here than elsewhere in Central and Eastern 
Europe because of this precedent.8
To show the significance of path-dependency and embeddedness in the current 
transformation, the Czech Republic’s economic and political history is presented, with 
particular reference to major reform periods. Considering the country’s development 
from its formation as a sovereign state in 1918 until the post-Communist reform 
period encapsulates legacies of the pre-Communist and Communist pasts as well as 
contemporary conditions, without negating any important influences. Not only is the 
physical institutional legacy of the old order important, but also the inherited “norms” 
and behavioural patterns that appear entrenched.9 Accordingly, attention is given to 
macro-level conditions in social, political, and economic spheres as well as micro­
6 Rick Fawn, Czech Republic: A Nation of Velvet, Postcommunist States and Nations (Amsterdam: 
Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000), pp. 17, 18.
7 Leff, Czech and Slovak Republics, pp. 135, 136; Fawn, Czech Republic, p. 3.
8 V&clav Klaus and Tom&§ Jezek, ‘Social Criticism, False Liberalism and Recent Changes in 
Czechoslovakia’, East European Politics and Societies, 5 (1991), 26-40, pp. 30,37-39; Jan Svenjar, 
‘Introduction and Overview’, in The Czech Republic and Economic Transition in Eastern Europe, 
edited by Jan Svenjar (San Diego: Academic Press, 1995), pp. 1-19, pp. 2-3.
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level factors in reform strategies such as individual rent-seeking behaviour and firm- 
level interactions.9 10 From a position of accepting the framework of embedded 
institutionalism, this work adopts an inclusive approach that identifies the three 
dimensions of institutions; formal, informal and enforcement, and their potential 
impact on decision-making and policy outcomes by either constraining or catalysing 
change.
2.2 PRE-COMMUNIST RULE.
2.2.1 The First Czechoslovak Republic: 1918-1938.
Whilst a unique type of reform is embodied in system creation, the First Republic 
remains the historical benchmark for a functioning capitalist economy in the Czech 
Republic, with respondents in the case study firms proudly referring to this heritage, 
and supposed inherent Czech ability to embrace such a system. The pre-Communist 
heritage made Czechoslovakia more favourably placed to sustain a democratic 
tradition than its Central and Eastern European neighbours in the inter-war years. 
There was a well-stratified class structure, educated population with some experience 
of group action and self-government, a tradition of egalitarianism and commitment to 
liberal values, and leaders sharing these values who were able to motivate the 
population.11 Constitutionally, a democratic state with private ownership of industry
9 Jon Elster, Claus Offe, Ulrich K. Preuss with Frank Boenker, Ulrike Goetting and Friedbert W. Rueb, 
Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p. 18.
10 Paul Aligica, ‘The Institutionalists’ Take on Transition’, Transition, 3 (4) (1997), 46-49, p. 47.
11 Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, pp. 3-5.
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and banks was secured in 1920.12 This ensured a degree of economic independence, 
but did not preclude a leading role for the government in guiding economic 
decisions.13 The new government as a social democratic coalition had a strong focus 
on developing and extending social security provisions.14 The bureaucracy was 
efficient and non-corrupt,15 with an inherited social security system that had been 
designed to support the industrial working class of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
contributing to social stability in the Czech Lands especially.16 These factors were all 
beneficial to the country’s economic development during this period. Now they are 
important because they can generate expectations amongst the population that the 
state has an obligation to intervene in the economic system, even where the economic 
situation belies this.17
Overall, the period from 1918 to 1937 saw economic consolidation during an era of 
political stability, attributable mainly to the administrative and political traditions 
inherited from the Habsburg Monarchy.18 The industrial sector diversified and 
matured, based on the skeletal but strong infrastructure already in place and supported 
by a liberal foreign trade regime, with 67.3% of Czechoslovakia’s exports in 1937
12 Frantisek Kavka, An Outline of Czechoslovak History (Prague: Orbis, 1960), p. 113; Jan Frait and 
Ramji Tamarappoo, ‘Macroeconomic Stabilisation in the Czech Republic’, in Financial Market 
Restructuring in Selected Central European Countries, edited by Karen S. Vorst and Willadee 
Wehmeyer (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 131-150, pp. 131-132.
13 William V. Wallace, Czechoslovakia (London: Benn, 1977), p. 156.
14 Jaroslav Krejdi, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History (London: Tauris, 1990), p. 
141; Vaclav Prucha, ‘Continuity and Discontinuity in the Economic Development of Czechoslovakia, 
1918-91 in Central Europe in the Twentieth Century: An Economic History Perspective, edited by 
Alice Teichova (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), pp. 23-41, p. 25.
15 R. W. Seton-Watson, 25 Years of Czechoslovakia (London: New Europe, 1945), p. 44.
16 Teichova, Czechoslovak Economy, pp. 78, 79.
17 Leff, Czech and Slovak Republic, p. 200.
18 J F. N. Bradley, Czechoslovakia: A Short History (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971), p. 
153; Zora P. Pryor, ‘Czechoslovak Economic Development in the Interwar Period’, in A History of the 
Czechoslovak Republic 1918-1948, edited by Victor S. Mamatey and Radomir Luza (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 188-215, p. 214; Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries, A History of 
Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 292.
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received by Western industrial nations.19 20The period from 1919 until 1929 was 
characterised by economic strengthening, with the financial sector increasingly 
influential in encouraging investment and assisting the government in extending its 
economic policy. Market forces were an important determinant of enterprises 
prospering or failing in the inter-war years. Although this set a useful precedent, the 
heavily concentrated traditional industries that dominated production in the 
Czechoslovak economy were hit hard by the Depression.21 By contrast, the economic 
authority of the USSR was enhanced by this event since its planned economy did not 
appear to be adversely affected, but even prospering at this time. A legitimisation of 
the USSR economic system in the eyes of Czechoslovak politicians began that 
persisted into the post-war era,22 but conditions in Czechoslovakia were far from 
suitable to the adoption of this model. The growth levels recorded in the USSR, 
notwithstanding the questionable statistical measures and the cost at which any 
growth was achieved, primarily reflected the effects of transforming from an agrarian 
to an industrialised economy.23 The system was economically inefficient and 
unbalanced, and the detrimental effects of this could only be exacerbated if introduced 
into a more advanced economy such as Czechoslovakia that could not draw upon such 
a large reserve of underemployed agricultural labour as the USSR for labour-intensive 
production increases.24
19 Hans Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 21.
20 Kavka, Outline, p. 156.
21 Wallace, Czechoslovakia, p. 184.
22 Alan H. Smith, The Planned Economies of Eastern Europe (London: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 23.
23 The processes involved in this are formalised in structural transformation models such as the Lewis 
model. Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development, 5th edition (Harlow: Longman, 1994), pp. 74-77.
24 Smith, Planned Economies, p. 20; Jiff Kosta, ‘The Czechoslovak Economic Reform of the 1960s’, in 
Czechoslovakia: Crossroads and Crises 1918-88, edited by Norman Stone and Eduard Strouhal 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 231-252, p. 233.
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2.2.2 From the Second Republic to Post-War Democracy: 1938-1948.
The first rupture in the Czechoslovak state followed its territorial division under the 
Munich Agreement of 1938, and the creation of the Second Czechoslovak Republic. 
Slovakia was subsequently given independence and Bohemia and Moravia made a 
German protectorate from 1939 until 1945. When reconstituted as a united state, the 
Third Czechoslovak Republic had newly redrawn boundaries to reflect the 
geopolitical division of power in the aftermath of the Second World War.
The immediate post-war period until 1948 represented an experiment with new forms 
of economic and political organisation that in principle is mirrored in the aims of the 
transformation policies of the Czech governments since 1989. There was a 
continuation of the inter-war government’s approach to economic and political 
systems in Czechoslovakia, but with a stricter emphasis on the role of centralised state 
control over the economy following the difficulties experienced in the First Republic 
during the Great Depression. This was intended to uphold the social democratic 
ideals promulgated by the leaders of Czechoslovakia and to curtail the negative 
impacts of capitalist free markets.25 Benes envisioned a “specific Czechoslovak way 
to socialism”, justified by presumed differences stemming from Czechoslovakia’s 
uniqueness in comparison with other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and
above all the Soviet Union.
In 1945, Czechoslovakia introduced central planning with market elements into a 
highly industrialised economy, and was able to take advantage of a relatively well-
25 Teichova, Czechoslovak Economy, p. 91.
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developed infrastructure, experienced and skilled labour force, and established trade 
relations and business practices.26 Closely linked to, but distinct from 
nationalisation,27 planning was advocated by the government for three reasons.28 
Firstly, the need for structural change and reconstruction after the war necessitated 
public investment to ensure the adequate provision of public goods. Secondly, the 
USSR’s planned economy appeared to have coped with the Great Depression, 
whereas those countries relying on orthodox Keynesian methods of demand-side 
stabilisation suffered adverse distributional effects in national income. Finally, 
equality in income distribution was regarded as a benefit of planning and this was 
seen as best augmented by setting output targets rather than relying solely on the 
profit to motivate firms.
Economic development in the Third Czechoslovak Republic was to be achieved 
through the Kosice Programme. Agreed to by all parties of the National Front,29 it 
comprised three key elements; confiscation of property belonging to Nazi traitors and 
collaborators, state control to be imposed over finance and credit, insurance, natural 
and energy resources and other “key” industries, and planning of the economy.30 The 
KSC did have a strong position within the National Front, but the non-Communists 
did not perceive state control and planning as synonymous. The long-term objective
26 Teichova, Czechoslovak Economy, p. 92.
27 H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1976), p. 850.
28 Jan M. Michal, ‘Postwar Economic Development’, in?l History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918- 
1948, edited by Victor S. Mamatey and Radomir Luza (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 
pp. 428-460, p. 442.
9 The structure of the National Front is significant in the development of the post-war political 
landscape. BeneS, in forming a new government held closely to the ideals of a homogenous society 
and so excluded many of the pre-war organisations as these following exclusively ethnic lines. 
Agreement was reached that only 6 parties would exist and that these should join under the umbrella of 
the National Front. Consequently, even before the KSC formalised single party rule, this existed in 
practice in Czechoslovakia. The creation of the National Front partly legitimised the emergence of a 
single party in 1948.
30 Michal, ‘Postwar Economic Development’, p. 438.
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of the Kosice Programme was not a Soviet-type planned economy, but rather an 
experiment in “democratic socialism”.
The notion of state ownership of property in Czechoslovakia therefore has a longer 
history than the form it took under the Communists. According to the Kosice 
Programme state control was to be achieved through four Nationalisation Decrees.31 
Nationalisation was received favourably because it was felt to be in line with the 
Czechoslovak national consciousness.32 33With both social and economic functions 
including the destruction of the petty bourgeoisie and land policies to achieve social 
justice, there were also costs in terms of the perceived legitimacy of the regime and 
political freedom to be paid for this.34 The result was a mixed economy combining 
public, nationalised and private enterprise forms that were intended to be of equal 
status in the post-war economic system. In reality though, even during the National 
Front years private ownership was being devalued against the preferred socialist 
organisation of enterprises.35 Although “this strange mixture of principles and politics 
need not have doomed the Czechoslovak experiment in democratic socialism” its 
impact is hard to assess because “the three year period of trial was too short”36 and the 
Communists seized power in February 1948, bringing the full adoption of the Soviet 
model of planning. Communist rule in Czechoslovakia then lasted until 1989, but the 
regime’s legitimacy passed through a number of periods of flux, with the 1968 Prague 
Spring its focal point.
31 Michal, ‘Postwar Economic Development’, p. 439.
32 Korbel, Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia, p. 238; Wallace, Czechoslovakia, pp. 259-260.
33 Wallace, Czechoslovakia, pp. 259-260.
34 Korbel, Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia, p. 238.
35 Michal, ‘Postwar Economic Development’, pp. 444-445.
36 Korbel, Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia, p. 241.
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2.3 COMMUNIST RULE: 1948-1989.
The introduction of the Soviet economic model, which defined the economic policy 
framework operating throughout this entire period initiated a rapid change in the 
nature, pace and direction of political and economic reform in Czechoslovakia. 
Between 1945 and 1948, Gottwald had continued to build upon the country’s pre-war 
heritage whilst attempting in principle to adopt the economic system implemented in 
the USSR. Some minor attempts at reform were made during this time reflecting 
the proposed “Czechoslovak way to socialism”, but this was soon dropped after the 
Communists came to power in 1948 in favour of a comprehensive adoption of the 
measures practised in the USSR.37 8 This was manifest principally by the new 
Czechoslovak leaders submitting their foreign and domestic policies to the Soviet 
model, and effectively renouncing the democratic and humanitarian principles that 
had characterised the interwar and immediate post-war periods.39 The 
implementation and outworking of the Soviet model provides insights into the 
mentality infused into the management and workers in state-owned enterprises and 
the experiences they bring to transformation as an informal institution, as well as 
creating formal structures in enterprises and the supporting legislation that also 
persists into the transformation. Parallel hierarchies of political and economic 
influence were implied, but economics was subordinate to politics where these 
interests conflicted. This was the main factor contributing to the need for continual
37 Martin Myant, The Czechoslovak Economy 1948-1988: The Battle for Economic Reform 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 7.
38 Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, pp. 23,26; Korbel, Twentieth-Century 
Czechoslovakia, p. 255; Myant, Czechoslovak Economy, p. 11; Prucha, ‘Continuity and Discontinuity’, 
p. 30.
39 Renner, History of Czechoslovakia, p. 4.
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adaptations and evolutions at all levels in the hierarchy to make the system operate 
more effectively, but that also precludes effective change during this time.
The Soviet economic model was a developmental strategy designed to bring 
industrialisation to underdeveloped regions, and not the indiscriminate application of 
a homogenous series of policies. Its implementation was subject to the constraints of 
the previously existing systems and subsequent adaptations were made in response to 
the prevailing conditions. Given the relatively advanced level of economic 
development that had already been attained in the Czech Lands, if at all appropriate, it 
was more so for Slovakia.40 The Communists in Czechoslovakia therefore had to 
legitimise the introduction of this new economic strategy into a successful market 
economy, and so re-interpreted Czechoslovakia’s history to present the new methods 
as a positive advance for the country.41 One of the aims of the new economic policy 
was to restructure the economy away from mixed ownership into one constituted 
almost exclusively around state or co-operative forms of ownership.42 Although there 
was a historical precedent for state ownership in Czechoslovakia in the Kosice 
programme prior to the KSC assuming power, there were predetermined boundaries 
to state and private ownership.43. Nationalisation under central planning required this 
to be realigned so that it attained priority over all other forms of economic 
organisation in the economic system.44
40 Paul G. Lewis, Central Europe Since 1945, Postwar World (Harlow: Longman, 1994), p. 105; Leff, 
Czech and Slovak Republic, p. 51.
41 Jan Adam, Employment and Wage Policies in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary Since 1950 
(London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 13.
42 Vdclav Prucha, ‘Economic Development and Relations 1918-1989’, in The End of Czechoslovakia 
edited by Jiff Musil (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 40-76, p. 65.
43 Smith, Planned Economies, pp. 25,29.
44 Ben Korda and Ivo Moravcik, ‘Thirty Years of Socialist Economic Development in Czechoslovakia’, 
Canadian Slavonic Papers, 22 (1980), 481-495, p. 481.
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Limitations in the Stalinist model were recognised in Czechoslovakia at an early 
stage.45 It was an inescapable fact that the economic situation was deteriorating as a 
consequence of adopting this model, and in 1963 Czechoslovakia registered a 
negative economic growth rate.46 Stalin’s death was followed by some political 
relaxation in the Soviet leadership, allowing debate in Czechoslovakia over how to 
improve the operation of the model given its failings in that country. This occurred in 
two main waves, the first from 1953 until the Prague Spring in 1968 and the second 
occurring in its aftermath and lasting until transformation began in 1989.47 Described 
below, these reform attempts were path-dependent but also embedded, building 
incrementally on previous measures48 yet with limits prescribed by the prevailing 
political, and to a lesser extent, economic climate.
2.3.1 First Wave Of Reforms: From The 1950s To The Prague Spring,
The culmination of efforts to legitimise Communist rule through shifting political 
conditions in this firs wave was the Prague Spring. Declining economic performance 
as early as 1953 in Czechoslovakia and popular discontent forced a re-orientation of 
economic policy, but even where it was increasingly evident that this was 
inappropriate, successive Five Year Plans showed a consistent application of the 
Stalinist model until 1961.49
45 Lewis, Central Europe, pp. 103-104.
46 Korda and Moravcik, ‘Thirty Years’, p. 483; Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, p. 27; Lewis, 
Central Europe, pp. 103-104, 114.
47 Wladyslaw W. Jermakowicz and Jane Thompson Follis, Reform Cycles in Eastern Europe 1944­
1987. A Comparative Analysis from a Sample of Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union (Berlin: 
Duncker and Humblot, 1988), p. 74.
48 Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, pp. 108-109.
49 Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, p. 22; Korda and Moravcik, ‘Thirty Years’, pp. 
482-483; Teichova, Czechoslovak Economy, p. 142; Kosta, ‘Czechoslovak Economic Reform’, p. 233.
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At this time, reformers were not merely seeking further attempts to deconstruct the 
pre-Communist traditions of the country. By drawing upon the failures of the 1950s 
and early 1960s, they focused on seeking to create dynamic efficiency through the 
implementation of market reforms within a planned system, mirroring similar debates 
in other socialist economies.50 According to the KSC 1962 Congress “the nation’s 
economic problems were not to be blamed on individuals or social groups as had been 
done in the past, but were due to defects in the system itself’.51 This resulted in a 
decision to alter the incentive structures in the economy, and marked the shift from 
extensive growth through increased use of factors of production to intensive growth 
that improved the efficiency with which a given quantity of resources was used.52 To 
achieve this, the Communist Party charged a group of economists from the Institute of 
Economics headed by Ota Sik to create a reform programme in the mid-1960s. Its 
aim was to introduce “socialism with a human face”, and provided the first important 
milestone in reform attempts in Czechoslovakia by recognising that the political and 
economic system in its entirety had to be reformed, rather than just undertaking partial 
economic changes to overcome specifically identified problems.53
The failure of this reform to have any major impact on the operation of the 
Czechoslovak economy arose because there was no discussion over changes in the 
supporting political regime as this would have been a politically unacceptable
50 Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, p. 148; Adam, Economic Reforms, p. 25; Lewis, 
Central Europe, pp. 114-115; Jozef M. van Brabant, The Political Economy of Transition: Coming to 
Grips with History and Methodology (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 6.
51 Lida Urbanek, ‘Some Difficulties in Implementing the Economic Reforms in Czechoslovakia’,
Soviet Studies, 19 (1967), 557-566, pp. 557-558.
52 Ivo Moravcik, ‘The Czechoslovak Economic Reform’, Canadian Slavonic Papers, 10 (1968), 430- 
450, pp. 432,438.
53 Moravcik, ‘Czechoslovak Economic Reform’, p. 438; Ota Sik, Plan and Market Under Socialism 
(White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1967); Berend, Central and Eastern Europe 
1944-1993, p. 137.
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declaration of the failure of the planned economy.54 Because comprehensive planned 
management had become too cumbersome and ineffective, Sik’s reforms endeavoured 
to introduce some market criteria into the economy, with planning retained for long­
term strategic reasons.55 At the heart of the resulting proposals was decentralisation, 
with increased autonomy at lower levels of the system. Plans retained their primacy 
in planning, but indirect economic instruments were also to be used in achieving 
specific economic goals, thus decentralising decision-making in the economy and 
creating a truly socialist market economy.56 These proposals were incorporated into 
the document “On the Improvement of Planned Management of the National 
Economy”, which was finally adopted following some modifications by the KSC in 
1965.57
As Novotny claimed there was no need for a new direction in reform but rather “a 
partial compromise with the forces of change”,58 the Czechoslovak leadership was 
unprepared to implement fully all the recommendations made by Sik.59 That the 
central authorities retained ultimate discretionary power and so could ensure that in 
practice the planning system remained unchanged was seen as the main impediment 
to change by the reformers who had only been set the task of proposing reforms to the 
economic instruments of control.60 Only with deteriorating economic conditions that
54 Korda and Moravcik, ‘Thirty Years’, p. 495; Prucha, ‘Continuity and Discontinuity’, p. 31; Myant, 
Czechoslovak Economy, p. 126.
55 Miroslav Sokol, ‘Changes in Economic Management in Czechoslovakia’, Czechoslovak Economic 
Papers, 8 (1967), 7-18, p. 12; Vaclav Klusoft, ‘Innovations and Planned Management’, Czechoslovak 
Economic Papers, 23 (1985), 39-54, p. 47; Myant, Czechoslovak Economy, p. 112.
56 Sokol, ‘Changes in Economic Management’, pp. 8,12; Moravcik, ‘Czechoslovak Economic 
Reform’, p. 438-439,443.
57 Kosta, ‘Czechoslovak Economic Reform’, p. 233.
58 George R. Feiwel, New Economic Patterns in Czechoslovakia: Impact of Growth, Planning and the 
Market (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 146.
59 Myant, Czechoslovak Economy, p. 119.
00 Kosta, ‘Czechoslovak Economic Reform’, p. 233; Myant, Czechoslovak Economy, p. 133; Lewis, 
Central Europe, p. 116.
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the Party deemed a threat to its political primacy was a serious attempt to introduce 
comprehensive reform made in the 1960s.61
Despite Novotny’s endeavours to maintain a political hold over debates on economic 
reform, by 1968 Czechoslovak economists were expressing more radical views over 
the desirability and necessity for economic reform than the political leaders.62 This 
arose from the seeming legitimacy given to economists such as Sik who were charged 
with discussing reform in view of recurring critiques of the economic preference for 
direct planning, and was backed by public opinion.63 As dissatisfaction with the 
prevailing system developed, the reformers had a tendency towards “an exaggerated 
view of what the market could and could not do” and “ambiguity and lack of 
sophistication of some concepts”.64 Preferring some change to none at all, the 
reformers attempted to seize any opportunity available to them to push through rapid 
reforms before the window of opportunity closed.65 The problem facing reformers in 
the 1990s of having greater awareness of dissatisfaction with the status quo that any 
real comprehension of how best to enact change was in evidence some 30 years
earlier.
61 Ian Jeffries, Socialist Economies and the Transition to the Market: A Guide (London: Routledge, 
1993), p. 246.
62 Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, p. 414; Korbel, Twentieth-Century 
Czechoslovakia, p. 273.
63 Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, p. 225; Myant, Czechoslovak Economy, pp. 112, 
125.
64 Feiwel, New Economic Patterns, p. 151.
65 Andrzej Korbonski, ‘Political Aspects of Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe’, in Economic 
Development in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe I: Reforms, Technology and Income 
Distribution, edited by Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl, Papers from First International Slavic Conference, 
Banff, Alberta, 4-7 September 1974 (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 8-41, p. 14.
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The opportunity to challenge the status quo came with the replacement of Novotny by 
Dubcek in January 1968.66 This did not solve the economic crisis of which the overall 
decline in the Czechoslovak economy was a certain indication, nor eliminate the 
political barriers to reform,67 but Dubcek was more amenable to the notions of a 
planned market and greater decentralisation of decision-making and enterprise 
autonomy. Increased openness of discussion was allowed, alongside pledges for 
economic decentralisation and reform measures to stimulate economic growth, which 
led inevitably to less strict political control over the economy. Dubcek wanted to 
bring increased flexibility into the Party and democratisation of centralised decision­
making by incorporating the demands and interests of society into liberalised 
economic and political realms, so that reform could advance much faster with the 
political sphere altered.68
An important innovation was that the central role of enterprises and especially of 
workers was to be accepted69 and developed under the “Action Programme of the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia” that was launched in April 1968.70 Economic 
organisation by planning, with rewards made on the basis of plan fulfilment was to 
encourage quantitative rather than qualitative growth.71
66 Myant, Czechoslovak Economy, p. 157.
67 Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, p. 448.
68 Adam, Employment and Wage Policies, p. 68; Jermakowicz and Follis, Reform Cycles, p. 88; Myant, 
Czechoslovak Economy, p. 161.
69 These ideas drew strongly from Polish and Yugoslavian ideas. Feiwel, New Economic Patterns, p. 
150; Vaclav Holesovsky, ‘Planning and Market in the Czechoslovak Reform’, in Plan and Market: 
Economic Reform in Eastern Europe, edited by Morris Bomstein (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1973), pp. 313-345, pp. 329, 332; Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, p. 148.
70 Kosta, ‘Czechoslovak Economic Reform’, pp. 234-235.
71 J. Wilczynski, The Economics of Socialism: Principles Governing the Operation of the Centrally 
Planned Economies in the USSR and Eastern Europe under the New System (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1970), p. 109.
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Nonetheless, despite the inauguration of changes in the Action Plan, in reality the 
extent of direct participation by the workers in routine decision-making and 
management was barely extended.72 The main influence that workers had over the 
management throughout the period of central planning was in the realm of 
employment tenure. Since full employment was the intention of the planners, 
employers were restricted in the disciplinary measures they could use over the labour 
force,73 and some workers still expect the commensurate job tenure under the 
uncertain conditions of transformation. Their widespread adoption would have 
implied a failing of existing management techniques and challenged the political and 
economic justification of the centrally planned economy and its organisational 
structures.74 The conservative element wanted to retain its power and influence at all 
levels of the political and economic hierarchies since this enabled them to preserve 
their position and status as well as protecting against their incompetence or inability 
to adapt from being exposed.75
Although preliminary steps were taken up to early June, the reforms proposed under 
the Action Programme were not implemented as political resistance to reform had not 
been eliminated by the change in leadership and it remained clear that political and 
economic reform had to occur in tandem.76 Some changes were implemented 
following the May Plenum, but from June onwards, political tension mounted both
72 Marie Lavigne, The Socialist Economies of the Soviet Union and Europe (London: Robertson, 1974), 
p. 45.
73 Simon Clarke, Peter Fairbrother, Vadim Borisov and Petr Bizyukov, ‘The Privatisation of Industrial 
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74 Lavigne, Socialist Economies, pp. 46-47.
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76 Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, p. 448; Prficha, ‘Continuity and Discontinuity’, p. 
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domestically and externally over the path that change was taking.77 Although the 
Czechoslovak leadership pledged that socialism was not being rejected,78 the USSR 
saw this as a mirror of the events in Hungary in 1956, which had resulted in Soviet 
military intervention. Czechoslovakia was warned that the other Warsaw Pact 
countries did not regard these reforms as only a domestic issue, but one that would 
have repercussions throughout the socialist bloc,79 but Dubcek continued the reform 
programme. With the USSR fearful of the destabilising effect that this might have on 
the region and at worst, the rejection of the socialist system in Czechoslovakia, 
Prague was invaded on August 21, decisively ending these reform efforts.80
The events leading up to the Prague Spring and whether this was even a valid 
response by the other members of the Warsaw Pact is well documented.81 Of 
importance here is the impact that this event had on the nature of reform in 
Czechoslovakia during the remainder of the Communist era, and on the subsequent 
post-Communist reforms, because it altered both the fonnal institutional environment 
by precluding change of the socialist economic and political system, and also 
reinforced an expectation that no meaningful reform effort could be made under these
conditions.
77 Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, pp. 275,284,288.
78 Leff, Czech and Slovak Republic, pp. 58-59.
79 Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, p. 290; Renner, History of Czechoslovakia, p. 68.
80 Korbel, Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia, pp. 302-303,305; Teichova, Czechoslovak Economy, p. 
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81 See for example Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution; Leff, Czech and Slovak 
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23.2 Reforms In The Second Wave: From Prague Spring To Velvet Revolution.
Czechoslovakia became a politically and economically ardent follower of the USSR 
through the suppression of reform and revoking many of the measures that had 
preceded the Prague Spring. Husak succeeded Dubcek in 1969, and established a 
government comprising those who had either denounced or never publicly supported 
those reforms.82 “Normalisation” began, centred around three principal activities of 
personnel purges to reinstate politically centralised control, tight censorship, and the 
re-implementation of central control over the economy.83 Although economic 
reforms were subsequently considered after 1968, since they could not circumvent the 
politically discredited ideas of centralised planning they were of limited impact.84 
The severity of the August 1968 invasion made it evident to the reformers that real 
change would not be tolerated by the USSR85 because this necessitated a relaxation of 
the political hold over the economy, and “preservation of this feature seems to be the 
limit of the reforms: beyond it the economy loses its socialist character”.86 An uneasy 
compromise was thus attained in Czechoslovakia, with a nominally high degree of 
public conformity and political temperance achieved87 at the cost of material 
concessions to the population and relatively lax discipline in the workplace.88
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Because of fears that economic decentralisation would weaken the government’s 
control over the population, changes implemented between 1965 and 1968 were 
revoked and economists reluctantly reverted to following Marxist-Leninist 
principles. Centralised wage controls were re-introduced in 1970, and binding plan 
targets once again became the central mechanism for directing economic decision­
making.89 90 A new administrative reform began in 1971 in recognition of the lack of 
control that the state had over enterprise management. Industrial associations 
comprising enterprises operating within the same branch were established to bring 
their management under the same control jurisdiction. Two types of association were 
established, with a trust formed between horizontally integrated enterprises, and a 
konzern comprising enterprises linked vertically. These intermediaries between 
enterprises and the central administration created a less bureaucratic environment for 
firms to operate in. Enterprises could in principle leave an association provided they 
were then made responsible to the appropriate Ministry, but in practice this right was 
restricted.91
Questions of economic reform again appeared on the political agenda in the 1980s in 
response to economic decline in the 1970s. This had been caused by an emphasis on 
central planning and focus on heavy industry;92 declines in the quantity and quality of
89 OldFich Kyn, ‘Czechoslovakia’, in The New Economic Systems of Eastern Europe, edited by Hans- 
Herman Hohmann, Michael Kaser and Karl C. Thalheim (London: Hurst, 1975), pp. 105-154, p. 148; 
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resources;93 external circumstances such as the energy crises;94 and a changing 
paradigm of production in the world economy to which the countries of Eastern 
Europe failed to adapt, bringing consequent trade and therefore budgetary 
difficulties.95 Despite attempts to “catch up” with the West, technological capital 
stocks often lagged by at least one generation.96 The reforms under discussion in 
Czechoslovakia for much of the 1980s focused around incentives and management of 
the economic system in an endeavour to strengthen the legitimacy of the Communist 
regime vis-a-vis competing economic and political systems and ideologies.97
Flaws in the design and control of the economy had been recognised since 1948,98 but 
the first explicit attempt to redress these problems after the aborted efforts of the 
1960s came in this decade. The supremacy of the plan and the need to centrally 
determine the character of the economic working environment was not challenged,99 
but changes in the style of planning were introduced to make enterprises more 
accountable for their own production decisions and the consequences of these 
choices.100 Hesitant steps were taken to reconsider the reform impetus of the 1960s, 
beginning with some moderate changes in the early part of the decade proposed and 
operated under the auspices of the Institute of Forecasting of the Czechoslovak
93 Jaroslav KrejCl, ‘The First Republic’, in Czechoslovakia 1918-1992: A Laboratory for Social 
Change, edited by Jaroslav Krejdi and Pavel Machonin (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 57-70, p. 
70.
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Academy of Sciences. The conclusion drawn from the “Set of Measures for the 
Perfection of the System of Planned Management” was that radical changes were 
required.100 01 102
Five Year Plans remained the central mechanism for planning and directing the 
economy, but in conjunction with these, additional documents were produced that 
included detailed measures designed to improve the operation of the centrally planned 
system. The 1980s programmes explicitly encouraged new methods of promoting 
economic efficiency in production and management via the controlled introduction of 
some components of the market into the economy.103 A gradual programme of 
decentralisation and economic reform was initiated with the approval of two 
documents: “Principles for Restructuring the Economic Mechanism in the CSSR” and 
“Concretisation of the Principle for the Restructuring of Economic Mechanism in the 
CSSR” in 1987. Recognising the need for fundamental change in the basis and 
operation of the Czechoslovak economy, they anticipated the re-introduction of some 
market aspects including increased enterprise autonomy, profit as an indicator of 
success, greater direct involvement of workers in decision-making, and price and 
trade reform.104 The main criticism levelled at these programmes was that despite the 
intention that any change would be very gradual, they were very limited and during 
their short period in operation their proposals were frequently ignored, or so modified 
as to make their practical impact negligible.105
100 Jiff Dvordk, ‘The Reform of the Economic Mechanism in Czechoslovakia’, Czechoslovak Economic 
Papers, 26 (1989), 7-17, pp. 10-11.
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Institutionally, the effects of normalisation were felt most deeply in the informal 
sphere, impacting on the shape of reforms in Czechoslovakia even when formal 
institutional structures shifted. Since policy in Czechoslovakia reflected its 
counterpart in the USSR in form and content,106 the rise of Gorbachev to power in the 
USSR could have encouraged the KSC to plan extensions to the scope of reform in 
the 1980s.107 108As a result of the Prague Spring experience though, the Czechoslovak 
leadership in the 1980s was unwilling to embrace the openness principles implied by 
glasnost, which was the defining political legitimisation ofperestroika.^ Whilst the 
objectives for reform proposed by Gorbachev and the KSC show strong congruity, 
both being ostensibly oriented towards the shifting of their economies onto paths of 
more intensive growth,109 they differed fundamentally according to the intentions of 
the leaders in each country. Whereas in the USSR Gorbachev’s reforms were to 
induce real, systemic changes, in Czechoslovakia the status quo was preferred, since 
the economy could sustain a further period of limited economic reform, but not the 
political consequences of radical change.110 Many of the same conditions and 
obstacles did not exist in Czechoslovakia as in the USSR. Consequently, prestavba 
(Czechoslovakia’s programme of restructuring in the 1980s) that occurred from 1987 
was not the equivalent of the Soviet Union’s perestroika (their 1980s restructuring 
programme) but instead reflected a Czechoslovak response to the altered external 
conditions.111
106 Adam, ‘Transfonnation to a Market Economy’, p. 629.
107 Adam, Economic Reforms, p. 191.
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Although the Czechoslovak government's programmes of the 1980s were due to 
operate until after the turn of the century, these were never fully implemented. The 
revolution of 1989 rendered these reforms obsolete because they had been devised for 
the Communist regime that was now being rejected, and were only valid within this 
restricted political and economic environment.112 Only removal of the threat of 
Soviet intervention allowed a change in the approach to reform in 1989, with a return 
to the pre-Communist principle of the government holding and maintaining a guiding 
role within a market economic system.
2.4 AFTER THE VELVET REVOLUTION.
In 1989, the symbiosis between politics and economics meant that a small catalyst 
resulted in the implosion of the Communist system and altered the prevailing systemic 
conditions.113 However, the Velvet Revolution did not initiate a smooth transfer from 
central planning to an economic system that provides a suitable accompaniment to a 
democratic political system. Systemic change is not simply the dismantling of the 
former system and replacing this with another model, but requires destruction, re­
creation, and restructuring of the institutional environment of the old and new 
systems.114 As with the Communist assumption of power in 1948, the new politicians 
had to find some way of legitimising their rule, and this was sought in their pre-
112 Holy, The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation, p. 60; Prficha, ‘Continuity and Discontinuity’,
fc33-
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114 Andrew Berg, ‘Does Macroeconomic Reform Cause Structural Adjustment? Lessons from Poland’, 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 18 (1994), 376-409, p. 376; JozefM. van Brabant, ‘Privatization, 
Industrial Policy and Governing the Transitions’, Moct-Most, 4 (1994), 63-85, p. 74; Herman W. Hoen, 
The Transformation of Economic Systems in Central Europe (Cheltenham: Elgar, 1998), p. 4; Horst 
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Communist heritage.115 As in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the 
political leadership seized upon these events as a “unique chance, to return to Europe, 
and to reverse its unsuccessful and sluggish development in the last few decades”,116 
regardless of how realistic such expectations of such a reform being able to overcome 
structural discrepancies in the economy really were.117 Despite all of its failings 
“[t]he communist system was characterised by its own peculiar, relatively stable 
equilibrium”.118 Soviet control and Soviet-inspired models of political and economic 
management did establish parameters within which these countries, albeit with 
national variations, operated,119 in particular by enabling the development of 
institutions that worked under that system, and these are not easily or rapidly replaced 
in the immediate transformation era.120 Returning to Europe cannot be merely a 
retrospective process, since both Eastern and Western Europe have diverged in their 
historical development under this politically created division. There is therefore a 
danger of the transforming economies merely attempting to mimic Western Europe as 
it appears to them, with the result that Central and Eastern Europe continues to lag 
behind Western Europe because of an inability to internalise appropriate changes and 
technological developments. Additionally, it would be unclear as to when
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convergence had been attained, since this “target is both multiple and moving”,121 and 
so these countries need to define their own standards for successful transformation
that will not necessarily correlate overtly with the form of other European economies.
The strongly centralised economy in Czechoslovakia under socialism gave rise to 
macro-economic stability that distinguished Czechoslovakia from its contemporaries 
in Central and Eastern Europe from 1989. Giving Czechoslovakia the chance to 
“concentrate on studying the reforms in other countries [and devote] time to studying 
mainstream economics”, Klaus saw this as “a sort of privilege”122 because it 
facilitated his government’s ability to control and direct the transformation 
programme.123 However, Czechoslovakia’s historical legacy was a liability in other 
ways. The environment into which transformation was to be effected in
Czechoslovakia showed a number of distortions and imbalances that had arisen as a
result of Communist policies and needed to be corrected in the transformation before 
a market economy could emerge.124 These included informational problems and 
particularly incentive difficulties,125 as well as structural deficiencies in the tangible 
infrastructure that had undermined central planning.
State-owned industry was dominant at the time of transition with 97% of
Czechoslovakia’s output in 1986 from the state sector and so the private sector was
121 Bernard Chavance and Erie Magnin, ‘National Trajectories of Post-Socialist Transformation: Is 
There a Convergence Towards Western Capitalisms?’, Prague Economic Papers, 7 (1998), 227-237, p. 
229.
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• 19 A •negligible, capital markets were under-developed, and investment and production 
decisions were centrally determined, coupled with highly monopolised industrial 
markets. Investment priorities were skewed primarily towards military needs with the 
lowest priority accorded to the production of consumer goods. Whilst the share of the 
economy’s resources diverted to services was much lower than in market economies 
this distortion was enhanced by the lack of a private sector because of legal 
prohibitions on private ownership. The large size of enterprises impeded the 
introduction of competitive pressures, and although significant emphasis had been 
placed on technical and vocational education and training in the centrally planned 
economy, the skills labour acquired are not necessarily readily transferable to the new 
forms of economic management.126 27 Subsidised transfers of fuel from the USSR left 
the economy based on heavy industry that was largely dependent on energy inefficient 
and obsolete technology. Many of these industries are technologically backward 
compared to their trading counterparts in other nations. In the realm of foreign trade, 
bilateral agreements within the CMEA mechanism dominated, complimenting a 
national level of specialisation in production in the region. This de-linking from the
international trade order meant that these countries had not been able to take
advantage of many of the technological and knowledge advances made available by 
producers in the West, and as time is required to assimilate these changes,128 Czech 
enterprises were therefore disadvantaged in attempting to gain new global market 
positions.
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A dependency culture was fostered under state socialism, demonstrated by 
institutionalised distrust and nominal compliance with authority. This distorted 
the operation of the economy and complicates the transformation to a market. Under 
Communist rule, reforms only had a limited credibility and resulted in inertia of 
people to adapt. This is replicated under the new conditions in the responses to 
uncertainty, for rather than seeing enterprises and individuals embracing the 
opportunity to change their behaviour and innovatively seeking ways to adapt to the 
new economic conditions and opportunities afforded,129 130 31 there is a blaming of mistakes 
and negative consequences from new policies almost exclusively on the former 
political and economic system. Also, although Czechoslovakia entered the post­
communist era with a very small foreign currency debt since during its rule the KSC 
continued the programme of fiscal conservatism that had been initiated under the 
conditions of the Great Depression,132 this encouraged the incoming government to 
emphasise tight monetary and fiscal policies and anti-inflationary measures.133 Such 
political continuities were linked to a wider intellectual climate supporting the notion 
of social justice that ascribes state intervention a role in achieving this,134 and which 
was perceived as a political heritage from the time of the First Republic.
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2.4.1 Transformation and Restructuring.
Political conditions in socialist Czechoslovakia after the Prague Spring meant that 
efforts at economic reform in the 1980s had been premised on an understanding that 
only gradual economic reform could occur, with no separation of politics and 
economics within the economy.135 This continued to underlay the immediate thinking 
on economic and system transformation in Czechoslovakia from 1989 until 
September 1990, when the government proposed a new radical reform strategy.136 As 
Finance Minister, Klaus followed the claims of many Western advisors and rejected 
gradual or partial reforms on the basis that they had proved inadequate in earlier 
reform attempts, and from a desire to implement changes that would not imitate or 
perpetuate the policies and strategies of Communism.137 History having shown the 
failure of reformed socialism, he also felt it necessary to initiate some measures as 
soon as possible to prevent rent-seeking behaviour under conditions of uncertainty.138
Central planning in Czechoslovakia was perceived by the reformers to represent a 
distorted market rather than a distinctly different economic paradigm.139 In designing 
a reform strategy at the start of the transformation, reformers shared a commitment to 
marketisation of the economy, regardless of the speed at which they advocated
135 Susan Baker and Petr Jehlidka, ‘Dilemmas of Transition: The Environment, Democracy and 
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transformation to occur.139 40 Such differences in perception over the speed at which 
reform should occur were responsible for the split in Civic Forum in 1991. From this 
emerged the right-wing Civic Democratic Party under the leadership of Klaus, and in 
addition to some smaller groups, Civic Movement and the Civic Democratic Alliance 
that were more centrist, and also less focused in their objectives.141 The debate on 
whether reform should be implemented quickly or more gradually, with the design 
and speed of implementation of the privatisation programme the defining issue, was 
primarily between Klaus and Komarek, the then Deputy Prime Minister.142 
Supporters of radical reform under Klaus, propounding a combination of perceived 
myths as well as some realities of the prevailing economic conditions, won this debate 
in Czechoslovakia, with neither Civic Movement nor the Civic Democratic Alliance 
gaining parliamentary representation in the 1992 elections.143
Klaus adopted a very clear neo-liberal rhetoric to describe the necessary changes that 
would underline this, with the ultimate goal as “an end of traditional economic 
paternalism”.144 For this new government to appear ideologically distinct from its 
Communist forebears, it desired to redefine its role to be less directly involved in the 
economic operation of the economy.145 Additionally, Czechoslovakia was in a
139 Klaus and Je2ek, ‘Social Criticism’, p. 33-34.
140 Leff, Czech and Slovak Republic, p. 179; Klaus, Ceska Cesta, p. 134; Bideleux and Jeffries, History 
of Eastern Europe, p. 548; Fawn, Czech Republic, p. 87.
141 Jon Elster, ‘Transition, Constitution-Making and Separation in Czechoslovakia’, Archives 
Europeennes de Sociologie, 36 (1995), 105-134, pp. 118-119; Leff, Czech and Slovak Republic, p. 101; 
Fawn, Czech Republic, p. 87.
142 Svenjar, ‘Czech and Slovak Federal Republic’, p. 27.
143 Frydman et al, Privatization Process in Central Europe, p. 71; Leff, Czech and Slovak Republic, p. 
101.
144 Klaus, A Road to Market Economy, p. 39.
145 Gemot Grabher, ‘Eastern “Conquista”: The Truncated Industrialisation of East European Regions 
by Large West European Corporations’, in Regional Development and Contemporary Industrial 
Response: Extending Flexible Specialisation, edited by Huib Emste and Verena Meier (London: 
Belhaven Press, 1992), pp. 219-232, p. 219.
69
favourable position to embrace the ideals of liberalism.146 This arose from the relative 
stability of the economy and willingness of the electorate to endure a deterioration in 
economic conditions because of the existence of this “buffer”, deep rejection of the 
socialist past, and a charismatic leadership able to gain the trust and support of voters. 
Secondary factors have been the break-up of Czechoslovakia, resulting in less dissent 
against the hardships endured by the population in the new Czech Republic, as well as 
favourable market conditions and concessions to social stability that bolstered support 
for Klaus’ government. There was also the derived legitimisation in adopting these 
policies in that they were supported by the international organisations involved in the 
transformation processes such as the World Bank, IMF, and European Union.
Klaus was cautious about letting the reform process appear to be directed by outside 
influences. Certainly emulating these ideas facilitated a legitimisation of the new 
elites at a low political cost given the benefits it could bring.147 Conversely, the 
demand-side stabilisation programmes that normally characterise the activities of the 
IMF were inappropriate in Central and Eastern Europe because of the pervasive 
legacies of state socialism and the resultant necessity for supply-side intervention to 
alter institutional conditions.148 Receiving assistance and in particular financial aid 
could merely result in perpetuating the former dependent behavioural patterns by 
firms.149 Klaus opted to minimise the financial assistance from these financial 
institutions, and claimed that
146 Glenny, Rebirth of History, p. 22; Martin Dangerfield, ‘Ideology and the Czech Transformation: 
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[a] fter three years of relatively successful fundamental systemic transformation 
of the Czech economy and society my experience tells me that the role of 
external factors in this process is relatively small.149 50
However, history shows all successful industrialisation periods globally have been 
founded on active state intervention.151 The new government’s desire for a laissez- 
faire approach risked merely creating difficulties for enterprises in these new 
conditions by not providing a stable framework for growth. Unfortunately, 
restructuring outcomes in the case study firms confirm this, but it is only through the 
embedded institutionalism approach that the underlying factors that dictate this are 
fully identified.
Economic transformation in Czechoslovakia began formally on 1 January 1991 when
the first measures from the Scenario of Economic Reform that Parliament had 
approved in late 1990 were introduced.152 In practice Klaus implemented a more 
judicious programme than his strongly neo-liberal reform rhetoric would suggest153 
because of the need to account for socio-political institutions as well as economic 
factors in the transformation. The need to deal with the conditions actually prevailing 
is very strong with regards to the debate over the nature of privatisation polices, 
because of its pivotal role in the transformation and the realisation of outcomes which 
differ from those projected by neo-classical economic theory.
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Embeddedness is a very appropriate explanation in this context, reflecting the fact that 
inherited institutional structures may not be functional under altered economic 
conditions, and that successful transformation depends on the establishment and 
enforcement of new institutions.154 Eliminating or overcoming resistance to reform, 
or ensuring that alternative organised forces support reform is essential to enable a 
progressive transformation to occur.155 The potential impact of the elites and other 
interest groups in modifying or aborting the reforms to maximise their personal 
benefits,156 alongside the credibility of the government’s commitment to reform also 
have to be considered. In addition, this all needs to be augmented by an ethos of 
compliance by the population affected or a re-education of their values to make them 
favourably disposed towards these changes.157 Delivering visible and positive results 
has already been shown historically to be imperative, otherwise the reform process 
could potentially be derailed as it may engender antipathy amongst the general 
population. The Communist accession to power was ultimately facilitated by extreme 
economic and political distortions, so the post-communist reformers need to ensure 
they understand the fragility of their status if the population are not fully prepared for 
negative reform consequences.158 Resistance may come from reform fatigue or from 
opposition groups becoming better organised and able to effectively counter refonn 
efforts,159 but this can only be effectively identified and judged when the presence and 
impact of institutions is accounted for.
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and Latin America, edited by Jon Elster and Michael S. McPherson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), p. 180.
156 Winiecki, ‘Obstacles to Economic Reform’, p. 65; Batt, East Central Europe, p. 83.
157 Janos Komai, ‘The Evolution of Financial Discipline Under the Post-Socialist System’, Kyklos, 46 
(1993), 315-336, pp. 320, 327; Aligica, ‘The Institutionalists’ Take’, pp. 47,49.
158 Ota Sik, ‘Revolutionary Changes in Czechoslovakia’, in Regional Development and Contemporary 
Industrial Response: Extending Flexible Specialisation, edited by Huib Emste and Verena Meier 
(London: Belhaven Press, 1992), pp. 247-259, pp. 257-258.
159 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, p. 165; Sachs, Poland’s Jump, pp. 42-43.
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2.5 CONCLUSION.
Reform events in the economic and political systems in Czechoslovakia prior to 1989 
demonstrated path-dependent and embeddeness aspects because institutional 
influences led to the formal identification of a need for Czech responses to reform. 
Reformers in 1989 therefore inherited a unique legacy from the past that distinguished 
Czechoslovakia institutionally from other transforming countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe. In Klaus’ neo-liberal reform rhetoric, these instititutional aspects 
were not formally embraced, but the implementation of post-communist reforms 
undeniably exhibits path-dependent and embedded aspects.
As this chapter has shown, there exist numerous legacies from the country’s history 
that act as institutional influences on the current transformation and the specific 
policies embraced in this. To create a market-based economy required the 
reintroduction of private property into these economies to overcome the previous 
dominance of state-owned industry. In Czechoslovakia, the government designed its 
initial policies in the 1990 Scenario of Economic Reform around an expectation that 
there would be a government-led restructuring of the economic infrastructure, 
enhanced by specifically targeted industrial policies of which privatisation would be 
one part. However
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the government soon dropped the idea of an active restructuring policy and 
accepted the philosophy of the international financial institutions that structural 
changes were to be left to the market mechanism.160
Privatisation became central to the entire transition,161 for the Klaus government 
having
initially cherished the illusion that it was easy to overcome the Communist 
heritage, has now changed its mind and is trying to move quickly ahead with its 
privatization and reprivatization programme.162
Recognising the complex, and particularly the non-economic constraints, this policy 
instrument as the central element of the Klaus government’s reform programme 
requires extensive consideration to determine whether it has achieved its goals. The 
following chapter begins this by presenting the privatisation policies of the Klaus 
government, and considering institutional determinants of its form and 
implementation.
160 Jan Adam, Social Costs of Transformation to a Market Economy in Post-Socialist Countries: The 
Cases of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p. 41.
161 Thomas W. Hazlett, ‘The Czech Miracle: Why Privatization Went Right in the Czech Republic’, 
Reason, 26 (11) (1995), 28-35. Academic Search Elite. EBSCO Publishing. 17 June 1999. 
<http://www.global.epnet.com/hosttrial/login.html>, [n.p.]; Vaclav Klaus, Ekonomicke Teorie a 
Realita Transformacnich Procesu, (Prague: Management Press 1995), p. 81; Tomas Jezek, ‘The 
Czechoslovak Experience with Privatization’, Journal of International Affairs, 50 (1997), 477-488, p. 
478.
162 Antoni Z. Kaminski and Piotr Strzalkowski, ‘Strategies of Institutional Change in Central and 
Eastern European Economies’, in Institutional Change: Theory and Empirical Findings, edited by 
Sven-Erik Sjostrand (Armonk: Sharpe, 1993), pp. 139-150, pp. 147-148.
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CHAPTER THREE
PRIVATISATION AND TRANSFORMATION
This chapter considers the Czech privatisation programme, its implications, and the 
extent to which it provides an appropriate foundation for sustainable development and 
long-term restructuring of enterprises during transformation. Limitations to applying 
existing models and experiences with privatisation to the Czech economy led to the Klaus 
government accepting the need for an eclectic approach to asset transfers.1 In particular, 
in response to the prevailing economic and political conditions in the economy, a novel 
form of mass privatisation using vouchers was developed. Consequently, in the initial 
design of voucher privatisation, there is a response to institutions, even if this is not 
formally acknowledged, which further validates the use of the embedded institutionalism 
framework in understanding it.
The chapter begins by looking at the intended function of privatisation within the 
transformation. The component elements of the Czech privatisation programme are then 
presented, focusing particularly on voucher privatisation because of its centrality to 
privatisation and transformation, and as the method by which each firm in the case studies 
was privatised. A discussion of whether voucher privatisation can promote restructuring, 
and institutional limitations to this, follows.
1 Vaclav Klaus, Vaclav Klaus Narovinu. Hovory V.K s Petrem Hajkem Nejen o Tom, Co Bylo, Je a Bude 
(Praha: Rabbit and Rabbit, 2001), p. 250.
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Overall it is shown that institutional influences in the operating environment for Czech 
firms can create difficulties in achieving equitable and efficient property transfers and 
cause outcomes divergent from those predicted in theory, vindicating the use of non­
standard privatisation methods. Voucher privatisation endeavours to overcome 
constraints from the institutional environment, in particular the novelty of private 
ownership and the lack of finance, through the use of vouchers. The Czech privatisation 
programme demonstrates a strong neo-classical inspiration in its intended outcomes, 
introduced by the government in the expectation that this would promote free market 
forces to bring efficiency gains. However, this chapter argues that institutional 
constraints define its overall structure, adoption, and therefore the consequent incentives 
for restructuring in privatised firms. This also pre-empts the discussion in subsequent 
chapters of the impact of specific institutional influences that determine the empirically 
observed restructuring in such enterprises.
3.1 THE ROLE OF PRIVATISATION IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC.
Privatisation gained a pivotal role in the Klaus government’s reform strategy despite “no 
clear and incontrovertible evidence that privatisation leads to improvement in any case 
and under any circumstance”.2 This was because Klaus considered privatisation to be “a
2 Bruno Dallago, ‘Privatization: The Teaching of Western Experiences’, in Privatization and Economic 
Performance in Central and Eastern Europe: Lessons to be Learnt from Western Europe, edited by Ivan 
Major (Cheltenham: Elgar, 1999), pp. 1-42, p. 1.
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crucial precondition for the normal functioning of a market economy”,3 not only because 
of the economic benefits it brings, but because it could be used to justify the ideological 
underpinnings of the transformation by generating support for all aspects of reform.4
Privatisation in the Czech Republic differed by scale and objective from the process in 
developed market economies, being total privatisation to (re) introduce property and (re) 
create markets as an integral element of structural transformation in the economy.5 The 
overriding goal of privatisation in the context of transformation is to consolidate the gains
from macroeconomic stabilisation and liberalisation, and to establish a market ethos that 
will ensure reforms implemented in the transformation maximise economic growth.6 
With private ownership, budget constraints for firms are credibly hardened, transaction 
costs to obtaining government assistance increase, and firms are encouraged to respond to 
market signals with the result that efficient resource allocation and use occurs.7
3 Vaclav Klaus, ‘Transition: An Insider’s View’, Problems of Communism, 41 (1-2) (1992), 73-75, p. 74.
4 Hilary Appel, ‘Justice and the Reformulation of Property Rights in the Czech Republic’, East European 
Politics and Societies, 9 (1995), 22-40, p. 39; Vaclav Klaus, Ekonomicke Teorie a Realita Transformacnich 
Process, (Prague: Management Press 1995), p. 12; Saul Estrin, ‘Privatisation and Company Restructuring 
in Central and Eastern Europe: Issues and Progress’, in Entrepreneurship and Economic Transition in 
Central Europe, edited by Jean-Paul Lar?on (Dordrecht: KluwerZHEC School of Management, 1998), pp. 
21-35, pp. 21-22.
5 Vaclav Klaus, Rebirth of a Country: Five Years After. Collection of Speeches of the Prime Minister of the 
Czech Republic (Praha: Ringier, 1994), p. 38.
6 Scott Thomas, ‘Political Economy of Privatisation in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia’, in The 
Emergence of Market Economies in Eastern Europe edited by Christopher Clague and Gordon C. Rausser 
(Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 279-295, pp. 279-280; David Parker, Unravelling the Planned 
Economy: Privatisation in Czecho-Slovakia’, Communist Economies and Economic Transformation, 5 
(1993), 391-404, p. 401; Tomas Jezek, ‘The Czechoslovak Experience with Privatization’, Journal of 
International Affairs, 50 (1997), 477-488, pp 478,479.
7 Eduardo Borensztein and Manmohan S. Kumar, ‘Proposals for Privatization in Eastern Europe’, IMF Staff 
Papers, 38 (1991), 300-326, pp. 302-303; JozefM. van Brabant, ‘Property Rights Reform, Macroeconomic 
Performance and Welfare’, in Transformation of Planned Economies: Property Rights Reform and 
Macroeconomic Stability, edited by Hans Blommestein and Michael Marrese (Paris: OECD/CEET, 1991), 
pp. 29-49, p. 38; Irena Grosfeld, ‘Privatization of State Enterprises in Eastern Europe: The Search for a 
Market Environment’, East European Politics and Society, 5(1991), pp. 142-161, p. 147.
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Privatisation can also aid the development of private capital markets, particularly when 
diverse methods of asset transfers are employed, since this increases the range of capital 
market instruments and tradeables in existence.8 Capital markets are useful for economic 
development by promoting efficient resource use, since firms need to demonstrate their 
profitability and remain competitive if they are to acquire additional funds here for 
production and expansion. Capital market development can be catalysed if formerly state 
owned property is distributed to the population by share issues. Share creation and 
consequently wider ownership is the basis for “popular capitalism” where large sections 
of the public become small shareholders from the distribution of shares from the 
privatisation of state property.9 Creating numerous new shareholders can be beneficial 
through encouraging a change in values and behaviour amongst these individuals, 
entrenching new interests, and also helping counter opposition to reform if privatisation is 
expected to bring improvements to enterprise efficiency. It also has a political benefit 
because the government gains legitimacy and support from the electorate by 
disseminating power in the economic sphere.
Distinct ownership structures differentially impact on efficiency because the structure of 
incentives and constraints under alternative property right allocations alters.10 From a
8 David J. Donaldson, Privatization: Principles and Practice (Washington: World Bank/IFC, 1995), pp. 32, 
55.
9 Radek La§tovicka, Anton Marcincin and Michal Mejstrik, Privatization and Opening the Capital Markets 
in the Czech and Slovak Republics, Working Paper, 54 (Prague: CERGE, 1994), p. 3; Peter Saunders and 
Colin Harris, Privatization and Popular Capitalism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994), pp. 25­
26; Jezek, ‘Czechoslovak Experience’, p. 485.
10 John Vickers and George Yarrow, Privatization: An Economic Analysis (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
1988), p. 7; John McHale, ‘Postcommunist Eastern Europe: Privatization and the Second Fundamental 
Theorem’, m Eastern Europe and the World Economy: Challenges of Transition and Globalization, edited
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Pareto-efficiency perspective, private ownership is advocated as the optimal institutional 
arrangement to balance private and social benefits (or costs) by generating incentives 
within the firm to achieve production and labour discipline. It also enhances the 
competitiveness of enterprises because contractual arrangements permit the direct 
monitoring of management.11 Before efficient and equitable property transfers could be 
made in the Czech Republic, the institution of private property had to be recreated.12 
This did not exist under central planning, where the state was meant to exercise 
ownership on behalf of the population, but this had been more of an ideological stance 
than an economic reality. Private property rights that could be consistently and 
effectively enforced did not exist.13 Conflicts between the social and private use of 
resources generated a problem of the commons14 where an individual’s benefit from the 
additional use of an asset increased by more than the marginal cost resulting from a 
reduction in aggregate social utility. This lack of private incentives to efficiency 
encouraged exploitation of the common (in theory socially-owned) property to the overall 
detriment of society.15
by Iliana Zloch-Christy (Cheltenham: Elgar, 1998), pp. 69-96, p. 89.
11 Armen A. Alchain and Harold Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization’, 
American Economic Review, 62 (1972), 777-795, p. 794; Borensztein and Kumar, ‘Proposals for 
Privatization’, p. 302.
12 Vaclav Klaus, ‘Main Obstacles to Rapid Economic Transformation of Eastern Europe: The Czechoslovak 
View’, in Towards a Market Economy in Central and Eastern Europe, edited by Herbert Giersch (Berlin: 
Springer-Verlag/Egon-Sohmen Foundation, 1991), pp. 77-91, p. 87; Parker, ‘Unravelling the Planned 
Economy’, p. 402.
13 Kazimierz Z. Poznanski, ‘Property Rights Perspective on Evolution of Communist-Type Economies’, in 
Constructing Capitalism: The Reemergence of Civil Society and Liberal Economy in the Post-Communist 
World, edited by Kazimierz Z. Poznanski (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 71-96, pp 79-80.
14 Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Science, 162 (1968), 1243-1248, p. 1244. The 
implications of this are also discussed in the most well-know conception in R. H Coase, ‘The Problem of 
Social Cost’, Journal of Law and Economics, 3 (1960), 1-44.
15 Jdnos Komai, ‘Socialist Transformation and Privatization - Shifting From a Socialist System’, East 
European Politics and Societies, 4 (1990), 255-304, pp. 273, 278-279.
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Once property rights have been allocated, holders (principals) should be protected in their 
chosen selection of contractual claims on an asset or service, or they may choose other 
individuals (agents) to manage these resources on their behalf, establishing a contrast 
between the two parties.16 Adequately functioning legal protection and regulation 
through corporate governance should ensure that the provisions of these contracts are met 
in the ownership and management of the enterprise.17 18Without monitoring, inefficiencies 
in the contractual arrangement will allow asymmetries between the utility functions of the 
principal and agent to create agency problems. Agency problems are liable to be 
particularly significant in the new economic enviromnent of Central and Eastern Europe, 
even following privatisation, because of the enduring nature of institutions that mean 
appropriate monitoring does not exist or cannot operate effectively. As a result, post­
privatisation restructuring within enterprises can be restricted, even though ownership
transfers have occurred.
When transformation began in 1989 a three-tier legal system to govern commercial 
activity existed in Czechoslovakia, comprising a Civil Code regulating transactions 
between private individuals and enterprises, the Economic Code concerned with business 
relations between enterprises, and an International Code covering international trade 
issues. New forms of ownership were created with privatisation, making this existing
16 Stephen A. Ross, ‘The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem’, American Economic 
Review, 63 (2) (1973), 134-139, p. 134; Ray Rees, ‘The Theoiy of Principal and Agent: Part 1’, Bulletin of 
Economic Research, 37 (1985), 3-26, p. 3.
17 Stephan Herten and Jens Holscher, ‘“Anglo-Saxon” or “Rhenish” Financial Markets for Central-East 
Europe?’, in Financial Turbulence and Capital Markets in Transition, edited by Jens Holscher 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 13-24, p. 157.
18 Roman Frydman, Andrzej Rapaczynski, John S. Earle et al, The Privatization Process in Central Europe
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legal framework inadequate after the collapse of central planning because it permitted 
only a limited spectrum of organisational forms; state-owned enterprises, co-operatives, 
municipal enterprises, and foreign trade enterprises.19 This necessitated property rights 
being defined and transferred through privatisation before efficient ownership patterns 
could emerge for Czech firms.20 This chapter is concerned with the design and 
implementation of the privatisation programme in the Czech Republic and the 
institutional implications of voucher privatisation for enterprise restructuring. In the 
following chapter the implications for restructuring of the creation and transfer of 
property rights from the state to private owners are discussed through a consideration of 
emerging corporate governance in the Czech Republic.
3.2 METHODS OF PRIVATISATION IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC.
As Klaus and his government accepted the need for a rapid reform strategy, embracing a 
need to “move on all fronts at once - or not move at all”, an eclectic mix of policies was 
required to maximise the benefit of market forces in the transformation.21 Consequently, 
the privatisation programme had to effect the transfer of property into the private sector 
using a mix of policies of “asset privatisation” (rationalising production and sales of
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 1993), p. 51.
19 George E. Gios, ‘The New Czechoslovak Commercial Code’, Review of Central and East European Law, 
18 (1992), 555-569, p. 555; Roman Frydman et al, Privatization Process in Central Europe, p. 51.
20 Parker, ‘Unravelling the Planned Economy’, p. 402; Gerald A. McDermott, ‘Renegotiating the Ties that 
Bind: The Limits of Privatization in the Czech Republic’, in Restructuring Networks in Post-Socialism: 
Legacies, Linkages and Localities, edited by Gemot Grabher and David Stark (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), pp. 70-106, p. 73.
21 Olivier Blanchard, Rudiger Dombusch, Paul Krugman, Richard Layard and Lawrence Summers, Reform
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fungible assets) and “transformational privatisation” (transferring former state-owned 
enterprises as going concerns into private ownership).22 Practically, this involved 
transferring enterprises from state to private ownership, greater provision of services by 
the private sector, the endogenous growth of the private sector as part of a market creating 
process, and reducing the proportion of production by the state sector relative to that of 
the private sector 23
Klaus desired rapid privatisation as a precursor to the emergence of a market economy 
because it can create conditions favouring continuing private ownership.24 However, the 
time that this could be expected to take by solely following existing models of 
privatisation was seen as too slow.25 Traditional methods of privatisation were also 
perceived to result in the emergence of forms of ownership and coiporate governance, 
which would be unacceptable from equity and efficiency perspectives if the incumbent 
management simply acquired control over their firms.26 The concept of extending
in Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1991), p. xi.
22 Leszek Balcerowicz, Socialism, Capitalism and Transformation (Budapest: Central European University 
Press, 1995), pp. 192-193.
23 Balcerowicz, Socialism, Capitalism and Transformation, p. 186; Katharine Pistor and Joel Turkewitz, 
‘Coping With Hydra-State Ownership after Privatization: A Comparative Study of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Russia’, in Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia, 2: Insiders and the State, 
edited by Roman Frydman, Cheryl W. Gray and Andrzej Rapaczynski (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 1996), pp. 192-244, p. 193.
24 Patrick Bolton and Gerard Roland, ‘Privatization Processes in Central and Eastern Europe’, Economic 
Policy 15 (1992), 275-309, p. 287.
25 Vaclav Klaus, A Road to Market Economy: Selected Articles, Speeches and Lectures Held Abroad 
(Praha: TOP Agency, 1991), p. 22; Jan Mladek, ‘The Different Paths of Privatization in Czechoslovakia, 
1990-?’, in Privatization in the Transition to a Market Economy. Studies in Preconditions and Policies in 
Eastern Europe, edited by John S. Earle, Roman Frydman and Andrzej Rapaczynski (London: Pinter, in 
association with Central European University, 1993), pp. 121-146, p. 130; Wladimir Andreff, ‘Corporate 
Governance of Privatized Enterprises in Transforming Economies: A Theoretical Approach’, Moct-Most, 6 
(1996), 59-80, p. 59.
26 Mladek, ‘Different Paths’, p. 130.
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privileges to insiders was ideologically opposed by the government and the population as 
a whole, for this discriminates against employees in sectors not to be privatised, and 
perpetuates injustices from the previous system configured to benefit those who may not 
have merited it.27 Instead, Klaus hoped that Czech privatisation would encourage the 
emergence of new owners to undertake the necessary restructuring of firms, precluding 
government-directed restructuring of firms prior to asset sales.28
Many analogies can be drawn between the inspiration for the Czech programme and the 
privatisation experiences of developed market economies in the 1980s, despite Klaus 
claiming to recognise that
[standard measures, such as those used in the past in the UK, are insufficient for a 
transfer of so much property which is conditional on fundamental changes in the 
function of the economy within the existing time constraints.29
Benefits could be expected to accrue from mirroring such conditions because
27 Vaclav Klaus, O TvarZttrka (Rok Devadesaty) (Praha: Praza Imaginace, 1991), pp. 60-61; Martin 
Kupka, ‘Transformation of Ownership in Czechoslovakia’, Soviet Studies, 44 (1992), 297-311, pp. 306, 
309; Appel, ‘Justice’, p. 30.
28 Vaclav Klaus, Ekonomicka Veda a Ekonomicka Reforma. State, Eseje (Praha: Gennex/TOP Agency, 
1991), p. 270; Thomas W. Hazlett, ‘The Czech Miracle: Why Privatization Went Right in the Czech 
Republic’, Reason, 26 (11) (1995), 28-35. Academic Search Elite. EBSCO Publishing. 17 June 1999. 
<http://www.global.epnet.com/hosttrial/login.html>, [n.p.].
29 Vaclav Klaus, ‘Economic Reform in Czechoslovakia and the Role of Foreign Assistance’, in Financial 
Strategies and Public Policies. Banking, Insurance and Industry, edited by Zuhayr Mikdashi (Basingstoke: 
St Martins Press, 1993), pp. 90-94, p. 92.
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[privatisation has an important demonstration effect. The more successful 
privatisation is perceived to have been in achieving its objectives, the more likely 
governments will be either to continue or step up their privatisation efforts.30
Nonetheless, privatisation in the Czech Republic was introduced into an institutionally 
distorted economy, so it is questionable whether the efforts of the Klaus government to 
mimic privatisation experiences from other countries were appropriate.31 It appears from 
the design of the Czech programme that the extent of such institutional differences was
underestimated at the outset of the transformation. Klaus believed that market forces
would operate to bring efficiency gains from privatisation and restructuring, as predicted 
by neo-classical economics, and did not expect that the outcomes of privatisation would 
differ in the Czech Republic from those of other countries with similar programmes. In 
practice, insufficient adaptations were made to counter the institutional pressures, which 
had the effect of discouraging restructuring in former state-owned enterprises undergoing 
privatisation, to the detriment of the overall operation of privatisation and the
transformation as a whole.
Klaus subsequently commented on such problems upon recognising that whilst many
30 Barrie Stevens, ‘Prospects for Privatisation in OECD Countries’, National Westminster Quarterly 
Review, August 1992, 2-22, p. 11.
31 Andras Inotai, ‘Experience with Privatization in East Central Europe’, in Privatization: Symposium in 
Honor of Herbert Giersch, edited by Horst Siebert, Institut fur Weltwirtschafit an der Universitat Kiel 
(Tubingen: Mohr, 1992), pp. 163-182, p. 163.
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Western countries and some developing countries have also embarked on 
privatisation ... [u]nfortunately and surprisingly, it has almost nothing in common 
with the task we face. The experience accumulated during such a process may be 
misleading when used in the context of transformation in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Privatization in our case does not mean the standard shift of property 
rights between two (or more) well-defined economic agents but the establishment 
of a property rights structure that was previously either non existent or very strange. 
Privatizing in the West may be viewed as a “reform” process. In the East, however, 
privatization is the most fundamental objective of a systemic transformation. 
Looked at that way, privatization in the post-communist world is not a process by 
which property changes hands. Rather, it is the process by which the “non-owner” 
or quasi-owner, the government, transfers the “non-assets” to their initial owners 
and by doing so “creates” the “assets”.32
Such recognition does not preclude the design of voucher privatisation being premised on 
neo-classical economic orthodoxy, but institutional influences on the transformation 
meant that some adaptations to the institutional environment were needed in its 
conception and operation. This was seen most clearly in the need to overcome financial 
limitations to individual participation, so a composite programme was desired where
32 Vaclav Klaus, Renaissance: The Rebirth of Liberty in the Heart of Europe (Washington: Cato Institute, 
1997), pp. 70-71.
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[t]he first stage is the commercialization of the existing state firms, their 
transformation into the privatizable form, which means the creation of state joint 
stock companies in the crucial part of the Czechoslovak economy by means of 
auctions. This is a standard procedure. We have, however, one specific addition to 
it. Because of the lack of domestic capital, it will be necessary to augment the 
wealth of the population by distributing free a part of state property in the form of 
vouchers to the population at large. After that it would be possible to start the 
exchange of vouchers for the shares of the state joint stock companies.33
The result was a mass privatisation programme favourably oriented to domestic 
participation, and creating a new class of entrepreneurs34 that satisfied the socio-political 
demands of the transformation by engendering greater levels of support for the reforms, 
even if this involved some economic costs.35
Five methods of privatisation were defined for Czech privatisation;36 restitution, 
municipalisation, transformation of cooperatives, and small-scale and large-scale 
privatisation. These latter two distinctions were devised on the basis of assimilated 
Western advice that such a dichotomous approach is needed to account for the differing
33 Klaus, A Road to Market Economy, pp. 21-22.
34 Marie Lavigne, The Economics of Transition: From Socialist Economy to Market Economy
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 166,167-168.
35 Lina Takla, ‘The Relationship Between Privatization and the Reform of the Banking System: The Case of 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia’, in Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe, edited by Saul Estrin 
(Harlow: Longman, 1994), pp. 154-175, p. 155; CIPE/USIA, Privatizing State Owned Companies, 
Prosperity Paper, 3. 11 March 1999. <http://www.cipe.org/prosperity/pp3.html>, [n.p.].
36 Jan Mladek, ‘Voucher Privatisation in the Czech Republic and Slovakia’, in Mass Privatisation: An 
Initial Assessment, edited by Stilpon Nestor (Paris: OECD/CCET, 1995), pp. 61-85, p. 64.
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nature of assets, requiring alternative approaches for their transfer into the private sector 
within the overall privatisation programme.37 The inclusion of any given assets in one of 
these approaches was not made according to any predefined criteria but rather by 
reference to the speed and ease by which their divestiture was expected to occur.
Retail and service assets tended to comprise the core of those included in the small-scale 
programme, and incorporated assets available to be privatised with little or no pre­
privatisation restructuring. Divisible assets from large plants not viable for privatisation 
in their entirety have been incorporated into this process.
Large-scale privatisation was the main approach to privatisation in the industrial 
manufacturing sector, and quantitatively the most important method for asset 
divestiture.38 It was to facilitate the transfer of large, indivisible assets into private 
ownership with limited pre-privatisation restructuring. The central element of this was 
mass privatisation through the use of vouchers.
Before considering voucher privatisation in more detail, the procedures of restitution and 
small-scale privatisation are outlined, as these were techniques applied to some firms in 
the manufacturing sector, and even with firms where some assets were included in 
voucher privatisation, as privatisation methods were not mutually exclusive. Amongst
37 Stanley Fischer, ‘Privatization In East European Transformation’, in The Emergence of Market 
Economies in Eastern Europe edited by Christopher Clague and Gordon C. Rausser (Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell, 1992), pp. 227-243, p. 227.
38 Evzen Kodenda, ‘Stdt Soukromikem’, Ekonom, 18-24 November 1999,22-23, p. 22.
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the case-study firms, this applied to the Drazitest state-owned enterprise. It is therefore 
important to discuss these elements of privatisation because they help to determine the 
institutional environment within which voucher privatisation occurred. By offering 
alternative forms of asset transfer and divestiture, varying patterns of incentives to change 
are created amongst new owners. These also ensured that some privatisation was 
experienced within the economy before large-scale privatisation began, and helped create 
the institution of private property. Both were important institutional catalysts to 
encouraging and supporting transformation and particularly restructuring within 
enterprises as privatisation occurs. Municipalisation and the transformation of co­
operatives are not discussed further since these forms of ownership are rarely applicable 
to the assets being privatised in this sector and do not feature in the case study firms.
3.2.1 Restitution.
One form of property transfers concerns property appropriated prior to nationalisation 
under Communist rule, with the original owners entitled to have these assets returned, or
receive compensation through restitution where this was not possible.
In Czechoslovakia this was intended to be more than a symbolic gesture,39 but rather the 
government’s response to the perceived need to satisfy equity considerations by 
compensating Czechoslovak citizens for the nationalisation of their property in the 1940s
39 Kupka, ‘Transformation of Ownership’, p. 301.
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and 1950s.40 It was supplemented by compensation payments offered for other injustices, 
such as the confiscation of assets belonging to former political prisoners, and substituted 
for direct restitutions where it was now optimal to retain continuity in ownership from the 
time of nationalisation.41 Such moral arguments and the justification that the original 
owners should be given the opportunity to return to their former activities also had a 
political benefit. By reducing the amount of property remaining in state ownership, 
restitution increases support for transformation by expanding the property-owning class, 
and promotes opportunities for other private ventures.42
Speed was to be emphasised in all aspects of the Czechoslovak programme, but the 
intensive administrative demands of the restitution procedure slowed the privatisation 
processes.43 Determining whether or not restitution should be undertaken, followed by 
extensive discussions on how this should be achieved, meant that the first restitution law 
did not appear until 1990. This was Act 298/1990 “On Regulations of Property Relations 
of Religious Orders and Congregations and the Archdiocese of Olomouc”, and was 
followed by three further laws: Act 403/1990 “Mitigation of Property Related Injustices
40 Bernard Wheaton and Zdenek Kavan, The Velvet Revolution: Czechoslovakia, 1988-1991 (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1992), p. 156. Details of some of the terms for offering compensation are given in Roman 
Frydman et al, Privatization Process in Central Europe, p. 77.
41 Mladek, ‘Different Paths’, pp. 123-124.
42 Martin Myant, Transforming Socialist Economies: The Case of Poland and Czechoslovakia (Aldershot: 
Elgar, 1993), p. 229; Morris Bomstein, ‘Non-Standard Methods in the Privatisation Strategies of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland’, Economics of Transition, 5 (1997), 323- 338, p. 324; John S. Earle, Scott 
G. Gehlbach, Zuzana Sakova and Jiff Vecernik, Mass Privatization, Distributive Politics, and Popular 
Support for Reform in the Czech Republic, Institute of Sociology Working Paper, 4 (Prague: Academy of 
Sciences of the Czech Republic, 1997), p. 22.
43 Vic Duke and Keith Grime, ‘Privatization in East-Central Europe: Similarities and Contrasts in its 
Application’, in The New Great Transformation? Change and Continuity in East-Central Europe, edited 
by Christopher G. A. Bryant and Edmund Mokrzycki (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 144-170, p. 152; 
Earle et al, Mass Privatization, p. 22.
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(Small-Scale Reprivatisation Law), Act 87/1991 “On Out-of-Court Rehabilitations 
(Large-Scale Reprivatisation Law) and Act 229/1991 “On Regulation of Ownership of 
Land and Other Agricultural Property”.44
Property that was subject to verification of restitution claims was ineligible to be entered 
into any other privatisation procedures until the claim was settled. Overlap between the 
establishment of legal provisions for restitution and the start of small-scale privatisation, 
with problems exacerbated by a need for court settlements over competing claims meant 
that some privatisations under the small and large-scale programmes had to be delayed.45
As an aspect of privatisation, restitution can be criticised for a number of other reasons.46 
Eligibility was restricted to resident Czechoslovak citizens whose property had been 
nationalised between February 25 1948 and January 1 1990. Using the date of the 
Communist accession to power avoided the issue of the Sudeten Germans who had lost 
property after the end of the Second World War as well as other property seizures that 
had occurred since 1938 after the Munich Agreement. The restriction on citizenship also 
excluded Czech emigres from claiming restitution unless they would return and take up 
permanent residency again.47 Also, despite the objective of restitution to encourage
44 Act 298/1990 Zakon o Uprave Nekterych Majetkovych Vztahu Reholnich Radu a Kongregaci a 
Arcibiskupstvi Olomouckeho', Act 403/1990 Zakon o Zmirneni Nasledku Nekterych Majetkovych Kfivd’, Act 
87/1991 Zakon o Mimosoudnich Rehabilitacich’, Act 229/1991 Zakon o Uprave Vlastnickych Vztahu k 
Pude a Jinemu Zemedelskemu Majetku', Roman Frydman et al, Privatization Process in Central Europe, 
pp. 50-51, 72.
45 Mladek, ‘Different Paths’, pp. 122, 124, 126.
46 Kupka, ‘Transformation of Ownership’, p. 301; Bomstein, ‘Non-Standard Methods’, p. 324.
47 Mladek, ‘Different Paths’, pp. 122,126; John S. Earle, Roman Frydman, Andrzej Rapaczynski, Joel 
Turkewitz, Small Privatization: The Transformation of Retail Trade and Consumer Services in the Czech
90
entrepreneurial activity, the emergence of a new business class may be hindered if the 
new owners of restituted property no longer have the incentive or capital to use this 
resource, with the current users lacking the right to own this property.48 Meeting equity 
criteria is not always efficient, as this policy shows. There are very few alternatives 
available to the owners of restituted property, who can either manage the assets 
themselves or retain the existing users and devolve responsibility back to them. These 
alternatives risk a reduction in efficiency, and in the second scenario counters the equity 
principle of restitution. In rewarding the current enterprise insiders, it also contravenes 
the justice principle in the Czech scheme that does not give privileges to employees of 
enterprises to be privatised but stresses equality in access of all citizens to the 
privatisation process.49 Finally, it was not only those whose property was nationalised 
after the Communists came to power who were disadvantaged, since all suffered from the 
declining state of the economy, but restitutions bring asymmetry into the privatisation 
process, and may perpetuate new inequalities in wealth.
Restitution clearly demonstrates a political justification, but it may be detrimental to 
promoting restructuring because it can institutionalise ownership that precludes 
economically beneficial property transfers. Nevertheless, for property that was not
Republic, Hungary and Poland (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1994), pp. 59-61.
48 Saul Estrin, ‘Economic Transition and Privatization: The Issues’, m Privatization in Central and Eastern 
Europe, edited by Saul Estrin (Harlow: Longman, 1994), pp. 3-30, p. 26; Appel, ‘Justice’, p. 29.
49 Estrin, ‘Economic Transition’, p. 26; Dinko Dubravcic, ‘Entrepreneurial Aspects of Privatisation in 
Transition Economies’, 47 (1995), 305-316, p. 311-312; Jon Elster, Claus Offe, Ulrich K. Preuss with 
Frank Boenker, Ulrike Goetting and Friedbert W. Rueb, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies. 
Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 178.
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restituted there were other ways of transferring this from the state into private ownership, 
with techniques of small and large-scale privatisation set out below.
3.2.2 Small-Scale Privatisation.
Like restitution, small-scale privatisation was carried out under the auspices of local 
committees.50 Any property not subject to restitution, inclusion in large-scale 
privatisation, or held by the state for legally specified exemptions to privatisation could 
be offered for small-scale privatisation.51 A new legal framework for this programme 
was developed, centred on two laws; Act 427/1990 “The Transfer of State Property and 
Some Goods to Other Legal or Natural Persons”, and Act 500/1990 “Competencies of 
Czech Republic Governmental Bodies in the Matter of Transfer of State Property of 
Some Things to Other Legal or Physical Persons”.52 These governed the parameters and 
implementation of small-scale privatisation respectively.53
Sales and leasing of fonner state owned property and assets occurred under the small- 
scale privatisation programme by public cash auction, with the funds generated from this 
transferred to the NPF.54 Sales techniques familiar from ownership transfers in Western
50 Bolton and Roland, ‘Privatization Processes’, p. 283; Marko Simoneti, ‘A Comparative Review of 
Privatisation Strategies in Four Former Socialist Countries’, Europe-Asia Studies, 45 (1993), 79-102, p. 91.
51 Kupka, ‘Transformation of Ownership’, pp. 307-308.
52 Act 427/1990 Zdkon o Prevodech Vlastnictvi Statu k Nekterym Vecem Na Jine Pravnicke Nebo Fyzicke 
Osoby, Act 500/1990 Zdkon Ceske Narodni Rady o Pusobnosti Organu Ceske Republiky ve Vecech 
Prevodu Vlastnictvi Statu k Nekterym Vecem Na Jine Pravnicke Nebo Fyzicke Osoby.
53 A full description of the legal basis for this can be found in Earle et al, Small Privatization, pp. 59-61.
54 Bolton and Roland, ‘Privatization Processes’, p. 283; Frydman et al, Privatization Process in Central
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Europe were used, including direct sales to domestic or foreign investors, tenders, and 
auctions.55 These resulted in the rapid emergence of retail outlets and the provision of 
other services to fill niches that had been neglected or under-provided in the centrally 
planned economy.56 The first round of auctions was only open to domestic investors as 
part of the government’s commitment to creating a class of domestic entrepreneurs.57
Small-scale privatisation was regarded as successfully meeting its aims of a rapid and 
efficient reallocation of ownership rights to a large number of retail and service assets.58 
It covered the assets most amenable to privatisation by direct sales, which were those that 
could be divided into sufficiently small units affordable even by domestic investors. Also 
included were some assets and companies spun-off from larger enterprises.59 Most 
significant for long term restructuring is that the owners and managers of these firms are 
often synonymous or otherwise have closely-related interests, which brings benefits 
because it allows effective monitoring of managers by the new owners.60 Amongst the 
case study companies, only in the Drazitest state-owned enterprise were any of the assets 
privatised in this way. When the company was divided into five separate business units, 
three parts were purchased outright. Subsequently one of these companies underwent
Europe, p. 79.
55 Country-based studies of these methods in Eastern Europe can be found in Earle et al, Small 
Privatisation.
56 Earle et al, Small Privatisation, p. 67.
57 Jan Adam, ‘Transformation to a Market Economy in the Former Czechoslovakia’, Europe-Asia Studies, 
45 (1993), 627-645, p. 630; Raphael Shen, Economic Reform in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Lessons in 
Systemic Transformation (Westport: Praeger, 1993), p. 187; Earle et al, Small Privatization, pp. 68, 69.
58 Earle et al, Small Privatization, p. 74.
59 Josef Kotrba, ‘Privatisation Processes in the Czech Republic: Players and Winners’, in The Czech 
Republic and Economic Transition in Eastern Europe, edited by Jan Svenjar (San Diego: Academic Press, 
1995), pp. 159-198, p. 162.
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asset stripping by its management, but the other two have been able to use their purchases 
of physical capital from the parent plant to establish new and profitable companies. Of 
the remaining two business sections, one was dissolved and the other, Drazitest, 
privatised by voucher.
Techniques adopted under the small-scale programme could not be applied
indiscriminately to all asset divestitures. Privatisation also had to effect the transfer of 
huge amounts of property that was virtually impossible to value meaningfully from state 
ownership into the hands of a population of limited financial and technical means.60 1 
Instead, a mass privatisation approach had to be designed that would transfer ownership 
and so create new owners that were anticipated would take responsibility for restructuring 
the assets.62 This was the main, or only, privatisation technique adopted for all of the 
firms presented in the case studies. Theoretical projections are contrasted with the 
interview responses below to show how large-scale privatisation was intended to operate, 
and the ways in which institutions affect the actual outcomes.
60 Daniel Gros and Alfred Steinherr, Winds of Change: Economic Transformation in Central and Eastern 
Europe (London; Longman, 1995), p. 286.
61 Jezek, ‘Czechoslovak Experience’, p. 479; Roman Frydman, Kenneth Murphy and Andrzej Rapaczynski, 
Capitalism With a Comrade’s Face (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998), p. 183.
62 Kotrba, ‘Privatisation Processes’, p. 164.
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3.2.3 Large-Scale Privatisation.
Large-scale privatisation was based on a legal framework approved by Parliament in 
April 1991.63 Initially, state-owned enterprises were to be converted into joint stock 
companies through Act 111/1990 on corporatisation, with the Ministry of Privatisation 
transferring assets to be privatised to the National Property Fund (NPF).64 The NPF was 
intended to have a passive role as an interim holding company for the assets.65 Designed 
to give enterprises greater financial autonomy under continued state ownership, only 
around 100 enterprises were involved before this was abandoned in favour of an approach 
where the NPF was to hold shares in corporatised enterprises and take responsibility for 
corporate governance until privatisation is realised.66
Managers in enterprises listed for privatisation had to prepare a privatisation plan (basic 
project) detailing the proposed method(s) of privatisation for the enterprise as a whole, or 
for each combination of assets, along with information about the current financial state of 
the enterprise, and a business plan projecting its future development.67 Any other 
potential investors were also required to produce similar plans (competing projects) for
63 Act 92/1991 Zakon o Podminkach Prevodu Majetku Statu Na Jine Osoby (On Conditions and Terms 
Governing the Transfer of State Property to Other Persons)', Frydman et al, Privatization Process in 
Central Europe, p. 79.
64 Act 111/1990 Zakon o Statnim Podniku', Frydman et al, Privatization Process in Central Europe, p. 91; 
Simoneti, ‘Comparative Review’, p. 91.
65 Lastovifika et al, Privatization and Opening, p. 3.
66 Frydman et al, Privatization Process in Central Europe, p. 91.
67 Frydman et al, Privatization Process in Central Europe, pp. 80-81; Earle et al, Small Privatization, p. 79; 
Nemcova, ‘Lessons’, p. 44.
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the parts of the enterprise or assets they wished to acquire.68 All the plans were submitted 
to the Ministry of Privatisation and from these the proposed investors and privatisation 
method(s) were selected. This evaluation procedure was firstly performed by the branch 
ministry or local government, and their recommendations passed onto the Czech or 
Slovak Privatisation Ministry or Federal Finance Ministry, where a final decision on the 
preferred privatisation approach was made.69
Standard privatisation techniques including auctions, direct sales, tenders, and asset sales 
or transfers could be proposed for assets included in large-scale privatisation. However, 
these could not be relied upon exclusively70 because of the scale of the task and the 
constraints to be overcome in the transformation, especially the problem of valuation.71 
Once property rights have been assigned legally, asset valuation and corporatisation can 
follow, but there are attendant difficulties with this due to the weak financial and capital 
markets in the transformation environment.72 The financial legacy of the communist era 
made the valuation of firms to be privatised virtually impossible at the outset because the 
accounting system employed under central planning was meaningless outside this
68 Frydman et al, Privatization Process in Central Europe, p. 80; Earle et al, Small Privatization, p. 79.
69 Frydman et al, Privatization Process in Central Europe, p. 82; Mladek, ‘Voucher Privatisation’, p. 70.
70 Mladek, ‘Different Paths’, p. 130; Frydman et al, Privatization Process in Central Europe, p. 80.
71 Roman Frydman and Andrzej Rapaczynski, ‘Industrial Reform in Eastern Europe: Evolution or Design?’, 
Brigham Young University Law Review, 18(1) (1992), 1-21. Academic Search Elite. EBSCO Publishing. 
24 April 1999. <http://www.global.epnet.com/hosttrial/login.html>, [n.p.].
Vaclav Klaus, Proc Nejsem Socialnlm Demokratem (Olomouc: Votobia, 1998), p. 1998.
72 Kupka, ‘Transformation of Ownership’, p. 297; Scott Thomas, ‘The Politics and Economics of 
Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe’, Columbia Journal of World Business, 28 (1) (1993), 166-178. 
Academic Search Elite. EBSCO Publishing. 8 May 1999.
<http://www.global.epnet.com/hosttrial/login.html>, [n.p.].
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system. Even if an adjusted measure comparable to Western accounting standards
could be calculated, it was unclear how useful this would be. The historical performance 
of an enterprise operating under conditions of central planning is likely to have only 
limited predictive power over the firm’s potential future performance, with many 
technically bankrupt, and others with large outstanding liabilities.73 4 A non-standard 
variant, voucher privatisation, was designed to account for these conditions and 
supplement traditional measures in large-scale privatisation, and is described more fully
in section 3.3.
Constitutionally any approach to privatisation of assets included in large-scale 
privatisation was equally valid, in principle allowing for a heterogeneous approach to 
ownership transfers since any combination of asset divestiture techniques could be 
proposed in a privatisation plan.75 In practice, proposals electing to follow privatisation 
by voucher dominated those accepted. This was not necessarily because potential 
investors understood the implications of voucher privatisation or felt it was the optimal 
privatisation technique, but since projects were selected by the privatisation agency, the 
government retained some control over the process.76 The Privatisation Ministries were 
known to have preferences for certain methods as each brought different political and 
economic benefits.77 The timescale for plan approval was quite short,78 so plans to use
73 Bos, Privatization, p. 1; Arye L. Hillman, ‘Progress With Privatization’, Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 16 (1992), 733-749, p. 741.
74 Thomas, ‘Politics and Economics’, [n.p.].
75 Frydman et al, Privatization Process in Central Europe, p. 82.
76 Lastovicka et al, Privatization and Opening, p. 5.
77 Frydman et al, Privatization Process in Central Europe, p. 82.
78 Iraj Hashi and Alison Sinclair, ‘Managerial Behaviour and Supply of Shares in the Czech Voucher
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voucher were often preferred as these helped the Ministries meet the targets for the 
number of enterprises to be privatised in this way.79 The large number of proposals 
including voucher privatisation as shown in Table 3.1 could therefore have arisen because 
of the perceived likelihood of its eventual acceptance.80
Privatisation Programme’, Moct-Most, 6 (1996), 103-121, p. 108.
79 Vladimir Dlouhy and Jan Mladek, ‘Privatization and Corporate Control in the Czech Republic’, 
Economic Policy, 19 (Supplement) (1994), 156-170, p. 161; CIPEZUSIA, Privatizing State Owned 
Companies, [n.p.].
80 Archana Hingorani, Kenneth Lehn and Anil K. Makhija, ‘Investor Behaviour in Mass Privatisation: The 
Case of the Czech Voucher Scheme’, Journal of Financial Economics, 44 (1997), 349-396, p. 354.
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Table 3.1: Privatisation Methods for Joint-Stock Companies.
Privatisation Method Republic of JSC registration.3
% of shares offered by number of companies.
0 1-25 26-50 51-75 >75
Voucher
First Wave Czech 0 14 108 177 689
First Wave Slovak 0 7 2 49 419
Second Wave Czech 0 76 112 114 374
Direct Sale to Domestic 
Buyer
First Wave Czech 898 24 28 35 3
First Wave Slovak 472 11 9 10 1
Second Wave Czech 594 21 35 27 0
Direct Sale to Foreign 
Buyer
First Wave Czech 947 12 14 15 1
First Wave Slovak 493 2 5 2 0
Second Wave Czech 660 6 5 5 0
National Property Fund 
Temporary
First Wave Czech 658 217 83 17 3
First Wave Slovak 492 21 37 11 2
Second Wave Czech 479 100 55 25 17
National Property Fund 
Permanent
First Wave Czech 960 23 5 0 0
First Wave Slovak 472 3 17 6 0
Second Wave Czech 673 1 1 1 0
Free Transfer of Shares
First Wave Czech 806 179 2 1 0
First Wave Slovak 503 0 0 0 0
Second Wave Czech 482 159 4 3 29
a Voucher privatisation was only continued in the second wave in the Czech Republic. 
Source: Kotrba, ‘Privatisation Processes’, p. 181.
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Plans designed by the management were also most likely to be accepted, suggesting that 
insiders could exploit experience and information gained from their position in designing 
or submitting privatisation proposals, regardless of the ethics or legality of this.81 This 
affected the privatisation of Odraz KM where there was
a competing plan from the Odraz KM directors wanting the firm to be independent 
of Rukopis Strojimy, but Rukopis Strojimy heard of this and as they had much 
stronger government connections, the current plan prevailed. The main reason that 
Rukopis Strojimy could persuade the government of the need for their plan was the 
lack of independence of Odraz KM and its 56% production for Rukopis Strojimy 
(Odraz KM 1, Managing Director).
Another reason cited by the case study firms for selecting voucher privatisation was 
strategic, perceiving that
this was the only possibility at the time. There were no foreign owners interested in 
buying the firm, indeed not even any Czechs, so voucher privatisation was chosen 
(Presnost KM 1, Financial Planning Manager)
81 Marie Bohata, ‘Some Implications of Voucher Privatization for Corporate Governance’, Prague 
Economic Papers, 7 (1998), 59-65, p. 61; Nemcova, ‘Lessons’, pp. 44-45; Hilary Appel and John Gould, 
‘Identity Politics and Economic Reform: Examining Industry-State Relations in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics’, Europe-Asia Studies, 52 (2000), 111-131, p. 113.
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and in Rukopis Strojirny where it was through throughout the firm that “at the time there 
were no other ways to help the company and keep it alive” (Rukopis Strojirny 5, 
Assembly worker).
These are significant institutional constraints on the potential benefits of voucher 
privatisation, with firms potentially selecting this method not because it is anticipated to 
be the optimal privatisation solution from the perspective of restructuring, but because it 
offers the greatest chance of immediate survival for the firm.
3.3 PRIVATISATION BY VOUCHER.
Voucher privatisation was intended to be the dominant approach by which large-scale 
privatisation would be achieved in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic.82 This 
represented Klaus’ confidence in private ownership to promote efficiency and 
restructuring, despite voucher privatisation’s potentially incompatible aims of achieving 
dispersed ownership with effective control over enterprise insiders.83 Voucher 
privatisation was designed to effect the necessarily large volume of transfers given the 
dilemma of scarce resources for investment. Despite excessive forced saving under the 
centrally planned economy, potential problems of a monetary overhang were alleviated by
82 La§tovicka et al, Privatization and Opening, p. 3; Jan Hanousek and Eugene A. Kroch, ‘The Two Waves 
of Voucher Privatisation in the Czech Republic: A Model of Learning in Sequential Bidding’, Applied 
Economics, 30 (1998), 133-143, p. 133.
83 Roman Frydman and Andrzej Rapaczynski, Privatization in Eastern Europe: Is the State Withering 
Away? (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1994), p. 107; Jan Klacek and Vladislav Flek,
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absorption through small-scale privatisation purchases and inflation following price 
liberalisation. Instead, liquidity shortages and the absence or immature development of 
financial institutions meant that there would have been insufficient potential buyers to 
enable privatisation to occur effectively.84 Prices would have been forced down to very 
low levels if determined only by demand. Similarly, if all the assets were to be privatised 
simultaneously, a condition that would be required to meet equity concerns, the flooded 
market would suffer artificially depressed prices.85 This would encourage speculative 
purchases and possibly intensify asset stripping if whole units were purchased cheaply to 
gain access to any more valuable part.86 Also, at the time of sale there may be no buyers 
for enterprises valued at a positive price, given the quantity of property offered for sale, 
the uncertain viability of assets and the low availability of financial capital,87 creating the 
potential for too rapid a liquidation of firms that could be profitable in the long-term.88
Exacerbated by valuation difficulties and the absence of financial institutions,89 cash bids 
were therefore very problematic. Alternative methods of asset divestiture were required 
to cope with the volume of property to be privatised, and overcome the constraints faced 
by privatising under conditions of uncertainty with political and economic legacies that
Company Restructuring: The Czech Experience, Working Paper, 48 (Leuven: LICOS Centre for Transition 
Economics, 1995), p. 1.
84 Thomas, ‘Politics and Economics’, [n.p.].
85 Yudit Kiss, ‘Privatization Paradoxes in East Central Europe’, East European Politics and Society, 8 
(1994), 122-152, p. 146.
86 Blanchard et al, Reform in Eastern Europe, pp. xiv, 37; Thomas, ‘Politics and Economics’, [n.p.]; 
Frydman et al, Capitalism With a Comrade’s Face, p. 13.
87 Hillman, ‘Progress With Privatization’, p. 734; Gros and Steinherr, Winds of Change, p. 186.
88 Raj M. Desai, ‘Reformed Banks and Corporate Governance in the Czech Republic, 1991-1996’, Post­
Soviet Geography and Economics, 37 (1996), 463-494, p. 464.
89 Aureliusz M. Pedziwol, ‘The Great Game of Privatization’, Transition, 3 (1) (1997), 36-40, p. 36.
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created institutional constraints.90 Distributing vouchers that were subsequently 
convertible into shares of formerly state-owned property was to help augment the wealth 
of the population.91 Making these transferable also helped lay the foundations for 
functioning capital markets and related institutions to emerge,92 which could 
subsequently provide additional financial resources for restructuring. Other benefits 
anticipated for voucher privatisation were that it would promote domestic ownership 
whilst allowing companies to potentially gain access to global capital markets through 
financial assistance and expertise transfers at the board level.93 It was also designed to 
bring support for other reforms by linking citizens’ interests to economic performance 
through their individual asset holdings, and directly tying the interests of beneficiaries of 
reform to a continuation of the government’s reform policies.94
Before looking at whether this brings the desired restructuring and the institutional
90 Stanislaw Gomulka, ‘Economic and Political Constraints During Transition’, Europe-Asia Studies, 46 
(1994), pp. 89-106, p. 97. Obstacles to divestment of former state owned assets in Eastern Europe are 
summarised in JozefM. van Brabant, ‘On the Economics of Property Rights and Privatisation in 
Transitional Economies’, in Privatisation Policy and Performance: International Perspectives edited by 
Paul Cook and Colin Kirkpatrick (Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1995), pp. 48­
83, pp. 63-69.
91 Klaus, ‘Main Obstacles’, p. 87; Radek Lastovicka, Anton Marcincin, and Michal Mejstrik, ‘Corporate 
Governance and Share Prices in Voucher Privatised Companies’, in The Czech Republic and Economic 
Transition in Eastern Europe, edited by Jan Svenjar (San Diego: Academic Press, 1995), pp. 199-209, p. 
200; Bomstein, ‘Non-Standard Methods’, p. 330-331.
92 Gerhard Fink and Peter Haiss, ‘Seven Years of Financial Market Reform in Central Europe’, in 
Corporate Governance in Central and Eastern Europe: Transition Management is a Tough Job, edited by 
Debora Revotella, Peter R. Haiss and Gerhard Fink (Amsterdam: SUERF, 1998), pp. 57-91, p. 83.
93 Roman Frydman and Andrzej Rapaczynski, ‘Markets and Institutions in Large-Scale Privatization: An 
Approach to Economic and Social Transformation in Eastern Europe’, in Reforming Central and Eastern 
European Economies: Initial Results and Challenges, edited by Vittorio Corbo, Fabrizio Coricelli and Jan 
Bossak (Washington: The World Bank, 1991), pp. 253-274, p. 270.
94 Frydman and Rapaczynski, ‘Industrial Reform’ [n.p.]; Jan Mladek and Iraj Hashi, ‘Voucher Privatisation, 
Investment Funds and Corporate Governance in Czechoslovakia’, British Review of Economic Issues, 15 
(37) (1993), 67-95, p. 69; Klaus, Ekonomicke Teorie, p. 12; Jiri Pehe, ‘Czechs Fall From Their Ivory 
Tower’, Transitions 4 (3) (1997), 22-27, p. 23.
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influences on the outcomes, the way in which voucher privatisation operated is detailed
below.
3.3.1 Participation In Voucher Privatisation.
Individuals participated in the voucher privatisation scheme by purchasing a booklet of 
vouchers denominated in various point values for Kc 35, which was then registered for 
Kc 1,000. As mass participation was one of the primary aims of this scheme these 
charges were only levied to cover administrative costs to prevent participation from being 
financially prohibitive for most eligible citizens.95 Possessing significant amounts of 
accumulated income was generally regarded as an indication either of links to the KSC or 
some form of illegal behaviour, so higher entry costs into the process would have been 
perceived as favouring those who had prospered under the previous regime.96 It was also 
argued that the population had endured extensive, forced deferred consumption under the 
Communists to permit the accumulation of assets now being privatised. Consequently 
they should now be transferred to the population without their having to repurchase 
property that they were meant to already own, but which right had previously been
95 Eligible participants in voucher privatisation were Czechoslovak citizens over 18 years of age. Josef C. 
Brada, ‘The Mechanics of the Voucher Plan in Czechoslovakia’, RFE/RL Research Report, 1(17) (24 April 
1992), 42-45, p. 43; Mladek, ‘Different Paths’, p. 131; John C. Coffee, ‘Institutional Investors in 
Transitional Economies: Lessons from the Czech Experience’, in Corporate Governance in Central Europe 
and Russia, 1: Banks, Funds and Foreign Investors, edited by Roman Fiydman, Cheryl W. Gray and 
Andrzej Rapaczynski (Budapest: Central European Press, 1996), pp. 111-186, p. 123.
96 Inotai, ‘Experience with Privatization’, p. 168; Timothy Ash, Paul Hare and Anna Canning, ‘Privatisation 
in the Formerly Centrally Planned Economies’, in Privatisation and Regulation: A Review of the Issues, 
edited by Peter M. Jackson and Catherine Price (Harlow: Longman, 1994), pp. 213-236, p. 220.
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exercised by the state on their behalf.97 Despite the political benefits of a free distribution 
of shares, a registration charge could perform a screening function and thus accelerate the 
development of a property-owning class.98 However, the minimal fee in the Czech case 
is unlikely to have had much disincentive effect for any investors.99
Large-scale voucher privatisation in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic occurred in 
two waves, with five and six rounds respectively. Registration for the first wave took 
place between November 1 1991 and February 17 1992. Vouchers could be deposited 
with IPFs between March 1 and April 26. Bidding began on May 18 and the fifth round 
of bidding ended on December 4 1992, with shares distributed on May 25 1993. In the 
second round, which applied only in the Czech Republic, registration occurred between 
October 1 and December 8 1993. Depositing shares with IPFs took place between 
December 15 1993 and March 9 1994. Bidding began on April 11 1994 and ended in late 
1994, with share distributions from this round in early 1995.100
Voucher points were used in bids for shares to determine their allocation amongst 
investors in the absence of an appropriate a priori valuation mechanism.101 All enterprise
97 Jan Adam, Social Costs of Transformation to a Market Economy in Post-Socialist Countries: The Cases 
of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 174-175.
98 Klaus, O Tvar Zitrka, p. 59.
99 John S. Earle and Scott G. Gehlbach, Privatization Policy Design and Popular Support for Reform in the 
Czech Republic, 5th Nobel Symposium in Economics - The Economics of Transition, 10-12 September 
1999 (Stockholm: SITE, 1999). 3 October 2000. <http://www.hhs.se/site/Publications/Nol41web.pdf>, p. 
10.
100 Kotrba, ‘Privatisation Processes’, p. 172.
101 For a detailed discussion of voucher privatisation in Czechoslovakia, from registration and bidding to 
share allocations, see Brada, ‘Mechanics of the Voucher Plan’, pp. 43-44; Frydman et al, Privatization 
Process in Central Europe, pp. 84-85; Coffee, ‘Institutional Investors’, pp. 118-145.
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shares were initially assigned a “price” proportional to the book value of the firm102 to 
eliminate too wide a variation in returns to the constant set of voucher points available for 
individuals to invest, rather than allowing demand and supply to determine the initial 
prices. Vouchers could be offered in blocks of 1,000 points during a specified 2-week 
period for shares at this notional value. If excess demand was less than 25% of the total
number of shares offered, the market was deemed to have cleared and all the shares are 
issued.103 With excess supply, any shares bid for were issued and the remaining shares 
offered in a subsequent round at a lower price. No sales were made when excess demand 
exceeded supply by more than 25%. Instead a new issue was made at a higher price in 
subsequent rounds until a clearing price was achieved.
Generating activism by the population to become investors was a problem for the Czech 
government despite the low barriers to entry into this programme. Having no experience 
of active participation in enterprise monitoring, many saw few incentives to participation 
in voucher privatisation because they did not understand the role of shareholders, so the 
first deadline for registering voucher books had to be extended to increase
participation.104 Individual private investors faced weak incentives for participation 
because the costs of assimilating information limit their ability to make rational
102 Myant, Transforming Socialist Economies, pp. 241-242.
IO3Individuals have priority over intermediaries in the allocation of shares in this instance. Frydman et al, 
Privatization Process in Central Europe, p. 85; Mladek, ‘Different Paths’, p. 131.
104 Coffee, ‘Institutional Investors’, p. 123; Bruno Dallago, ‘Between Spontaneity and Economic 
Engineering: Path Dependence in the Process of Economic Transition’, in Economic Developments and 
Reforms in Cooperation Partner Countries: The Social and Human Dimension, edited by Reiner Weichardt 
(Brussels: NATO Economic Directorate and Office of Information, 1997), pp. 73-86, p. 79.
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investment decisions.105 Until November 1991, only 25% of the eligible population 
expressed an interest in participation, compounded by the transformation bringing 
negative economic and social effects for much of the population in the short-run that did 
not encourage investment.106 Incentives for participation only increased with the 
involvement of institutional intermediaries collectively representing shareholders, despite 
the intention for vouchers to encourage the emergence of financial markets, leading to 
one respondent to comment that
for most people the stock exchange was unknown and most did not want to 
participate and did not know what to do, so they gave them to the companies to 
invest as they knew what to do with them, just to get back their Kc 1,000 (Cisaf 1, 
Trade Union President).
By spreading the risks of information collection, institutional investors eliminate 
prohibitively expensive information gathering and dissemination facing individuals and 
therefore facilitate post-privatisation restructuring.107 They can derive economies of scale 
from this, creating sufficient incentives to exercise corporate governance.108 Individual 
investors expect to benefit from the investment expertise of financial institutions, as
105 Mladek and Hashi, ‘Voucher Privatisation’, pp. 68, 74.
106 Cyril C. Ling, ‘The Development of the Automobile Industry in Eastern Europe’, in Firm Behavior in 
Emerging Market Economies: Cases from the Private and Public Sectors in Central and Eastern Europe, 
edited by Daniel S. Fogel (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), pp. 23-52, p. 35.
107 Paul J. J. Welfens, Market-Oriented Systemic Transformation in Eastern Europe: Problems, Theoretical 
Issues and Policy Outcomes (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1992), p. 124; David Ellerman, Voucher 
Privatisation -with Investment Funds: An Institutional Analysis, Policy Research Working Paper, 1924 
(Washington: The World Bank, 1998), p. 1.
108 Mladek and Hashi, ‘Voucher Privatisation’, pp. 72-74.
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intermediaries should be better placed to find and use information about enterprises than 
individuals, therefore following more rational investment strategies.109
The Czech government did not set out to establish such intermediaries,110 envisaging that 
they would emerge as independent private institutions with incentives correspondingly 
different from those of the state privatisation agencies.111 In the Czech case there were 
investment privatisation funds (IPFs) founded either by individuals or by investment 
companies (ICs), usually another financial institution or corporation.112 113Over 430 IPFs 
were established for the first wave of voucher privatisation, and an additional 120 for the 
second wave, although the number of founders was less since each could be licensed to 
sponsor more than one IPF, provided all legal requirements on their establishment were 
met.114 By January 1992 overall participation rates in voucher privatisation had risen to 
55% and eventually reached 75% of the eligible population115 after some of the IPFs
109 Roland Egerer, Capital Markets, Financial Intermediaries, and Corporate Governance: An Empirical 
Assessment of the Top Ten Voucher Funds in the Czech Republic, Policy Research Working Paper, 1555 
(Washington: The World Bank, 1995), p. 3.
110 Kristin A. DeKuiper, ‘The Development and Regulation of Investment Funds in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics: A Case Study on the Use of Intermediaries in the Privatisation Process’, in Privatization in 
Eastern Europe: Legal, Economic and Social Aspects, edited by Hans Smit and Vratislav Pechota 
(Irvington-on-Hudson: Transnational Juris, 1994), pp. 74-91, p. 87; Michal Mejstrik, Czech Investment 
Funds as a Part of Financial Sector and their Role in Privatization of the Economy, Reform Round Table, 
Working Paper, 14 (Prague: Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University, 1994), p. 4.
111 Frydman et al, Capitalism With a Comrade’s Face, p. 26.
112 Karla Brom and Mitchell Orenstein, ‘The Privatised Sector in the Czech Republic: Government and 
Bank Control in a Transitional Economy’, Europe-Asia Studies, 46 (1994), 893-928, p. 904; Egerer, 
Capital Markets, p. 6.
113 Cheryl W. Gray, In Search of Owners: Lessons of Experience with Privatization and Corporate 
Governance in Transition Economies, Policy Research Working Paper, 1595 (Washington: World Bank, 
1996), p. 23.
114 Egerer, Capital Markets, p. 3; Coffee, ‘Institutional Investors’, pp. 124-126; Stijn Claessens, Simeon 
Djankov and Gerhard Pohl, Ownership and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Czech Republic, 
Policy Research Working Paper, 1737 (Washington: The World Bank, 1997), p. 3.
1,5 Coffee, ‘Institutional Investors’, p. 123.
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“monetized the gains and established a short-term profit that motivated citizens”116 by 
offering to buy back voucher booklets at a guaranteed price at a future date.117
The IPFs competed with each other to acquire voucher points from individuals who 
exchanged these for shares in the funds that then invested these points in privatising 
enterprises.118 These two avenues were not mutually exclusive and investors could at 
their discretion opt to directly invest any proportion of their voucher points individually 
and offer the remainder to the IPFs, so a lack of expertise did not preclude 
participation.119
As can be seen from Table 3.2, many investors opted to deposit at least some of their 
voucher points with the intermediaries, especially in the first wave. The smaller number 
of voucher points held by the largest ICs in the second wave partly reflects an increase in 
the number of intermediaries in existence, and that this wave did not occur in Slovakia. 
However, the total number of shares held by all intermediaries in the second wave was 
fewer, possibly indicating that investors preferred to invest directly in enteiprises during 
this wave. This could reflect either dissatisfaction with the performance of the IPFs, or 
participants feeling that they had gained sufficient experience in the first wave and now 
preferred to select their own investment portfolios.120
116 Coffee, ‘Institutional Investors’, p. 124.
117 Sweder van Wijnbergen and Anton Marcinin, Voucher Privatization, Corporate Control and the Cost of 
Capital: An Analysis of the Czech Privatization Programme, CEPR Discussion Paper, 1215 (London: 
CEPR, 1995), p. 21; Coffee, ‘Institutional Investors’, pp. 117, 124,129.
118 Gray, In Search of Owners, p. 23; Claessens et al, Ownership and Corporate Governance, p. 3.
119 DeKuiper, ‘Development and Regulation’, p. 76; Lastovicka et al, ‘Coiporate Governance’, p. 200.
120 Mejstrik, Czech Investment Funds, pp. 18, 20.
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Table 3.2: Largest Investment Companies By Number of Voucher Points Collected.
First Wave" Second Waveb
Cesk& SpoFitelna 950 million Fondy Agrobanky 320 million
Prvnl Investifinl 714 million Expandia (Chemapol) 306 million
Harvard Capital and Consulting 639 million Harvard Capital and Consulting 292 million
VSeobecna Uv5rov& Banka Invest 501 million Kvanto (CS Obchodni Banka) 198 million
IKS Komerdni Banka 466 million KIS Ceskft PojiSt’ovna 187 million
KIS Ceska PojiSt’ovna 334 million IS Enterprises 157 million
Creditanstalt 220 million YSE 156 million
Slovenskd Investice 188 million II. Czech Coupon Invest 152 million
VS2-Slovensk& Sporitel’fia 169 million Ceskd SpoFitelna 124 million
Prvft Sloven ska InvestiCni 136 million IKS Komerdni Banka 124 million
Prvnf PrivatizaCnl Fond 118 million Morce Investidni Spolednost 113 million
2ivonstensk& Banka 118 million Prvnl PrivatizaCnl Fond >100 million
Slovensko Poist’ovfta 117 million InvestiCnl Banka 98 million
Agrobanka 112 million CS Fondy 94 million
Creditanstalt >80 million
Credit Suisse First Boston 70 million
Trend 65 million
2ivnostensk& Banka 60 million.
Total Number of Voucher Points 8541 million Total Number of Voucher Points 6160 million
"Czech and Slovak IPFs.
bCzech IPFs only.
Sources: Brom and Orenstein, ‘Privatised Sector in the Czech Republic’, pp. 907, 910; Dlouhy and Mladek, 
‘Privatization and Corporate Control’, p. 168; Otradovec, YSEFunds, [n.p.].
That the institutional environment that IPFs and the firms they represent are situated 
within influences their practical impact has consequent implications for how restructuring 
proceeds in voucher privatised enterprises. The governance role of IPFs in post­
privatisation restructuring of Czech enterprises is discussed further in the following 
chapter. The final section in this chapter considers the institutional framework for 
enterprise restructuring as the goal ultimately desired by Klaus’ government for the 
voucher privatisation scheme.
110
3.4 INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES AND VOUCHER PRIVATISATION.
In order to ascertain the role that formal privatisation policies have in promoting 
restructuring in firms after privatisation, reference needs to be made to institutions
because the
simultaneous restructuring of firms and reformulation of property and contracting 
rights may have less to do with the simple transfer of ownership from the state to 
private unitary actors than with the political deliberations about how risks and 
responsibilities will be borne by the actors, institutions and social relationships that 
have grown up around the assets into an economic whole.121
Neo-classical economic theory predicts that privatisation would alter the incentive 
structure facing actors linked to firms so that they respond to economic stimuli to achieve 
greater efficiency. Constraints in the institutional environment can limit the anticipated 
benefits of privatisation, whether because of failings in the design of the privatisation 
process or because of other inherited conditions, and the extent to which these could 
affect the design and application of privatisation in the Czech Republic are the concern of 
the remainder of this chapter.
121 McDermott, ‘Renegotiating the Ties that Bind’, p. 76.
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In deciding how the privatisation process should be organised in transformational 
economies, state involvement may be promoted to ensure that the state retains control 
over the transformation as a whole. Alternatively, advocates of free-markets look to the 
failings of attempts to impose economic systems and claim that as markets emerge 
spontaneously, privatisation should be driven by demand and supply.122 Regardless of 
which approach guides privatisation, in practice the role of the state is crucial in 
determining the outcome of privatisation and restructuring of enterprises. This is not only 
through the establishment of policies and institutional arrangements, but also in ensuring 
that these function effectively and the legal provisions embodied within them are upheld. 
State involvement in privatisation is therefore required, whether the programme is 
government- or market-led. Legislation in the economy consequently provides an 
important formal institutional influence on the scope of privatisation and restructuring, 
with informal institutions and the enforcement aspect of these consequent in part on state 
intervention. This is part of a more generic reality that the outcomes of post-privatisation 
restructuring are conditional on the institutional environment within which they occur, 
and for understanding this, the embedded institutionalism framework has been developed
in this work.
With government-led privatisation a central agency is charged with restructuring 
enterprises into a form potentially viable in a market environment before selling them to 
core investors with a long-term commitment to investment and future restructuring. This
122 Keith Grime and Vic Duke, ‘A Czech on Privatization’, Regional Studies, 27 (1993), 751-757; pp. 752­
753.
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is the model of the German Treuhandanstalt, which employed extensive state and 
institutional intervention for pre-privatisation restructuring.123 The emphasis on 
restructuring is supported with financial assistance and other expertise from the former 
West Germany.124 Adopted under very specific circumstances, this has not been used 
elsewhere.125
Market-led models at the other extreme use sales of shares or property to distribute assets. 
A version of this approach has been adopted for the Czech Republic where the architects 
of the programme intended there to be minimal intervention by the state. Privatisation 
was applied to the vast majority of formerly state-owned enterprises in Czechoslovakia 
and the Czech Republic because of Klaus’ belief in this as a means to encourage the 
emergence of a dynamic market economy126 comprising efficiently owned and 
structurally organised enterprises. In principle, the assets of enterprises accepted for 
large-scale privatisation were passed from the founding ministry to the Fund of National 
Property (NPF) of the Czech or Slovak Republics.127 The enterprises so controlled were 
meant to be privatised fully within 5 years, with the NPF taking responsibility for 
governance in the intervening period and having an ownership role once partial 
privatisation has occurred.128
123 Wendy Carlin and Colin Meyer, ‘Restructuring Enterprises in Eastern Europe’, Economic Policy, 15 
(1992), 311-352, p. 313.
124 Ash et al, ‘Privatisation in the Formerly Centrally Planned Economies’, p. 218.
125 Lavigne, Economics of Transition, p. 160.
126 David Stark, ‘Path-Dependence and Privatization Strategies in East Central Europe’, East European 
Politics and Society, 6 (1992), pp. 17-54, p. 23.
127 These replaced the Federal Fund of National Property, established by Act 92/1991 for the same purpose.
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As this thesis shows, institutional constraints mean that unlike the predictions of neo­
classical economics based on frictionless markets, subsequent enterprise restructuring is 
not guaranteed after privatisation. Privatisation is not a panacea to alter expectations and 
mentalities, as privatisation policies only deal with the transfer of assets. Path- 
dependency and embeddedness ensure that the actual outcomes in firms depend on the 
influence of legacies and persistent mentalities of actors involved in privatisation and 
restructuring, as well as the conditions into which privatisation is introduced.128 29
The effectiveness of privatisation within transformation therefore needs to be defined 
according to its ability to create dynamic and responsive firms from the ruins of the 
centrally planned economy. While voucher privatisation was envisaged as potentially 
encompassing all the assets of firms listed for inclusion in this scheme, a more common 
response in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic was a division of firms into smaller 
units for privatisation. This was to become more popular in the second wave and 
increased the complexity of the programme, despite an increased homogenisation in the 
firms included in the programme following the secession of the Slovak Republic and 
exclusion of firms located there,130 an example of actual conditions in the economy 
required that “voucher fundamentalism was relaxed, allowing other modes of 
privatization and hence a more flexible programme.”131
128 Frydman et al, Privatization Process in Central Europe, pp. 72-74.
129 Edward J. Green, ‘Privatization, the Entrepreneurial Sector, and Growth in Post-Comecon Economies’, 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 17 (1993), 407-417, p. 413.
130 Kotrba, ‘Privatisation Processes’, p. 175.
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Institutional changes are required if privatisation is to be effective as a policy of 
transformation as well as in promoting restructuring131 32 since
within the prevailing state property, the measures and steps aimed at 
decentralization of decision-making processes cannot suffice to bring about the 
desired change in the pattern of behavior of producers.133
The formal large-scale privatisation programme in Czechoslovakia was not implemented 
until 1991, so inevitable changes in the structure of the economy preceded this 
programme. These included the spontaneous emergence of an endogenous private sector 
comprising smaller firms, shifts in the product mix away from that artificially determined 
under central planning, and some redistributive flows of labour out of the labour force 
and to different uses as demand patterns altered.134
Notwithstanding these changes, many formal and informal institutions from the centrally 
planned economy remained at the inception of privatisation. The effective introduction of 
privatisation policies that will encourage restructuring is dependent upon the institutional 
environment being supportive of the development of a market economic system.135 
Market structures inherited from the former system exhibited high degrees of 
concentration and monopoly. The sector studied in this thesis, manufacturing industry,
131 Dlouhy and MlAdek, ‘Privatization and Corporate Control’, p. 157.
132 Dallago, ‘Privatization’, p. 35.
133 Klaus, ‘Main Obstacles’, pp. 86-87.
134 Bolton and Roland, ‘Privatization Processes’, pp. 285-286.
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was structurally highly concentrated in Czechoslovakia in 1989, comprising very large 
and highly integrated enterprises developed to generate economies of scale. Such 
enterprises cannot compete effectively on world markets without restructuring because of 
their cumbersome internal and external configurations. An attendant change in the 
market structure that stresses demonopolisation rather than decentralisation, is necessary 
with privatisation if the economy is to be prevented from entering the “reform trap”135 36 as 
ownership transfers through privatisation would otherwise simply replace one form of 
monopoly with another.137 Competition could thus be institutionally restricted by their 
continued existence, unless such firms are sufficiently regulated to ensure that they 
operate in an efficient way, and the development and strengthening of competitive 
industrial and market structures occurs.138
The design of voucher privatisation did incorporate some concessions to conditions in the 
Czech economy, especially the desire for strong domestic participation and the lack of 
finance necessitating a cheap distribution of shares. In this work though, it is proposed 
that many institutional influences on the design of the programme and the effects have 
been neglected. Crucially, voucher privatisation has not successfully generated incentives
135 Ling, ‘Development of the Automobile Industry’, p. 35.
136 Klaus, A Road to Market Economy, pp. 12-13.
137 George B. Assaf, ‘Enterprise Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: 
The Role of Technical Assistance’, in Privatization, Enterprise Development and Economic Reforms: 
Experiences of Developing and Transitional Economies, edited by Paul Cook, Colin Kirkpatrick and 
Frederick Nixson (Cheltenham: Elgar, 1998), pp. 129-149, p. 129.
138 Paul Starr, ‘The New Life of the Liberal State: Privatization and the Restructuring of State-Society 
Relations’ in The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization, edited by Ezra N. Suleiman 
and John Waterbury (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 22-54, pp. 30-31; Blommestein et al, ‘Privatising 
Large Enterprises: Overview of the Issues and Case Studies’, in Methods of Privatising Large Enterprises 
(Paris: OECD/CCEET, 1993), 11-37, p. 20.
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or restructuring because the programme is premised on a model inappropriate to the
transformation conditions. The existence of institutional influences in the Czech
environment therefore create unintended outcomes and eliminate the predictive function 
of neo-classical economics regarding expected restructuring outcomes subsequent to asset 
transfers through voucher privatisation.
3.4.1 Institutional Limitations to Voucher Privatisation in the Czech Republic.
As many firms need to acquire new funds in the short-term, restructuring of the financial 
sector, and particularly banks is an essential precondition for this. Share distributions 
following the completion of each wave of voucher privatisation have resulted in the 
emergence of embryonic stock and capital markets,139 but these do not provide a realistic 
alternative to bank credit finance. Although there are three stock markets - the Prague 
Stock Exchange, the RM System and the Securities Centre - these have no common share 
price listings,140 regulation of these capital markets is weak,141 and the dominant 
participants are domestic investors with limited capital resources.142 Share issues remain 
merely the technique by which property transfers are achieved, and have not promoted
139 Klaus, Ekonomicke Teorie, p. 37; Frydman etal, Capitalism with a Comrade’s Face, p. 183; Andrew 
Spicer, Gerald A. McDermott and Bruce Kogut, ‘Entrepreneurship and Privatization in Central Europe: The 
Tenuous Balance Between Destruction and Creation’, Academy of Management Review, 25 (2000), 630­
649, p. 632.
140 Petr Chvojka, ‘Financing Enterprise Restructuring’, in Industrial Competitiveness in East-Central 
Europe, edited by Martin Myant (Cheltenham: Elgar, 1999), pp. 76-105, pp. 98, 99.
141 Debora Revoltella, ‘Financing Firms in East European Countries: An Asymmetric Information and 
Agency Costs Approach’, in Corporate Governance in Central and Eastern Europe: Transition 
Management is a Tough Job, edited by Debora Revoltella, Peter R. Haiss and Gerhard Fink (Amsterdam: 
SUERF, 1998), pp. 9-50, p. 44.
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active ownership of firms.142 43 Without any experience of stock markets, or an expectation 
that public information can or should be accurate, the anonymity of shareholding may 
have been a disadvantage in the programme, potentially exposing inexperienced investors 
to a high degree of risk.144 Wide participation induced by low barriers to entry therefore 
was not certain to cause the emergence of an entrepreneurial class, with some investors 
only participating because they expected short-term financial gains from speculation.
Speed is seen as a positive attribute of mass privatisation programmes, minimising the 
opportunity for unregulated ownership transfers during the initial period of uncertainty.145 
In practice, an efficient, rapid privatisation is neither possible nor desirable146 as 
demonstrated by voucher privatisation. Lobbying to gain preferential treatment may 
occur, and the stages of project approval, share allocation and subsequent distributions 
that needed to be undertaken individually for firms delayed privatisation in the Czech 
case.147 However, the pace of privatisation is less important than the adaptations wrought 
in enterprises after ownership changes. One respondent perceived that privatising the 
firm through the voucher scheme meant
142 Mladek and Hashi, ‘Voucher Privatisation’, p. 68.
143 Olivier Bouin, ‘Privatization in Czechoslovakia’, in Constraints and Impacts of Privatization, edited by 
V. V. Ramanadham (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 115-138, p. 133; Mladek, ‘Czech Companies’, pp. 34, 
44; Revoltella, ‘Financing Finns’, p. 34.
144 Bouin, ‘Privatization in Czechoslovakia’, p. 135; Lastovicka et al, ‘Corporate Governance’, p. 200.
145 Jiff Vecernik, ‘Capitalist Renewal: Privatization and Business’, in Ten Years of Building Capitalism: 
Czech Society After 1989, edited by Jiri Vedernik and Petr Mateju (Praha: Academia, 1999), pp. 70-93, p. 
77.
146 Bolton and Roland, ‘Privatization Processes’, p. 287.
147 Kotrba, ‘Privatisation Processes’, p. 169.
118
the chosen way was very quick but the penalty for this was that the quality of 
privatisation was lower than it could have been in other ways (Rukopis Strojirny 2, 
Operations Director).
More detailed consideration of these limitations of, and constraints on, owners as they 
specifically relate to the case study firms are discussed in the next chapter within the 
wider context of corporate governance and restructuring.
Privatisation can also theoretically eliminate or undermine expectations of support 
afforded to enterprise insiders by creating new owners with countervailing interests to 
those of the incumbent management acting in accordance with the principles of state 
ownership.148 Klaus hoped that rapid privatisation would prevent the nomenklatura from 
taking advantage of their positions that reflected privileges inherited from the former 
regime,149 and avoid the symbiosis between politics and economics being replicated.150 
Privileges were not formally extended to enterprise insiders through the Czech 
privatisation scheme,151 so there should not be problems with insider control creating 
obstacles to the replacement of ineffective managers.152 Yet incumbent managers
148 Thomas, ‘Politics and Economics’, [n.p.].
149 Kupka, ‘Transformation of Ownership’, pp. 306, 309.
150 Kiss, ‘Privatization Paradoxes’, pp. 148-149.
151 Olivier Blanchard, ‘Theoretical Aspects of the Transition’, American Economic Review, 86 (2) (1996), 
117-122, p. 121; Stijn Claessens and Simeon Djankov, ‘Enterprise Performance and Management Turnover 
in the Czech Republic’, European Economic Review, 43 (1999), 1115-1124, p. 1116.
152 Masahiko Aoki and Hyung-Ki Kim, ‘Corporate Governance in Transition Economies’, Finance and 
Development, 32 (3) (1995), 20-22, p. 20; Martin Myant, ‘Czech Enterprises: The Barriers to 
Restructuring’, Prague Economic Papers, 8 (1999), 163-177, pp. 164-165.
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endeavoured to exploit the voucher privatisation programme, and remain in power.153 
Many of them did not regard the outcomes of voucher privatisation as a threat to their 
ability to control the firm in the post-privatisation era. Little new discipline was likely to 
be imposed on them through this as the new beneficiaries of reform are more dispersed 
than traditional interest groups.154 With an element of flexibility on whether some assets 
could be included in the large or small-scale privatisation, it is possible that managers 
therefore preferred voucher privatisation for non-altruistic reasons, for although
the auctions of the small-scale privatization endangered management positions, the 
large-scale privatization offered a palatable alternative, transforming formerly state- 
owned companies into joint-stock companies that made it possible for managers to 
retain their positions.155
The Czech privatisation programme also enabled the incumbent management to attempt 
to maximise its personal gain or generate support from the effective holders of power, the 
workforce, through spontaneous privatisation. A semi-legal version involves the 
incumbent management attempting to take control of the firm with the support of its
153 Mladek, ‘Different Paths’, p. 137; Miklos Szanyi, ‘Ownership Change and Performance in Companies of 
the Former Socialist Countries of Europe’, in Changes and Challenges: Economic Transformation in East- 
Central Europe, edited by Pal Gaspar (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1995), pp. 119-131, p. 128.
154 Jan Winiceki ‘Obstacles to Economic Reform of Socialism: A Property Rights Approach’, Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 507 (1990), 65-71, p. 65; Roman Frydman and Andrzej 
Rapaczynski, ‘Insiders and the State: Overview of Responses to Agency Problems in East European 
Privatizations’, Economics of Transition, 1 (1993), 39-59, p. 51; Rumen Dobrinsky, ‘Enterprise 
Restructuring and Adjustments in the Transition to Market Economy: Lessons from the Experience of 
Central and Eastern Europe’, Economics of Transition, 4 (1996), 389-410, pp. 398,402.
155 Jezek, ‘Czechoslovak Experience’, p. 483.
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workforce,156 but this strategy can be detrimental to successful restructuring.157 The basic 
approach is then for the incumbent management and other members of the nomenklatura 
to tiy and exploit their previously privileged position to gain de facto control over 
previously state-owned assets in order to be identified as the incumbent management and 
legal owners when property rights are allocated, and to appropriate these for their own 
purposes. The firm then enters a period of “pre-privatisation agony”, being a phase of 
inaction where the incumbent management focus only on short run aims of survival and 
undertakes no long term changes or improvements in the anticipation of the arrival of 
new owners.158 This could be used as a cover to deliberately manipulate a decline in the 
firm’s output and asset value, enabling the management to acquire the firm through 
privatisation at a discounted price.159 Similarly, if financial assistance from the state or 
closure of the firm in the future is expected, imposing financial discipline can become 
more difficult even after privatisation,160 for example with wages in excess of 
productivity being paid.
156 Roman Frydman and Andrzej Rapaczynski, Privatization and Corporate Governance in Eastern 
Europe: Can a Market Economy be Designed?, Economic Research Reports, 52, C. V. Starr Center for 
Applied Economics (New York: Department of Economics, New York University, 1991), pp. 25-25.
157 Igor Filatotchev, Trevor Buck and Mike Wright, ‘Privatisation and Buy-Outs in the USSR’, Soviet 
Studies, 44 (1992), 265-282, p. 268.
158 Martin Myant, ‘Problems of Transition in Eastern Europe - Should We Seek Alternatives?’, British 
Review of Economic Issues, 15 (37) (1993), 9-32, pp. 28-29.
159 Alena Nesporova, ‘Industrial Restructuring in Czechoslovakia after 1989’, in Industrial Restructuring 
and Trade Reorientation in Eastern Europe, edited by Michael A. Landesmann and Istvan P. Szekely 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 181-212, p. 188; Roman CeSka, ‘Corporate 
Governance, Restructuring, Accountability: The Czech Republic’s Experience’, in Trends and Policies in 
Privatisation, 3 (1) (1997), 117-132, p. 125; Kristian Palda, ‘Czech Privatisation and Corporate 
Governance’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 30 (1997), 83-93, pp. 89, 91; Michal Mejstrik, 
‘The Restructuring After Privatization in the Czech Republic’, Prague Economic Papers, 8 (1999), 233­
260, p. 241.
160 Desai, ‘Reformed Banks’, p. 464.
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Another possibility is asset stripping where the most profitable assets are re-deployed into 
either a private subsidiary or a new company, creating a devalued firm with depreciated 
assets. This original firm can then be re-acquired through a cheap sale, and re-capitalised 
after privatisation with its former assets, or simply left to go out of business.
Amongst the case study firms, only in Drazitest was there any direct evidence of 
spontaneous privatisation restructuring activities. Here, the managerial team had 
successfully bid for the most profitable section of the plant, and achieved this with wide 
employee participation in share ownership, and the acquisition of much of the original 
assets from the former Drazitest state-owned enterprise. The overall results in this case 
appear beneficial. This contrasts with Cisaf, which is increasingly facing difficulties in 
the long-term that could potentially relate to a managerial strategy that expects state 
assistance to be forthcoming. Employees of the firm gave implicit suspicions of this, but
there was no concrete evidence of this. It does however confirm the influence of
managers for privatisation and restructuring outcomes in the absence of credible owners.
The extent to which managers promote or hinder restructuring after privatisation is a 
function of their influence within the enterprise. In part determined by the ownership 
forms as discussed in the following chapter, the influence of managers is also dictated by 
the institutional environment as discussed in more detail in Chapter Five, where the 
incentive structures of managers in privatised firms is examined more extensively. It is 
shown that in the case study films, weak ownership has promoted the role of managers in 
restructuring. However, in each case studied, this has resulted in the continued
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development of the firm, rather than exploitation of its assets in the short-term. Whilst 
ensuring the immediate survival of these firms, the effectiveness from a restructuring 
perspective has been mixed, ranging from the proactive managerial takeover of Drazitest 
to more disguised managerial strategies of Cisar. Nevertheless, observed restructuring 
does depend on the respective influence of all actors within the firm, and this is addressed 
in the following chapters by reference to the wider institutional environment of the case 
study firms.
3.5 CONCLUSION.
Privatisation can, according to neo-classical economic theory bring positive changes to 
the functioning of an economy, which was the intention of privatisation experiments of 
governments in the 1980s, and now for the transformational economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe.161 162This visibly reduces the direct role of the government in economic 
activity, thus signalling that the rules of the market take priority over planning. The 
establishment of an ethos of popular capitalism can also be significant if it effects a shift 
in the population’s mentality on the social or economic desirability of a given form of 
ownership, and the role of complementary institutions within a market economic 
system. However, m the medium to long-term new entrants become more important
161 Stuart W. Bell, Sharing the Wealth. Privatization Through Broad-Based Ownership Strategies, 
Discussion Paper, 285 (Washington: World Bank, 1995), p. 2.
162 Nikolaos T. Milonas, Mass Privatization Methods and their Effects on Capital Market Institutions, 
Agency Relationships and Managerial Monitoring, Working Paper, 50 (Leuven: LICOS Centre for 
Transition Economics, 1995), p. 7.
123
than privatisation per se for creating a private sector. The stress on designing and 
implementing privatisation by Klaus may therefore have been misplaced for the long-term 
transformation of the economy, and a more effective strategy have been to encourage the 
emergence of new, endogenous private firms.163 All producers face institutionalised 
distortions in their external operating environment in the transformational economy, but 
restructured state-owned firms cany with them endogenous institutional limitations to 
economically efficient behaviour in their structures, trade links, and personnel that should 
constrain new private firms to a lesser extent.
As privatisation does not unambiguously result in greater economic efficiency, there is a 
need to establish why this was so strongly advocated as an integral aspect of the Czech 
transformation. To determine the appropriateness of the Czech approach to privatisation 
it is necessary to consider how far the Klaus government’s aims to achieve a rapid and 
equitable privatisation led to restructuring and therefore furthered the transformation 
process. Despite admitting that some mistakes has been made with privatisation,164 Klaus 
has described voucher privatisation as having rapidly and effectively achieved its aims, 
and produced an approach that is respected and reproduced globally.165 However, this 
study argues that there is uncertainty over the outcomes and benefits of privatisation, 
demonstrating that interdependence between the economic and political aspects of 
transformation means that justification cannot be sought solely in one of these spheres.
163 Murrell, ‘Privatization Complicates the Fresh Start’, Orbis, 36 (3) (1992). Academic Search Elite. 
EBSCO Publishing. 24 April 1999. <http://www.global.epnet.com/hosttrial/login.html>, [n.p.].
164 Vaclav Klaus, Ceska Cesta (Praha: Profile, 1994), pp. 61-62.
165 Vaclav Klaus, Nemam Rad Katastroficke Scenare (Ostrava: Sagit, 1991), p. 44; Vaclav Klaus, Rok Malo
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Although neo-classical economic theory legitimised the use of privatisation, the 
experience of privatisation in the Czech Republic has shown that the institutional 
environment cannot be neglected if its impact on restructuring is to be understood. 
Characteristics of the capitalist system abolished by the communists such as free markets, 
flexible prices and fully prescribed property rights needed to be re-introduced to provide a 
foundation for new, economically-oriented production after privatisation.166 It was also 
necessary to change the industrial structure of the economy, otherwise the privatisation of 
former state-owned enterprises would have simply created private monopolies, to the
detriment of consumer welfai'e overall.
Klaus claimed a commitment to liberal politics and monetarist economic principles,167 
and used privatisation in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic to increase economic 
efficiency, reduce state subsidies, and bring a radical change in the socio-economic 
system.168 The true passivity of the state as merely an overseer of the process though is 
debatable.169 The prescribed neo-liberalism and restricted role of the state does not 
appear to have been strictly adhered to, for example through measures such as the 
softening of credit availability, and the debt consolidation programme for banks to 
prevent their failure and the repercussions of this throughout the economy. These 
measures suggest that instead, the political imperative of achieving some form of 
privatisation has been most important, and that the incentives this generates for
Ci Mnoho v Dejinach Zeme (Praha: Repro-Media, 1993), p. 88.
166 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Whither Socialism (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1994), p. 180.
167 Frydman et al, Capitalism With a Comrade’s Face, p. 22.
168 Simoneti, ‘Comparative Review’, p. 90.
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restructuring are less significant.
The resultant privatisation policies superficially appear to correspond with the advice 
received from Western economists, which could have arisen because
[a] measure adopted elsewhere can be imported more easily because it arrives 
wrapped in a certain legitimacy. It also helps the innovative image of a particular 
party in search of “new” solutions.169 70
This alone, though is insufficient justification. Choices over privatisation policies also 
reflect the political need to appease different agents affected by the process.171 Potential 
actors include insiders (management, employees and the former nomenklatura), domestic 
outsiders (individuals, financial institutions and companies) and foreign investors. 
Restitution as a form of privatisation has been used as a way of distancing the reformers 
from the former regime and engendering a commitment to reform amongst the general 
population.
Although privatisation quickly solved the issue of unclear property rights, corporate 
governance issues still need to be resolved172 because
169 Lastovicka et al, Privatization and Opening, p. 3.
170 Ezra N. Suleiman and John Waterbury, ‘Introduction: Analyzing Privatization in Industrial and 
Developing Countries’, in The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization edited by Ezra 
N. Suleiman and John Waterbury (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 1-21, p. 3.
171 Milonas, Mass Privatization Methods, p. 1.
172 Dallago, ‘Between Spontaneity and Economic Engineering’, pp. 79, 82.
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voucher privatisation ... has left a complex and confusing ownership pattern and an 
emphasis on financial dealings and takeovers rather than productive investment... 
but... it is unclear ... that a different method of privatisation alone would have led 
to radically different results.173
The effectiveness of this policy in introducing new owners able to restructure the firms 
and contribute to the transformation processes is also critical. Not only can the incentives 
facing different principals vary according to their objectives as owners, but also the 
incentives of any one type of owner can differ across films, according to their ownership 
share or objectives for the particular firm. Accordingly, the restructuring outcomes in any 
firm can only be accounted for empirically, by considering the aims and motives of all 
those involved in privatisation and subsequent restructuring. Corporate governance 
represents the mechanisms of control over the firm by owners as a determinant of 
restructuring choices and is discussed in the following chapter in order to assess the 
effectiveness of privatisation in creating new owners with adequate incentives to 
undertake restructuring.
173 Martin Myant, Where is the Economic Transformation Going?, Paper at What’s Going On in the Czech 
Republic? Conference, Central European Research and Development Unit, University of Glasgow, 14 
March 1997. 4 August 2000. <http://www2.arts.gla.ac.uk/Slavonic/staff/Myant.html>, [n.p.].
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CHAPTER FOUR
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND RESTRUCTURING
Once asset transfers had been achieved through privatisation, the Klaus government 
anticipated that the altered incentive structure would cause new owners to emerge and 
undertake restructuring. As this thesis has already argued, institutional influences 
determine how the implementation of privatisation occurs and the resulting outcomes 
arise. This chapter addresses the issue of whether owners emerging from voucher 
privatisation have sufficient incentives and opportunities to perform the necessary and 
desirable restructuring of firms after privatisation of fonner state-owned enterprises. 
Specifically, this chapter argues that in the absence of effective corporate governance, 
contrary to the government’s expectations derived from neo-classical economics, new 
owners emerging after voucher privatisation do not necessarily initiate restructuring.
It is shown that this is because they lack the incentives, and in particular the control 
rights to do this, as a consequence of the way corporate governance mechanisms have 
developed and operate in the Czech Republic after voucher privatisation.
The chapter begins by considering the nature of corporate governance and how this 
relates to post-privatisation restructuring under transformation conditions. The 
remainder of this chapter illustrates theoretical aspects of corporate governance with 
evidence from the restructuring in the case study firms, and the way in which 
corporate governance is developing in response to the institutional conditions created 
by voucher privatisation. The issue of bankruptcy however is specifically addressed 
in the first section. A distinct overarching institutional aspect of corporate governance
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in any economic system, it has been difficult to introduce and use this in the Czech 
Republic.
The chapter continues by discussing the emergence of corporate governance after 
privatisation in the Czech Republic. There are a priori contradictory pressures on the 
development of corporate governance because of the historical development of the 
economy, particularly under communism, that restricted the extent of financial 
institutions and the shareholder based approach to corporate governance of voucher 
privatisation. Bank- and market-based corporate governance models as archetypes of 
corporate governance currently operating in other countries are reviewed, and their 
features contrasted with the corporate governance appropriate to the ownership 
patterns emerging in Czech firms. The experiences of privatisation and subsequent 
restructuring in the case study firms are used to illustrate how the adoption and 
implementation of governance mechanisms for Czech voucher privatised firms has 
occurred. The particular role of boards, institutional investors, and share 
consolidation in the context of voucher privatisation are presented, with the respective 
influence of each dependant upon and derived from, the institutional environment of 
voucher privatisation.
The chapter demonstrates that there are institutionalised difficulties for owners to 
exercise corporate governance within voucher privatised firms because of owner 
dispersal, limited financial resources, and remoteness from the firm that in many cases 
has been institutionalised through voucher privatisation. Limitations deriving from 
institutional influences, particularly the contradictions between the legislation and the 
practical implementation of voucher privatisation, have led to hybrid governance
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conditions in privatised enterprises. It is shown that the heterogeneous ownership 
patterns arising from voucher privatisation are not directly compatible with the 
wholesale adoption of either of the two archetypes. Transplanting any corporate 
governance model into the uncertain and unique environment of Central and Eastern 
Europe would need to undergo such extensive modifications that the outcome of this 
could not be determined in advance.1 As such, the emerging corporate governance in 
Czech enterprises reflects adaptations to the institutional environment actually 
existing. The chapter concludes by discussing the implications of current 
developments in influencing the future direction of corporate governance in Czech 
firms. Due to the uniqueness of voucher privatisation and the institutional 
environment in the Czech Republic, it is necessary for a system of corporate 
governance to develop that reflects the institutional environment facing voucher 
privatised enterprises.
4.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND TRANSFORMATION.
Corporate governance is the formal mechanism through which those with ownership 
rights should be able to exercise control within their enterprises to ensure that agency 
problems, which arise from owners and managers having differing goals, are 
overcome to the satisfaction of the owner. Owners differ in the ways they perform 
governance because of their own characteristics, as well as the institutional 
environment within which they act. Socialist ownership generated a “misalignment of 
governance” because control rights were implicitly allocated to the state through the
1 Roman Frydman and Andrzej Rapaczynski, Privatization and Corporate Governance in Eastern 
Europe: Can a Market Economy be Designed?, Economic Research Reports, 52, C. V. Starr Center for 
Applied Economics (New York: Department of Economics, New York University, 1991), pp. 14-17.
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subordination of other goals of owners and managers to plan fulfilment.2 With private 
property, corporate governance has to be developed so that owners and managers have 
adequate power and scope to control asset use effectively, whilst fulfilling their 
responsibility to investors in the enterprise.3 Ownership forms determine the 
appropriateness of particular corporate governance mechanisms, but the precise 
ownership and structure of Czech enterprises is often unclear after voucher 
privatisation. A number of interim forms of corporate governance are therefore likely 
to be exhibited during transformation because the economic system and the broader 
institutional context of firms do not exhibit stability,4 resulting in continually 
changing demands that corporate governance should resolve.
In addition to being embedded in their contemporary context,5 corporate governance 
solutions are path-dependent, with strong historical precedents explaining the 
occurrence of opposing institutional corporate governance models.6 Corporate 
governance develops in accordance with perceptions of who should benefit from their 
relationship to an enterprise. Traditionally, economic theory assumes shareholders to
2 Bob Garratt, ‘Directing and the Learning Board’, in East-West Business Collaborations, edited by 
Max Boisot (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 7-23, pp. 10-11,20-21; Daniel S. Fogel, ‘Introduction’ in 
Firm Behavior in Emerging Market Economies: Cases from the Private and Public Sectors in Central 
and Eastern Europe, edited by Daniel S. Fogel (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), pp. 1-19, p. 10.
3 Margaret M. Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First 
Century (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 19; Elaine Sternberg, Corporate 
Governance: Accountability in the Market Place, Hobart Economic Paper, 137 (London: Institute of 
Economic Affairs, 1998), p. 20.
4 Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: 
Macmillan, 1933), p. 69; Blair, Ownership and Control, pp. 28-29.
5 Erik Berglof, ‘Capital Structure as a Mechanism of Control: A Comparison of Financial Systems’, in 
The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties, edited by Masahiko Aoki, Bo Gustafsson and Oliver E. Williamson 
(London: Sage, 1990), pp. 237-262, p. 254; Kevin Keasey and Mike Wright, ‘Issues in Corporate 
Accountability and Governance: An Editorial’, Accounting and Business Research, 23 (Special Issue) 
(1993), 291-303, p. 302.
6 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’, Journal of Finance, 52 
(1997), 737-783, p. 750; Oliver E. Williamson, ‘Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance’, 
Journal of Finance, 43 (1998), 567-591, pp. 588-589.
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be residual claimants,7 8but increasingly competing arguments are being proposed for 
enterprises to develop “social responsibility” and give control to other interest 
groups. By encouraging competitive behaviour by enterprises, releasing managers to 
perform their specialised functions, and ensuring both informal and legal 
accountability of managers to others with vested interests in the firm, corporate 
governance should complement rather than supplant managerial functions.9 
Corporate governance in transformation economies has to overcome perceptual and 
behavioural legacies where the authority of principals over agents has not been 
recognised, as well as defining newly created control rights in enterprises. Corporate 
governance is thus inextricably linked to, although separate from privatisation. The 
aims for corporate governance therefore need to be established in transformation 
economies before a suitable legal and regulatory infrastructure to support this can be 
developed.10
Specificities of privatisation processes and subsequent adaptations within individual 
enterprises allow for the possibility of a novel form of corporate governance to 
emerge in the Czech Republic.11 The main theoretical argument to mitigate against 
this is the apparent similarity in organisational forms evolving after privatisation in 
comparison to those in developed market economies that have emerged over a longer 
period of time. Since corporate governance is applied at the enterprise level,
7 Berle and Means, Modern Corporation, p. 355.
8 Blair, Ownership and Control, pp. 27, 203.
9 Blair, Ownership and Control, p. 3; Jonathan Charkham, ‘Corporate Governance and
Competitiveness: The Main Principles’, in Competitiveness and Corporate Governance, edited by 
Andrea Westall (London: IPPR, 1996), pp. 1-4, pp. 2-3.
10 Blair, Ownership and Control, p. 11; Stavros B. Thomadakis, Long-Term Investment, Stable 
Governance and Financial Issues of Privatization in Transition Economies, Working Paper, 51 
(Leuven: LICOS Centre for Transition Economics, 1995), p. 14.
11 Rainer Gesell, Corporate Governance Issues in the Polish Mass Privatisation Program, International 
Workshop on Transition and Enterprise Restructuring in Eastern Europe, 20-22 August 1998
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techniques that have previously proved themselves durable and compatible with given 
organisational forms in other countries are most likely to succeed in the transforming 
economies if such enterprise structures emerge here.12 This chapter understands the 
emerging patterns of corporate governance through embedded institutionalism, 
arguing that conditions in the surrounding environment will affect the appropriateness 
of corporate governance mechanisms to particular firms.
Corporate governance procedures can be internal and firm-specific, or external 
measures that typically operate when internal methods fail and ownership changes 
result. Corporate finance, board structures, and shareholder monitoring by 
individuals and institutional investors are the primary internal corporate governance 
mechanisms in developed market economies. Their impact is discussed in the 
following sections of this chapter, because as transformation aims to move the 
economy towards this type of economic system, they are likely to be the most relevant 
mechanisms for exercising corporate governance in privatised Czech firms. They are 
also the mechanisms of corporate governance used by the case study firms, and so 
their restructuring impact within these firms is shown. Before considering these, 
however, bankruptcy, as the principal external corporate governance procedure, is 
described briefly. Whilst none of the case study firms have been subject to this 
extreme instrument of external governance, it remains an important aspect of the 
institutional framework for post-privatisation restructuring within Czech firms.
(Copenhagen: CEES/Copenhagen Business School, 1998). 25 September 2000.
<http://www.econ.cbs.dk/institutes/cees/workshop/pdEGesell.pdf>, p. 9.
12 Roman Frydman, Cheryl W. Gray, and Andrzej Rapaczynski, ‘Overview of Volumes 1 and 2’, in 
Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia, 1: Banks, Funds and Foreign Investors, edited 
by Roman Frydman, Cheryl W. Gray and Andrzej Rapaczynski (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 1996), pp. 1-19, p. 4.
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4.1.1 Bankruptcy.
Corporate governance is meant to encourage efficient behaviour in firms and by 
implication, financial propriety with restructuring. Nonetheless, if an enterprise does 
experience financial distress and bankruptcy results, competing claims on the 
enterprise’s remaining assets have to be legislated between to compensate investors in 
accordance with the risk embodied in their original investment.13 4 With bankruptcy, 
control passes to the firm’s creditors. Although this gives an additional reason for 
banks to be seen as important governance agents in Czech firms,15 it is crucial to 
effective corporate governance in developed market economies.
Bankruptcy is an essential component of any market economy that enables 
uncompetitive films to be replaced by more efficient ones. Legal provisions have 
been made for bankruptcy in the Czech Republic, but this is not a credible discipline 
for many privatised Czech firms because the persistence of state ownership with 
imperfections in the legislation, interlinkages of industry, and the potential socio­
political consequences of widespread enterprise closures bring an expectation that 
these measures are politically too costly for the government to enact. Reticence in 
imposing bankruptcy was also part of the Klaus government’s effort to help firms 
preserve the value of their assets, with subsidies and soft budget constraints through 
lax bankruptcy and inter-enterprise credit also extended to enterprises through
13 Charlie Weir, ‘Corporate Governance, Performance and Take-Overs: An Empirical Analysis of UK 
Mergers’, Applied Economics, 29 (1997), 1465-1475, pp. 1465-1466.
14 Blair, Ownership and Control, pp. 23-24.
15 Cheryl W. Gray, ‘Creditors Crucial Role in Corporate Governance’, Finance and Development, 34 
(2) (1997), 29-32. 13 July 1999. http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/fandd/1997/06/pdl7gray.pdf, p. 
29.
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continued state ownership in the immediate transformation period.16 This has 
remained one of the areas in which the governments have been able to retain some 
form of social policy essential to maintaining the support of the population for the 
continuation of reforms.17 In addition, the configuration of socialist industry means 
that bankruptcy of large firms is likely to reverberate through the economy, with the 
perception that this could lead to an economy-wide collapse.18
Whilst there are valid social, economic, and of course positive political reasons to 
delaying wide-scale bankruptcy,19 in combination these factors will normally result in 
non-efficient behavioural patters and expectations being reinforced within firms.20 
Soft budget constraints were pivotal to the existence of many socialist firms, so new 
owners do not see an economic obligation to restructure and ensure the efficient 
operation of their firms without a credible bankruptcy discipline. Restructuring in 
healthier firms is also discouraged without this because such private firms face harder 
budget constraints as well as artificially inflated levels of competition. Without an 
enforceable threat of bankruptcy, the long-term institutional environment for
16 Aydin Hayri and Gerald A. McDermott, Restructuring in the Czech Republic: Beyond Ownership 
and Bankruptcy, Working Paper, 66 (Prague: CERGE, 1995), p.7; Jan Klacek and Vladislav Flek, 
Company Restructuring: The Czech Experience, Working Paper, 48 (Leuven: LICOS Centre for 
Transition Economics, 1995), pp. 16-17.
17 Richard Jackman, ‘Economic Policy and Employment in the Transition Economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe: What Have We Learned?’, International Labour Review, 133 (1994), 327-345, p. 331; 
John C. Ham, Jan Svenjar and Katherine Terrell, ‘Unemployment and the Social Safety Net During 
Transitions to a Market Economy: Evidence from the Czech and Slovak Republics’, American 
Economic Review, 88 (1998), 1117-1142, p. 1120.
18 Josef C. Brada, ‘Privatisation is Transition - Or Is It?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (2) 
(1996), 67-86, p. 82; Carlo Sdralevich, ‘Banks and Governance in Transition Economies’, Banco 
Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Special Issue: Property, Control and Corporate Governance of 
Banks, 200 (1997), 83-109, pp. 88,105; Martin Myant, ‘Transition in the Czech Republic’, 
Proceedings of the Scottish Society for Russian and East European Studies (Glasgow: IREES, 1997), 
pp. 5-14, p. 9.
9 Klacek and Flek, Company Restructuring, pp. 16-18.
20 David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East 
Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 155-156; Petr Chvojka, Banking 
Sector’s Role In Restructuring Of Central And Eastern European Economies: Case Study Of The Czech 
Republic (Bratislava: Institute of Forecasting Slovak Academy of Sciences, 1997). 15 July 1999. 
<http://progeko.savba.sk/6-74519975eng.htm>, [n.p.].
135
restructuring in privatised firms is unfavourably skewed against this, which may have 
economically detrimental fixture effects.21 Its use in immature transfonnation 
economies should be guided by a consideration of the surrounding institutional 
environment of a firm and its operating conditions, but with a full realisation that 
postponing bankruptcy proceedings is not always beneficial to the economy’s future 
development.
From the outset of the transformation, Czech commercial law has mirrored the 
German legal system22 in implicit recognition that a bank-based system inspired by 
the German model was expected to develop, and therefore that the legal framework 
should support bank involvement from the earliest possible time to allow them to 
acquire valuable experience in this role.23 The bank-based model of corporate 
governance is presented below, and its relevance in encouraging restructuring by
owners in Czech firms reviewed.
4.2 BANK-BASED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE.
Bank-based systems are usually associated with German and Japanese models of 
corporate governance. Both of these models are characterised by the presence of
21 Barbara Fakin, Financial Institutions, Enterprise Investment Behaviour and Industrial Restructuring 
in Transition Economies, Working Paper, 44 (Leuven: LICOS Centre for Transition Economics, 1995), 
p. 23; Klacek and Flek, Company Restructuring, p. 26.
2 Miriam Z Klipper, The Governance of Privatized Firms: Problems of Power and Control, Working 
Paper, 71 (Prague: CERGE, 1994), p. 17.
23 Peter Dittus and Stephen Prowse, ‘Corporate Control in Central Europe and Russia: Should Banks 
Own Shares?’, in Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia, I: Banks, Funds and Foreign 
Investors, edited by Roman Frydman, Cheryl W. Gray and Andrzej Rapaczynski (Budapest: Central 
European Press, 1996), pp. 20-67, pp. 62.
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dominant, large shareholders24 but important differences between these two variants 
remain, such as their dual and unitary board structure respectively.25 Industrial 
organisation in each country also differs, which gives rise to some significant 
differences in the outworking of corporate governance. The Japanese version 
includes the keiretsu, an amalgamation of enterprises within an industrial grouping 
based on ties of monitoring and cross-ownership, centred around one dominant 
provider of financial services.26 In this form priority is given to maximising returns to 
social capital.27 Ownership and control over firms is stable because implicit 
agreement exists between most of the significant equity holders to relinquish the 
control rights that ownership construes.28 29Although institutional links between IPFs, 
banks, and enterprises in the Czech Republic may actually be tighter than those of the 
keiretsu?9 this variant is not considered here to be applicable to the Czech case. 
Reflecting a particular development in response to specific historical and cultural 
conditions, it relies on a degree of loyalty and co-operation that is not likely to be 
emulated in any of the transformational economies, so this discussion concentrates on 
the German variant of the model that is partly emulated in the Czech Republic.
24 Michael J. Rubach and Terrence C. Sebora, ‘Comparative Corporate Governance: Competitive 
Implications of an Emerging Convergence, Journal of World Business, 33 (1998), 167-184. Academic 
Search Elite. EBSCO Publishing. 8 May 1999. <http://www.global.epnet.com/hosttrial/login.html>, 
[n.p.].
25 Sternberg, Corporate Governance, p. 79.
26 Stephen D. Prowse, ‘Institutional Investment Patterns and Corporate Financial Behaviour in the US 
and Japan’, Journal of Financial Economics, 21 (1990), 43-60, p. 46.
27 Rubach and Seborua, ‘Comparative Corporate Governance’, [n.p.].
28 Martha Prevezer and Martin Ricketts, ‘Corporate Governance: The UK Compared with Germany and 
Japan’, in Capital Markets and Corporate Governance, edited by Nicholas Dimsdale and Martha 
Prevezer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 237-256, pp. 245-246.
29 Stark and Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways, p. 159.
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Bank-based models are optimal where the interests of various stakeholders have to be
3 A
met. They tend to emerge in loosely regulated environments where flexibility is 
accorded on the size of institutions, composition of portfolio holdings, and the 
involvement of outsiders and their subsequent role in share dealing if financial 
difficulties arise. The close connection between debtors and creditors means large 
shareholders with incentives to monitor firms to ensure they act in a consistent 
manner are common in bank-based systems.30 1 Generating enterprise capital relies 
primarily on internal methods such as retained profits and company-based 
contribution funds that reduce the necessity to resort to the market and external 
investors.32 33Financial markets tend to be comparatively shallow in these countries, 
with additional finance obtained from shareholders who hold significant equity stakes
33
in the company. Risk is shared amongst creditors, which can generate complex 
interdependencies in the economy, but with enhanced direct control firms can more 
easily obtain credit, often at a preferential rate.34 The close relationship between the 
firm and governance actors in bank-based systems brings significant benefits under 
conditions of uncertainty,35 or where public information is scarce or unreliable, 
conditions prevalent in transformational economies.
Long-term realisation of a firm’s objectives within the context of a complementary 
supporting institutional and economic culture is achieved with bank-based corporate
30 Kevin Keasey and Mike Wright, ‘Introduction: Corporate Governance, Accountability and 
Enterprise’, in Corporate Governance: Responsibilities, Risks and Remuneration, edited by Kevin 
Keasey and Mike Wright (Chichester: Wiley, 1997), pp. 1-21, p. 12.
31 Jeremy Edwards and Klaus Fischer, Banks, Finance and Investment in Germany (Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), p. 194.
32 Ellen R. Schneider-Lenne, ‘Corporate Control in Germany’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 8 
(3) (1992), ll-23,p. 13.
33 Robert I. Mochrie, Mark E. Schaffer and Alan A. Bevan, ‘Enterprise and Bank Restructuring in the 
Transition Economies’, Economic Survey of Europe, 2 (1998), 33-66, p. 34.
34 Berglof, ‘Capital Structure’, pp. 237-238,251.
35 Keasey and Wright, ‘Introduction’, p. 13.
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governance. The literature frequently portrays the existence of a hausbank in the 
German model that enters into a working relationship with a firm, financing it during 
periods of temporary financial distress in anticipation of being free of competition 
from other banks should the firm become profitable later.36 7 In practice, the perception 
of a hausbank may be misrepresentative. Banks are only one element in this 
relational system of corporate governance where commonality and deference to 
shared and competing interests of a number of agents, including banks and providers 
of other financial services, trade unions and employees, guilds and societies, 
shareholders and stakeholders all seeking for the enterprise to be governed in 
accordance with their own specific interests, have to be reconciled.38
Whilst banks are achieving ownership in Czech firms, they are not necessarily 
adequately performing a governance role. This does not preclude the emergence of a 
bank-based system here in the future, since non-bank financial institutions were not 
developed under central planning, justifying the use of restructured banks as a primary 
source of enterprise finance.39 To emerge as creditors with sufficient equity holdings 
to give incentives to undertake monitoring though, they needed to be reorganised and 
recapitalised through privatisation,40 yet the development and reconstruction of the 
banking system in the Czech Republic has only occurred slowly in practice. Banks 
here are frequently unable to perform even the most fundamental banking functions
36 Allen Sykes, ‘Proposals for a Reformed System of Coiporate Governance to Achieve Internationally 
Competitive Long-Term Performance’ in Capital Markets and Corporate Governance, edited by 
Nicholas Dimsdale and Martha Prevezer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 111-127, p. 116; Rubach 
and Sebora, ‘Comparative Corporate Governance’, [n.p.].
37 J. S. Edwards and K. Fischer, ‘An Overview of the German Financial System’, in Capital Markets 
and Corporate Governance, edited by Nicholas Dimsdale and Martha Prevezer (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994), pp. 257-283, p. 265.
38 Schneider-Lenne, ‘Corporate Control in Germany’, pp. 15,21; Shleifer and Vishny, ‘A Survey’, p. 
739.
39 Frydman et al, ‘Overview’, p. 8.
40 Mochrie et al, ‘Enterprise and Bank Restructuring’, p. 56.
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because of limited expertise in their human capital.41 Although this is true of most 
institutions in the domestic economy,42 in comparison with IPFs, the banks had much 
more information about many of their clients. The former branches of the state 
monobanks had pre-existing links to enterprises and some regional infrastructure 
through their inherited branch network. Even though the banks had gathered much of 
their information under the conditions of central planning, the slow pace of 
behavioural change means that this can still be a valuable resource to them during the
transformation.
Bank owners should have a vested interest in the existence and improved economic 
situation of their firms, as these will become their future customers. Regardless of the 
legal corporate governance mechanisms in operation, banks can act as governance 
agents either directly as owners, or indirectly through lending to companies. 
Theoretically, banks that acquire a good understanding of a firm’s true financial 
position and its proposed future development can offer finance at more competitive 
rates than markets under conditions of economic uncertainty. This can facilitate 
restructuring, but credit provision should always be subject to active screening and 
monitoring. Banks need to take responsibility for monitoring their clients to ensure 
that owners and managers have incentives to act responsibly in strategic decision­
making and avoid bank intervention or withdrawal of funding that could jeopardise 
their position. Reputation is also important to institutions in developed market 
economies since they often perform functions that are easily identified and monitored,
41 Leslie E. Grayson and Samuel E. Bodily, Integration into the World Economy: Companies in 
Transition in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, Research Report 96-19 (Laxenburg: 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1996). 27 August 1999.
<http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Publications/Documents/RR-96-019.pdf>, [n.p.].
42 Dittos and Prowse, ‘Corporate Control’, pp. 55-56.
140
which requires them to act responsibly in order to secure their future earnings.43 This 
should be replicated in the transformational economies where the banks are emerging 
as significant owners of firms and agents of enterprise restructuring. However, 
sufficient useful and accurate information is not always presented by Czech firms, 
which means judgements on lending by banks can be fundamentally flawed to the 
detriment of governance, and consequently restructuring.
The domestic banking sector already has an indirect ownership stake in many 
privatised enterprises in the Czech Republic through their ownership of IPFs as well 
as through outstanding debts, giving them an informational and participatory 
advantage over other newly emergent institutions in performing a governance role.44 
In addition, banks have performed some debt for equity swaps in an attempt to 
encourage enterprise restructuring,45 which also represents their having already taken 
on some tasks associated with corporate governance.
To further support banks in their ownership and monitoring role a new state bank, 
Konsolidacnf Banka, was created in 1991 to purchase discounted bad debts and 
outstanding loans from the commercial banks. Alleviating the burden of bad debts on 
commercial bank lending and preventing the feared chain of bankruptcies was 
supposed to enable commercial banks to undertake new lending without having to 
finance a poorly functioning loan portfolio inherited from the centrally planned 
economic system.46 Loan consolidation was critical to restructuring in privatised
43 Bernard S. Black, ‘Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: The Case for Institutional 
Voice’, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 5 (3) (1992), 19-32, p. 30.
44 Dittus and Prowse, ‘Corporate Control’, pp. 58, 60.
45 Dittus and Prowse, ‘Corporate Control’, pp. 58-59.
46 Karla Brom and Mitchell Orenstein, ‘The Privatised Sector in the Czech Republic: Government and 
Bank Control in a Transitional Economy’, Europe-Asia Studies, 46 (1994), 893-928, pp. 900-901.
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firms, since banks holding a large proportion of bad debts have few incentives to 
undertake more prudent lending in the future where bank supervision is weak as in the 
Czech Republic. Defaults at the margin then have only a limited effect on the overall 
asset quality of the bank’s portfolio, and lending to inappropriate ventures with a high 
risk attached in the hope of strong returns to the bank if it was successful can occur 
more frequently.47 Poorly capitalised banks and much uncertainty in the economic 
environment can result in high interest rates and shorter loan periods.
Long-term credits are most useful for restructuring purposes, but only account for 
around 30% of those issued to Czech firms.48 49However, Czech banks tend to offer 
credits for short or medium term financing because of their limited liquidity, suspicion 
of the creditworthiness of the borrowers, and inexperience in assessing borrowing 
proposals. Alternatively, banks will lend in preference to those firms able to put up 
greater amounts of collateral. Larger enterprises and those for whom budget 
constraints are not completely hardened through some residual state ownership meet 
these conditions most easily. This not only makes it more difficult for a new private
sector to emerge, but also perpetuates the industrial networks that emerged during the
• 49communist era.
Although Konsolidacnf Banka became the main creditor to around 80% of medium 
and large privatised firms, and was supposed to take an active role in enterprise
47 Dittus and Prowse, ‘Corporate Control’, p. 57; Sdralevich, ‘Banks and Governance’, pp. 88-89.
48 Petr Chvojka, ‘Financing Enterprise Restructuring’, in Industrial Competitiveness in East-Central 
Europe, edited by Martin Myant (Cheltenham: Elgar, 1999), pp. 76-105, p. 95.
49 Roman Frydman and Andrzej Rapaczynski, Privatization in Eastern Europe: Is the State Withering 
Away? (London: Central European University Press, 1994), pp. 130-131; Sdralevich, ‘Banks and 
Governance’, p. 89.
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restructuring,50 in reality the programme was not sufficiently comprehensive. It left 
many banks with continuing bad debts and an inability or unwillingness to initiate 
bankruptcy proceedings in the economically unstable environment, to the overall 
detriment of their own balance sheets. The effects of this can be to discourage 
restructuring because it is more difficult for owners to obtain new financial resources, 
with one respondent suggesting that
a strong influence on the debt problem is the unwillingness of banks to lend to 
companies - even fear - because of previous bad experiences. This is a 
problem for Rukopis Strojimy and there is a trickle-down effect problem for 
Odraz KM. Privatisation in the Czech Republic generated a lot of new owners 
here who do not want to do business but just to get loans from banks for their 
private use and not to repay the funds to the banks, which is the main reason 
why banks now are finding it difficult to survive (Odraz KM 1, Managing 
Director).
Certain conditions favourable to the emergence of a bank-based system existed in the 
Czech Republic but this has not been fully supported by institutional developments. 
Voucher privatisation created new shareholders and was to introduce an ethos of 
popular capitalism, suggesting that a more suitable model of corporate governance 
would be a market-based approach that gives shareholder interests priority. Such 
models have proven most appropriate in economies with rapid changes in technology 
and innovations in management systems,51 which means they could be optimal for
50 Brom and Orenstein, ‘Privatised Sector in the Czech Republic’, pp. 894, 900-901.
51 Julian Franks and Colin Mayer, ‘Capital Markets and Corporate Control: A Study of France, 
Germany and the UK’, Economic Policy, 10 (1990), 191-231, p. 214; Keasey and Wright, 
‘Introduction’, p. 12.
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transformational economies that are operating under conditions of uncertainty. Risk 
is shared amongst external shareholders and creditors, but shareholders are residual 
claimants, so only after all other claims on the enterprises assets have been satisfied 
are they eligible for financial reward. To be effective, this type of corporate 
governance relies on large quantities of accurate information being publicly available, 
and the presence of investors with sufficient incentives and expertise to evaluate this 
information.52 These preconditions for effective market-based governance are 
difficult to attain in transformation economies, which additionally supports the 
appropriateness of a bank-based system.
Bank-based systems exhibit a greater degree of stability in ownership and control of 
enterprises than market-based ones,53 which is particularly evident through their 
reliance on internal monitoring and the limited number of hostile takeover attempts 
because insiders easily oppose these.54 They promote active monitoring because risk­
bearing creditors have their interests closely tied to the success of the firm. Effective 
monitoring of firms can occur under bank-based systems because a degree of loyalty 
exists between the firm and its investors that can give them time to recover from a 
decline in efficiency, whereas the immediate economic status of the firm might 
require exit in a market-based system.55 However, the equality of all shareholders is 
compromised since those closely involved in monitoring the firm acquire some status 
as insiders with access to privileged knowledge not necessarily publicly available.56 
Investors who take an interest in monitoring firms in market-based models are
52 Dittus and Prowse, ‘Corporate Control’, pp. 33-34; Sternberg, Corporate Governance, p. 72.
53 Prevezer and Ricketts, ‘Corporate Governance’, p. 246.
54 Franks and Mayer, ‘Capital Markets and Corporate Control’, p. 191.
55 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and 
States (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 79.
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normally prohibited from future trading under fears of insider advantage, but this can 
impede flows of information between owners and shareholders and the management,56 7 58
and engender inefficiency because of a lack of close shareholder monitoring.
Despite these limitations of market-based governance and the legislative support for a 
bank-based model in Czech enterprises, the voucher privatisation scheme and its 
intended objectives are contradictory to those of bank-based models, being more 
compatible with a market-based system. The following section examines whether 
market-based corporate governance can develop as a form of corporate governance 
that will ensure restructuring occurs in enterprises after voucher privatisation in the 
Czech Republic.
4.3 MARKET-BASED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE.
An ability to defend one’s rights is essential for any shareholder to exercise effective 
corporate governance. Where firms raise capital by issuing shares, the interests of 
shareholders as the ultimate owners of firms, should take priority in corporate 
governance. With voucher privatisation, the government focused on asset transfers 
to change ownership, but little consideration was given to the impact of consequent 
share ownership patterns on restructuring in enterprises. Voucher privatisation 
produced dispersal between individual shareholders as typically arises where market-
56 N. H. Dimsdale, ‘The Need to Restore Corporate Accountability: An Agenda for Reform’, in Capital 
Markets and Corporate Governance, edited by Nicholas Dimsdale and Martha Prevezer (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 13-49, p. 31.
57 Helen Short and Kevin Keasey, ‘Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance’, in Corporate 
Governance: Responsibilities, Risks and Remuneration, edited by Kevin Keasey and Mike Wright 
(Chichester: Wiley, 1997), pp. 23-60, p. 28.
58 Prevezer and Ricketts, ‘Corporate Governance’, p. 244.
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based governance methods are used.59 As the holdings of any one individual usually 
represent only a small fraction of the firm’s equity, undertaking monitoring can be 
prohibitively expensive for individuals.60 As residual claimants, they are more likely 
to focus on short-term profits and high dividend payments than entering into long­
term relationships with the firm,61 with the dispersal of shareholders impeding co­
ordinated actions.
Nevertheless, shareholders are not necessarily ineffective in their dispersal for
[i]n a world in which self interest plays a significant role in economic 
behaviour, it is foolish to believe that owners of valuable resources 
systematically relinquish control to managers who are not guided to seive their 
interests.62
Individuals act in their own interest to maximise their financial gains or discipline 
managers, regardless of whether this is rational in the aggregate.63 The strategy 
adopted by shareholders is termed “exit”, and occurs where
[s]ome customers stop buying the firm’s products or some members leave the 
organisation. ... Asa result, revenues drop, membership declines, and
59 Sykes, ‘Proposals’, p. 114; Rubach and Sebora, ‘Comparative Corporate Governance’, [n.p.].
60 Josef C. Brada, Alexandra Hess, Inderjit Singh, ‘Corporate Governance in Eastern Europe: Findings 
from Case Studies’, Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 37 (1996), 589-614, p. 595; Gray, 
‘Creditors Crucial Role’, p. 29.
61 Brada, Hess and Singh, ‘Corporate Governance in Eastern Europe’, p. 594; Rubach and Sebora, 
‘Comparative Corporate Governance’, [n.p.].
62 Harold Demsetz, ‘The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm’, Journal of Law and 
Economics 26 (1983), 375-390, p. 390.
63 Ken Mayhew and Paul Seabright, ‘Incentives and the Management of Enteiprises in Economic 
Transition: Capital Markets Are Not Enough’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 8 (1) (1992), 105-
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management is impelled to search for ways and means to correct whatever faults
have led to exit.64
Managerial behaviour in market-based systems is constrained by accountability to 
shareholders who trade in stock markets to maximise their dividend payments65 and 
through this indicate their satisfaction or complaint with the current practice of 
enterprise directors and management. If sufficient numbers of shareholders act 
consistently in the market, share prices will respond accordingly. Also, ownership 
change is often associated with this type of corporate governance, particularly through 
takeovers as a solution to managerial failure. In such cases, inefficient incumbents are 
replaced with the prospect of more efficient resource use occurring. The threat of 
takeovers is expected to motivate the management and employees to adopt more 
efficient behaviour,66 although wherever the incumbent managers are also significant 
shareholders, they may be in position to block or hinder takeovers and other market- 
driven governance techniques.
Exit is only a suitable strategy if alternative buyers with incentives to monitor firms 
exist,67 with additional complications if shareholders are institutional investors. These 
should be free to readjust their portfolios and maximise returns to their investors to 
whom they are primarily accountable to and whom can withdraw their funds if they 
are not satisfied with the institution’s performance in monitoring,68 but they may not 
have adequate incentives to do this. Markets are most likely to respond to negative
129, p. 107; Colin Mayer, ‘Corporate Governance and Performance: The Evidence’, in Competitiveness 
and Corporate Governance, edited by Andrea Westall (London: IPPR, 1996), pp. 17-23, p. 20.
64 Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, p. 4.
65 Blair, Ownership and Control, p. 21; Mayer, ‘Corporate Governance and Performance’, p. 20.
66 Franks and Mayer, ‘Capital Markets and Corporate Control’, pp. 191, 210, 214, 215; Dittus and 
Prowse, ‘Corporate Control’, p. 37.
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disclosures with falling share prices, but as institutional investors are shareholders 
themselves this reduces the aggregate value of their portfolio holdings, creating a 
disincentive against the adequate enforcement of corporate governance discipline over 
managers.67 68 9 In market-based systems, firms can thus be unwilling to disclose 
information as this can signal difficulties being experienced by the management and 
owners, and negatively affect share prices. In the Czech Republic, inexperience of 
investors and uncertainty from the transfonnational environment will compound these 
problems, which could exacerbate obstacles to restructuring.
The relationship between external investors and the incumbent management generates 
an agency problem that needs to be resolved by corporate governance,70 so 
shareholder representation on enterprise boards is a key element of market-based 
corporate governance approaches. The structure of boards and the representation 
shareholders attain in their companies is important for understanding the incentives 
facing new owners in restructuring after privatisation because this defines their access 
to resources, and extent of control within the enterprise.71
67 Mayhew and Seabright, ‘Incentives and the Management of Enterprises’, p. 111.
68 Black, ‘Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance’, p. 30.
69 Black, ‘Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance’, p. 29; Short and Keasey, ‘Institutional 
Shareholders and Corporate Governance’, pp. 28, 37-38.
70 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (1976), 305-360, p. 309.
71 Shleifer and Vishny, ‘A Survey’, p. 755.
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4.3.1 Boards and Corporate Governance.
The 1992 Czech Commercial Code requires a dual board structure in joint-stock
*79companies. This comprises an executive board of shareholder-elected
representatives that is responsible for day-to-day decision-making,72 3 and a supervisory 
board to control the enterprise, with responsibility for ensuring the enterprise acts in 
compliance with legal requirements in its operation, and monitoring the enterprise 
management through the executive board.74 In companies with more than 50 
employees, two-thirds of the supervisory board are elected by the shareholders and 
one third by employees, whereas the executive board can be similarly elected at the 
AGM, or its members appointed by the supervisory board at the discretion of the 
individual enterprise.75
A pattern emerging in the Czech Republic is one where the executive board is 
dominated by representatives of owners if they have a controlling influence within the 
firm, and otherwise they normally only achieve representation on the supervisory 
board.76 The ability of the owners to influence restructuring decisions is more 
problematic in the latter case because their direct control over the way the firm is 
operated is emasculated. In Rukopis Strojimy the owner has representation on the 
executive board, and this is resented here by many of the executive directors because
72 Act 513/1991, ObchodniZakonik', Brom and Orenstein, ‘Privatised Sector in the Czech Republic’, p. 
910.
73 Blair, Ownership and Control, p. 21.
74 Schneider-Lenne, ‘Corporate Control in Germany’, p. 16.
75 Brom and Orenstein, ‘Privatised Sector in the Czech Republic’, p. 910; Iraj Hashi, ‘Mass 
Privatisation and Corporate Governance in the Czech Republic’, Economic Analysis, 1 (1998), 163­
187, p. 175.
76 Brom and Orenstein, ‘Privatised Sector in the Czech Republic’, p. 911; Coffee, ‘Institutional 
Investors’, p. 150.
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this circumscribes their independence. Describing this, one director spoke of his 
perception that this meant
when the owner has a plan for change that the directors don’t agree with, the 
General Director has to follow this even if he is not happy with it, so it would be 
better if the owner had less control and not have the power to direct the directors 
(Rukopis Strojimy 8, Quality Director).
Another argued that owners should only have representation on the supervisory board 
so that they can be
actively interested in the company, not trying to direct the company but just to 
know the aims and problems and how these are being addressed by the other 
directors (Rukopis Strojimy 8, Quality Director).
The dual board structure can bring advantages because managers may have greater 
incentives to actively undertake monitoring to avoid intervention by the owners, but 
this enhances the shift in the locus of power away from the formal owners. If a firm 
has multiple large shareholders with significant equity holdings and divergent 
interests, the enterprise management can strengthen their position by setting these in 
competition against each other to gain managerial support, or by favouring those 
perceived to give the greatest advantages to the incumbents,77 which is unlikely to be 
conducive to restructuring.
77 Coffee, ‘Institutional Investors’, p. 154.
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The function of the supervisory board in particular was seen by many respondents as 
obsolete or of limited value as in Drazitest where “the company is so small and all 
communicate with each other; the supervisory board is just a decoration that has to 
legally exist” (Drazitest 1, Quality Director), and similarly in Presnost KM where
the function of the supervisory board is to supervise the work of the executive 
board, but it does not have any legal “power” to do anything (Presnost KM 1, 
Financial Planning Manager).
In one case, the requirement of a dual board structure was criticised from a from a 
different perspective, with the respondent seeing a benefit from having the owners 
always present so that “where there are problems it is possible to get a co-ordinated 
response” (Rukopis Strojirny 2, Operations Director). However, this appears to be a 
theoretical, rather than a practical concern, with the predominant view of respondents 
in the case study firms indicating that the interests of managers and owners often 
diverge, and that such co-ordination is not sought.
Labour representation is also afforded an explicit role in the Czech legislation that is 
supposed to encourage a greater commitment to the firm in the long-term by the 
employees. Labour representation can reduce the tendency to express dissatisfaction 
through strikes and other “shop-floor” actions. Having this at the level of the 
supervisory board accentuates the removal of labour interference in operational 
decisions, whilst increasing the strategic influence of labour concerns.78 9 Owners may
78 Mayhew and Seabright, ‘Incentives and the Management of Enterprises’, p. 114; Martin Ricketts,
The Economics of Business Enterprise: An Introduction to Economic Organisation and the Theory of 
the Firm, 2nd edition (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), p. 273.
79 Mayhew and Seabright, ‘Incentives and the Management of Enterprises’, p. 114.
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perceive this to hinder discussion or the adoption of necessary restructuring measures 
that would require substantial downsizing and reorganisation of the workforce,80 81
whilst employees can see this as ineffective since “there is minimum influence by 
worker shareholders who are consulted at meetings, but managers have the last word” 
(Drazitest 3, Supplies Manager).
Shareholder representation is meant to encourage optimising behaviour by the 
incumbent management, but popular capitalism results in dispersed ownership that 
can be inefficient because the new owners may be too widely dispersed, 
disinterested, or inexperienced to extend effective ownership and corporate 
governance in firms they own.82 Respondents recognised institutional constraints 
dictate the effectiveness of shareholder representation, for whilst
success or failure is due to the directors and managers of the firm who are in 
turn responsible for the company to all its shareholders, in practice it does not 
work like this. Although the directors are responsible to all the shareholders by 
law, and although the shareholders can all be together at their AGM, they are 
never all together at one time. This is caused by the structure of shareholders 
and it not being a custom in the Czech Republic to get over 3000 people 
together in one place at one time. This means that the contemporary owner can
80 Coffee, ‘Institutional Investors’, pp. 152,154-155.
81 Jan Mladek, ‘Czech Companies after the First Wave of Voucher Privatisation: Was the Change Real 
or Formal?’, m Privatisation in Visegrad Countries: Old Principles and New Methods, edited by 
Miklos Szanyi, Proceedings of the International Conference (Budapest: Institute for World Economics, 
1994), pp. 153-172, p. 160; Gesell, Corporate Governance Issues, pp. 7-8.
82 Hilary Appel, ‘Justice and the Reformulation of Property Rights in the Czech Republic’, East 
European Politics and Societies, 9 (1995), 22-40, p. 28; Bruce Kogut and Andrew Spicer, Institutional 
Technology and the Chains of Trust: Capital Markets and Privatization in Russia and the Czech 
Republic, Working Paper, 291 (Ann Arbor: Davidson Institute, 1999). 3 October 2000.
<http://www.eres.bus.umich.edu/docs/workpap-dav/wp291.pdf>, p. 15.
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be a majority owner even if they do not have more than 50% of the shares 
(Odraz KM 1, Financial Planning Manager).
As a result
individual shareholders do not go to the AGM because they do not have the 
power to make decisions. In a better situation they would have a union and one 
representative over them (Cisar 1, Trade Union President).
In the Czech Republic shareholder rights have only been crudely prescribed83 and 
enforcing shareholder protection is difficult, so “in no way do the directors have to act 
in the interests of the small, individual shareholders” (Cisar 3, Retired Analyst). 
Therefore,
voucher privatisation led to a lot of problems in the economy as some mangers 
are only interested in getting money and really do not care about the company 
and business activities. They can do this as the shareholders cannot influence 
what happens in the company, but it depends on the capacity of the workers and 
how they work to solve the problems (Presnost KM 1, Financial Planning 
Manager).
Where relative shareholder dispersal is the cause of agency problems, concentration is 
necessitated. One way for individual investors to overcome this limitation is to 
amalgamate their holding within an umbrella organisation so that as shareholders they
83 Coffee, ‘Institutional Investors’, p. 167.
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can gain board representative and directly express their collective interests.84 This is a 
strategy of “voice” where
[t]he firm’s customers or the organization’s members express their 
dissatisfaction directly to management or to some other authority to which 
management is subordinate, or through general protest addressed to anyone who 
cares to listen. ... Asa result, management once again engages in a search for 
the causes and possible cures of customers’ and members’ dissatisfaction.85
Voice is consistent with long-term investment practices where shareholders do not 
constantly aim to maximise immediate profits by monitoring and readjusting their 
portfolio. Instead they are meant to offer advice and assistance in order that as many 
as possible of the enterprise’s goals are met simultaneously. Shareholders following a 
voice strategy are expected to acquire knowledge about the enterprise they monitor 
and be able to distinguish between a cyclical downturn and fundamental problems in a 
way that the market is less able to do. Where voice is the dominant strategy for 
expressing dissatisfaction with managerial behaviour, it is expected that there will be 
fewer and more active shareholders than where exit dominates, to make them 
“audible” to the management and directors.86 It is therefore commonly associated 
with bank-based systems of Germany and Japan where the conditions for voice are 
easily met, but can also exist within market-based systems. In this latter case, the 
financially small and dispersed nature of individual shareholders means that 
institutional investors can be the only shareholders with sufficient equity holdings to
84 Hilary Appel and John Gould, ‘Identity Politics and Economic Reform: Examining Industry-State 
Relations in the Czech and Slovak Republics’, Europe-Asia Studies, 52 (2000), 111-131, p. 114.
85 Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, p. 4.
154
exercise corporate governance effectively. In the Czech Republic voice strategies 
are appropriate for institutional owners in exercising corporate governance, especially 
IPFs, yet as discussed below, their impact as governance agents can be ambiguous.
4.3.2 Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance.
With market-based corporate governance, institutional investors are external to the 
firm and they have to expend resources in acquiring information about the firms they 
monitor. Large shareholdings constitute the purchase of an expensive and durable 
good, and these few shareholders in a firm will be able to pursue a concerted action 
because their influence is sufficiently strong to induce changes in managerial
qo
actions. This mirrors the behaviour of large shareholders in bank-based systems 
having control rights matched with cash-flow rights that give them an incentive to 
incur monitoring costs, particularly if they can gain economies of scale from doing 
this.86 87 88 9 Institutional investors however do not unambiguously prefer voice to exit 
strategies. For this they need to see equity holdings as conferring rights of ownership, 
rather than just as part of an investment portfolio with returns to be maximised.90 
Institutional investors with a large number of firms in their portfolio may prefer to 
concentrate on firms within similar sectors of the economy, so that experience gained 
from learning about the modus operandi of one firm and its operating environment
86 Dimsdale, ‘Need to Restore Corporate Accountability’, p. 20; Shleifer and Vishny, ‘A Survey’, pp. 
753-754.
87 John Pound, ‘Beyond Takeovers: Politics Comes to Coiporate Control’, Harvard Business Review, 
March-April (1992), 83-93, pp. 83, 86; Robert Mangel and Habir Singh, ‘Ownership Structure, Board 
Relationships and CEO Compensation in Large US Corporations’, Accounting and Business Research, 
23 (Special Issue) (1993), 339-350, p. 339.
88 Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, pp. 40-41.
89 Nicholas Kochan and Michel Syrett, New Directions in Corporate Governance, Research Report 
2137 (London: Business Information, 1991), p. 3; Dimsdale, ‘Need to Restore Corporate 
Accountability*, p. 30.
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can be transferred in their monitoring of other firms in a similar position. This 
strategy may cause institutions to be insufficiently diversified and open to correlated 
risks, but since this arrangement persists in market-based systems and is mirrored by 
large shareholders in bank-based systems, it would appear that the expected costs are 
less than those of relinquishing control.90 1 It is also possible that free-riding will be 
incurred amongst other shareholders, but this should only be problematic where large 
investors have interests that contradict those of the firm, and that may result in long­
term deterioration in the enterprise’s performance in the absence of action by other
shareholders.
As well as individual investors, voucher privatisation depended upon the participation 
of intermediaries acting corporately on behalf of dispersed shareholders.92 The Klaus 
government expected these to evolve and to perform corporate governance functions 
to facilitate the owner-driven restructuring it desired in privatised firms. IPFs as 
owners of newly privatised firms and board members through their shareholdings 
were supposed to have adequate incentives to monitor firms in their portfolio and 
oversee the management to ensure that the enterprise is being operated in a 
sustainable manner.93 Supplementing this would be information they collected during 
the bidding phases over firms that together should allow them to make rational
90 Short and Keasey, ‘Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance’, p. 25.
91 Sweder van Wijnbergen and Anton Marcinin, Voucher Privatization, Corporate Control and the 
Cost of Capital: An Analysis of the Czech Privatization Programme, CEPR Discussion Paper, 1215 
(London: CEPR, 1995), p. 21; Shleifer and Vishny, ‘A Survey’, p. 758.
92 Jan Mladek and Iraj Hashi, ‘Voucher Privatisation, Investment Funds and Corporate Governance in 
Czechoslovakia’, British Review of Economic Issues, 15 (37) (1993), 67-95, p. 70. The degree to 
which this was formalised differs between countries. In Poland, these were to be created by the state 
whilst the Czech government expected them to emerge spontaneously. Raj M. Desai, ‘Reformed 
Banks and Corporate Governance in the Czech Republic 1991-1996’, Post-Soviet Geography and 
Economics, 37 (1996), 463-494, pp. 467-468; DuSan Tflska, The Role of Investment Funds in the Czech 
Republic, Working Paper, 23 (Ann Arbor: Davidson Institute, 1996, pp. 6, 7.
93 Harold Demsetz, Ownership, Control and the Firm: The Organisation of Economic Activity: 1 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 231.
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investments for the benefit of the shareholders investing in the IPF. IPFs with sound 
financial backing can adopt a long-term outlook on investment and restructuring and 
implement extensive investment and restructuring strategies in conjunction with the 
incumbent management. This ability of some investors to hold a long-term 
perspective could result in undervalued enterprises being acquired by funds with the 
greatest ability and incentive to restructure them.94 Funds planning to take an active 
role in restructuring would be expected to bid for large quantities of stock in a small 
number of enterprises to facilitate gaining board representation and actively undertake 
restructuring and corporate governance functions.
The reality in the Czech Republic has been that despite their continued presence, not 
all IPFs have long-term restructuring as their aim, so any changes in firms cannot be 
attributed with certainty to the actions of IPFs. IPFs motivated by immediate profit 
and attempting to maximise the immediate value of the firm and its share sales are 
unlikely to undertake deep restructuring, probably indicating a lack of funds or limited 
access to technology and new markets.95 This scenario led to criticisms of IPF 
ownership in the firms studied here because respondents perceived that “these only 
wanted profits. They did not understand our production and were ruled by officials 
and not by managers” (Rozdat Systems 4, Technical Director), and similarly,
at the start of privatisation, ownership was by IPFs, the ownership of these was 
uncertain and they were only interested in profit, not investing in machinery 
(Odraz KM 1, Managing Director).
94 Brom and Orenstein, ‘Privatised Sector in the Czech Republic’, pp. 913-914.
95 Coffee, ‘Institutional Investors in Transitional Economies’, pp. 155-156; Ingeborg Nemcova, 
‘Lessons from Czech Privatisation’, in Entrepreneurship and Economic Transition in Central Europe, 
edited by Jean-Paul Larson (Dordrecht: Kluwer/HEC School of Management, 1998), pp. 37-55, p. 47.
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Another respondent saw this as a difficulty of these owners, commenting that
unfortunately Cisar was under the influence of IPFs that sold shares to owners 
who appear to have the strategy of trying to suck money out of the company and 
put it elsewhere. They are not interested in the renovation of the company 
(Cisar 3, Retired Analyst).
Particular problems arose in the Czech Republic because the personnel resources of 
IPFs prevented them from actively pursuing restructuring within firms. Even where 
IPFs have sufficient representation on company boards to fire the management, this is 
not always a credible threat. A limited supply of qualified personnel as potential 
replacements exists, especially following the 1992 Lustration Law that decreed former 
Communist Party officials or secret police members could not hold public office for 5 
years, including management positions of firms where the state has a majority equity 
holding.96
As well as being external actors with skills to help combat agency problems, IPFs 
were expected to place their staff onto the boards of newly privatised enterprises as 
shareholder representatives. In appointing directors to boards, the same restricted 
market for personnel is entered. Some IPFs have tried to overcome this by using their 
own staff97 as in Cisar where
96 Ian Jeffries, Socialist Economies and the Transition to the Market: A Guide (London: Routledge, 
1993), p. 387; Roderick Martin, Transforming Management in Central and Eastern Europe (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 13.
97 Stijn Claessens and Simeon Djankov, ‘Enterprise Performance and Management Turnover in the 
Czech Republic’, European Economic Review, 43 (1999), 1115-1124, p. 1117.
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IPFs bought individual vouchers and then became the owners and investor in 
companies. At the start, the management were the same as before 1989, but 
over time the IPFs wanted to put their people on the boards (Cisaf 1, Trade 
Union President).
Despite the apparent ineffectiveness of this form of shareholder participation because 
these new shareholders often lack expertise in key roles,98 the replacement of 
managerial teams in enterprises by IPF owners has continued.99 The reasons for this 
are unclear but it may simply be that in the absence of any alternative behaviour, this 
symbolises the IPFs trying to justify their ownership status.100 In Brodchmel however 
this has led to a perception that the company is “owned from Prague by professionals 
who by law meet once a month” (Brodchmel 2, Project Manager), and so these are not 
seen as credible or effective owners, leaving the principal-agent problem unresolved.
IPFs may not monitor firms adequately because they do not have significant equity 
holdings in the companies they represent, and so do not benefit directly from an 
increased market value arising from proactive intervention.101 Substantial equity 
stakes cannot ensure that IPFs will become active owners, since the marginal costs of 
intervention can initially outweigh the marginal benefits quite substantially.102 
Despite investment in IPFs reaching very high levels in both waves of voucher 
privatisation, establishing their role as significant owners in the newly privatised 
sector, IPFs can be in a contradictory situation with regards restructuring. They have
98 Hans J. Blommestein, Rainer Geiger and Paul G. Hare, ‘Privatising Large Enterprises: Overview of 
the Issues and Case Studies’, in Methods of Privatising Large Enterprises (Paris: OECD/CCEET, 
1993), 11-37, p. 20.
99 Klacek and Flek, Company Restructuring, p. 6.
100 Coffee, ‘Institutional Investors’, p. 153.
101 Coffee, ‘Institutional Investors’, pp. 112-113; Mladek, ‘Czech Companies’, pp. 45-46.
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characteristics of both “active” owners as direct investors in firms, as well as being
“passive” because of their obligation to maintain the market price of the shares and 
pay dividends.102 03 Consequently those transferring vouchers to IPFs have often only 
converted their nominal co-ownership of firms to become passive owners in the 
funds.104
Klaus originally foresaw IPFs as private intermediaries, aiding ownership and 
restructuring of enterprises because they “privatise the privatisation process” by 
reducing the potential for direct state activity in firms.105 However, state-owned joint- 
stock companies were permitted as ICs, which accounts for the significant number of 
bank-owned funds.106 Intended to bring benefits that included increased public 
confidence in the financial stability of IPFs,107 and the ability to adapt their existing 
information infrastructure, in reality it has restricted monitoring and restructuring 
because IPFs owned by ICs that are sponsored by state banks represent state 
ownership in the private sector. This had the effect that
102 Mladek, ‘Czech Companies’, p. 153; Coffee, ‘Institutional Investors’, p. 157.
103 Marie Bohata, ‘Some Implications of Voucher Privatization for Coiporate Governance’, Prague 
Economic Papers, 7 (1998), 59-65, p. 59; Pavel Mertlik, ‘A Case Study: The Czech Privatization and 
Subsequent Structural Changes in Capital Ownership and Property Rights’, Economic Survey of 
Europe, 2 (1998), 103-110, p. 104.
104 Jin Vedemik, ‘Capitalist Renewal: Privatization and Business’, in Ten Years of Building Capitalism: 
Czech Society After 1989, edited by Jill Vedernik and Petr Matfiju (Praha: Academia, 1999), pp. 70-93, 
p. 77.
05 Cheryl W. Gray, In Search of Owners: Lessons of Experience with Privatization and Corporate
Governance in Transition Economies, Policy Research Working Paper, 1595 (Washington: The World 
Bank, 1996), pp. 23, 25; Iraj Hashi and Alison Sinclair, ‘Managerial Behaviour and Supply of Shares in 
the Czech Voucher Privatisation Programme’, Moct-Most, 6 (1996), 103-121, pp. 106-107.
106 Jan Mladek, ‘The Different Paths of Privatization in Czechoslovakia, 1990-?’, in Privatization in the 
Transition to a Market Economy. Studies in Preconditions and Policies in Eastern Europe, edited by 
John S. Earle, Roman Frydman and Andrzej Rapaczynski (London: Pinter, in association with Central 
European University, 1993), pp. 121-146, p. 131.
107 Roman Frydman, Kenneth Murphy and Andrzej Rapaczynski, Capitalism With a Comrade’s Face 
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998), p. 31.
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pseudo-owners came from areas where there was money e.g. banks. These 
owners did not know how to take care of property and therefore usually 
managed in a bad way. Usually banks owned the companies and would buy or 
own them through the IPFs. The main goal of the banks was to try and keep the 
activities operating to try and make money in the short run and to then sell the 
company (Cisar 4, Services Director).
Institutional limitations to intermediaries acting as efficient governance agents in 
Czech firms are not exclusive to the IPFs, with such criticisms also levied at bank
owners as in Brodchmel where
after privatisation financiers have owned the company and their main goal is to 
make profit and pay dividends. They made money and this should have been 
used to renew the machinery and buy new, but because the new owners are 
banks and invested in the company, they wanted to have this money back 
(Brodchmel 2, Project Manager).
In the Czech Republic the state also retains a significant ownership stake with the 
National Property Fund owning up to 40% of the book value of enterprises privatised 
by voucher.108 Nevertheless, the direct influence of the government on enterprise 
managers is of secondary importance with the strong dependence of Czech companies 
on bank credits.109
108 Brom and Orenstein, ‘Privatised Sector in the Czech Republic’, pp. 894, 911.
109 Bohata, ‘Some Implications’, p. 60.
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Although the governments in the Czech Republic have remained relatively passive in 
its dealings with the banks, their continued state ownership could become a greater 
problem to privatising firms if a future government were to adopt a more paternalistic 
economic policy towards the banks.110 Any state ownership, whether overt or hidden, 
is liable to affect restructuring decisions. Representatives on enterprise boards in 
firms with such state ownership could act against the signals from the market, to 
promote social and political objectives such as employment preservation,111 raising 
doubts over the potential for state intervention in the future.112 Market forces would 
be subordinated to soft budget constraints and managers would not longer face as 
strict market discipline as in private firms, giving them more opportunity to maximise 
their own interests, rather than those of the owners.
A further institutional limitation facing institutional investors in exercising corporate 
governance is that the composite ownership of individual enterprises was widely 
dispersed between IPFs and individual shareholders with privatisation.113 This was 
despite heavily concentrated ownership by institutional owners after the completion of 
voucher privatisation, with their holding over two-thirds of all shares in both 
rounds.114 To promote the dissemination of investment risk through IPFs having 
diversified portfolios, the initial legislation allowed ICs to own only 40% of shares in 
a company, providing the maximum limit of 20% by any IPF was not exceeded.115 
The legal provision was later amended such that the 20% limit should apply to all
110 Frydman et al, Capitalism With a Comrade's Face, p. 33.
111 Stijn Claessens, ‘Corporate Governance and Equity Prices: Evidence from the Czech and Slovak 
Republics’, Journal of Finance, 52 (1997), 1641-1658, pp. 1647, 1655-1656.
112 Brom and Orenstein, ‘Privatised Sector in the Czech Republic’, p. 895.
113 Peter Kenway and Eva KlvaCova, ‘The Web of Cross-Ownership Among Czech Financial 
Intermediaries: An Assessment’, Europe-Asia Studies 48 (1996), 797-809, p. 802.
114 Mladek and Hashi, ‘Voucher Privatisation’, p. 83.
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IPFs founded by a single parent, but this has the effect of restricting the ability of 
institutional investors to exert influence over the incumbent management on behalf of 
their shareholders. Also, although designed to protect minority shareholders from 
being exploited by larger shareholders, the limits were not always adhered to.115 16 A 
“web of cross-ownership”117 of financial intermediaries involved in privatisation arose 
in the Czech Republic because many of the ICs founded or had significant equity or 
credit interests in more than one IPF.118
Principal-agent problems are not necessarily overcome in Czech firms after 
privatisation because of the absence of a “monitor of the monitors”119 120and cross­
ownership of IPFs. Conflicting relationships between firms and their creditors can 
result in IPFs having greater incentives to act in the interests of their founders rather 
than those of the firm’s shareholders. There can be a lack of accountability by large 
investors to shareholders in either their own funds or shareholders in firms they 
own. Shareholders in IPFs exercise limited pressure on their funds because of their 
dispersed nature that encouraged them to invest in an IPF initially. By contrast, the 
founding company has a direct impact on the actions of its subsidiaries and directs 
them to act in the founder’s interest, which may cause IPF-affiliated directors to orient 
their activities towards maximising opportunities for this parent rather than
115 Coffee, ‘Institutional Investors’, p. 128; Roland Egerer, Capital Markets, Financial Intermediaries, 
and Corporate Governance: An Empirical Assessment of the Top Ten Voucher Funds in the Czech 
Republic, Policy Research Working Paper, 1555 (Washington: The World Bank, 1995), p. 3.
116 Egerer, Capital Markets, p. 8; John S. Earle, Scott G. Gehlbach, Zuzana Sakovd and Jiri VeCemik, 
Mass Privatization, Distributive Politics, and Popular Support for Reform in the Czech Republic, 
Institute of Sociology Working Paper, 4 (Prague: Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, 1997), 
pp. 28-29.
17 Kenway and KlvaCova, ‘Web of Cross-Ownership’, p. 797.
118 Masahiko Aoki and Hyung-Ki Kim, ‘Corporate Governance in Transition Economies’, Finance and 
Development, 32 (3) (1995), 20-22, p. 22; OECD, Economic Survey: Czech Republic 1997-1998 (Paris: 
OECD, 1998), p. 65.
119 Gray,/n Search of Owners, p. 24; Patrick Helson, Privatisation in Eastern Europe, ADU 
Occasional Paper, 14 (Wye: Department of Agricultural Economics, Wye College, 1993), p. 8.
120 Shleifer and Vishny, ‘A Survey’, p. 758; Sternberg, Corporate Governance, pp. 60, 68.
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endeavouring to maximise returns for shareholders.121 This is especially common if 
there is a dominant IPF to whose founding IC the enterprise has a conflicting 
relationship, such as a bank holding outstanding debts of the enterprise, or where 
bankruptcy is a possibility and the bank’s role as a creditor may take precedence over 
optimal restructuring decisions.122 The emergence of financial institutions such as 
IPFs separates owners from managers, which may help overcome corporate 
governance problems within the enterprise and encourage restructuring. However, 
IPF fund managers are agents and not owners of the shares in their funds, so 
separating ownership from control still further and introducing another set of actors 
between the management and shareholders. This can exacerbate agency problems 
that corporate governance is meant to alleviate. If the enterprise management expects 
state assistance to be granted in the future, they may adopt behaviour including 
lobbying for continued protection or subsidies that is contrary to the fiscal propriety 
required to complement the IPFs efforts as owners to bring about restructuring. IPFs 
can also collude with the management, replicating the effects of insider ownership,123 
and annulling much of the effects of any corporate governance mechanisms.124 
Consequently voucher privatisation did not eradicate the “ties that bind” the state and 
enterprises but cross-ownership “re-arranged them” by introducing further
121 Mayhew and Seabright, ‘Incentives and the Management of Enterprises’, p. Ill; Blair, Ownership 
and Control, pp. 47, 182.
122 Blair, Ownership and Control, p. 47; Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov and Gerhard Pohl, 
Ownership and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Czech Republic, Policy Research Working 
Paper, 1737 (Washington: The World Bank, 1997), p. 6.
123 Dimsdale, ‘Need to Restore Corporate Accountability’, p. 20; Philippe Aghion and Wendy Carlin, 
‘Restructuring Outcomes and the Evolution of Ownership Patterns in Central and Eastern Europe’, in 
Lessons from the Economic Transition: Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, edited by Salvatore 
Zecchini (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic/OECD, 1997), pp. 241-261, p. 242.
124 Jonathan R. Macey, ‘Institutional Investors and Corporate Restructuring: A Demand-Side 
Perspective in a Comparative View’, in Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and 
Emerging Research, edited by Klaus J Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark J. Roe, Eddy Wymeersch and Stefan 
Prigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 903-919, p. 918.
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contradictions into claims over assets with shared ownership.125 Ownership patterns 
emerging from voucher privatisation did not always represent those of functioning 
market economies, particularly with cross-ownership arising from the involvement of 
IPFs,126 but also continued state ownership has often resulted in the emergence of 
only “quasi-private” firms.127
4.3.3 Share Consolidation and Corporate Governance.
Alongside dispersed ownership, cross-ownership has allowed many IPFs to achieve 
controlling positions in firms where they do not have majority shareholdings.128 To 
allow restructuring to occur there is a need for subsequent reconfigurations of 
ownership after share transfers with mass privatisation to re-allocate resources and 
bring sufficient incentives to change. This gives a crucial role to the newly emergent 
capital markets, as
[i]t is the dilemma of mass privatisation policies that they establish the promise 
of mass ownership, but ultimately depend upon capital markets to achieve the 
concentration of shares in the hands of strategic investors who can effect 
control.129
125 Lubomfr Mlcoch, ‘Czech Privatization - Penalties for the Speed’, Prague Economic Papers, 6 
(1997), 3-15, p. 10; Stark and Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways, p. 162.
126 Brom and Orenstein, ‘Privatised Sector in the Czech Republic’, p. 920; Aureliusz M. Pedziwol, 
‘The Great Game of Privatization’, Transition, 3 (1) (1997), 36-40, p. 40.
127 Alice H. Amsden, Jacek Kochanowicz and Lance Taylor, The Market Meets its Match: 
Restructuring the Economies of Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 
123; MISoch, ‘Czech Privatization’, p. 11.
128 Mladek, ‘Czech Companies’, p. 163; Kenway and Klvadovd, ‘Web of Cross-Ownership’, p. 802; 
OECD, Czech Republic 1997-1998, p. 53.
129 Kogut and Spicer, Institutional Technology, p. 35.
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Dispersal as institutionalised in the Czech model with the 20% limit on ownership can 
prevent effective corporate governance being exercised over firms where dispersed 
individual owners comprise the majority shareholders, since this makes it much 
harder to attain a consensus. If these IPFs are to act as efficient intermediaries they 
need the opportunity to concentrate their holdings,130 especially in key enterprises 
they own so that they have extra leverage and greater incentives to become active 
monitors. The incumbents in particular do not always regard IPFs as the final owners, 
although this problem is being rectified with much higher concentrations of ownership 
resulting after share trading in the “third wave”. This is the period since the 
completion of bidding and share allocations where investment funds have been 
engaged in portfolio re-adjustments to consolidate their portfolios and efficiently 
restructure their holdings according to their differing investment interests and become 
major shareholders in specific firms.131
Since restructuring is required at both the micro level in individual enterprises and at a 
macro level within the economy, a “fourth wave” of voucher trading with credible 
policies of bankruptcy and liquidation may be inevitable in the Czech Republic.132 
One respondent spoke of the necessity of such rationalisation, desiring that
130 Kenway and Klva£ov£, ‘Web of Cross-Ownership’, pp. 802-803, 808.
131 Eric R. Hake, ‘Third Wave of Privatization: A Search for True Owners?’, in Financial Market 
Restructuring in Selected Central European Countries, edited by Karen S. Vorst and Willadee 
Wehmeyer (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 151-181, pp. 155, 170; Michal Mejstrik, ‘The Restructuring 
After Privatization in the Czech Republic’, Prague Economic Papers, 8 (1999), 233-260, pp. 251-252.
132 Xavier Richet, ‘Transition Towards the Market in Eastern Europe: Privatisation, Industrial 
Restructuring and Entrepreneurship’, Communist Economies and Economic Transformation, 5 (1993), 
229-243, p. 236; Petr Chvojka, ‘Financial Context of Central and East European Countries Process of 
Privatisation and Restructuring (Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary)’, Prague Economic Papers, 7 
(1998), 140-164, pp. 142-143.
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those who own shares should be evaluated and the rest of the shares that do not
belong to anyone should be sold at a lower price so that something is done and 
these are not wasted (Brodchmel 4, Quality Manager).
Such rationalisation of shareholdings should introduce new owners to actively 
restructure firms and increase the overall economic efficiency of the economy. Most 
important though is that the restructuring process should ensure the establishment of a 
new framework for economically oriented production.133 The precursor to this is 
effective corporate governance because this will allow new owners to emerge and 
control asset use within enterprises, but as the case study firms show in the next 
section, an adequate corporate governance system to support new owners has not 
emerged as a consequence of voucher privatisation.
4.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER VOUCHER PRIVATISATION.
The two preceding sections have described the archetypal models and mechanisms of 
corporate governance currently used in developed economies. This has shown that 
whilst some features of both are paralleled by post-privatisation corporate governance 
in the Czech Republic, there are important differences in its outworking here because 
of institutional influences. This idea is extended in this section where the experiences 
of the case study firms from a perspective of embedded institutionalism illustrate how 
corporate governance is being developed in these firms after voucher privatisation.
133 George B. Assaf, ‘Enterprise Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union: The Role of Technical Assistance’, in Privatization, Enterprise Development and Economic
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Following voucher privatisation, new owners are often institutionally constrained 
from restructuring their firms because of limitations inherent within enterprises and 
the surrounding institutional environment. This indicates that there is an 
insufficiently developed corporate governance framework to facilitate the desired 
restructuring in voucher privatised firms in the Czech Republic.
Voucher privatisation only represents a “restructuring of ownership”,134 135but for 
enterprise restructuring to occur, appropriate incentives for owners or another 
constituency within the firm to support improvements in efficiency and owners’
lie
interests are required. Even when a significant or majority shareholder can be 
identified, they may not have the ability to instigate change,136 so voucher 
privatisation risks one form of inefficient ownership being superseded by another. 
Respondents criticised this as a failing of voucher privatisation, seeing that although 
“it was quick, it did not solve the problem of owners” (Odraz KM 2, Marketing 
Manager) and
a concrete owner was expected to come and be interested in development of the 
firm, but this did not happen with voucher privatisation (Rozdat Systems 4, 
Technical Director).
The extent to which owners are involved in their firms is an important determinant of 
the restructuring that occurs. According to one respondent
Reforms: Experiences of Developing and Transitional Economies, edited by Paul Cook, Colin 
Kirkpatrick and Frederick Nixson (Cheltenham: Elgar, 1998), pp. 129-149, p. 138.
134 Chvojka, ‘Financing Enterprise Restructuring’, p. 81.
135 Ken G. Smith, Terence R. Mitchell and Charles E. Summer, ‘Top Level Management Priorities in 
Different Stages of the Organizational Life Cycle’, Academy of Management Journal, 28 (1985) 799­
820, p. 801.
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the contemporary owners do have an interest in the firm and they are looking at 
strengthening this, but it is likely that they would be a stronger owner if 
Presnost KM produced in a different field of production that was closer to the 
interests of Obchodni Cesta (Presnost KM 1, Financial Planning Manager).
In Rozdat Systems the new owners were regarded less favourably as it was perceived
that
the priority of owners should be manufacturing, and they must have an interest 
in production, in selling and trading, and getting money to re-invest it, but the 
current owners here only look at the situation in terms of profit. They want 
money very quickly, but this can be slower in practice than the owners, workers 
and customers would be satisfied with (Rozdat Systems 2, Production 
Manager).
Another respondent argued that this occurred since
the owners do not understand the firm, probably because they only see it as a 
commercial subject in terms of results from production and trade. They don’t 
know many of the problems in the firm, or if they do they found out too late and 
now many of them cannot be solved as they are too big (Rozdat Systems 3, 
Maintenance Department supervisor).
136 Aureliusz M. Pedziwol, ‘The Great Game of Privatization’, Transition, 3 (1) (1997), 36-40, p. 38.
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The benefits of privatisation are most likely to be seen if this introduces owners with 
new sources of capital as well as entrepreneurial expertise and access to markets,137 
but in the Czech Republic new domestic owners have only very limited capital and 
business acumen to bring to privatised firms.138 Limited liquidity combined with a 
reliance on bank credit may deter post-privatisation restructuring in the Czech 
Republic139 for although “more restructuring would be possible with other methods of 
finance, it is very difficult to get this” (Rozdat Systems 5, Financial Director). 
Respondents specifically saw this as a negative consequence of voucher privatisation 
compared to other privatisation methods because “those buying coupons in the initial 
stages did not have enough money to restructure the company” (Cisar 1, Trade Union 
President), since
voucher privatisation has been carried out in such a way that each company has 
been bought and financed by credit. People buying these companies inherited 
their debts and with their limited financial resources, have not been able to pay 
them off in such a short period of time (Presnost KM 1, Financial Planning 
Manager).
This institutional environment demanded a privatisation approach that would inject 
new capital and dynamism into the economy because market forces are not sufficient 
under these conditions. Non-monetary techniques of property transfers were used 
through voucher privatisation because of institutional constraints in the economy.
137 Cheryl W. Gray, ‘In Search of Owners: Privatization and Corporate Governance in Transition 
Economies’, The World Bank Research Observer, 11 (2) (1996), pp. 179-197, pp. 180.
138 Dieter Bos, ‘Privatization in Europe: A Comparison of Approaches’, Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, 9 (1993), 95-111, p. 106.
139 Chvojka, ‘Financial Context’, pp. 145, 149; Debora Revoltella, ‘Financing Firms in East European 
Countries: An Asymmetric Information and Agency Costs Approach’, in Corporate Governance in
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The primary theoretical problem is the lack of revenue generated by this method, both 
for the new enterprises and the state,140 a concern that can also be levied at restitution. 
However, outweighing the financial concern for the government was that non­
monetary distributions helps avoid refuelling inflationary pressure in the economy141 
that would have been inimical to the other aims of the reforms. Also Czechoslovakia
had a virtually balanced budget in 1989, so financial stability was a relatively low 
priority for the government at the time.142
More serious with regards meeting the long run aims of the government is that 
enterprises do not obtain new capital inflows from voucher privatisation, and many 
already lack resources for restructuring.143 In Cisaf, one of the directors claimed
there are no problems in the quality of production and its completion on time 
but there are problems in finance. The company has orders worth Kc 100 to 120 
million but the company cannot finance these itself. To overcome this, the ideal 
state would be long run co-operation with banks to support these big orders but 
at the moment the company has to get money from other companies at very high 
interest rates, which is not a good situation. The consequences will be seen in 
the profit of the company and of course this will influence the costs of 
production and there will be no additions to financial reserves, but this has to be
Central and Eastern Europe: Transition Management is a Tough Job, edited by Debora Revoltella, 
Peter R. Haiss and Gerhard Fink (Amsterdam: SUERF, 1998), pp. 9-50, pp. 18,45.
140 Aureliusz M. Pedziwol, ‘Great Game’, Transition, 3 (1) (1997), 36-40, p. 36; Frydman et al, 
Capitalism With a Comrade's Face, p. 26.
141 Martin Myant, ‘Problems of Transition in Eastern Europe - Should We Seek Alternatives?’, British 
Review of Economic Issues, 15 (37) (1993), 9-32, p. 28.
142 Frydman et al, Capitalism With a Comrade’s Face, p. 26.
143 Josef Kotrba, ‘Privatisation Processes in the Czech Republic: Players and Winners’, in The Czech 
Republic and Economic Transition in Eastern Europe, edited by Jan Svenjar (San Diego: Academic 
Press, 1995), pp. 159-198, p. 198; Frydman etal, Capitalism With a Comrade’s Face, p. 15.
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done otherwise we would lose the customers and we cannot afford this (Cisar 4, 
Services Director).
Another respondent described how this was a difficulty arising from voucher 
privatisation, seeing it as
very unfortunate for the firm, and not just this firm but for most of the Czech 
Republic. A general expectation was that the sale of firms should bring 
improvements in its situation and all the environments such as financial and 
markets that are linked to it. This did not happen in Presnost KM as 
privatisation occurred with voucher privatisation and this could not bring new 
capital (Presnost KM 1, Financial Planning Manager).
Although voucher privatisation was structured to maximise domestic ownership, the 
costs of not encouraging strategic investors able to undertake restructuring in the 
economy outweigh these advantages when restructuring in the longer-term is 
considered. One director seeing this as a potential solution to permit firms to
restructure commented that
personally I prefer the German method of privatisation. I like the principle of 
selling companies to individuals with finances. There, medium-sized 
companies were offered in auctions and were bought by individuals and so even 
the unprofitable firms were sold to individuals as well who then decided if it 
was worth to try and run, or to close the business (Cisar 4, Services Director).
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Not only can private investors as owners provide funds for restructuring, but they are 
subject to hard budget constraints, so efficiency is essential in their firms to ensure 
they are competitive. Primarily it is foreign investors that have knowledge of 
alternative methods of organising production and resources to deploy in introducing 
creative restructuring solutions.144 As the effectiveness of a given type of ownership 
is defined by access to resources rather than differing priorities between outside and 
domestic owners,145 the appropriateness of the Klaus government in discouraging 
foreign investors from involvement in privatisation on ideological grounds is 
dubious.146 In the short run, a number of Czech firms have been able to begin 
restructuring with little or no foreign assistance, and restructuring in any privatised 
enterprise should not be delayed in the absence of such assistance that may not even 
be forthcoming in the future.147 Nonetheless, further difficulties could potentially be 
generated if this leads to an absence of new resources for strategic change, and by 
implication a lack of incentives to drive active changes in behaviour that would 
complement the move towards more market-oriented behaviour. This has already 
created real difficulties for one case study firm in its restructuring because
there is tough competition and we would like some help from outside, but 
foreign companies fear the competition, and therefore there is no way we can
144 Martin Myant, ‘Transition in the Czech Republic’, Proceedings of the Scottish Society for Russian 
and East European Studies (Glasgow: IREES, 1997), pp. 5-14, p. 9.
145 Aghion and Carlin, ‘Restructuring Outcomes’, p. 245; Philippe Aghion and Olivier J. Blanchard, 
‘On Privatization Methods in Eastern Europe and their Implications’, Economics of Transition, 6 
(1998), 87-99, p. 88.
146 Cyril C. Ling, ‘The Development of the Automobile Industry in Eastern Europe’, in Firm Behavior 
in Emerging Market Economies: Cases from the Private and Public Sectors in Central and Eastern 
Europe, edited by Daniel S. Fogel (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), pp. 23-52, p. 35; Myant, ‘Transition in 
the Czech Republic’, p. 9.
147 Robert E. Anderson, Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov and Gerhard Pohl, ‘Privatization Effects in 
Central and Eastern Europe’, Moct-Most, 7 (1997), 137-162, p. 139; Karen L. Newman and Stanley D. 
Nollen, Managing Radical Organizational Change (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998), p. 134.
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learn about managing from foreign companies, and therefore we cannot reach 
their effectiveness (Brodchmel 4, Quality Manager).
A result of weak corporate governance can be that owners and their representatives 
are not actively involved in decision-making on restructuring issues, and if other 
shareholders are unable to offer a co-ordinated response, then the management can 
exercise de facto control freed from shareholder discipline.148 As voucher 
privatisation institutionalises shareholder dispersal, this is an important consideration 
for Czech firms. This situation has occurred in Drazitest, where the “management, as 
the largest shareholder, makes decisions in their own interests” (Drazitest 2, 
Production Director). It is seen as beneficial here since the IPF has only minority 
ownership and
the IPF tried to have an influence but a 17% holding is not much, not because 
they are not interested in leadership or being involved, but because it is satisfied 
with the way the company operates and do not see any reason to be further 
involved (Drazitest 7, Personnel Manager).
Overall, the effect has been that
the top management shareholders are really involved. Here the owners 
understand the firm’s problems and anticipate them as they work here (Drazitest 
3, Supplies Manager).
148 Rajeswararas Chaganti and Fanborz Damanpour, ‘Institutional Ownership, Capital Structure and 
Firm Performance’, Strategic Management Journal, 12 (1991), 479-491, p. 480; Paul J. J. Welfens, 
Market-Oriented Systemic Transformation in Eastern Europe: Problems, Theoretical Issues and Policy 
Outcomes (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1992), p. 125.
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In another firm a respondent perceived potentially positive as well as negative 
implications arose from the managerial control issue such that
managerial ownership can bring benefits as these have a greater interest in the 
firm and are more directly acquainted with its problems. However, this can also 
have some negative effects too and there are many examples of this in the Czech 
Republic where managerial ownership has resulted in workers becoming poor 
and the management getting rich as some managers are only interested in 
getting money and really do not care about the company and its business 
activities. They can do this as shareholders cannot really influence what 
happens in the company (Presnost KM 1, Financial Planning Manager).
Individual enterprises in the Czech Republic have to solve their own governance 
problems directly between shareholders, owners, and managers within each individual 
firm. The evolving institutional environment does not appear to predispose the Czech 
Republic towards any given corporate governance approach. Following voucher 
privatisation, corporate governance needs to function effectively in the absence of the 
basic institutions of capitalism, whilst as the previous quote demonstrates, there is a 
continuing expectation by workers that managers should act in the interests of the firm 
and its workforce, rather than to primarily satisfy profit motives. A direct transplant 
of Anglo-American, German or Japanese corporate governance systems is not 
appropriate because of differences and in the form of institutions and their 
complementary linkages in the Czech Republic.149 A hybrid between the bank-based
149 Andrei Kuznetsov and Olga Kuznetsova, Corporate Governance in a Transitional Economy: Has 
Everything Been Done to Make the Concept Work?, International Workshop on Transition and 
Enterprise Restructuring in Eastern Europe, 20-22 August 1998 (Copenhagen: CEES, Copenhagen
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systems of continental Europe and the market-centred Anglo-American instead seems 
to be emerging. As neither bank nor market-based approaches offer an 
unambiguously superior corporate governance solution,150 this trend towards “the 
simultaneous existence of bank financing and capital market financing”151 can be 
regarded positively in the transformation economies.
It also reflects a global development towards convergence in corporate governance 
models, which can produce better outcomes than using any single approach.152 That 
development is a response to organisational structures emerging through privatisation, 
as well as evolutions in formal and informal institutions.153 The extent of 
restructuring that then occurs will be an adaptation to the external environment, in 
particular the legislative environment, the respective position of institutional 
investors, and pressures exerted by the market for corporate control.154 Complex 
corporate governance systems only need to be designed when there are sufficiently 
complex contractual arrangements that need to be monitored in this way.155 Whilst 
corporate governance is likely to extend and diversify over time as the transformation 
progresses in the Czech Republic,156 brief consideration is made below of how the
Business School, 1998). 25 September 2000.
<http://www.econ.cbs.dk/institutes/cees/workshop/Kuznetsov.html>, p. 3.
150 Nikolaos T. Milonas, Mass Privatization Methods and their Effects on Capital Market Institutions, 
Agency Relationships and Managerial Monitoring, Working Paper, 50 (Leuven: LICOS Centre for 
Transition Economics, 1995), p. 17.
151 Fakin, Financial Institutions, p. 22.
152 Kenneth J. Rediker and Anju Seth, ‘Boards of Directors and Substitution Effects of Alternative 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms’, Strategic Management Journal, 16 (1995), 85-99, p. 87.
153 Klaus Meyer, Direct Investment in Economies in Transition, New Horizons in International 
Business (Cheltenham: Elgar, 1998), p. 20.
154 William Q. Judge Jr. and Carl P. Zeithaml, ‘Institutional and Strategic Choice Perspectives on Board 
Involvement in the Strategic Decision Process’, Academy of Management Journal, 35 (1992), 766-794, 
pp. 767-768; Richard A. Johnson, Robert E. Hoskisson and Michael A. Hitt, ‘Board of Director 
Involvement in Restructuring: The Effects of Board versus Managerial Controls and Characteristics’, 
Strategic Management Journal, 14 (Summer Special Issue) (1993), 33-50, pp. 33-34, 36-39.
155 Prevezer and Ricketts, ‘Corporate Governance’, p. 241.
156 Stilpon Nestor and John Thompson, Corporate Governance Patterns in OECD Economies: Is 
Convergence Under Way? ’, OECD/Korean Development Institute Conference on Corporate
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corporate governance system emerging in the Czech Republic should be understood, 
and whether provides sufficient institutional impetus for sustainable restructuring to 
occur within Czech enterprises after voucher privatisation.
4.5 CONVERGENCE OR A NEW MODEL?
Convergence in corporate governance does not imply the emergence of identical 
models, as these are a response to specific operating conditions, and historical 
influences within firms and economic systems. Empirical evidence is the only way to 
determine how the interplay of forces of governance are resolved for any particular 
enterprise, since market structures and other operating conditions, as well as the 
formal legal framework, determine the optimal form of corporate governance 
approaches,157 and these can conflict. Governance tends to be less impersonal where 
there is more “noise” in the economic environment, because there are greater costs but 
also larger gains here for principals maintaining strict control over dispersed agents,158 
so investors with large shareholdings and institutions in the Czech Republic should 
have strong incentives to undertake governance. However, increasing 
competitiveness in financial markets as has occurred with voucher privatisation 
erodes the relationship between a firm and a few core financial institutions. The 
financial needs of firms diversify over time with restructuring but financial 
institutions concentrate increasingly on specific niches in the market, which requires a 
firm to establish a greater number of relationships. Commitment between firms and
Governance in Asia: A Comparative Perspective, Seoul, 3-5 March 1999. 18 May 1999. 
<http://mvw.oecd.org/daf/peru/govemance/in-asia.nestor.pdC>, p. 18.
157 Frank H. Easterbrook, ‘International Corporate Differences: Markets or Law?’, Journal of Applied
Corporate Finance, 9 (4) (1997), 23-29, p. 29.
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financial institutions then diminishes because the potential returns to risk taking are 
low.159 Shareholders will only actively undertake governance and restructuring if the 
gains from this exceed their private benefit from realigning their portfolios. 
Consequently, the institutional structure of ancillary markets helps determine the 
effectiveness of corporate governance under such conditions.
A more appropriate foundation for understanding the mechanisms of corporate 
governance emerging in the Czech Republic, and in transformational economies in 
general, when assessing the development of corporate governance from an 
institutional perspective, could be one of stakeholder interests rather than the 
traditional view of dominant shareholders having residual rights claims.160 This 
alternative strand of corporate governance theory in the literature considers a larger 
spectrum of competing interests than just shareholders as in traditional models. The 
impact of decisions of a wide range of agents, extending from the employees and 
managerial team through to customers, suppliers and local communities, and the 
influence they can exert over the firm are accounted for in stakeholder theories.161 
Stakeholder group membership does not have to be mutually exclusive or continuous 
for any given individual, rather being contingent on circumstances. These interests 
can often conflict with each other over time,162 yet benefits can arise from their 
interaction and the realisation of outcomes that are sensitive to the array of concerns
!58 Harold Demsetz and Kenneth Lehn, ‘The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and 
Consequences’, Journal of Political Economy, 93 (1985), 1155-1177, p. 1159.
159 Meyer, ‘Corporate Governance and Performance’, p. 21.
160 Meyer, ‘Corporate Governance and Performance’, p. 17.
161 John Monks, ‘Stakeholding: The Way Ahead’, in Competitiveness and Corporate Governance, 
edited by Andrea Westall (London: IPPR, 1996), pp. 54-61, p. 56; David Wheeler and Maria Sillanpaa, 
The Stakeholder Corporation: A Blueprint for Maximising Stakeholder Value (London: Pitman, 1997), 
p. x.
62 Gerry Johnson and Kevan Scholes, Exploring Corporate Strategy, 3 rd Edition (Hemel Hempstead: 
Prentice Hall, 1993), pp. 171-172.
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these represent.163 Companies in transformational economies typically need to 
resolve many competing interests and claims on their firms arising from their 
historical development, as well as the new conditions offered by transformation.
Often the incumbent management and other small groups gained levels of control 
disproportionate to their shareholdings through voucher privatisation because of the 
highly fragmented ownership that emerged. Stakeholder interests that justify these 
groups promoting their own self-interest could help explain the popularity of mass 
privatisation schemes amongst the incumbent management,164 even if this is not 
recognised formally by participants.
Stakeholder theories can be criticised because they limit direct accountability to 
investors, and can reduce the total wealth generating capacity of the economy by 
focussing on non-economic gains.165 This argument that such policies are necessarily 
economically detrimental is spurious, for any deviation away from profit-maximising 
behaviour needs to be assessed within the context of satisfying other objectives. 
Ensuring that the enterprise is profitable is important, but if stakeholder interests are 
to be considered, the ethical and social implications of the firms’ actions and attempts 
to increase non-commercial, value-adding activities becomes rational.166 Supporting 
stakeholders has advanced as a positive trend in developed market economies where 
there is an adequate legal and regulatory provision to control and direct this. In the 
Czech Republic however, this could give rise to some difficulties by merely allowing 
the management to satisfy the demands of more powerful external actors, perhaps in
163 Monks, ‘Stakeholding’, p. 58; John Parkinson, ‘Reforming Governance to Improve Discipline and 
Support Co-Operative Relationships’, in Competitiveness and Corporate Governance, edited by 
Andrea Westall (London: IPPR, 1996), p. 69; Wheeler and Sillanpaa, Stakeholder Corporation, p. 144.
164 Scott Thomas, ‘The Politics and Economics of Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe’, 
Columbia Journal of World Business, 28 (1) (1993), 166-178. Academic Search Elite. EBSCO 
Publishing. 8 May 1999. <http://www.global.epnet.com/liosttrial/login.html>, [n.p.].
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the expectation of increasing their own pecuniary benefits at the expense of 
shareholders and creditors, and resultant negative performance in the enterprise.165 166 67
Nonetheless, representing a reworking of the traditional corporate governance 
dichotomy, stakeholder theories of governance potentially offer an alternative 
approach that may be applicable to the Czech Republic, primarily because of the 
existence of multiple groups with interests to be reconciled. Should it be adopted and 
represent a form of corporate governance that is most suitable to the conditions here, 
this could offer the transforming economies the opportunity to lead rather than lag 
behind their economic competitors, overcoming possibly the most debilitating legacy 
of the socialist era. However, without a precise understanding of the aims towards 
which enterprises are oriented, contradictory development in the institutional 
framework that would appear to support an Anglo-Saxon governance model, and 
commercial legislation that is predominately inspired by a German system, the 
corporate governance mechanisms that will emerge in the Czech Republic remain 
unclear.168 Juxtaposing fundamentally contradictory corporate governance systems is 
unlikely to bring an optimal outcome169 but instead give scope to the strongest 
interests to manipulate governance to favour their own interests, which is unlikely to 
be shareholders. Although this does occur in the seemingly altruistic German and 
Japanese corporate governance systems that favour long-term enterprise growth and
165 Sternberg, Corporate Governance, pp. 106-107.
166 Parkinson, ‘Reforming Governance’, p. 69; Wheeler and Sillanpaa, Stakeholder Corporation, p. ix.
167 Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’, Journal of Law 
and Economics, 26 (1983), 301-325, p. 304; Demsetz, Ownership, pp. 378-379.
168 Hayri and McDermott, p. 1; David L. Bartlett, ‘Has the East Really Become the South? Ownership 
Structure and Economic Policy in Eastern Europe’, Politics and Society, 25 (1997), 202-231. 
Academic Search Elite. EBSCO Publishing. 8 May 1999.
<http://www.global.epnet.com/hosttrial/login.html>, [n.p.].
169 Stephan Herten and Jens Holscher, ‘“Anglo-Saxon” or “Rhenish” Financial Markets for Central- 
East Europe?’, in Financial Turbulence and Capital Markets in Transition, edited by Jens Holscher 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 13-24, p. 14.
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wealth-creation, these models do not endeavour to uphold private property rights.170 
Introducing this model would be contrary to the aims of the general transformation 
since restoring private property was fundamental to re-establishing individual liberties 
in the Czech Republic, as well as helping to create a culture of popular capitalism. An 
eclectic approach to corporate governance is thus required to understand the 
governance mechanisms that are developing and guiding restructuring in firms after 
voucher privatisation.
4.6 CONCLUSION.
Moving from central planning, where there is no corporate governance as understood 
in developed market economies, to a system embracing this cannot occur 
immediately. Appropriate control mechanisms, whether through creditors skilled in 
restructuring firms within a bank-oriented system, or financial institutions and active 
shareholders to undertake market-based control as in the Anglo-American model, take 
time to emerge and develop.171 Despite the early involvement of the banks in 
enterprise financing, through voucher privatisation Klaus claimed a commitment to 
private financing, removing subsidies and soft budget constraints and the restructuring 
of enterprises by new owners, with the intention of creating “a market economy 
without complicating and obfuscating adjective added to the word market”.172 The 
sale and distribution of vouchers with mass privatisation was to be a catalyst to active 
trading of equities, incorporating a desire to create an emergent stock market to 
facilitate active trading of shares as in the Anglo-American model, with price
170 Sternberg, Corporate Governance, p. 92.
171 Berglof, ‘Capital Structure’, pp. 256-257; Fakin, Financial Institutions, p. 22.
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movements offering publicly available information on the absolute and relative 
performance of firms and disciplining managers. Financial intermediaries were 
always to be involved in voucher privatisation, although the architects of the 
programme did not foresee them as being involved in active restructuring, but rather 
as tools of collective investment with diversified portfolios. Financial intermediaries 
were legislated for in voucher privatisation to have an active monitoring and control 
agenda for long-term enterprise restructuring, but financial markets have remained 
thin,172 73 which has hindered the development of corporate governance because of 
inconsistencies in the supporting institutional environment.
Understanding the evolution of corporate governance after voucher privatisation in 
the Czech Republic depends strongly on the institutional conditions in existence that 
prevent either of the main paradigms currently recognised from being appropriately 
adapted and implemented in Czech firms. The actual path of restructuring depends 
upon incentives facing owners and managers generated by the institutional 
environment for those actors in relationship with the firm, with informal institutions 
primarily dictating the pace of change. Discrepancies between the legislative 
provisions after voucher privatisation for exercising governance and the institutional 
realities in the Czech Republic have led to privatised firms experiencing difficulties 
with restructuring. In the Czech Republic, actors traditionally involved in corporate 
governance in developed market economies are lacking or restricted in their ability to 
undertake necessary and appropriate restructuring, especially after voucher
172 Klaus, A Road to Market Economy: Selected Articles, Speeches and Lectures Held Abroad (Praha: 
TOP Agency, 1991), p. 12.
173 Desai, ‘Reformed Banks’, p. 464.
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privatisation.174 Even where new owners have emerged, they rarely have the ability 
or incentive to restructure their firms. Principal-agent problems are not fully resolved 
because of weakly specified and inconsistently operating corporate governance 
mechanisms, so rather than owners, other groups achieve de facto control over 
privatised enterprises, becoming those who will direct restructuring. This is 
particularly true for the management, who previously lacked credible discipline from 
the state as the owner under central planning, and who endeavour to avoid such 
control from being introduced, even after privatisation. Although a rational response 
to these circumstances, restructuring after voucher privatisation has not been 
supported by the corporate governance arrangements existing in the Czech Republic. 
Dispersed ownership from privatisation has a greater potential for future instability in 
corporate governance than with concentrated ownership from a clearly defined 
owner,175 which has been a dilemma of voucher privatisation that has promoted 
managerial control to take precedence over ownership. The next chapter therefore 
addresses the role of managers with either de facto or de jure control rights on 
influencing restructuring within privatised enteiprises.
174 Mehmet Ozkoya and Kossein Askari, ‘Management of Thirty Privatized Companies: Its Importance 
and How Little We Know’, World Development, 27 (1999), 1097-1114, p. 1105.
175 Thomadakis, Long-Term Investment, p. 12.
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CHAPTER FIVE
MANAGERS AND RESTRUCTURING
Neo-classical economic theory predicts that privatisation will produce new owners 
with incentives to restructure their firms, which was Klaus’ intended outcome for 
voucher privatisation. However, this has not been realised in the Czech Republic 
where, in reality, owners are institutionally restricted in their ability to undertake 
restructuring. These institutionalised difficulties arise from the design of the voucher 
privatisation programme as well as the wider social, political, and economic 
environment within which films operate, that negate the direct application of neo­
classical economics to understanding privatisation and restructuring outcomes in the 
Czech Republic. As the previous chapter has shown, corporate governance 
mechanisms within films have been weakly defined during the transformation.
Institutional influences in transformational economies mean that those with control
over enterprises are not necessarily those with formal ownership rights, invalidating 
the simple principal-agent prescription of neo-classical economic theory in such 
instances. To determine what restructuring will occur and who directs this, it is 
therefore important to consider the incentive structures of all agents involved in the
firm.
The chapter argues that institutional influences exist for Czech firms, which are 
sufficient to exert influence over the choices and outcomes of managerial 
restructuring strategies after privatisation. Managers are important agents of change, 
and privatisation opens new opportunities as well as providing a credible impetus for 
them to change their behaviour. However, their choices and the outworking of these
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in enterprises are impacted by institutional influences, so that actual restructuring 
outcomes in firms cannot be predicted a priori. The central argument of the chapter is 
that with weak corporate governance, principal-agent problems are not effectively 
overcome by voucher privatisation. As a result, managers retain the de facto control 
over enterprises gained from their privileged position attained in state-owned 
enterprises as unconstrained agents. Whilst this limitation arises from the way 
voucher privatisation was designed, the behaviour of managers in the restructuring of 
privatised enterprises is influenced by, and cannot be understood outwith the 
institutional environment because of path-dependency and embeddedness of the 
managerial function and the firm.
The existence of institutional influences does not preclude adequate and necessary 
restructuring from occurring after voucher privatisation. Nevertheless, there are 
factors endogenous and exogenous to the management function that impact on the 
overall changes they can and will undertake, and how beneficial these will be for 
restructuring. The measures the managers undertake and the effects of these are 
discussed in this chapter to ascertain whether voucher privatisation in the Czech 
Republic encourages managers to undertake restructuring. It is argued that the 
strategies of post-communist managers in restructuring their enterprises are a function 
of legacies of the centrally planned economy and behaviour this engendered; the 
expectations for change within firms, the way the firm is structured and extricates 
itself from the former economic system, as well as the interests of managers 
themselves to maintain and preserve their position.
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Using data from the case study firms, this chapter considers the post-privatisation role 
of managers in the Czech Republic. In each section, the impressions of respondents 
are presented to assess the restructuring measures that managers introduce, given the 
context within which these occurred. Firstly, the expectations of managers and 
employees over the changing managerial role from privatisation and transformation 
are considered. This is compared to the historical function of managers under central 
planning, and legacies from this that can continue within privatised firms are then 
discussed. This contextualisation of the managerial function and behavioural patterns 
seen now is a precursor to the consideration of actual changes implemented by 
managers in privatised firms in the following sections. “Soft” changes represented by 
strategic planning, human resource management, adaptations in communication, and 
production changes are discussed alongside “hard” measures arising from alterations 
to the structural configuration of enterprises. Corresponding with the responses from 
the interviews, these embody the primary functions of contemporary managers and so 
represent the extent of managerial influence on overall restructuring. The chapter 
therefore demonstrates the institutional influences facing managers to undertake 
restructuring changes, and the extent to which they induce or prevent change.
5.1 CHANGING ROLE OF MANAGEMENT.
The tasks of the managerial function, and the status afforded it under central planning 
as little more than an administrative role, bears little resemblance to its proactive and 
distinct function as understood for enterprises in developed market economies.1
1 Michael Patrick Allen, Sharon K. Panian and Roy E. Lotz, ‘Managerial Succession and 
Organizational Performance’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 24(1979), 167-180, p. 167.
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Much of the managerial task under central planning was concerned with issues that 
arose aside from firm-specific production issues2 such as meeting the demands of 
Party interests and acquiring resources to ensure plan fulfilment, with the effect that 
“the positions of managers were more generalised as the state-owned enterprise was 
led centrally by the state with set goals” (Cisaf 1, Trade Union President). Also, most 
former managers did not have experience of managing firms within different 
industries, and organisational homogeneity in the centrally planned economy 
discouraged a wide dissemination of skills and knowledge of alternative management 
techniques,3 especially those that would be useful under the new market conditions.4 
In the post-communist transformation there is therefore a need not only for former 
state-owned enterprises to adapt to new opportunities afforded by liberalisation, but 
also for a redefinition of the role and institution of management if managers are to be 
able to implement appropriate restructuring measures.5
5.1.1 Post-Privatisation Expectations For Managers.
A significant institutional constraint preventing managers from altering their 
behaviour is that after privatisation managers risk losing their personal, as well as
2 Sandor Nagy, ‘Historical Background of Management Development in Central and Eastern Europe’, 
Review of Business, 13 (4) (1992), 10-12. Academic Search Elite. EBSCO Publishing. 24 April 1999. 
<http://www.global.epnet.com/hosttrial/login.html>, [n.p.].
3 R. Whitley, J. Henderson, L. Czaban and G. Lengyel, ‘Continuity and Change in an Emergent Market 
Economy: The Limited Transformation of Large Enterprises in Hungary’, in The Changing European 
Firm: Limits to Convergence, edited by Richard Whitley and Peer Hull Kristensen (London:
Routledge, 1996), pp. 210-237, p. 232.
4 Maury Peiperl and Saul Estrin, ‘Managerial Markets in Transition in Central and Eastern Europe: A 
Field Study and Implications’, International Journal of Human Resource Management, 9 (1998), 58­
78, pp. 58-59.
5 Joseph Prokopenko, ‘Transition to a Market Economy and its Implications for HRM in Eastern 
Europe’, in Human Resource Management in Europe: Perspectives for the 1990s, edited by Paul S. 
Kirkbride (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 147-163, pp. 157-158; D. M. W. N. Hitchens, J. E. Bimie, J. 
Hamar, K. Wagner and A. Zemplinerova, Competitiveness of Industry in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), pp. 81, 334.
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professional authority, unless they prove their ability to adapt to the new market 
conditions.6 Without this, their precarious position in society as well as in their 
enterprises is endangered. Respondents recognised the need for behavioural changes
because
there are big differences in the management function. It was easy in the state- 
owned enterprises but is different in private companies where the owner 
employs managers and their job is to evaluate whether it is possible to reach set 
goals and work to seek ways to reach these goals. Managers are paid for 
looking for solutions even after working hours but everyone is supposed to 
think about solutions and bring them. On the other hand, workers in the 
workshops are not paid for bringing any kind of solutions, and as thinking and 
creativity are valued here so much of course we want to motivate people to 
come up with solutions and appraise them for it. The work of management is to 
solve problems, be creative and think. If they are unable to bring solutions they 
are not a good manager. People like that are not wanted here as they are paid 
for doing such work in their job (Cisar 4, Services Director).
Another director concurred the changes are most significant and important for 
managers rather than other employees, suggesting that there have been
no changes to the workers work, but managers now solve different problems 
than they did in the past and have different future problems to deal with. The
6 Anna Soulsby and Ed Clark, ‘Economic Restructuring and Institutional Change: Post-Communist 
Management in the Czech Republic’, Journal of Socio-Economics, 25 (1996), 473-496. Academic 
Search Elite. EBSCO Publishing. 8 May 1999. <http://www.global.epnet.com/hosttrial/login.html>,
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main priority of management is financial restructuring, then focusing on 
customer needs with improvements in sales results and organisation, as it is 
essential to sell products (Odraz KM 1, Managing Director).
Respondents placed a lot of emphasis on the changed opportunities privatisation 
brings for managers to undertake restructuring measures, believing that
managers and directors are responsible for the success of the firm and they have 
better opportunities to lead the company compared to before privatisation 
(Rukopis Strojimy 5, Assembly worker).
As a result, there were anticipated changes in the function and interests of mangers
since
privatisation was expected to bring independence in decision-making away from 
certain people and lead to independence of the firm so that it is able to approach 
other markets in foreign countries (Brodchmel 4, Quality Manager).
Other differences highlighted were that managers now need to “take responsibility for 
the department and all the tasks in it, and if they cannot do this well, then they have to 
leave” (Rozdat Systems 4, Technical Director), with the effect that
[n.p.]; Anne Mills, ‘Contextual Influences on Human Resource Management in the Czech Republic, 
Personnel Review, 27 (1998), 177-199, p. 180.
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today’s management give more effort to their work than 10 years ago, and now 
if they want the firm to survive, they have to talk about financial issues all the 
time (Rozdat Systems 3, Maintenance Department supervisor).
These changes have arisen because firms operate within an increasingly competitive 
market environment, with the effect that
the main interest of the managers is to keep the firm in existence as there is a lot 
of competition in this industrial area. Maybe in the past it was development but 
now it is survival (Rozdat Systems 3, Maintenance Department supervisor).
Improvements in managerial influence over operational and production level issues 
were also expected within the firms so that managers would
allow workers to do more and new things in designing new products. They 
should buy new equipment and keep it in good working order, and provide a 
good place to work. Good working conditions are especially important as this 
means that the job is done better (Rukopis Strojirny 3, Mechanic).
Overall those who saw positive changes argued that “the management is more 
qualified, younger, and more effective” (Drazitest 3, Supplies Manager), with it 
possible to identify
improvements in the structure of management with gaining new knowledge and 
other fields of experience. The top management has been forced to learn new
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skills and so there has been an increase in the quality and education of the 
management here (Presnost KM 1, Financial Planning Manager).
Other respondents did not perceive that changes had been attained because although
the role of management is more important than it used to be, the role of 
managers is underestimated in this company and they tend to only be 
professionals in their field, and no managers here have managerial experience or 
qualifications. Some have learned more about management but it could be 
better in economic and organisational terms. The management have 
engineering backgrounds and their qualifications for the technical work they do 
are very good but most people do not realise or have no idea about how 
management works and how firms should operate in competition with other 
companies (Drazitest 1, Quality Director).
For another respondent, problems existed because although workers
expected managers to work better after privatisation, to become faster in dealing 
with problems, and to keep workers in their jobs, this didn’t really happen. 
Management should understand the problems in this firm but I don’t think they 
do fully. It is unclear how to change this. Their priority should be to find new 
customers and markets, and to try and find new employees with good 
experience in other companies that can be imported and used here (Rukopis 
Strojimy 4, Machine worker).
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Even where respondents did not directly perceive changes within the management 
function, they expected the effects of this would be felt in other spheres.
Consequently this employee thought that the managerial function had not changed, for 
though
what management do is not visible and so cannot be judged, the results of this 
are seen which are bad as there is not enough time or good conditions for 
working in, and also the quality of materials is not very good. Management do 
not understand the problems and are not interested in the real problems 
(Rukopis Strojimy 5, Assembly worker).
The diversity of responses reflects differences in perception by workers and the 
management over the changes necessary for restructuring and those introduced. 
However they also indicate that some behavioural patterns have not altered, as simply 
changing ownership with voucher privatisation does not effectively solve the 
principal-agent problem when managers do not introduce sustainable and appropriate 
restructuring to their firms. The potential for managers to induce restructuring and 
limits on its ability to do this depends upon the extent to which they can successfully 
redefine their function away from that under central planning in the post-privatisation 
environment.7 Before turning to look at the changes post-communist managers are 
introducing, legacies from the managerial function under central planning are 
presented as these persist, and their influence can impact on the perception of what 
restructuring should entail by managers in their own personal perspective as well as
that of the labour force.
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5.2 MANAGERIAL LEGACIES.
Since managers are responsible for implementing restructuring measures within firms, 
their own legitimacy to the workforce is essential.7 8 9The management function in all 
the centrally planned economies became increasingly discredited over time because of 
its direct associations with the Party apparatus. For example, managers were 
normally selected for political reasons from amongst members of the nomenklatura? 
although exceptions were made in some cases for particularly skilled technocrats.10 
This was understood by employees who saw how
many people were in positions no matter what qualifications they had. If the 
political leaders wanted them there, they were there. If they had a “red book” 
they could be a boss, even as an alcoholic (Brodchmel 3, Assembly Section 
Head).
In Czechoslovakia this lack of legitimacy was exacerbated after the Prague Spring and 
the subsequent period of normalisation when political links became more important 
than ever to attaining and retaining a position of influence. Even before 1989 
therefore, managers needed to justify their position and associated authority to the
7 Stavros B. Thomadakis, Long-Term Investment, Stable Governance and Financial Issues of 
Privatization in Transition Economies, Working Paper, 51 (Leuven: LICOS Centre for Transition 
Economics, 1995), p. 14.
8 Iraj Hashi and Alison Sinclair, ‘Managerial Behaviour and Supply of Shares in the Czech Voucher 
Privatisation Programme’, Moct-Most, 6 (1996), 103-121, p. 110.
9 Vincent Edwards and Gloria Lee, ‘Models of Management Formation: Implications for Central and 
Eastern Europe’, Journal for East European Management Studies, 4 (1999), 292-305, pp. 294-295.
10 Donna L. Wiley, ‘Developing Managers in the Former Soviet Union: An Application of the Systems 
Approach’, International Studies of Management and Organization, 24 (4) (1994), 64-82. Expanded 
Academic ASAP International Edition. 13 November 2000.
<http://infotrac.galegroup.com/itweb/stand>.
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labour force.11 This was often sought in ways that would benefit the workforce, such 
as bargaining for an easy plan to fulfil and providing social activities linked to the 
enterprise,12 as well as in links between the firm and the wider community.13
As a result, state-owned enterprises institutionalised paternalism in the management 
function, so that socio-political objectives predominated in the relationship between 
the enterprise management and the labour force at the expense of economic 
efficiency.14 In the transformation these provisions have been withdrawn reluctantly 
by managers and government, and only where it is an economic necessity. They 
retain a useful function in the transformation environment in maintaining social peace 
and mitigating the negative pressures associated with transformation,15 especially in 
the absence of clearly defined alternative social assistance.16 For example, managers 
of firms with passive owners can attempt to pacify their labour force through avoiding
11 Andrzej K. Kozminski, Catching Up? Organizational and Management Change in the Ex-Socialist 
Block (Albany: State University of New York, 1993), p. 159; Anna Soulsby and Ed Clark, ‘The 
Emergence of Post-Communist Management in the Czech Republic’, Organization Studies, 17 (1996), 
227-247, p. 232.
12 Olga Kuznetsova and Andrei Kuznetsov, ‘From a Socialist Enterprise to a Capitalist Firm: The 
Hazards of the Managerial Learning Curve’, Communist Economies and Economic Transformation, 8 
(1996), 517-528, p. 518.
13 Gemot Grabher and David Stark, ‘Organizing Diversity: Evolutionary Theory, Network Analysis, 
and Post-Socialism’, in Restructuring Networks in Post-Socialism: Legacies, Linkages and Localities, 
edited by Gemot Grabher and David Stark (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 1-32, p. 10; 
David Uhlif, ‘Internationalization, and Industrial and Regional Change: Restructuring Post-Communist 
Networks in the Region of LanSkroun, Czech Republic’, Regional Studies, 32 (1998), 673-685, p. 677.
14 Ronald Savitt, ‘Critical Issues of Privatization: A Managerial Perspective’, in Transformation 
Management in Post-Communist Countries: Organizational Requirements for a Market Economy, 
edited by Refik Culpan and Brij Nino Kumar (Westport: Quorom Books, 1995), pp. 17-28, p. 24; Niels 
Mygind, Enterprise Governance in Transition: A Stakeholder Perspective, Working Paper, 29 
(Copenhagen: CEES, Copenhagen Business School, 1999). 25 September 2000.
http://www.econ.cbs.dk/cees/institutes/cees/pub/wp/wp29.html, p. 17.
15 Maurice Ernst, Michael Alexeev and Paul Marer, Transforming the Core: Restructuring Industrial 
Enterprises in Russia and Central Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p. 146; Martin Myant, 
‘The Transformation of Czech Enterprises’, in Industrial Competitiveness in East-Central Europe, 
edited by Martin Myant (Cheltenham: Elgar, 1999), pp. 145-168, p. 155.
16 Vladimir Vrtiak, ‘Management, Labour and Transition to a Market Economy in Czechoslovakia’, 
Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations, 27 (Special Issue) (1993), 153-164, p. 153; Agnes Simonyi, 
‘Labour and Social Welfare in Competitive Firms’, in The Management and Organisation of Firms in 
the Global Context, edited by Csaba Mako and Chris Warhurst (GOddllft: Institute of Management 
Education, University of GodOllo/Department of Management and Organisation, Budapest University 
of Economic Sciences, 1999), pp. 101-109, p. 107.
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lay-offs where possible to enable them to maintain their own managerial positions.17 
Consequently these legacies provide important institutional influences that influence 
the way managers behave in introducing restructuring measures to their firms.
5.2.1 Networkings
Networking is an important legacy that can help managers preserve their position 
following privatisation. This can act as an institutional buffer against managers 
needing to change where threats to their position are weak, as with poorly defined 
ownership and corporate governance structures, or protect their position under 
conditions of uncertainty. Network ties are stable interpersonal interactions,18 ranging 
in form and strength from “arms length” to “embedded”.19 In the former case 
transactions between specified partners are impersonal and infrequent and permit a 
wide range of brokerage opportunities that can increase the firm’s active market 
involvement and the potential number of relationships a firm can enter into.
Embedded ties by contrast are collaborations predicated on trust and previously 
positive experiences between the agents involved, and can lead to mutually beneficial 
transactions occurring, including ones that would not normally be available in the 
open market.20
17 Marie Frydmanova, Kamil JandCek, Petr Mares and Toma§ Sirovdtka, ‘Labor Markets and Human 
Resources’, in Ten Years of Building Capitalism: Czech Society After 1989, edited by Jiff Vedemik and 
Petr MatSju (Praha: Academia, 1999), pp. 21-43, pp. 33-34.
18 Akos R6na-Tas, Persistence of Networks in the Post-Communist Transformation in Eastern Europe, 
Research Report, 4 (San Diego: Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, 
University of California, 1998), [n.p],
19 Brian Uzzi, ‘Embeddedness in the Making of Financial Capital: How Social Relations and Networks
Benefit Firms Seeking Finance’, American Sociological Review, 64 (1999), 481-505, p. 483.
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Networking is frequently used in economic exchanges between different actors 
involved in activities that are linked in some way in an endeavour to reduce 
uncertainty and minimise exchange costs in specific relationships. Such ties had a 
particularly prominent role in the centrally planned economies,20 1 for although central 
planning was meant to enable the enterprise management to focus solely on 
production, in practice there were inconsistencies in the plans. Films exhibited a high 
degree of vertical integration in direct response to the plans that were devised and 
implemented according to a strict hierarchy, but also because unreliability of supplies 
promoted the internalisation of upstream and downstream production. As such 
internalisation was not total, and as planned production and actual consumption 
demands often did not match, contractual bargaining with planners and other suppliers 
was necessitated.22 Additional horizontal networks were developed in an endeavour 
to compensate for shortages and overcome bottlenecks and obstacles to co-operation 
engendered within the centrally planned economy.
Uncertainty in the transformation environment should provide new opportunities for 
networking,23 which has implications for restructuring because it consolidates and 
facilitates interactions between actors. It is important to consider whether totally new
20 Mark Granovetter, ‘Economic Actors and Social Structures: The Problem of Embeddedness’, 
American Journal of Sociology, 3 (1985), 481-510, pp. 490-491; Uzzi, ‘Embeddedness in the Making 
of Financial Capital’, pp. 483,491.
21 Endre Sik, Network Capital in Capitalist, Communist and Post-Communist Societies, Working 
Paper, 212 (Notre Dame: Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, 
1995), p. 4; Peter Huber and Andreas Worgotter, ‘Political Survival or Entrepreneurial Development? 
Observations on Russian Business Networks’ in The Tunnel and the End of the Light: Privatization, 
Business Networks and Economic Transformation in Russia, edited by Stephen S. Cohen, Andrew 
Schwartz and John Zysman (Berkley: University of California, 1998). 7 December 2000. 
<http://escholarship.cdlib.org/ias/cohen/tunnel_hw.html>, [n.p.].
22 Jan Adam, Economic Reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Since the 1960s 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 16-17.
23 Rupert F. Chisholm, ‘On the Meaning of Networks’, Group and Organization Management, 21 (2) 
(1996), 216-235. Expanded Academic ASAP International Edition. 11 December 2000. 
<http://infotrac.galegroup.com/itweb/stand>, [n.p.]; Willie Seal, Pat Sucher, Ivan Zelenka and Marcela
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links will form, or if previous links can be reconstructed and maintained during the 
transformation, as well as the extent to which maintaining existing ties can be 
effective or will subsequently represent obstacles that prevent the enterprise from 
adapting. Networks cannot be established without cost, and their usefulness increases 
over time given consistently credible behaviour.24 It is therefore realistic to expect 
that ties developed under the former system will still be mobilised within this unstable 
environment, even if their applicability or effectiveness may have changed, rather 
than seeing many new ones being established.25 One director related a specific 
positive aspect of such historical experience with networking, commenting that
for managers in the past, work had to be done in a certain way, but at least they 
learnt to work with people and that can be used nowadays, and they learnt how 
to negotiate with banks and certain key individuals in the past (Cisar 4, Services 
Director).
Nevertheless, the enforced marginalisation of network ties into an ancillary 
production-based role during the period of central planning can limit their 
effectiveness as a new resource for overcoming the vertically integrated orientation of 
the former state-owned enterprises. By centring on meeting targets, past
Zarova, ‘Accounting and Societal Transition: The Bohemian Accountant and the Velvet Revolution’, 
Communist Economies and Economic Transformation, 9 (1997), 383-406, p. 402.
24 Granovetter, ‘Economic Actors and Social Structures’, p. 490; Robert C. Liden and Terence R. 
Mitchell, ‘Ingratiatory Behaviors in Organizational Settings’, Academy of Management Review, 13 
(1988), 572-582, p. 584.
25 Peter Rutland, ‘Thatcherism, Czech-Style: Transition to Capitalism in the Czech Republic’, Telos, 94 
(1992-1993), 103-129. Academic Search Elite. EBSCO Publishing. 8 May 1999. 
<http://www.global.epnet.com/hosttrial/login.html>, [n.p.]; Mark Casson, ‘Enterprise Culture and 
Institutional Change in Eastern Europe’, in The Economies of Change in East and Central Europe: Its 
Impact on International Business, edited by Peter J. Buckley and Pervez N. Ghawi (London: Academic 
Press, 1994), pp. 33-53, pp. 37,44; Rona-Tas, Persistence of Networks, [n.p.].
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inefficiencies are perpetuated because there is no incentive to seek innovative ways to 
make improvements within the firm.26
Another form of networking exists through the “institutional linkage”27 between an 
enterprise and its surroundings. As highlighted for Brodchmel, the usefulness of this 
can change during transformation if the surrounding environment then no longer 
supports this. Respondents spoke of such a process being observed, with the 
company having
a lot of links to the local community because it is one of two large companies 
here that influences life in this region. This changed with privatisation in a 
negative way as the management changed, and co-operation with the town hall 
has diminished. Only a small amount of development in this region is 
sponsored, because the new management all come from Prague and therefore 
have no links to this region (Brodchmel 4, Quality Manager).
Other respondents in the firm also described these changes as negative developments
since
the top management has links to the town hall and the firm gets financial 
support from those activities. Before it was different as the financial
26 Gemot Grabher, ‘Rediscovering the Social in the Economics of Interfirm Networks’, in The 
Embedded Firm: On the Socio-Economics of Industrial Networks, edited by Gemot Grabher (London: 
Routledge, 1994), pp. 1-31, p. 20.
27 Joel A. C. Baum and Christine Oliver, ‘Institutional Linkages and Organizational Mortality’, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 36 (1991), 187-218, p. 187; Anna Grandori and Guiseppe Soda, 
‘Inter-firm Networks: Antecedents, Mechanisms and Forms’, Organization Studies, 16 (1995), 183­
214, p. 190.
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possibilities to support things were greater and so there were more activities in 
this area that the company supported (Brodchmel 3, Assembly Section Head).
For Brodchmel, restructuring may be hindered by this change, but loosing the ties of 
enterprises to their surroundings can also permit economically rational decisions to be 
taken more easily, with it noted by another employee that “the company does not 
sponsor sport and cultural activities as much as it used to as now more is invested in 
advertising products” (Brodchmel 1, Personnel Manager).
Networking continues to have a prominent function for post-communist managers, 
supporting them in their role by allowing some restructuring to occur through these 
existing demands for information. Networking is therefore likely to have contributed 
to the strong continuities in personnel and their behaviour in former state-owned 
enterprises visible at all levels that reflects the partial nature of the revolutions. This 
resulted in “elite recycling” whereby managerial positions are filled by the former 
nomenklatura and those who would have succeeded their predecessors in time had the 
Communist regime persisted,28 and was identified by one respondent who commented 
that “some new people came but mainly they are the same ones from the old state- 
owned enterprise” (Drazitest 2, Production Director).
The use of networks cannot substitute for restructuring, but they can have an 
entrepreneurial significance, which is most likely to explain their primary function 
within mature market economies.29 If network ties can be mobilised in similarly
28 Roderick Martin, Transforming Management in Central and Eastern Europe (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), pp. 81,91.
29 Alena V. Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 170; Klaus E. Meyer, ‘International Production
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effective ways in Czech firms, their pre-eminence and persistence could be 
advantageous. In the case study firms though, respondents placed little emphasis on 
their potential commercial use and the possibilities of linking to other organisations to 
increase such opportunities, with a typical response that
we are not members of any other organisations as we wouldn’t really have any 
benefit from joining as our customers are clearly defined and we know our 
customers very well through our historical links. Abroad we have distributors 
and we meet with them at trade fairs to negotiate and so we have a good 
relationship as we know each other well (Odraz KM 2, Marketing Manager).
Only in Rozdat Systems and Drazitest was any reference made to membership of 
professional organisations. From this the firms saw benefits because “as it is 
important to get information” (Rozdat Systems 5, Financial Director) “that can be 
used in the development of the factory” (Rozdat Systems 1, Managing Director) 
although for Drazitest it was perceived to be “the local Chamber of Commerce that 
gives the closest contacts from the relationship” (Drazitest 6, Business Director). 
Consequently, it appears that managers are not transferring the historical uses of 
network ties into more relevant applications that would assist in restructuring their 
firms. Instead, former elites are using these to their advantage as institutional changes 
only occur slowly, allowing them to retain access to resources and information that
Networks and Enterprise Transfonnation in Central Europe’, Comparative Economic Studies, 42 
(2000), 135-150. Expanded Academic ASAP International Edition. 13 November 2000. 
<http://infotrac.galegroup.com/itweb/stand>, [n.p.].
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can be used to create new links to other business partners.30 One director spoke of 
this, noting how
members of the KSC, especially in the higher levels, had some kind of 
advantage with privatisation because they had connections and money, and it 
was a lot better for these than other employees. It was different to after the 
Second World War where everyone was at the same level and given 45 Marks 
from the state to start their own business, for here everyone was at different 
levels. Although it was expected that money and possessions would be given to 
the people who used it, many just wanted to get rich and did not take care of 
these possessions in a good way (Drazitest 2, Production Director).
The more the position of managers depends strongly on their links to the state 
bureaucracy, and with limited structural change occurring in the wider environment, 
the more beneficial and rational it is for existing managers to retain or revert to their 
previous patterns of behaviour.31 To overcome this requires both a “de­
institutionalisation” of the enterprise from its old practices, and a “re­
institutionalisation” to harmonise it with the new conditions.32 It therefore cannot be 
assumed that privatisation outcomes will necessarily follow those predicted by 
economic theory, in particular due to a retained social mentality of managers in 
making decisions and exercising authority over the labour force, but also by workers
30 Eric Hanley, ‘Cadre Capitalism in Hungary and Poland: Property Accumulation Among Communist- 
Era Elites’, East European Politics and Society, 14(2000), 143-178, p. 147.
31 Leslie E. Grayson and Samuel E. Bodily, Integration into the World Economy: Companies in 
Transition in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, Research Report 96-19 (Laxenburg: 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1996). 27 August 1999.
<http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Publications/Documents/RR-96-019.pdf>, [n.p.]; Michael W. Peng, Business 
Strategies in Transition Economies (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2000), p. 128.
32 Christine Oliver, ‘The Antecedents of Decentralization’, Organization Studies, 13 (1992), 563-588, 
pp. 564-567; Soulsby and Clark, ‘Economic Restructuring’, [n.p.].
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in their expectations of social protection from their workplace. Despite evident 
differences in the management function and different tasks required after the demise 
of central planning, especially a shift in focus from technological issues to cost and 
quality, many of the old habits of managerial behaviour still persist because of the 
retained mentality in decision-making and exercising authority over the labour 
force.33
5.2.2 Elite Recycling.
Positive effects may arise from the retention of the old management through elite 
recycling and continued state ownership, since a level of trust and understanding 
between existing employees and management can facilitate the introduction of 
restructuring measures with negative side-effects such as wage reductions as a 
compensation against unemployment. Nonetheless, such benefits must inevitably be 
seen as a temporary adaptation that will become less appropriate as efficiency 
becomes the primary concern in privatised enterprises over time.34 Another benefit is 
that useful human capital may be inherent within incumbent managers, particularly if 
these have been able to survive the initial ownership transition, for they have 
knowledge of the former system that, alongside their contacts and experience 
combined with an inherent interest in the firm could be used as an advantageous
33 Jean Woodall, ‘The Transfer of Managerial Knowledge to Eastern Europe’, in HRM in Europe: 
Perspectives for the 1990s, edited by Paul S. Kirkbride (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 164-177, pp. 
172-174; Whitley et al, ‘Continuity and Change’, p. 232.
34 Simon Clarke, Peter Fairbrother, Vadim Borisov and Petr Bizyukov, ‘The Privatisation of Industrial 
Enterprises in Russia: Four Case-Studies’, Europe-Asia Studies, 46 (1994), 179-214, p. 183.
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legacy to facilitate restructuring,35 but which they may be unwilling or unable to 
transfer to new managers.36
In some firms, benefits from retaining the former managers were precluded where 
these were unable to retain their positions with privatisation.37 38In addition to 
lustration, others were removed in the initial transformation period through workers 
electing to approve or reject top management in the absence of new, clearly defined 
owners. This was described by a respondent from Brodchmel who spoke of
changes made between 1989 and 1992 that still have an effect now. Although 
some people who were closely linked to the old regime needed to leave their 
leading positions, in the town workers were proclaiming their trust of the 
leaders and they were very powerful, so if they said they did not trust a certain 
manager they had to leave, although this was only on their word. The workers 
were in effect voting over every manager after 1989 on whether they wanted 
them or said they trusted them, so it was up to them as to whether the old 
management stayed or left. All of the top management left (Brodchmel 3, 
Assembly Section Head).
35 Akos Rona-Tas, ‘Path-Dependence and Capital Theory: Sociology of the Post-Communist Economic 
Transformation’, East European Politics and Societies, 12 (1998), 107-131, pp. 127, 130; Simonyi, 
‘Labour and Social Welfare’, p. 103.
36 Savitt, ‘Critical Issues’, pp. 21-22; Ed Clark and Anna Soulsby, Organizational Change in Post­
Communist Europe. Management and Transformation in the Czech Republic (London: Routledge, 
1999), pp. 168, 170.
37 Irena Grosfeld and Gerard Roland, Defensive and Strategic Restructuring in Central European 
Enterprises, CEPR Discussion Paper, 1135 (London: CEPR, 1995), p. 18; Ed Clark and Anna Soulsby, 
‘The Re-formation of the Managerial Elite in the Czech Republic’, Europe-Asia Studies, 48 (1996), 
285-303, p. 301.
38 Hilary Appel and John Gould, ‘Identity Politics and Economic Reform: Examining Industry-State 
Relations in the Czech and Slovak Republics’, Europe-Asia Studies, 52(2000), 111-131, p. 121.
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Whilst the potential benefits highlighted above are lost, doubts about the moral 
appropriateness of the participation of former elites in privatising companies and 
managers may also be raised.39 Despite lustration, it was impossible to prevent 
former members of the KSC from retaining or acquiring managerial positions in 
privatised firms. However, the most important aspect of their continued presence in 
managerial roles is whether they have adequate incentives to undertake restructuring. 
As a measure attempting to remove the behavioural legacies of the Communists, 
lustration was likely to be of dubious effectiveness for the values of the system were 
shared more widely than by those in formal positions of authority.40 Instead of 
lustration, to encourage restructuring reform of the economic system, what is required
is to
confront [former Communist bureaucrats] with the rules of political and 
economic democracy, thereby forcing them to show whether they were able to 
adapt to the new system.41
It is unclear without empirical evidence how much restructuring these former elites 
who have been able to convert gains from their tenuous social position into more 
useable economic capital will undertake.42 This conversion of capital alone does not 
ensure that they will act efficiently as managers in the new environment or have the 
incentives to bring about appropriate and necessary changes. Without strong external 
constraints on their behaviour, although managers should not be expected to continue
39 Ed Clark and Anna Soulsby, ‘Organization-Community Embeddedness: The Social Impact of 
Enterprise Restructuring in the Post-Communist Czech Republic’, Human Relations, 51 (1998), 25-50, 
pp. 29-30, p. 28.
4(7 Jiri Pehe, ‘The Controversy Over Communist Managers’, Report on Eastern Europe, 1 (36) 7 
September 1990, pp. 6-10, p. 8; Martin, Transforming Management, p. 13.
41 Pehe, ‘Controversy’, p. 10.
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to act in ways consistent with the former system, they might only instigate changes 
they believe will give the enteiprise and their own function legitimacy either 
externally and internally in its social or commercial dimensions.42 3 Fonner communist 
elites are unlikely to have the necessary business knowledge for the effective 
operation of their companies in a market environment,44 but instead regard this 
conversion of power as “the key to their social re-integration within the new society 
and their social distancing from their former status” 45
One moderating factor against this is that the new managers of post-communist firms 
had often gained their position in the 1980s and did not hold as strong convictions 
over Communist dogma as previous generations. For managers in Cisaf it was
observed that
the influence of the past depends on which generation they belong to. The new 
generation are much better, have more energy and their approach to people is 
different in not considering the workers as much. The older generation of 
managers was formerly the young generation going up and becoming 
prosperous and effective in general. A negative side for the older generation 
comes from being used to getting plans and orders from the state. They are not 
used to making their own decisions and being responsible for the changes this 
involves and have a mental block on making independent decisions. But these
42 Hanley, ‘Cadre Capitalism’, pp. 145,147; Clark and Soulsby, Organizational Change, p. 137.
43 Bala Chakravarthy and Martin Gargiulo, ‘Maintaining Leadership Legitimacy in the Transition to 
New Organizational Forms’, Journal of Management Studies, 35 (1998), 437-456, p. 441; Clark and 
Soulsby, ‘Adoption of the Multi-Divisional Form’, p. 552.
44 Nikolaos T. Milonas, Mass Privatization Methods and their Effects on Capital Market Institutions, 
Agency Relationships and Managerial Monitoring, Working Paper, 50 (Leuven: LICOS Centre for 
Transition Economics, 1995), p. 17.
45 Ed Clark, ‘The Role of Social Capital in Developing Czech Private Business’, Work, Employment 
and Society, 14 (2000), 439-458, p. 449.
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are generalisations and of course cannot apply to everyone (Cisar 1, Trade 
Union President).
A continuation of former managerial personnel will be negative if their interests or 
behaviour are contrary to those of other stakeholders in the firm,46 especially where 
they face limited pressure to alter their behaviour due to a lack of managerial 
accountability.47 In other cases there are benefits from the retention of former 
managers and so the outcomes within firms can only be resolved empirically. The 
extent to which these potential difficulties have been overcome in the case study firms 
is presented below where the new functions and actions of post-communist managers 
are assessed with regard to institutional influences in existence.
5.3 POST-COMMUNIST MANAGERS AND RESTRUCTURING.
The extent to which former state-owned enterprises can be effectively transformed 
into enterprises able to compete in a market economy depends in combination on 
flexibility in their structure and the ability of the firms’ top officials to lead and 
restructure the firm in an appropriate and dynamic way,48 as well as whether these 
changes are embraced within the firm. Since tight personal links and associations 
were constructed in state-owned enterprises, a major challenge in restructuring lies in
46 Jennifer E. Bethal and Julia Liebeskind, ‘The Effects of Ownership Structure on Corporate 
Restructuring’, Strategic Management Journal, 14 (Summer Special Issue) (1993), 15-31, p. 16.
47 Joseph Saba, ‘Orphans in the Storm: The Challenge of Corporate Governance in Transition 
Economies’, in Between State and Market: Mass Privatization in Transition Economies, edited by Ira 
W. Lieberman, Stephan S. Nestor and Raj M. Desai (Washington: World Bank/OECD, 1997), pp. 121­
129, p. 121.
Karen L. Newman and Stanley D. Nollen, ‘Managerial Challenges During Organisational Re­
Creation: Industrial Companies in the Czech Republic’, in Privatization and Entrepreneurship: The 
Managerial Challenge in Central and Eastern Europe, edited by Arieh A. Ullman and Alfred Lewis 
(Binghampton: International Business Press, 1997), p. 131.
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overcoming human capital constraints49 rather than simply instigating technological 
and impersonal solutions premised on economic principles.50 In the following 
sections changes that managers have implemented in the case study films for 
restructuring are presented. Institutional influences are highlighted through their 
impact on the restructuring decisions undertaken, and these are shown to arise from 
formal and informal causes with a strong inter-temporal dimension, making path- 
dependency and embeddedness important. Cognitive issues predominate, which is 
likely to be exacerbated by the limited change amongst personnel within enterprises, 
suggesting that informal institutions are both influential and persistent in 
understanding post-privatisation restructuring outcomes in firms.
5,3.1 Strategic Planning.
Because of the limited functions of managers in state-owned enterprises
before privatisation you cannot really talk about a management as this did not 
really exist. There were just plans from the top that needed to be implemented 
(Drazitest 6, Business Director).
An important change for managers brought about with privatisation is that whilst 
some former practices associated with implementing plans became obsolete in the 
new environment, it has become economically essential to develop other functions 
that were not the responsibility of managers under central planning. These include the
49 Clark and Soulsby, Organizational Change, p. 178.
50 Ed Clark and Anna Soulsby, ‘Transforming Former State Enterprises in the Czech Republic’, 
Organization Studies, 16 (1995), 215-242, pp. 216, 222.
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establishment of foreign trade relations and marketing strategies, innovations and 
quality assurance measures, and a shift to consumer-driven production, as product 
markets are no longer assured.51 Managers now have to be concerned with strategic 
decision-making and resource optimisation, whereas previously they
did not have to consider finance so much, and did not have to change anything 
to make a plan. They just asked for a certain amount of money and got it (Cisaf 
4, Services Director).
The stress on plan fulfilment and taut planning that did not encourage innovation or 
modifications to product specifications that benefit the consumer constitutes an 
important behavioural legacy. Although the costs of innovation were borne 
internally, benefits accrued to society as a whole, and changes in the firm’s output 
would have required cumbersome changes in the input specifications of the plan.52 
This behaviour stifles the “gales of creative destruction” upon which mature, 
competitive market economies depend.53
One new task of managers in privatised firms is the development of strategic plans so 
that the long-term suivival and development of their enterprises is formalised. This is 
important because it requires managers to assess the viability of their firms according 
to economic criteria, and to plan its future strategic development, rather than 
expecting state assistance if difficulties arise. This shift in outlook should facilitate
51 Richard Whitley, ‘The Internationalization of Firms and Markets; Its Significance and Institutional 
Structuring’, Organization, 1 (1994), 101-124, p. 109; Jiff Havel, ‘Changes in Governance Structure of 
Czech Enterprises, 1989-1995’, Prague Economic Papers, 5 (1996), 127-136, p. 128.
52 Alan H. Smith, The Planned Economies of Eastern Europe (London: Croom Helm, 1983), pp. 57,
75.
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restructuring because the operation of the firm and criteria for continued production 
after privatisation differs from those under central planning. Explicit recognition of 
the role of strategic plans was made in Rozdat Systems where these were created
because of the firm’s
development needing to be clear for the owners, and for the European Union, 
although legislation has not been harmonised between the European Union and 
the Czech Republic. The main priority was that the firm had to exist. Managers 
signed special agreements over responsibilities and tasks as it includes direct 
points on motivation for managers such as financial goals that are fixed and 
worked into and derived from the overall strategy of the firm (Rozdat Systems 
1, Managing Director).
Excepting minor variations, these plans all share common target issues covering the 
short, medium, and long-term development of the firm, stated in Presnost KM as 
“marketing and sales, market position, management, and human resource 
development” (Presnost KM 2, Co-operation Plant Section Manager), and in Cisar
where the
main goals are profit, to renew and bring new qualified people, keep good 
technology and renew technology to keep and increase standards, and to keep 
partners and customers (Cisar 4, Services Director).
53 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1944), p. 
83.
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As the only company in this study without a strategic plan, representatives in Odraz 
KM recognise this as a weakness as it “makes it difficult for workers to know plans 
for management and company and plans for the future” (Odraz KM 2, Marketing 
Manager). According to the Managing Director
although there is no separate business plan for Odraz KM, this is in mind, but at 
present we follow Rukopis Strojimy’s for this. Some at Rukopis Strojimy want 
to resolve this situation and get on with it but so far it has not been done because 
of the high cost for the company. Some customers are also interested in this for 
the company but the owners want more money for themselves instead of doing 
this (Odraz KM 1, Managing Director).
The existence of strategic plans does not predetermine their usefulness or even signify 
a change in behaviour within firms. Although reference is made to human resource 
development, in practice these plans and the restructuring strategies of firms appear to 
centre on more tangible strategic issues. In Rukopis Strojimy, the management 
defined its goals in the strategic plan as
planning a lot for the future, stabilising the firm, looking for expansion and 
trying to find new partners because a strong partner is needed for globalisation, 
although the company has made good progress internationally (Rukopis 
Strojimy 2, Operations Director).
The daughter companies reflect this desire in their strategies, recognising “finding 
good markets for the future as a priority” (Rozdat Systems 2, Production Manager)
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and that “globalisation has come to this branch, with a need to be competitive” 
(Rozdat Systems 4, Technical Director). Consequently,
future stabilisation is expected, and a need to get foreign partners and finalise 
agreements with these. A strategic plan for finding a new strategic investor 
according to all issues related to the future development has been made and 
confirmed by directors as the future of this firm (Rozdat Systems 1, Managing 
Director).
This means that even in the new market environment it is common to see
formerly state-owned companies approach strategy formulation as planning 
[since they] have experience with developing annual and five year plans under 
the socialist regime.54
However, in the case study firms the strategies appear to represent an awareness of 
the changed operating conditions of the firms, and an appropriate motivation to 
change their production behaviour in accordance with the new market conditions. 
This was evidenced in two firms where respondents described the formulation of the 
strategic plan and setting its goals “for one year, and for three to five years ahead, as 
now we have to set goals and reach them, otherwise we do not get any money” (Cfsar 
4, Services Director), and in another firm where the “strategic policy of the firm is
54 Karoly Balaton, Management in Different Phases of Organizational Transformation in Hungary, 
International Workshop on Transition and Enterprise Restructuring in Eastern Europe, 20-22 August 
1998 (Copenhagen: CEES/Copenhagen Business School, 1998). 25 September 2000.
<http://www.econ.cbs.dk/cees/institutes/cees/workshop/pdPBalaton.pdf>, [n.p.].
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made for five years, fixed for one year, but every 3 months all points in it are 
reviewed” (Rozdat Systems 1, Managing Director).
In the companies where strategic plans have been introduced, owners and managers 
anticipate that all employees within the firm will be aware of these and respond to the 
goals set within them so that restructuring responses are integrated throughout the 
firm. To help achieve this, some of the companies have tried to formalise this so that 
not only are the objectives of the strategic plan included in the vision of the company, 
but devolved so that “each department has its own goals that all employees know 
about” (Brodchmel 1, Personnel Manager), with
goals for each workshop, and even the lowest positions of workers are informed 
over these goals and the stages on the way to these goals and about the situation 
(Cisar 4, Services Director).
However, responses showed that this was not always achieved in practice, especially 
for non-managerial personnel, with employees claiming they “don’t know the strategy 
of the management” (Cisar 1, Trade Union President) or that
the details of the strategic plan are not known because the management keeps 
them secret, which is a pity as they must know what will happen in a years time 
(Brodchmel 2, Project Manager).
Sometimes the existence of a strategic plan was “not recognised” (Rukopis Strojimy 
1, Personnel Director), or employees claimed its function was not clear, so that they
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“do not know how it has any influence over how the job here is done” (Presnost KM 
3, Assembly line worker). This indicates that there are significant limitations in their 
effectiveness as an institutional pressure for change because they do not cause a 
change in mentality within the workplace.
An alternative difficulty was highlighted in Cisar, where employees conflict with the 
owners and management in their respective interpretations of the firm’s strategy over 
its appropriateness to the new conditions. One director described how in the strategic 
plan for the firm
the main goal is profit although not in every situation. We try to get profit to 
renew and bring new, qualified people, keep good quality, and renew 
technology to maintain standards and even increase them, and keep partners and 
customers. It is a matter of finance in general, not just profit from orders but an 
ability to manage finance for operating the firm for production. This is a 
question that takes years and cannot be accomplished in the short run in big 
companies (Cisar 4, Services Director).
Commenting on this strategy, the perspective of one worker though was that it
cannot really be evaluated from not being part of the management and therefore 
not knowing their intentions and goals, but just seeing it in practice it appears to 
be saving as much money as possible as the owner and the market puts stress on 
them according to how much product can be sold (Cisar 1, Trade Union 
President).
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Another shared a similar view, describing how the firm’s strategy appears to be
coming from the management with the help of an investor from Germany, 
which was not possible to be successful. They were trying to keep people in the 
factory and keep the same production, with debts for the operation of the 
company covered by selling the property of the company. The policy was like 
this for 5-6 years when they still had money for salaries and funds to keep the 
company operating. The management try to get as much money as possible, 
which is not a good way to manage. Unfortunately there are some parts where 
the management has paid too much attention to even if they were not healthy, 
and this was not justifiable or necessary. The management did not want to 
accept that this part was taking the whole company down and they would not 
get rid of it although this would make the whole company healthier. Their 
words differ from their actions, and although the firm could have a good 
prognosis for the future, the actual operation of the company does not compare 
to this at all (Cfsar 3, Retired Analyst).
In this case the employees’ interpretations correlate most closely with the observable 
situation of the firm. This does not necessarily mean that the strategy is different 
from that claimed by the management, but if such long-term goals are being set, they 
do not seem to be becoming embedded in the firm and bringing the desired results 
quickly enough here. Alternatively, it could be that this is merely the rhetoric that 
managers believe to be consistent with a market economic system, and that such 
changes are not being implemented in the firm in reality, either because they are not
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understood, or that they are incompatible with the actually existing conditions in the
firm.
Managers also need to determine how internal control systems and the hierarchy of 
command can be implemented to most effectively re-assert control over production 
and labour. Issues relating to the impact of labour as an institution on restructuring 
are discussed in the next chapter in more detail. However, as the supply of labour is 
relatively inelastic, managers need to devise ways of motivating labour and using this 
resource more efficiently as part of the restructuring of the firm. One aspect of 
maximising the effectiveness of such internal structural innovations relies on the 
development of effective human resource management practices as a strategy of post­
privatisation restructuring.55
5.3.2 Human Resource Management
Adaptations in human resource management (HRM) have often been neglected in 
voucher privatised companies. Instead, post-communist managers often seek rapid 
and tangible indicators of their success in areas such as marketing and sales.56 This is 
despite the evidently key role of HRM in organisations in developed market 
economies, and so can represent an institutional limitation against effective overall 
restructuring of Czech enterprises following privatisation if managers do not 
appreciate its potential to affect the overall competitiveness of the firm.
55 David Parker, ‘Ownership, Organisational Change and Performance’, in The Political Economy of
Privatization, edited by Thomas Clarke and Christos Pitelis (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 31-53, pp. 
39-40. '
56 Josef Koubek and Chris Brewster, ‘Human Resource Management in Turbulent Times: HRM in the 
Czech Republic’, International Journal of HRM, 6 (1995), 223-247, pp. 228-229.
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Those in managerial positions can be unaware of alternative methods of HRM to ones 
they previously adopted. It can therefore be problematic to motivate the management 
to recognise the validity of HRM and change their perception over what this 
involves.57 Under the Soviet model, monitoring of workers was attained through tight 
administrative controls over production, with limited emphasis placed on increasing 
productivity, and promotion accorded on political criteria.58 In conjunction with the 
planning system that discouraged flexibility, HRM practices were deleterious to 
rewarding innovative behaviour and creativity by labour. There was very little scope 
for increasing the remit of HRM practices as this was seen as a task with political 
objectives, rather than as a way of maximising the potential of the labour force.59 
Personnel management and HRM functions in state-owned enterprises were assigned 
to a number of different departments. Personnel departments as an extension of the 
secret police kept very detailed records over the working and personal lives of 
employees,60 since the absence of a free labour market meant they did not need to be 
concerned with recruitment issues. Instead, they were active in the areas of cadre 
activities and, in conjunction with the trade unions, social welfare provision.61 
Appraisal systems were only a formality, mainly used as a measure of political 
activism since employment or wage-based incentives could not be mobilised to 
discipline or encourage workers because full employment created labour shortages
57 Marian Kube§ and Peter BenkoviC, ‘Realities, Paradoxes and Perspectives of HRM in Eastern 
Europe: The Case of Czechoslovakia’, in HRM in Europe: Perspectives for the 1990s, edited by Paul S. 
Kirkbride (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 178-193, pp. 183, 192; Woodall, ‘Transfer of Managerial 
Knowledge’, p. 176.
58 Clarke et al, ‘Privatisation of Industrial Enterprises’, p. 183; Koubek and Brewster, ‘Human 
Resource Management in Turbulent Times’, p. 228.
59 Kube§ and Benkovifi, ‘Realities, Paradoxes and Perspectives’, p. 178; Karen L. Newman and Stanley 
D. Nollen, Managing Radical Organizational Change (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998), pp. 28-29.
60 Koubek and Brewster, ‘Human Resource Management in Turbulent Times’, pp. 224-225; Rosalie L. 
Tung and Stephen J. Havlovic, ‘Human Resource Management in Transitional Economies: The Case of 
Poland and the Czech Republic’, International Journal of HRM, 7 (1996), 1-19, p. 6.
61 Alec Nove, The Socialist Economic System, 3rd edition (Winchester, MA.: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 
pp. 229-230; Anna Soulsby and Ed Clark, ‘Controlling Personnel: Management and Motive in the
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and wage levels were centrally determined.62 The extent of control that the personnel 
department had in enterprises on behalf of the KSC and resentment of this felt by the 
labour force is also reflected in the suspicion of many employees of new HRM and 
personnel departments, even where their function has evidently changed.63
Path-dependency and embeddedness of firms to formal and informal institutions 
during the transformation process will influence employment-based relationships 
within the firm and thus alter the HRM practices deemed appropriate. New values are 
being imbibed into the management during transformation, but the emerging HRM 
practices in the Czech Republic also reflect more deeply rooted, cultural values. The 
Czech Lands were amongst the most economically advanced areas in the inter-war 
period, with extensive labour market provisions and a skilled labour force. This, 
alongside traditional Czech characteristics that include a strong belief in equality and 
social democracy, and a historically close affinity with Western European nations that 
is reflected in parallels in their industrial traditions and work ethos,64 has enabled 
similarities between the HRM practices adopted in Western Europe and those of the 
newly privatised enterprises of the Czech Republic to develop.
Structural inertia in firms can also hinder changes in HRM, with state-owned 
enterprises exhibiting a strongly hierarchical internal structure that cannot be changed 
instantaneously, and to which the former directive management practices are
Transformation of the Czech Republic’, International Journal of Human Resource Management, 9 
(1998), 79-98, pp. 81. 83.
2 Koubek and Brewster, ‘Human Resource Management in Turbulent Times’, p. 227.
63 KubeS and BenkoviC, ‘Realities, Paradoxes and Perspectives’, p. 183; Koubek and Brewster, ‘Human 
Resource Management in Turbulent Times’, p. 229.
64 Koubek and Brewster, ‘Human Resource Management in Turbulent Times’, p. 229; Tung and 
Havlovic, ‘Human Resource Management’, p. 4.
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efficiently adapted.65 This management style will have increasingly restricted 
applicability when firms begin to operate according to market conditions. However, 
uncertainty increases the risk for managers if they choose to adopt new strategies with 
uncertainty over future conditions, so reform may actually discourage major changes 
in HRM practices.66
The theory of different HRM practices may reach the enterprises, but how far these 
are then translated into any tangible changes is unclear, whether from not being 
implemented or adopted in the enterprise, or because only a few ideas rather than a 
consistent set of measures are introduced.67 Workers may not respond well to many 
of the new changes in HRM, either because they are alien to their inherited working 
patterns, or because they appear to be innovations that only mirror the former styles of 
work and management.68 Specific problems in this area were noted in Presnost KM 
where a new system of appraisals had been designed in 2000 so that
the best workers do not just get the wages of the average worker. Under 
socialist times, there were boards for worker evaluations and were abolished 
initially because of this history, but we are finding that we need to restart this 
again. It is unclear whether the workers will understand the differences between 
the old and the new system. Now people live in a different economic and 
obviously political situation but many people do not understand the changes yet 
(Presnost KM 1, Financial Planning Manager).
65 Kubes and BenkoviC, ‘Realities, Paradoxes and Perspectives’, p. 188.
66 Richard Whitley, Jeffrey Henderson and Laszlo Czaban, ‘Ownership, Control and the Management 
of Labour in an Emergent Capitalist Economy: The Case of Hungary’, Organization, 4 (1997), 409­
432, p. 412.
67 Soulsby and Clark, ‘Controlling Personnel’, p. 91.
68 Soulsby and Clark, ‘Economic Restructuring’, [n.p.].
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Similar difficulties that also demonstrate the need for an approach such as embedded 
institutionalism to understand the progress of restructuring were highlighted for 
Brodchmel, where a manager spoke of how
new things have been introduced such as material on motivation, but this is not 
so strong. People have to change their thinking and introduce new things such 
as competition and appraisals. People do not understand the real meaning of 
these expressions and do not take it seriously, but say they “already know that”. 
Most people still do not understand what work is in capitalism and the changes 
this needs in the way they work and appraise work (Brodchmel 2, Project 
Manager).
Another director recognising the need for changes in HRM methods described 
difficulties in achieving this since
it is difficult to appraise workers and the directors are always looking at how to 
motivate workers, get quality, and lead people (Rukopis Strojimy 2, Operations 
Director).
Attempts to overcome this in Rozdat Systems have been achieved by altering the 
institutions of HRM. For example “assessments of worker performance are mainly 
interested in the quality of work done” (Rozdat Systems 5, Financial Director). To 
promote this
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regular information over the firm is given to the employees. Having studied the 
politics of motivation, we have come up with eight criteria, including salary 
bonuses. The aim is to get employees to work better and if they do not work 
well they need to move to another job or leave (Rozdat Systems 1, Managing 
Director).
In addition, change is expected amongst the managers and institutionalised into their
role where
managers have all signed special agreements over their responsibilities and 
tasks with direct points on motivation for managers such as financial goals to 
achieve. These are very hard and strong, and worked into the overall strategy of 
the firm (Rozdat Systems 1, Managing Director).
Effective change in HRM therefore requires adaptations by managers and workers, 
but more generally the prevailing institutional setting can modify organisational 
restructuring according to whether this rewards or discourages initiative and 
innovative behaviour.69 This does not depend simply on the adoption of new 
strategies, but on the successful dissemination of ideas and information and its 
application through all levels of the corporate hierarchy. Consequently, 
communication is central to the conduct of restructuring to ensure that adequate 
information is being passed through the company, but also to ensure that the interests 
and desires of all agents are expressed effectively and accurately.
69 Mike Geppert, ‘Paths of Managerial Learning in the East German Context’, Organization Studies, 17 
(1996), 249-268, p. 253.
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5.3.3 Communication.
Communication is essential for all aspects of production in firms, but under central 
planning, information had to flow strictly along the hierarchies of authority within and 
between firms and planning agencies. Now this needs to flow effectively in multiple 
directions despite these legacies, because the dissemination of information is an 
important factor in determining the effectiveness of communication that will be 
tangibly reflected in how effectively restructuring is introduced. Excepting minor 
variations in the frequency of meetings, all the companies studied follow the pattern 
adopted in the Rukopis Strojimy group where
directors meet weekly and subsequently each of these directors meets with their 
staff in direct response to this [and] approximately every three months there is a 
meeting between the directors and the workers that is very popular (Rukopis 
Strojimy 1, Personnel Director).
To complement this, there are also regular meetings for the different functions, for 
example
every 10 days in production, which the management attend, along with 
representatives of the trade union who are then responsible for giving 
information to workers (Rozdat Systems 2, Production Manager).
A few specific incidents of effective communication were identified in the case 
studies. Drazitest is seen as “a “flat” organisation and so getting information and
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spreading it is not a problem” (Drazitest 7, Personnel Manager). Consequently
benefits arise because
the company is so small and all communicate with each other. There are not 
any problems at all with communication up to the Board and anyone with a 
problem can go and speak directly to the Director if necessary (Drazitest 1, 
Quality Director).
Similarly in Rozdat Systems, the relevance of good communication was noted by this 
respondent who saw that
in the maintenance department, communication with management and workers 
is excellent, and so the results of the work are good (Rozdat Systems 3, 
Maintenance Department supervisor).
Another director, seeing communication as an integral aspect of the strategic 
development of the firm introduced “in accordance with the program of motivation, 
an office hour on a Friday morning” (Rozdat Systems 1, Managing Director). In other 
Aims, managers stressed some form of “open door policy” (Rukopis Strojimy 8, 
Quality Director; Rukopis Strojimy 2, Operations Director), which are important 
innovations in firms because they represent attempts to break down the strictly 
hierarchical communication lines that existed in state-owned enterprises. As well as 
indicating a change in communication, this also requires differing functions of 
managers in making independent strategic decisions for the firm that requires more 
contact with the workers and disseminating information about strategic planning.
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Some positive changes in attitudes to communication have resulted from privatisation 
that can help promote restructuring. Meetings before privatisation were described as 
being
on a very large scale even though managers did not have time for this. When 
working as a manager it was necessary to attend these, and so this was a waste 
of time (Rozdat Systems 2, Production Manager).
Their changed function was clearly illustrated by one respondent who described how
there were
meetings until 1989 where everyone could and would participate. Now it is 
more differentiated, with some meetings only for higher management or some 
for lower workers. It was strange at Communist meetings as everyone was 
there but they were about political issues and not related to issues and decisions 
in the firm. People were put together against a common enemy but would 
afterwards gossip about the news and stupid comments and decisions made in 
the meetings (Drazitest 5, IT Analyst).
Specific benefits seen from communication changes after privatisation were that
communication is different compared to before privatisation where there was 
not this kind of communication for workers but instead was formal, forced 
communication. There were political institutions in the company forcing people 
to come to meetings and forcing people to speak up (Cisaf 4, Services Director).
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Another worker noted that
communication has changed totally and has improved a lot compared with 
previously. Communication is less deep now, indicating that people have less 
time to meet and chat but they try now to do things rather than just talk 
(Drazitest 4, Researcher).
Similarly, there is more interaction as “now it is not necessary to wait for these formal 
meetings as it was before privatisation” (Rukopis Strojimy 4, Machine worker). Also 
workers communicate more widely, for example
with other departments if there are any problems in production. Collaboration 
with other departments must be consistent and if there are problems, supervisors 
talk about these, but all is informal rather than through meetings with the aim 
being to solve the problem as quickly as possible (Rozdat Systems 6, 
Supervisor).
These comments indicate that respondents recognise that communication has altered 
with privatisation to become an economic, rather than a political mechanism. 
Notwithstanding all these improvements in communication, and the impression of one 
employee that communication is “better because the managers are more open and 
willing to help employees now” (Rukopis Strojimy 3, Mechanic), difficulties with 
communication that are detrimental to encouraging restructuring were also 
highlighted by both managers and workers in the case study firms. One manager 
promoting an open door policy recognised how
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in different sections it works differently. Other managers want to keep their 
distance and workers are often told to go to a lower level, so the workers do not 
go back to talk to the manager (Brodchmel 3, Assembly Section Head).
Also, though another offered “an opportunity for communication with the workers, 
this does not happen very much” (Rukopis Strojimy 8, Quality Director).
In each of the case study firms, information is still passed strictly through each level 
of the corporate hierarchy, with typical descriptions being that
communication between workers and managers follows the structure of the 
company, and to communicate upwards, employees have to go through the 
hierarchy of the firm (Odraz KM 1, Managing Director)
and that
it is possible to speak to the managers as they would listen, but only in very 
serious cases. Normally people would go and speak to their supervisor in a shift 
(Presnost KM 3, Assembly line worker).
This is because whilst workers “can go to whoever is responsible to help, they will be 
directed to go down a level if necessary” (Drazitest 2, Production Director). The most 
extreme case in these companies was where a respondent described how
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communication is necessary with the management because problems must be 
solved in conjunction with them. If workers try to solve their problems in the 
workplace directly, they are told to speak to the manager (Cisaf 2, Machine 
worker).
The inclusion of communication in the ISO 9001 and other quality standards adopted 
by firms that institutionalise this is important because it represents exogenous 
institutional constraint against managers persisting with previous communication 
patterns that are contrary to the development of the firm. Only in Drazitest though 
was specific reference made to the effects of this on communication in the firm, so
that
whilst all workers have the opportunity to approach the manager responsible for 
the problem, another aspect comes from ISO 9001, and meeting the criteria of 
this is very strict. If there is a specific problem, a certain form has to be filled in 
and given to a certain person. It is very bureaucratic, but also has the advantage 
as we have reports then of everything that is said or done, the way the problem 
went from the beginning with the worker up to the Director and then to final 
solution of the problem (Drazitest 3, Supplies Manager).
It was noted that this was to be used to enhance, rather than dramatically alter 
communication within the firm, as
we tried to continue and join the ISO 9001 standards to other ways of 
communication and adapted it to the ways of communication needed in the firm
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and not work the other way around. There should not be any problems with 
communication, but the system should instead bring increased control to the 
firm, for example if there is a document to be signed, someone may forget and 
ISO 9001 ensures that it does get done (Drazitest 7, Personnel Manager).
Although these can promote better communication that can encourage restructuring to 
be incorporated and accepted within the firm, these standards are also potentially 
detrimental to effective communication because they encourage the persistence of 
former practices of hierarchical communication patterns.
An additional aspect of communication that can influence the nature and
implementation of restructuring measures managers introduce arises from the way 
information flows between the workers, management and owners. Ineffective 
communication can easily become an institutional barrier against restructuring. In 
some of the companies there appear to be discrepancies between the understanding of 
communication and practices by the owners and managers and the perception of this 
by the workers. Some of the difficulties arise because communication is ineffective in 
passing through the firm, with the existence of real and perceived barriers. 
Respondents primarily identified the distance along which information had to pass as
the crucial issue such that
the hierarchy is too long between the source and the action and often the 
information is just not given to the right people at the right time. Information is 
not carried in an effective way (Presnost KM 1, Financial Planning Manager).
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Another spoke of how
it takes a long time for information to get down from the leading positions. 
Communication up the hierarchy would be a solution. This way of 
communication generally works better compared to the other way round. 
Pressure is more effective from the bottom to the top than the other way round. 
The information that gets passed from the management down is not complete 
(Brodchmel 4, Quality Manager).
In other firms a similar sentiment was expressed, with respondents recognising that
communication down to the rest of the company from the board could be better. 
It is hard to get information from the board down to the very lowest levels as 
information is not passed effectively. Communication upwards depends on the 
position of the workers, and whether they are willing to discuss their problems 
according to whether they think they can be solved or not. To improve this, 
communication between individual people needs to be better (Drazitest 5, IT 
Analyst).
In Rozdat Systems this was also seen where specifically there are
often meetings between managers and workers where a lot of information is 
shared and so we get numbers and facts, but of course there is a lot of 
information that is shared between the top management and the owners. 
Workers do get enough information but there may be some problems in how
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this information is discussed before it is passed to the workers from the top 
management level. Labour cannot tell supervisors what they don’t understand 
and so they go to the trade unions if they have problems (Rozdat Systems 7, 
Supervisor).
Where the workers regarded communicating with the management as problematic, 
this creates an impression within the firm that
management are not interested in the real problems, and although it is possible 
to communicate daily with the head of the department, this is not possible with 
the top management, but this wouldn’t help though because the way that they 
see the problems and their potential solutions are not the best (Rukopis Strojirny 
5, Assembly worker).
In Cisaf respondents were more explicit in describing the effects of such problems, 
saying that though “it should not be a problem for a worker to go and speak to the top 
management, this does exist here as a problem (Cisaf 1, Trade Union President), and 
“there is always some information going from the bottom-up, but in the last period the 
management is not interested in any problems” (Cisaf 3, Retired Analyst).
This problem was also cited for another firm by a manager who suggested “not all 
information seems to be passed in all directions. Maybe the owners don’t even want 
to know the more detailed information” (Odraz KM 2, Marketing Manager). 
Respondents expected that if communication was better, it would be easier to resolve 
this, otherwise
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because no-one knows about the next few years, about the immediate future, 
decisions are made in a fast way and not in a good way (Brodchmel 4, Quality 
Manager).
However,
people do not even know about new quality norms introduced in the company, 
which is a problem. People do not know about the new goals, they are not 
informed and therefore cannot do anything to help the company as they do not 
understand how big the problem that is here now is (Brodchmel 2, Project 
Manager).
The function of communication has changed with privatisation, but adaptations at a 
personal and corporate level have not always been visible. Both a structural and a 
mentality issue, this negatively affects the development of companies as restructuring 
follows altered incentives for production after privatisation. Without an accurate 
understanding of the problems within the firm and the overall strategy of the 
management and owners, restructuring changes cannot be effectively designed and 
implemented. One respondent gave this general assessment of changes in 
communication and the need for this to be effective, speaking of how
compared to the past, contact between management and the workers has 
decreased and now it is up to trade unions to encourage meeting with 
management and workers. What does not happen is that a manager goes to the 
workshop to speak to people, and therefore any initiative comes from workers
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and trade unions. This reduced contact is worse. The management does not 
communicate to the workers enough and so they do not know about the 
problems. Some of the unsolved problems may lead into serious difficulties or 
work-stopping situations such as if a machine breaks that need an immediate 
solution. Not knowing the reality in the factory, the circumstances, background 
or the cause of the problem etc means that a management solution to the 
problem may not be the optimal way. They do not care to go to the workshop
and find out the actual situation. Communication is an individual matter and if
people want to communicate, they can always find a way. Some do 
communicate off the job because they are friends, other people don’t even meet 
each other at work because their jobs and tasks are different. Communication 
comes from good relationships between people. Bottom-up communication is 
gradual, it is always better on the same level. Going up, communication gets 
worse as it goes higher. Communication is trying to talk about opinions and 
find middle way but what works perfectly here is the giving of formal orders in 
the company. The main problem is communicating over opinions and views as 
communication is not just about giving and receiving orders, but also discussing 
work and how to improve and change ideas to improve it (Drazitest 4, 
Researcher).
This demonstrates that without communication between managers and employees, 
effective restructuring changes will not be introduced and become embedded into the 
firm, to the overall detriment of privatisation and restructuring.
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So far this chapter has considered institutional changes that primarily reflect 
managerial strategies at the interpersonal level. Typically the function of owners in 
firms in developed market economies to initiate such changes, the case study firms 
show strong evidence of this occurring at the managerial level. This reinforces the 
perception that the de facto control attained by managers in voucher privatised firms 
is more important than de jure ownership.
The remaining two sections shift to deal with more concrete physical structural 
aspects of restructuring that are also changes managers can make when restructuring 
their firms. As with the other changes discussed, their effectiveness is determined by 
the way resources internal to the firm can be mobilised as well as institutional 
constraints from the operating environment of the firm.
5.3.4 Production Changes.
Evidence of managers changing production techniques to achieve greater institutional 
congruence with the new conditions was another aspect of restructuring observed for 
films in this study. Changing to production methods compatible with the needs of the 
global market benefits firms by requiring them to develop new technical standards 
and expertise. A common technique observed in the case study firms was altering 
production so that individual workers deal with a number of tasks, and consequently 
approach production from a more holistic perspective. In some respects this is only a 
minor change, for the system carried forward from Communist-era production where 
“workers are in teams that work on the orders and functions in teams change with 
different orders” (Drazitest 7, Personnel Manager) mirrors the semi-autonomous
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workgroups of post-Fordist production techniques. However, in developed market 
economies it is an adaptation designed to humanise working practices, whereas the 
centrally planned economy demanded such flexibility to overcome the shortages and 
irrationalities of planning. Restructuring production can raise problems though if the 
changes are not relevant to production conditions, with an instance of this leading to 
one worker complaining that
not all the changes made are good. Workers on the assembly line know what is 
good but problems come when “technologists” try to make changes but have 
never tried to work with them (Presnost KM 3, Assembly line worker).
Changes that enable the firm to become more economically viable are necessary, but 
the management must be aware of the embeddedness of existing production systems 
and the skills and capabilities of their workforce if these are to be successful. With 
the move towards a market economic system, there are exogenous institutional 
processes that demand restructuring within the firm. With the move from producer to 
consumer-driven production, firms have to restructure their product lines in response 
to aggregate demand. An important institutional change that can help achieve this and 
that impacts on the internal structure of firms has come from the need to increase the 
quality of production, symbolised by the adoption in each of the companies in this 
study of the appropriate ISO 9000 series norms or equivalent industry standards to 
ensure quantifiably high standards are consistently achieved.70 For this to produce the 
effective restructuring changes desired by managers though, it is crucial that
70 Grayson and Bodily, Integration into the World Economy, [n.p.]; Lubomir Lizal, Does a Soft 
Macroeconomic Environment Induce Restructuring on the Microeconomic Level During the Transition 
Period? Evidence from Investment Behaviour of Czech Enterprises, Working Paper, 235 (Ann Arbor: 
Davidson Institute, 1999), p. 3.
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employees recognise their significance. Evidence of this occurring clearly elucidated 
by one respondent who commented on how production differs now compared to the 
Communist past
where there were plans for producing large numbers. Now customers each have 
their own demands and these have to be fulfilled individually, for example on 
colour, equipment, etc (Rozdat Systems 6, Supervisor).
Another manager commented on this, stating that
as a state-owned enterprise, priority was to complete the plan and it did not 
matter if it made sense or not, but we just had to do it. Now it depends on the 
board, if they are satisfied with the work done, if orders are completed on time, 
and if the work done is of a high standard (Drazitest 6, Business Director).
For some other companies, improvements in production quality have come from 
economically necessary rationalisation of production in the post-privatisation era. For 
example, whilst
historically Rukopis Strojimy has also made other products, now we are looking 
to leave these other activities and to concentrate on one product line and in 
particular the service, sales, quality, and manufacture of these alone (Rukopis 
Strojlrny 2, Operations Director).
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Positive benefits of such a strategy have been realised in Brodchmel where favourable 
market conditions have subsequently led to the company considering expansionary 
techniques to ensure its future survival and development. Here
before privatisation, production was concentrated on three products in three 
plants for production. After privatisation two were shut down as the customers 
were insolvent, but now with time the company is trying to diversify production 
again and create and find new products to concentrate on (Brodchmel 1, 
Personnel Manager).
Another institutional change promoting restructuring is economic liberalisation and 
new opportunities for co-operation with foreign partners that results in quality 
improvements. This has already been realised in Odraz KM, where products are 
being developed for German and Swiss companies (Odraz KM 1, Managing 
Director). This is seen to be of particular importance because in
working with foreign companies that have not been under socialism, we must 
work well for these. We have to do what they want in a short time and for this 
there needs to be new computers, new programmes for design, working in 
accordance with what the customers want (Odraz KM 3, Technical Designer).
There are long-term gains from this, for “although in initial dealings we were not at 
the same status, we have since achieved an equality with them” (Odraz KM 1, 
Managing Director). The end of the CMEA, alongside trade liberalisation, have been 
important institutional changes because they offer new opportunities for
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improvements in product development and technological transfers. The benefits 
respondents saw from this was that
all our products are at the right level of quality as we have used the opening of 
markets and can now buy the best products. We now have the same conditions 
in using know-how and developments in technology as our business partners 
and competitors and have our own unique components of a very high quality 
designed in direct collaboration with a large multinational firm (Rozdat Systems 
4, Technical Director).
Trade liberalisation also removes the artificial comparative advantage established for 
production within the CMEA, which has enabled Cisar to
return to its traditional production. When IT production started, all the 
traditional production activities were reduced. Before 1989 around 90% of 
production was in IT but this had to stop after 1989 as majority of exports had 
been to CMEA markets. The technology was one generation behind the West 
and therefore production ceased after the changes as cheaper and higher quality 
products were available from the West (Cisar 1, Trade Union President).
Other firms have introduced changes motivated by the altered institutional
environment as illustrated for Drazitest where
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although much of the work still remains, there is no need to do that which was 
previously “work for no reason but to keep some employed” (Drazitest 1, 
Quality Director).
Similarly in Presnost KM
now we produce fewer products than previously. When the CMEA broke apart, 
these markets were lost and we had a huge decrease in production of the classic 
product line selection although there have been compensations elsewhere 
(Presnost KM 1, Financial Planning Manager).
These shifts in the operating environment of firms then permit managers to implement 
appropriate restructuring measures that are regarded as economically beneficial, but 
that cannot be introduced without these changes firstly being made.
The corollary of economic liberalisation is that it has also brought difficulties to firms 
and can hinder restructuring changes as in Drazitest where although
the main goal of Drazitest is prosperity and aiming to expand activities in the 
professional area by offering more services and improving regional involvement 
with expansion into other regions both in the Czech Republic and abroad, 
problems of expansion apply to everywhere, not just in going abroad. A loss of 
markets through political change is part of the problem and is difficult to get 
new territories, whether expansion into foreign markets is either independent or
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by using a foreign company as a strategic partner (Drazitest 7, Personnel 
Manager).
Access to appropriate markets is a problem for Rozdat Systems, having limited export 
possibilities because “the main external market is Eastern Europe” (Rozdat Systems 1, 
Managing Director). Although it was stressed that “there is a large market potential 
in China and South America” (Rozdat Systems 5, Financial Director), significant 
expansion into high income markets is restricted, for
newer markets are Iran, Pakistan, but there is nothing really in Western markets, 
except a little in Austria as competition is strong and these markets are already 
quite saturated in the West (Rozdat Systems 4, Technical Director).
Competitive pressures are extremely strong and hard to overcome for these firms, for 
whilst they seek foreign assistance because they recognise limitations in their own 
production techniques and
would therefore like to see some help from outside, when foreign firms find out 
we are from Brodchmel, they do not let us learn because they fear the 
competition and therefore there is no way we can learn about managing from 
foreign competition. It is almost impossible to learn from Western companies 
because of competition and we therefore cannot reach effectiveness of foreign 
companies (Brodchmel 4, Quality Manager).
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The second significant type of production change is for a firm to become involved in 
co-operation and sub-contracting to foreign firms. This has been adopted in Presnost 
KM “in an attempt to find sources of cash flow because of the collapse of previous 
markets in the East” (Presnost KM 2, Co-operation Plant Section Head). For the firm, 
this is “the biggest change since 1990 and is something completely new” (Presnost 
KM 1, Financial Planning Manager), but has been beneficial to overall quality. The 
head of one of these production areas claimed
this part is challenging European standards because the company co-operates in 
Japanese markets and the parent is based in the USA and so has to prove itself 
here (Presnost KM 2, Plant Co-operation Section Head).
Co-operation production may be their only potential survival strategy in the short­
term, but although it protects employment even if this is at the cost of deskilling of 
some of the workforce, it can also be regarded as a form of subordination of the newly 
emerging countries of Central and Eastern Europe to existing producers.71 Managers 
can therefore be unwilling to adopt this if it threatens their personal authority within 
the firm, but it can be very effective at initiating restructuring changes within firms.
A final aspect of production changes that constitute a restructuring change in 
enterprises has arisen because of the changed function of employment. With central 
planning, enterprises were the primary domain of social assistance to employees and
71 Jan Vldcil, ‘Economic, Organizational and Personnel Problems in the Manufacturing Firms, in 
Politics, Skills and Industrial Restructuring, Institute of Sociology Working Paper, 8, edited by J. 
Vlacil, I. Hradecka, I. Mazalkova and G. McDermott (Prague: Academy of Sciences of the Czech 
Republic, 1996), pp. 43-48, p. 44.
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their families, and so had large overheads from social provision.72 As political 
justifications for this social function of enterprises and work has been lost with the 
move to capitalism, many firms have simply ceased operating in these areas. This
was demonstrated in Presnost KM where
in 1993 the firm was in a critical financial situation and a programme to 
improve the “health” of the company was realised. The firm sold shares that 
had been retained to gain finance for restructuring and sold off unnecessary 
assets, housing, supplies, etc., and overcame the financial problems by lowering 
the basic fixed costs of the company (Presnost KM 1, Financial Planning 
Manager).
Now in Rukopis Strojimy there are “outside contracts to companies for the parts that 
cannot be made on site” (Rukopis Strojimy 1, Personnel Manager) and “several other 
smaller companies to look after catering, housing maintenance etc” (Rukopis 
Strojimy 2, Operations Director). Comparable changes occurred in Drazitest, where 
“restructuring was needed because the firm had to start competing and there is a lot of 
competition in the market” (Drazitest 4, Researcher), so
1/5 of the state-owned enterprise remained for this company that is the core of 
the Drazitest state-owned enterprise and the extra structures that were not 
needed were got rid of (Drazitest 3, Supplies Manager).
72 Anna Soulsby and Ed Clark, ‘Privatisation and the Restructuring of Enterprise Social and Welfare 
Assets in the Czech Republic’, Industrial Relations Journal, 26 (1995), 97-109, pp. 97-98.
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As a result, privatised firms are becoming more highly focused on their main 
production areas, representing a favourable development from the perspective of 
enterprise restructuring.
As demonstrated by the responses given, the firms in this study show a strong 
tendency towards restructuring according to economic considerations borne out of a 
need for survival of the firm. However, the structural organisation of the firm and 
patterns of authority also provide an institutional framework within which all of the 
above changes operate, and in part define their effectiveness, as discussed in this final
section.
5.3.5 Organisational Changes.
Although many former state-owned enterprises had a wide skill and product base that 
provides flexibility in transformation at the enterprise level,73 this can cause them to 
be overdiversified in an environment that primarily values economic efficiency.74 
This can be as risky as too narrow a specialisation for overall stability,75 but the 
potential for refocusing onto core business activities to bring about an increase in the 
marginal value of resource use, market value, and higher profit comes from improved
73 Gerald A. McDermott, ‘Governance Structures and Restructuring in Machinery Firms, in Politics, 
Skills and Industrial Restructuring, Institute of Sociology Working Paper, 8, edited by J. VMCil, I. 
Hradecka, I. Mazalkova and G. McDermott (Prague: Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, 
1996), pp. 31-42, p. 32.
74 Edward J. Green, ‘Privatisation, the Entrepreneurial Sector and Growth in Post-Comecon 
Economies’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 17 (1993), 407-417, p. 413; Miklos Szanyi, 
‘Ownership Change and Performance in Companies in the Former Socialist Countries of Europe’, in 
Changes and Challenges: Economic Transformation in East-Central Europe edited by Pal Gaspar 
(Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1995), pp. 119-131, p. 124.
75 Heather Haveman, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Organizational Change and Performance 
Under Conditions of Fundamental Economic Transformation’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 37
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managerial control over the firm.76 Nonetheless, this does not simply require internal 
production changes, but should also be complemented with structural changes to the 
overall configuration of the firm.
Upstream and downstream production were formally internalised in plants to ensure 
supplies because of uncertainty under central planning, but this needs to cease now as
each factory in the machine industry had many fields of production making 
different products. Nowadays the market asks for lower expenses and higher 
quality. For this it is better to have smaller companies that specialise in one 
kind of product manufacture (Brodchmel 4, Quality Manager).
As state-owned enterprises were often involved in periphery production and other 
activities, spin-offs can be a viable structural change to rationalise production and the 
composite structure of the firm after privatisation.77 Defined broadly as the division 
of an existing company into a parent and the (usually smaller) spin-off or daughter 
company, these can occur in two ways. The first is a restructuring response where the 
creation of a new firm comes from strategic motivations in the pursuit of overall 
efficiency for the new firm and sometimes also the parent. The alternative is an 
entrepreneurial response, where a new firm is established with existing employees 
using experience gained from their work in the parent on a new product or market
(1992), 48-75, p. 53; Edward H. Bowman and Harber Singh, ‘Corporate Restructuring: Reconfiguring 
the Firm’, Strategic Management Journal, 14 (Summer Special Issue) (1993), 5-14, p. 6.
76 Constantinos C. Markides, ‘Consequences of Corporate Refocusing: Ex Ante Evidence’, Academy of 
Management Journal, 35 (1992), 398-412, pp. 398-400; Richard A. Johnson, ‘Antecedents and 
Outcomes of Corporate Refocusing’, Journal of Management, 22 (1996), 439-483, pp. 441-442.
77 Soulsby and Clark, ‘Privatisation and the Restructuring’, p. 103.
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niche. This latter type can also take the form of a new start-up rather than a spin-off 
if resources are not provided directly by the parent company. As shown in companies 
in this study, both restructuring and entrepreneurial driven responses are occurring in 
Czech enterprises. The privatisation legislation provided a framework to support both 
processes because numerous forms of privatisation could be proposed for asset 
divestitures and transfers, with the choice between these driven by access to 
information and resources in the early privatisation period.78 9 A third possibility that 
could be especially prominent in post-communist countries in particular is that spin­
offs could be driven by an employee’s desire for increased power and personal 
welfare as a manager of a new firm, rather than seeking improved performance within 
their existing firm and position.80 Although difficult to ascertain the extent to which 
this is a motive behind change, in Cisar this was alluded to by one respondent 
commenting that
although privatisation came from the law, the management also found it 
attractive to be an independent company; they knew that the company had to be 
restructured and they liked it this way too (Cisar 1, Trade Union President).
The restructuring motivation led to Rozdat Systems being spun-off as a daughter 
company of Rukopis Strojimy because a foreign firm expressed an interest in buying 
this part (Rozdat Systems 1, Managing Director), but this has generated “problems
78 Alexander Tiibke, Corporate-Spin-Ojfs.com. 16 November 2000. <http://www.corporate-spin- 
offs.com>, [n.p.].
79 Judith Sedaitis, ‘The Alliances of Spin-offs Versus Start-ups: Social Ties in the Genesis of Post­
Soviet Alliances’, Organization Science, 9 (1998), 368-381, pp. 375-376.
80 Lubomir Lizal, Miroslav Singer and Jan Svenjar, Manager Interests, Breakups and Performance of 
State Enterprises in Transition, Working Paper, 51 (Prague: CERGE, 1994), p. 22.
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with Rukopis Strojirny as the owner” (Rozdat Systems 6, Supervisor). Also in Odraz 
KM, a second daughter company of Rukopis Strojirny that was similarly spun-off
there is a lot of relationship strain with Rukopis Strojirny now because 
previously about 56% of production was for them but this did not give stability 
because of uncertainty over delivery of materials and money. From 1997,
Odraz KM has been looking at revising the company’s development to change 
from mainly supplying Rukopis Strojirny and to looking for more co-operation 
with foreign companies and to increase annual turnover (Odraz KM 1,
Managing Director).
Such conflicts between the management and owners that are consistently left 
unresolved demonstrate that principal-agent problems have not been overcome with 
this change. The extent of authority that managers have can be unclear, but often the 
owners lack credible constraints to ensure that their interests are represented. This has 
not prevented restructuring where the managers have then been able to exercise de 
facto control. In evidence, respondents in these daughter companies placed greater 
emphasis on subsequent internal changes than on the structural changes that had led to. 
their creation. In Rozdat Systems, it was claimed that the
structure of the firm has been developing for many years and is now optimal, 
which is one of the reasons that Rukopis Strojirny is now making structural 
changes to mirror these (Rozdat Systems 5, Financial Director).
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Restructuring and subsequent changes can be seen, since the company was
previously a typical state-owned enterprise, only able to use Eastern know-how. 
Now the structure is very different compared to pre-1989 where the main 
production was for the state, which ended in 1994, and only the development of 
new services from 1990 in this product line saved production here (Rozdat 
Systems 4, Technical Director).
In Odraz KM, changes have occurred because of exogenous pressures so “1993 saw 
the closure of the foundry because of environmental pressures” (Odraz KM 1, 
Managing Director) and “moving into smaller buildings to make the company smaller 
and reduce costs” (Odraz KM 3, Technical Designer).
Comparable structural changes were made in Cisar following privatisation
as smaller companies are more flexible as far as changes in financing and 
structure. In 1992 the state-owned enterprise was changed into a joint-stock 
company, and a new structure of daughter companies came into existence in 
2000. The economic situation is more transparent and they are independent in 
all areas e.g. financially, economically, and politically as the daughter 
companies wanted, which was their main goal in making these independent 
companies. The change in structure was initiated by the owner, presented to 
and agreed by shareholders at the AGM. Its structure is now a holding company 
with five divisions, and four wholly-owned daughter companies (Cisar 4, 
Services Director).
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Benefits amongst employees were anticipated from this since
the new daughter companies came from the different production sections, so it 
is hoped this decentralisation will be better as the management in the daughter 
companies are closer to the problems and know the problems there. How much 
independence these have is unclear as this has just started but communication is 
better as the problems are solved immediately at the place where these occur 
(Cisar 2, Machine worker).
However, the strategy has been criticised by others in the firm who feel that the 
strategy is not warranted, because there are
some parts that the management has paid too much attention to, even if this was 
not justifiable or necessary but they did not want to accept that this was taking 
the whole company down and would not get rid of it even though if doing this 
would make the whole company healthier. Cisar is a mother company with four 
daughter companies and the management should pay the same amount of 
attention to all the parts and then these should bring the same amount of profit 
to the market. The problem has been that the daughter company with the lowest 
profit has been accepted as the area of its highest priority (Cisar 3, Retired 
Analyst).
Another aspect of the strategy that was criticised was where the management seemed 
to pursue the profit goal with inadequate consideration of the consequences of this. 
One respondent described how they
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joined some pails of production into one complex under one management, 
moved machines into new locations, and reduced the size of machinery as the 
management wanted to make production cheaper, but employees now complain 
that they do not have some of the technology necessary to make some products, 
so only time will tell if the changes have worked (Cisaf 1, Trade Union 
President).
It therefore appears to the employees that managers have acted to maximise their own 
pecuniary interests, but that this has been detrimental overall to the firm’s 
restructuring and survival after privatisation. Whilst in theory the economic logic 
behind such decisions is clear, in Cisaf it appears that there are non-economic motives 
underlying much of the restructuring strategy of the owners and managers in what is 
increasingly a failing firm.
An entrepreneurial type response motivated the restructuring that occurred for some 
parts of Drazitest following the dissolution of the fonner state-owned enterprise. 
Following privatisation, Drazitest is all that remains of the original parent, but two 
other firms were created by employees purchasing assets in the small-scale 
privatisation programme from the old divisions of the Drazitest state-owned enterprise 
to establish new, independent companies. Both of these have successfully redefined 
their role within this market area, although relationships between them and Drazitest 
are retained to some extent. Here also the prestige motivation may have been 
significant in the establishment of each of the new plants out of the former divisions, 
but it is not explicitly definable, and the parts not privatised by voucher are not 
considered further in this work. However, the entrepreneurial response is less likely
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to occur with voucher privatisation because of the larger or uneconomic nature of the 
assets included in the programme that precluded outright sales to strategic investors.
An alternative structural adaptation has been the decentralisation of decision making 
and devolving responsibility down the corporate hierarchy to encourage efficiency 
improvements. Divisionalised firms (M-firms) are divided into distinct production 
units, with senior managers only concerned with strategic decisions, allowing 
localised management tasks to be dealt with at or near the point of production. This 
contrasts with unitary firms (U-firm) where top managers are additionally responsible 
for taking decisions regarding co-ordination between functional units.81
For restructuring state-owned enterprises, divisionalisation can offer a number of 
benefits. Firstly, as a structure distinguishable from that of enterprises in centrally 
planned economies it represents a decisive change in the structure of firms associated 
with the new economic system. Secondly, this can be understood as the “optimal” 
form of structural organisation to be attained because its prevalence in Western 
companies provides a benchmark against which to measure the extent of structural 
change in an otherwise highly uncertain environment. Appealing to the credibility of 
models already operating in other market economies, especially with regards 
changing the structural form of enterprises away from their hierarchical form that was 
consistent with central management of the economy into more decentralised decision­
making structures may be undertaken to try to break associations and links to the 
former system. Divisionalisation can help break the prevailing monopolistic 
orientation of firms and introduce market-oriented intra-departmental relationships
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that were neglected under the former system. It can also allow management to 
reassert control over the labour force at every level within the enterprise, especially by 
redefining structures of power and influence to bring a consolidation of their own 
power. As U-firms expand, strategic decision-making becomes more difficult for 
top managers to administer because of the range of tasks that needs to be covered. In 
response, M-firms are often preferred in market economies because relevant decision­
making is devolved to specific task areas, and the top management only needs to be 
concerned with overall strategic decisions.81 82 3 This motive for divisionalisation is 
liable to be strong as there are new functions that need to be undertaken within 
production units. Previously only certain firms were allowed to participate in foreign 
trade, and this only in co-operation with specific state-run foreign trade units. With 
the collapse of the CMEA markets and trade liberalisation, exports potentially 
presented new market opportunities globally. Marketing divisions did not exist in 
state-owned enterprises as they operated under production-led conditions, with state 
distribution channels for their output. Now firms have to establish these, “which is 
one of the biggest changes” (Rozdat Systems 4, Technical Director), for this was 
previously a function external to the firm as described for Brodchmel where
until privatisation an organisation in Prague was marketing these products, but 
after privatisation a new marketing department had to be created (Brodchmel 3, 
Assembly Section Head).
81 Donald Palmer, Roger Freidland, P. Devereaux Jennings and Melanie E. Pavers, ‘The Economics 
and Politics of Structure: The Multidivisional Form and the Large US Corporation’, Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 32 (1987), 25-48, p. 25.
82 Grosfeld and Roland, Defensive and Strategic Restructuring, p. 18; Ed Clark, ‘Czech Enterprises and
the Multidivisional Form: Legitimation, Legacies and Structural Choice’, Journal for East European 
Management Studies, 3 (1998), 46-63, pp. 47, 54.
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In Rukopis Strojirny, several respondents commented on the trend towards 
divisionalisation, so that now “each part has its own directors who are responsible for 
their own divisions e.g. economics, technology” (Rukopis Strojirny 1, Personnel 
Director). The process comprised
changes both large and small. Major changes to the structure have occurred 
three times, with the introduction of separate export and import sections 
(Rukopis Strojirny 1, Personnel Manager).
Alongside these changes, there has also been the
creation of a sales department, as previously the company did not sell 
independently. Until 1990 sales were through state companies specialising in 
this (Rukopis Strojirny 2, Operations Director).
Similar changes occurred in Rozdat Systems where divisionalisation
began in 1993 with demands from the market. One of the biggest changes was 
the need to found business centres or trade departments and sales departments 
(Rozdat Systems 4, Technical Director).
Also in Presnost KM “in 1990, management began looking at ways the company is 
run and out of this came 20 divisions, but now about 4 divisions run the company” 
(Presnost KM, Financial Planning Manager). An important aspect of such
83 Palmer et al, ‘Economics and Politics of Structure’, pp. 25-27.
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divisionalisation is that it alters the interconnections between departments and 
incentives for production. This was demonstrated in one firm where
the main change was the split from the Drazitest state-owned enterprise and 
division into “professional sector branches”. Now every branch has its own 
executive director to organise work, and each section should have assessors to 
guarantee work and quality. This did not exist before 1989 when all were under 
one directorship that had all the responsibility as it was not necessary to do any 
searching for contracts since the state gave work and this just had to be divided 
amongst workers at the lower levels. Now each branch has to do this and also 
look for work and bargain over prices (Drazitest 1, Quality Director).
Comparable adaptations were seen in other firms, as in Brodchmel, where structural 
changes occurred with the
conversion from a state-owned enterprise, with a lowering of the number of 
employees, and an amalgamation of all the departments not involved in 
production, and then all the production departments respectively (Brodchmel 1, 
Personnel Manager)
In Rozdat Systems also this was seen, where
the main change has been moving the supply department from being part of the 
sales department and combining it now with production. In the future, further 
integration of activities is expected with the technical department to be
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combined with production as there is a need to simplify connections between 
the departments (Rozdat Systems 4, Technical Director).
These responses indicate that divisionalisation is more than a structural change but 
involves shifts in the balance of power within enterprises that favour the management 
and enables it to exercise authority over strategic and operating level decisions within 
the firm. As the legal position of managers is weaker than that gained informally 
following privatisation, it is unsurprising that the M-form firm has been favoured by 
them as this helps consolidate their authority.
Problems can arise though because the M-form is accompanied by changes in control 
and power-relations within a company.84 As described for Odraz KM
after privatisation some things had to be done that were not done before such as 
dealing with banks and building distribution networks. The problem was that 
most people at Odraz KM were not prepared for this, and since the change was 
very sudden there were a lot of personnel changes in the company and 
instability because of this. However, Odraz KM overcame this instability faster 
than Rukopis Strojimy by being smaller and more flexible (Odraz KM 1, 
Managing Director).
The effectiveness of any change is therefore shown again to be dependent on the 
institutional environment and pressures and constraints on managers to introduce
84 Clark, ‘Czech Enteiprises and the Multidivisional Form’, p. 55.
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changes and to see them become successfully embedded into the operation of their
firms.
5.4 CONCLUSION.
Voucher privatisation has resulted in dispersed ownership and weak corporate 
governance mechanisms, so managers often achieve de facto control over their 
enterprises. This makes their actions instrumental in determining the extent and 
effectiveness of restructuring changes. The institutional context of privatisation 
creates this outcome, but managers are themselves constrained in their activity by the 
existence of institutions that encourage or preclude change that determines the 
restructuring that occurs. Managers acting rationally will try and meet their own 
interests, and these do not have to correspond to those of the firm’s owners, but can 
still incorporate favourable restructuring developments.
Changes to the internal and external structure of former state-owned enterprises are 
essential for their long-term existence, given the altered external operating 
environment for these firms arising from the transformation.85 Privatisation is a 
catalyst to restructuring that is externally imposed and this will only impact 
comprehensively on restructuring of former state-owned enterprises if it brings about 
the removal or changing of attitudes amongst the top managers and elites, who are 
often those most resistant to change within enterprises.86 In all firms privatised by
85 Jan Mladek, ‘Czech Companies after the First Wave of Voucher Privatisation: Was the Change Real 
or Formal?’, Privatisation in Visegrad Countries: Old Principles and New Methods, edited by 
Miklos Szanyi, Proceedings of the International Conference (Budapest: Institute for World Economics, 
1994), pp. 153-172, p. 172.
86 Saba, ‘Orphans in the Storm’, p. 121.
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voucher in the Czech Republic some fonn of restructuring occurred through designing 
a privatisation projects, which represents their having undertaken a strategic 
management task. Changes in workplace practices, the firm’s structure and culture, 
and new and re-oriented investment strategies as aspects of deep restructuring are also 
required, but restructuring changes may not be effectively implemented if their 
purpose is not understood properly by those introducing and adapting to these 
changes. The newly privatised firms have a low capacity to adapt to change, and 
limited relevant experience from their previous operation that can be used in their new
• • qqoperating environment.
There are a number of potentially conflicting issues that can affect the nature and 
form of restructuring that can occur in a firm. A successful strategy has to encompass 
“soft” and “hard” issues. Quantifiable changes in production techniques and shifts in 
product mix, quality improvements, efficiency improvements in resource use, and 
forward-looking investment strategies are important. However, qualitative features 
such as marketing, managerial styles, changes in organisational structure, human 
resource management, and effective corporate governance can also be definitive for 
successful or failed restructuring.87 88 9 Skills and experience rewarded within the 
centrally planned economy were those effectively adapted to these conditions.
Limited institutional change encourages the persistence of old behavioural patterns
87 Philippe Aghion and Wendy Carlin, ‘Restructuring Outcomes and the Evolution of Ownership 
Patterns in Central and Eastern Europe’, in Lessons from the Economic Transition: Central and 
Eastern Europe in the 1990s, edited by Salvatore Zecchini (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic/OECD, 
1997), pp. 241-261, pp. 244-245.
88 Karen L. Newman, ‘Organizational Transformation During Institutional Upheaval’, Academy of 
Management Review, 25 (2000), 602-619, pp. 605, 606, 612.
89 Josef C. Brada, Management 101: Behavior of Firms in Transition Economies, Working Paper, 133 
(Ann Arbor: Davidson Institute, 1998), [n.p].
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amongst managers,90 in direct contradiction with the aims of privatisation to bring 
external pressures from owners that would force the adoption of market-oriented 
behaviour.91 92Managers are faced with the dilemma of undertaking change with 
uncertain benefits in the future, or maintaining the status quo but with costs in the 
future. If they perceive that change is most likely to reduce their status and power 
and they fear losing their job in the uncertain economic environment, little change is 
likely to occur. Although a natural tendency may be for actors within organisations to 
revert to behavioural patterns that have historically proved successful, in the 
transformation to a market economic system some of this behaviour may be so 
dysfunctional as to hinder the organisations ability to adapt, so it is important to 
ensure that deep and lasting changes occur to prevent this.93
Important constraints on change for managers are limited experience and finance, 
which can permit only superficial restructuring to occur.94 Many of the restructuring 
changes introduced are those normally regarded as the domain of owners in firms in 
developed market economies. As credible owners are often lacking in voucher 
privatised films, managers instead try to use this vacuum of power to implement 
changes that will enhance their position. This further consolidates the importance of 
managers having de facto control within enterprises, even if this is not supported by 
de jure shareholdings. Throughout this chapter it has been demonstrated that the 
ability of managers to implement these changes and their effectiveness is dependant
90 Dinko Dubravdid ‘Entrepreneurial Aspects of Privatisation in Transition Economies’, Europe-Asia 
Studies, 47 (1995), 305-316, p. 310; Whitley et al, ‘Continuity and Change’, p. 234.
91 Clark and Soulsby, ‘Organization-Community Embeddedness’, p. 29.
92 Wendy Carlin, John van Reenen and Toby Wolfe, Enterprise Restructuring in the Transition: An 
Analytical Survey of the Case Study Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe, Working Paper, 14 
(London: EBRD, 1994), p. 8.
93 Peter Murrell, ‘Privatization Complicates the Fresh Start’, Orbis, 36 (3) (1992). Academic Search 
Elite. EBSCO Publishing. 24 April 1999. <http://www.global.epnet.com/hosttrial/login.html>, [n.p.].
94 Myant, ‘Transformation of Czech Enterprises’, p. 155.
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upon the context within which they are introduced. The role of labour has been 
touched upon briefly but this is an important institutional influence on restructuring in 
its own right. It impacts on the effectiveness of managers, and also owners to some 
extent, in being able to implement restructuring measures because it is the primary 
mechanism through which change within enterprises is effected. The following 
chapter therefore considers developments in labour market conditions and wider 
institutional framework of industrial relations. This deepens and complements this 
discussion of post-privatisation enterprise restructuring in former state-owned 
enterprises in the Czech Republic by addressing the question of institutional 
limitations to effective restructuring at the level of the workforce within enterprises.
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CHAPTER SIX
LABOUR MARKETS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
The two preceding chapters have demonstrated the significance of owners and managers 
as institutional influences to understanding the observed restructuring in formerly state- 
owned Czech firms. Having argued that de facto control is generally a more important 
determinant of restructuring than de jure ownership, this chapter contends that the actual 
influence of the post-privatisation restructuring measures of both owners and managers 
depends on the labour resource. Labour markets and the industrial relation structures 
provide formal and informal institutional influences on the restructuring measures 
introduced, but also directly affect the incentives of labour to adapt to these once they
have been introduced.
The chapter argues that assessing restructuring within enterprises cannot be achieved 
unless the context at the enterprise level where the desired changes are implemented is
understood. The discussion of labour markets and the industrial relations framework as
institutional influences again demonstrates the importance of an approach such as 
embedded institutionalism that can account for the comprehensive range of institutional 
influences on restructuring within firms. Whether owners and managers can overcome 
fonnal and infonnal legacies that dictate how labour responds to the new working 
practices is vital to effective post-privatisation restructuring within films.1 Nonetheless,
1 Jiri Burianek, ‘The Industrial Relations Still in Transition: A Commentary on Some Recent Studies on the 
Czech Case’, Journal for East European Management Studies, 2(1997), 161-172, p. 167.
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labour is also subject to the influence of these institutions, and so this chapter shows that 
overall the interaction of these institutions gives labour a direct, although limited, impact 
on restructuring outcomes in enterprises. A new institutional environment is emerging, 
but the period of central planning still shapes the expectations and responses of labour 
over work. Although owners and managers conceive formal restructuring strategies after 
privatisation, employees achieve and exercise de facto control by dictating how these 
changes are incorporated into the operation of the firm. Also, the industrial relations 
framework in existence that prescribes legal requirements for owners and managers to 
abide by, and so determines the feasible range of restructuring measures that can be 
introduced, also affects the incentive structure of workers to adapt to these changes. The 
purpose of this chapter is therefore to complement the preceding discussion of incentives 
for owners and managers to undertake restructuring by considering how labour responds 
to and implements their desired restructuring measures.
The size of the labour force in state-owned enterprises was artificially inflated as 
Communist governments desired full employment for socio-political reasons, although 
this was economically inefficient. Changes in unemployment levels with the 
transformation are reviewed here because these can indicate whether restructuring and 
therefore necessary labour shedding is occurring in firms. Factors that determine these 
aggregate levels are discussed, but it is shown that restructuring does not always 
correspond with higher unemployment in the economy, making these levels alone 
insufficient as an indicator of change. An important determinant of unemployment levels 
that is also an institutional influence on the choices labour makes about unemployment
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derives from the structure of unemployment policies. Their evolution and the potential 
effects of this on restructuring outcomes are discussed in section 6.2. As these influences 
do not give a prediction of how unemployment affects restructuring outcomes, this 
section is followed by a discussion of labour productivity in the case study enteiprises. 
This shows that institutional influences hinder improvements, and therefore limit the 
effectiveness of restructuring in these firms.
In addition to unemployment issues, the formal institutional framework of industrial 
relations affects the responses of labour to the restructuring strategies of owners and 
managers. It is shown in particular that trade unions have a declining influence in 
privatised firms as the transformation continues. The patterns of employment since 1989 
also depend upon wage policies, which in turn influence restructuring decisions by 
altering the demand and supply of labour in privatised firms. In the chapter, each of the 
above aspects are discussed, with the theoretical projections supplemented by empirical
data from the case studies to demonstrate how these interact and are resolved at the
enterprise level.
Labour shedding is required in many former state-owned enterprises after privatisation, 
but labour markets need to operate effectively if structural changes in enteiprises are to 
arise from this. The cases in this study provide evidence of continual labour shedding so 
that within firms it is expected that “more unemployment is inevitable, but we cannot tell 
where and how much is likely to occur” (Rukopis Strojimy 6, Machine worker).
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Unemployment levels in transforming economies are subject to many contradictory 
institutional influences. The general institutional context of unemployment levels is 
therefore presented before turning to consider the impact of unemployment policies as a 
specific institutional influence that helps determine these levels, as the actual 
restructuring outcomes in firms in response to these can only be resolved empirically.
6.1 UNEMPLOYMENT AND RESTRUCTURING.
Holding a job became an institutionalised “right” under socialism, with unemployment 
rejected as a failing of capitalism, and those not working without legitimate reason liable 
to imprisonment. Full employment was initially the consequence of extensive growth 
policies, but despite the social stability and personal benefits to individual employees, it 
engenders inefficiency in production, and promotes a culture of “work avoidance”.2 
Unemployment becomes visible in transformational economies since full employment 
can no longer be ideologically justified at the cost of economic inefficiency. Despite its 
costs, respondents recognised that this change would occur since “previously 
unemployment did not exist, which was abnormal” (Cisar 3, Retired Analyst).
The KSC had the right to directly allocate labour resources, although rigid planning could 
not be applied to labour as with other resources in the economy since labour can be
2 Milford Bateman, ‘Introduction: The Transition Towards the Market Economy’, in Business Cultures in 
Central and Eastern Europe, edited by Milford Bateman (Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, 1997), xiii- 
xxii, p. xviii.
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differentiated and motivated with the correct incentives to increase its value.3 Policies 
were formulated to either directly or indirectly affect existing and planned labour demand 
and supply, with labour resources deployed to meet the economic and social needs of the 
country, including full employment.4 In the post-communist era, labour may be 
unwilling to see this revoked despite its incongruence with the economic rationale of the 
new system. Having not been a feature of the centrally planned economy, the response of 
enterprises to open unemployment is essential to understanding post-privatisation 
restructuring in Czech firms. As one respondent commented, persistent mentalities can 
prevent workers adapting to the economic need for unemployment because
the previous system supported workers in a strong way, but now with capitalism 
this does not exist as there are no special workers rights and the state does not 
support them as much as before, but they cannot wake up from this change 
(Brodchmel 4, Quality Manager).
A distinguishing feature of the Czech transformation in comparison with other 
transforming economies of Central and Eastern Europe has been its low levels of 
unemployment, despite apparent restructuring in fonner state-owned enterprises.5 It is 
essential to determine whether the country’s historical legacies and its initial starting 
conditions pre-determined this outcome, giving Czech firms an advantage as
3 Alec Nove, The Socialist Economic System, 3rd edition (Winchester, MA.: Allen and Unwin, 1986), p.
202.
4 Jan Adam, Employment and Wage Policies in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary Since 1950 (London: 
Macmillan, 1984), pp. 3,43,45-46,49,105,108,109.
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transformation progresses, or if higher unemployment is inevitable as enterprises 
subsequently undertake restructuring not motivated by survival. If the latter, then 
privatisation alone generates insufficient impetus for rationalisation of labour use in 
enterprises. The following section describes features of Czech unemployment that are 
structurally derived, for these are important to supporting favourable developments in the 
transformation, and show how unemployment does not have to correlate with 
restructuring within enterprises.
6.1.1 Low Unemployment - Miracle or Mirage?
By international standards, low unemployment levels have characterised transformation 
in the Czech Republic.5 6 Three waves of unemployment can be discerned since 1989, 
with two periods of low, or only slowly increasing, unemployment between 1989 and 
1991, and 1992 and 1996, followed by more rapid increases since 1996. Peaking in 1991 
at 4.1% of the labour force, annual unemployment levels did not then exceed 5% for 
another six years,7 although the subsequent progressive rise in unemployment may be 
indicative of the start of a second distinct phase in unemployment. Whilst too little time 
has elapsed to determine whether this will represent a long-term trend, the Czech
5 Robert J. Gitter and Markus Scheuer, ‘Low Unemployment in the Czech Republic: “Miracle” or 
“Mirage”?’, Monthly Labor Review, 121 (8) (1998), 31-37. Business Source Premier. EBSCO Publishing. 
17 June 1999. <http://www.global.epnet.com/hosttrial/login.html>, [n.p.].
6 Daniel Daianu, ‘Judging Romania’s Way in a Comparative Framework’, in Economic Developments and 
Reforms in Cooperation Partner Countries: The Social and Human Dimension, edited by Reiner Weichardt 
(Brussels: NATO Economic Directorate and Office of Information, 1997), pp. 241-260, p. 249.
7 In part, there is a statistical gain for the Czech Republic after the split of Czechoslovakia, as Slovakia has 
had consistently higher unemployment of a more long-term, structural nature. CCET/OECD, Industry in
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Republic still maintains unemployment levels consistently lower than other transforming 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe.8 However, these levels alone are not an 
accurate indication of whether privatisation is associated with enterprise restructuring.
Observed unemployment levels reflect the interaction of a number of different 
institutions that are complex and may be contradictory in their effects.9 These different 
institutions are not only institutional influences on the levels of unemployment, but they 
also act to shape the expectations and responses of labour in transformation and, as a 
result, the de facto control labour achieves over enterprise restructuring. This section 
considers institutional influences that have contributed to levels of unemployment in the 
transformation aside from lay-offs as a strategy of enterprise restructuring.
Some initial conditions positively limited unemployment levels in Czechoslovakia. 
Immediately after transformation began, Klaus undertook two measures to enhance the 
competitiveness of the domestic industry: a currency devaluation from Kc 14/US$ to Kc 
28/US$, and a reduction in real wages of over 40%.10 This did not preclude 
unemployment, but in combination with the country’s favourable fiscal position, did
the Czech and Slovak Republics (Paris: OECD, 1994), p. 29; Domenico Mario Nuti, ‘Fighting 
Unemployment in Transitional Economies’, Moct-Most, 6 (1996), 39-55, p. 48.
8 OECD, Economic Survey: Czech Republic 1997-1998 (Paris: OECD, 1998), p. 77.
9 Tito Boeri, ‘Heterogeneous Workers, Economic Transformation and the Stagnancy of Transitional 
Unemployment’, European Economic Review, 41 (1997), 905-914, pp. 905-906; Marek Gora, ‘Central and 
Eastern European Labour Markets in Transition’, in Lessons from the Economic Transition: Central and 
Eastern Europe in the 1990s, edited by Salvatore Zecchini (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic/OECD, 1997), 
pp. 393-412, p. 395.
10 Vaclav Klaus, Vaclav Klaus Narovinu. Hovory V.K. s Petrem Haj'kem Nejen o Tom, Co Bylo, Je a Bude 
(Praha: Rabbit and Rabbit, 2001), pp. 192-193.
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dampen the initial pressure on companies to restructure through labour shedding.11 In 
addition to historical and cultural links, the border with Germany permitted cross-border 
employment,12 whilst significant inflows of tourists and one of the highest rates of FDI 
inflows in Central and Eastern Europe generated new employment opportunities for the 
Czech labour force.13
Another advantage in the Czech economy that positively limited unemployment levels, 
even with restructuring occurring, came from the historically developed structure and 
market heritage of the Czech economy. This meant that enterprises established before the 
Communist period normally had locations determined by market forces that are 
economically rational, whereas more recent plant was generally located in accordance 
with other objectives, especially the levelling of regional disparities.14 Other structural 
developments in the economy during transformation have allowed for the employment of 
both skilled and unskilled labour* reserves, such as the rapid growth of the service sector 
that had been artificially suppressed under Communism. Marked sectoral responses in 
overall employment are visible in the Czech transformation, with labour flowing out of 
agriculture and industry into services, and also moving jobs within companies and
11 Martin Raiser, ‘Governing the Transition to a Market Economy’, Economics of Transition, 3 (1995), 
215-246, p. 226.
12 Perth Koistinen, ‘The Employment Policy in the Making: Search for National Solutions in Central and 
Eastern Europe’, in Labour Markets in Transition: Employment, Unemployment and Labour Market 
Policies in Central and Eastern Europe, edited by Birgit Pfau-Effinger, Marion Neufeld and Volkmar 
KreiBig, Working Paper, 1 (Gelsenkurchen: SAMF, 1994), pp. 11-46, p. 17.
13 Raiser, ‘Governing the Transition’, p. 219.
14 John C. Ham, Jan Svenjar and Katherine Ten-ell, ‘Unemployment and the Social Safety Net During 
Transitions to a Market Economy: Evidence from the Czech and Slovak Republics’, American Economic 
Review, 88 (1998), 1117-1142, p. 1132.
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industrial sectors in response to a rationalisation of production.15 In particular, the 
concentration of agricultural employment in Slovakia favourably benefited aggregate 
unemployment measurements for the Czech Republic after the Velvet Divorce.16
An additional cause of low aggregate unemployment consistent with restructuring has 
been substantial outflows of labour from the labour force, primarily amongst pensioners, 
women and marginal groups including the disabled. Such reductions in employment do 
not result in increasing unemployment when they represent a reaction against enforced 
participation in the socialist model. After transformation began, the participation of 
pensioners fell from 520,000 in 1989 to less than 270,000 in 199717 through voluntary 
losses or redundancy. These can be beneficial to firms if they represent a loss of 
unproductive labour with wage cost reductions in excess of the decline in productivity. 
Nonetheless, continued reductions in aggregate labour supply could become increasingly 
costly to the economy as a whole, and thus countering the effects of privatisation as a 
catalyst to the overall transformation. As well as potentially representing a loss of skills 
and experience from the labour force, although the current retirement ages are unlikely to 
be reduced, the already low mean age of pensioners and high dependency ratios this 
engenders combine to generate strong fiscal pressures on social security provisions.18
15 Vladislav Flek, ‘Employment Structure and Unemployment in the Czech Republic’, Prague Economic 
Papers, 8 (1999), 195-207, p. 206; Tomas Konecny, Changing Labour Market - Will the Czech Republic 
Succeed in Combating the Unemployment, Unpublished paper given at Rajik Lazslo College Third Central 
European Conference, Pecsvar&d, 10-16 April 2000, [n.p].
16 CCET/OECD, Review of the Labour Market in the Czech Republic (Paris: OECD, 1995), p. 21.
17 Marie Frydmanova, Kamil Janacek, Petr Mares and Tomas Sirovatka, ‘Labor Markets and Human 
Resources’, in Ten Years of Building Capitalism: Czech Society After 1989, edited by Jiri Vecernik and 
Petr Mateju (Praha: Academia, 1999), pp. 21-43, p. 32.
18 Tito Boeri, Michael C. Burda and Janos Kollo, Mediating the Transition: Labour Markets in Central and 
Eastern Europe (London: Institute for East-West Studies/CEPR, 1998), p. 4.
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Similar effects arise with enforced exit, when labour withdraws from the available labour 
force if it does not expect to find employment, or wages are not adequate to retain these 
people.19 The loss of many women from the labour force strongly reflects the increasing 
costs of child-care and the discontinuation of social provisions by enterprises. These 
changes cause higher reservation wages amongst mothers before they would choose 
employment and be able to afford adequate child-care,20 despite an extension of 
maternity leave by 12 months to three years, as well as higher allowances for children up 
to four years old.21
Also, the Czech authorities stringently enforced the rules on unemployment benefits to 
encourage job seeking rather than evasion and benefit fraud, so marginal groups are more 
likely to either take work that they would otherwise refuse with higher transfer payments, 
or withdraw totally from the potential supply of labour, and so become discounted from 
statistical unemployment measures.
Between 1994 and 1996 low unemployment co-existed alongside rising real wages,22 but 
this was unsustainable in the long-term because it creates conditions for the build-up of 
wage-push inflation that can reduce the competitiveness of firms. Rising unemployment 
from 1997 reflects changed institutional pressures on firms and labour from stronger 
market forces to economic efficiency, but is only beneficial as a restructuring strategy if
19 Tito Boeri and Christopher J. Flinn, ‘Returns to Mobility in the Transition to a Market Economy’, 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 27 (1999), 4-32, pp. 4-5.
20 Robert S. Chase, ‘Markets for Communist Human Capital: Returns to Education and Experience in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 51 (1998), 401-423, p. 404.
21 Michal Rutkowksi, ‘Labour Market Polices in Transition Economies’, Moct-Most, 6 (1996), 19-38, p. 10.
22 Flek, ‘Employment Structure’, p. 201.
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there is a rationalisation of labour use within firms. In some cases, labour shedding 
increased as budget constraints have hardened for firms, but this can have negative 
consequences for aggregate unemployment. As the transformation progresses, fewer 
employment opportunities exist in previously growing sectors of the economy, with the 
absorptive capacity of the economy from this aspect of structural change in decline.23 
Demographic factors such as the higher birth rates of the 1970s are also causing increased 
labour flows into already saturated markets, as well as marked regional variations in 
unemployment rates.24 These exacerbate difficulties for firms needing to shed labour if 
they are tightly embedded into their local communities with implications for productivity 
as described further in section 6.3, but more generally are significant because they mean 
rising unemployment does not necessarily mean that such restructuring is occurring in
Czech firms.
As the preceding discussion has shown, unemployment levels in the Czech Republic have 
responded to a number of institutional influences aside from unemployment caused by 
enterprise restructuring strategies of firms. Notwithstanding these factors that have 
helped reduce aggregate unemployment levels in the economy, the extent of labour 
shedding as part of the restructuring strategy of owners and managers is subject to 
additional institutions. These are considered in the following section that demonstrates
23 Flek, ‘Employment Structure’, p. 206.
24 Alois Holub, ‘Rising Unemployment in the World Economy and the So-Called Czech Paradox’, Prague 
Economic Papers, 3 (1993), 337-351, pp. 348-349; Heinz Fassmann, ‘Unemployment in East-Central 
Europe and its Consequences for East-West Migration’, in People, Jobs and Mobility in the New Europe, 
edited by Hans H. Blotevogel and Anthony J. Fielding, European Science Foundation (Chichester: Wiley, 
1997), pp. 169-186, pp. 176-177.
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whether privatisation encourages restructuring through lay-offs when this is an 
economically desirable strategy, or if there are institutional influences that prevent this.
The formal policy response of the post-communist Czech governments in dealing with 
unemployment provides the context within which labour responds to altered 
unemployment opportunities. It also influences the decisions of owners and managers to 
introduce restructuring measures that will impact on employment levels in their firms. 
Rigidity in labour flows can be institutionalised into an economy through measures aimed 
at the legal protection of workers rights, especially where labour unions are strong. This 
has been true historically in the centrally planned economies, and expectations of worker 
protection derived from experience of this system can continue to prevent restructuring 
occurring in firms to the extent that is economically desirable. This can justify the use of 
labour market interventions in response to distortions that can be rectified through such 
policies, but it is essential that these are motivated by efficiency, rather than equity 
concerns, if they are to promote restructuring within privatising firms.25
As transformation progresses, the government needs to determine whether to tolerate 
labour under-utilisation by continuing soft budget constraints and artificially inflating the 
demand for labour through non-market measures, or whether unemployment should be 
made visible.26 In the Czech Republic, new social security provisions have been made 
that can encourage companies to shed labour more easily and also restrict direct social
25 Boeri et al, Mediating the Transition, p. 69.
26 Boeri and Flinn, ‘Returns to Mobility’, pp. 4-5.
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assistance within the enterprises, permitting a more rational employment structure to
27emerge.
6.2 UNEMPLOYMENT POLICIES.
In the Czech transformation, much direct government intervention through social 
assistance is discernible, because of a primacy placed on maintaining domestic social 
peace,27 8 in contradiction to Klaus’ professed neo-liberalism. Czech labour market 
policies have a dual emphasis on minimising social costs of transformation, with transfer 
payments and wage restraint to moderate labour flows out of enterprises, whilst 
simultaneously attempting to encourage re-employment of labour.29 They aim to allow 
credible hard budget constraints for enterprises that will encourage restructuring, and the 
provision of a basic social safety net to protect labour against the search costs of 
unemployment.30 Although they can be criticised for artificially inflating unemployment 
by alleviating the discipline of market forces against labour,31 in the Czech Republic the 
parallel developments of labour market polices to receive and redistribute this labour
27 Boeri, Transition with Labour Supply, p. 13.
28 Peter Rutland, ‘Thatcherism, Czech-Style: Transition to Capitalism in the Czech Republic’, Telos, 94 
(1992-1993), 103-129. Academic Search Elite. EBSCO Publishing. 8 May 1999. 
<http://www.global.epnet.com/hosttrial/login.html>, [n.p.]; Mitchell Orenstein, ‘Transitional Social Policy 
in the Czech Republic and Poland’, Czech Sociological Review, 3 (1995), 179-196, p. 180.
29 Rutkowksi, ‘Labour Market Polices’, p. 28; Nicolas Spulber, Redefining the State: Privatization and 
Welfare Reform in Industrial and Transitional Economies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
p. 181.
30 Ferdinando Targettti, ‘The Privatization of Industry with Particular Regard to Economies in Transition’, 
in Privatization in Europe: West and East Experiences, edited by Ferdinando Targetti (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, 1992), pp. 1-29, pp. 22-23.
31 Richard Jackman and Catalin Pauna, ‘Labour Market Policy and the Reallocation of Labour Across 
Sectors’, va Lessons from the Economic Transition: Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, edited by 
Salvatore Zecchini (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic/OECD, 1997), pp. 373-392, pp. 385-386.
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appears to have positively impacted aggregate unemployment in the economy, and 
encouraged labour redistributions within enterprises as restructuring occurs after 
privatisation. The precise form and content of these labour market policies is presented 
below, because these determine levels of unemployment that in turn decide the incentives 
for labour to flow into more productive uses, and influence the extent to which decision­
makers respond to the need for labour redistributions and restructuring.
6.2.1 Passive Labour Market Policies.
The level and duration of unemployment benefits introduced from 1990 in
Czechoslovakia are amongst the lowest in Central and Eastern Europe, appealing 
stringent in comparison with Western Europe, but liberal in contrast to the USA.32 This 
unemployment compensation system (UCS) gave benefits payable for 12 months at 60% 
of the claimant’s previous average wage for the first six months, falling to 50% for a 
subsequent six months. In cases of redundancy, payments in the initial six months were 
65% of the previous wage. These workers were also entitled to claim severance pay,33 
but they could not collect unemployment benefit until these payments ended. Those who 
had not received a wage previously but were still eligible had their benefits calculated in 
accordance with the minimum wage. This replaced the benefits payable from 1989 of 
95% of previous income for six months, falling to 60% for the next six months for those
32 Ham et al, ‘Unemployment and the Social Safety Net’, p. 1122.
33 From 1990-1991 under Decree of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 312/1990 this was 
equal to five months average wage, but it was reduced to two months when this Decree was replaced by 
Redundancy Law 195/1991. Janice Bell and Tomasz Mickiewicz, ‘EU Accession and Labour Markets in
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dismissed through enterprise reorganisations, and the flat rate of 60% of previous income 
for 12 months for all others becoming unemployed.* 34 Eligibility until 31 December 1991 
required that a claimant had worked for a minimum of one year in the preceding three 
years, and had not claimed unemployment benefit in the previous six months, although 
this was waived for new graduates from school or university. Also those who had been 
unable to work for at least 12 months in the previous three years because they were 
caring for young children, sick or elderly relatives, serving in the military, or were in 
prison, were entitled to assistance. Any worker who had been dismissed or who 
voluntarily resigned persistently was not entitled to benefits for the initial six months of 
unemployment. From January 1992 benefits were reduced because of the high costs of 
the original scheme and the disincentive effects it engendered against the unemployed 
seeking work.35 Eligibility criteria for those who had not been in the labour force for 12 
months in the preceding three years only applied to those caring for young children. The 
duration of benefit payments was halved, with those who became unemployed after 1 
July 1991 only receiving a maximum of six months payments. Redundant workers could 
only claim 60% of their previous wage, although for workers undergoing training it was 
70%. For those who had not worked previously, the payments were 60% of the 
minimum wage, falling to 50% after three months. A ceiling on benefit payments of 
150% of the minimum wage was imposed, but households where the total combined 
income from wages and UCS payments did not reach the minimum living standard,
the Visegrad Countries’, in Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, edited 
by Karen Henderson (London: UCL Press, 1999), pp. 129-150, p. 135.
34 Jeno Koltay, ‘Unemployment and Employment Policy in Central and Eastern Europe: Similarities and 
Differences’, in Unemployment and Labor Markets in Central and Eastern Europe, edited by Marvin 
Jackson, Jeno Koltay and WouterBiesbrouck(Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), pp. 1- 30, p. 20.
35 Svenjar, ‘Labor Market Adjustment’, [n.p.].
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additional social assistance was available. After six months, workers still had to remain 
registered and therefore actively seek work to be eligible for social welfare and other 
benefits such as health insurance and employment counselling.35 6 Further reductions were 
introduced in January 1998 with a 10% reduction in existing benefit levels.37
Critics of UCSs argue that stressing equity can have negative consequences for efficiency 
in labour markets. The degree to which benefits provide the recipient with adequate 
financial security can reduce the incentive for job searching and lengthen the time spent 
in unemployment. Given the low level of benefits introduced during the transformation, 
this effect is unlikely to be severe in the Czech transformation, although consistent with 
such a disincentive hypothesis, unemployment did fall after the restrictions on receiving 
unemployment benefits were tightened in 1992.38
Employment policies in transitional economies need to ensure that economic growth 
results and living standards increase, bringing visible benefits and minimising social 
problems.39 Over time unemployment increasingly becomes structural, requiring labour 
markets to be restructured if this is not to result in long-term unemployment, particularly 
amongst the least-skilled labour. To counteract this, a commonly favoured alternative to
35 Ham et al, ‘Unemployment and the Social Safety Net’, pp. 1122-1123; Henrik Huidfeldt, Unemployment 
and the Labour Market Transitions in the Czech Republic: Evidence from Micro-Data, Department of
Economics Working Paper, 5 (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1998), pp. 4-5.
37 OECD, Czech Republic 1997-1998, p. 124.
38 Svenjar, ‘Labor Market Adjustment’, [n.p.]; Alena Nesporova and Vera Uldrichova, ‘Employment 
Policies and Programmes in the Czech Republic’ in Employment Policies and Programmes in Central and 
Eastern Europe, edited by Martin Godfrey and Peter Richards (Geneva: ILO, 1997), pp. 47-75, p. 54.
39 Ham et al, ‘Czech Republic and Slovakia’, p. 143.
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passive policies is the use of proactive measures, and this has been a key element of the
Czech governments’ response to unemployment.40
6.2.2 Active Labour Market Policies.
The use of active labour market policies (ALMPs) in the Czech Republic preceded the 
changes in labour market policies introduced from 1 January 1992 from predominately 
passive to active methods of support.41 Government assistance to workers to ensure that 
full employment was achieved with central planning was a precursor to such 
interventions, but being motivated simply by ideological considerations, it was 
inappropriate to continue this in the transformation.42
In response to increasing unemployment rates, 76 District Labour Offices (DLOs) were 
established by November 1990, and others were later opened.43 Their main role as 
specified in the Employment Act is to provide retraining schemes that address the 
specific unemployment difficulties in their regions.44
40 Kamil Janacek, ‘Unemployment: The Most Pressing Social Problem in Czechoslovakia’, Prague 
Economic Papers, 2 (1993), 259-264, p. 263.
41 Tito Boeri and Michael C. Burda, ‘Active Labour Market Policies, Job Matching and the Czech Miracle’, 
European Economic Review, 40 (1996), 805-817, p. 807.
42 David Fretwell and Richard Jackman, ‘Labor Markets: Unemployment’, in Labor Markets and Social 
Policy in Central and Eastern Europe: The Transition and Beyond, edited by Nicholas Barr (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press/World Bank/London School of Economics and Political Science, 1994), pp. 160­
191, pp. 163,165.
43 Miroslav Hir§l, Jiri Rusnok and Martin Fassman, Market Reforms and Social Welfare in the Czech 
Republic: A True Success Story?, Occasional Paper, 50 (Florence: UNICEF International Child 
Development Centre, 1995), p. 9.
44 Kamil Janacek, ‘Unemployment and the Labor Market in Former Czechoslovakia and the Czech 
Republic’, in Unemployment and Labor Markets in Central and Eastern Europe, edited by Marvin Jackson, 
Jeno Koltay and Wouter Biesbrouck (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), pp. 49-70, p. 49.
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An overall budget for ALMPs is set annually by the government. To encourage efficient 
use of these funds, they are apportioned between regions in accordance with their labour 
market conditions, ALMP participation rates, and the past performance of the originating 
DLOs.45 The National Labour Ministry examines the labour markets and devises 
employment and training programmes as precautionary measures on the basis of 
observed trends that are implemented by the DLOs. The main aspect of their work has 
been the creation of subsidised “social jobs”. These can be subsidies to new enterprises, 
although a specific programme was established to deal with unemployment amongst 
young graduates from further and higher education. Employers would receive a subsidy 
equivalent to the minimum wage if they created a suitable assistent or praktikant position 
for a new graduate for one year.46
In general, training became a more attractive option following the changes made to the 
UCS from 1992, not only because the duration of benefits was shortened, but also 
because benefits payable were proportionally higher for those in training than for other 
workers.47 From 1994, the Czech governments have focused on targeted ALMPs in 
recognition of their greater value to the unemployed, especially long-term and problem 
groups, but it is essential that their implementation is counter-cyclical to maximise the 
policy’s effectiveness.48 Successes of the employment offices are not simply due to their
45 Boeri and Burda, ‘Active Labour Market Policies’, p. 810.
46 Alena Nesporova, ‘Recent Labor Market Developments in Former Czechoslovakia’, in Unemployment 
and Labor Markets in Central and Eastern Europe, edited by Marvin Jackson, Jeno Koltay and Wouter 
Biesbrouck (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), pp. 71-91, pp. 86-87.
47 Boeri and Burda, ‘Active Labour Market Policies’, p. 808.
48 Gunther Schmid, ‘Institutional Incentives to Prevent Unemployment: Unemployment and Active Labour 
Market Policy in a Comparative Perspective’, Journal of Socio-Economics, 24 (1) (1995), 51-102. 
Academic Search Elite. EBSCO Publishing. 17 June 1999.
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extensive remit and the significant amounts of government expenditure on ALMPs in 
comparison with all other labour market policies. There are also low ratios of 
unemployed persons for each employment advisor, allowing more intensive and personal 
job and training searches to be undertaken,49 and strict criteria to ensure that those 
registered as unemployed are actively seeking work. Workers are strongly encouraged to 
accept the jobs offered to them,50 even if these are not fully commensurate with their 
expectations.
The decline in unemployment after 1991, shown in Table 6.1, is attributable more to the 
extensive outflows from unemployment into work, rather than low levels of layoffs.51 
This suggests that the introduction of ALMPs has been effective in combating 
unemployment. ALMPs are seen as superior to passive polices because they deal with 
the causes of structural mismatches between labour demand and supply by altering the 
infrastructure and institutional framework to increase labour absorption. Retraining 
reduces the incentive of labour to cease searching for employment and become dependent 
upon social assistance. As this makes the net costs significantly lower than the gross 
costs, ALMPs can often be more cost-effective than passive policies in the long-term.
<http://www.global.epnet.com/hosttrial/Iogin.html>, [n.p.]; Tomas Sirovatka, ‘On the Role and 
Perspectives of the Labour Market Policy in the Czech Republic’, Prague Economic Papers, 5 (1996), 28­
40, p. 36.
49 Boeri and Burda, ‘Active Labour Market Policies’, p. 806; Gitter and Scheuer, ‘Low Unemployment’, 
[n.p.].
50 Boeri etal, Mediating the Transition, p. 84; Huidfeldt, Unemployment, p. 5.
51 Boeri and Burda, ‘Active Labour Market Policies’, p. 806; Gora, ‘Central and Eastern European Labour 
Markets’, pp. 395-396.
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Table 6.1: Dynamics of Unemployment in the Czech Republic 1990-2000.
Unemployment (%) GDP Growth Rate 
(%)
Annual Mean 
Inflows to 
Unemployment (%)
Annual Mean
Outflows to 
Unemployment (%)
1990 0.8 -1.2 N/A N/A
1991 4.1 -11.5 0.9 17.1
1992 2.6 -.3.3 0.9 26.6
1993 4.4 -0.9 0.7 22.0
1994 4.4 2.6 0.6 21.3
1995 4.1 5.9 0.6 21.3
1996 3.9 3.8 0.6 19.3
1997 4.8 0.3 N/A N/A
1998 6.5 -2.3 N/A N/A
1999 8.8 -0.2 N/A N/A
2000 8.5 1.8 N/A N/A
Sources: Ham etal, ‘Unemployment and the Social Safety Net’, p. 1119; OECD, Czech Republic 2000, pp. 212,214; 
Czech Statistical Office, <http://www.czso.cz>.
The labour involved in ALMPs in the Czech Republic is dynamic, comprising 1% of the 
labour force in 1991, nearly 3% in 1992, but falling again to just over 1.4% in 1994. 
Holding pools of stagnant labour resources are therefore not being created, and periods of 
unemployment are reasonably short, which differs from other countries of the region.52 
This is a major reason for the success of these ALMPs since it is easier and less costly to 
move the short-term unemployed into employment than for those who have been out of 
the labour force for longer.53 Another crucial aspect is that unemployment was still fairly 
low when the Czech government gave ALMPs precedence over passive policies in the 
transformation, so the relative proportion of skilled and higher productivity workers, who 
are those amongst the unemployed most likely to find new employment and respond to 
ALMPs, exceeded that of other countries in the region.54 Diversity in labour in the 
unemployment pool at the outset of the transformation arose because managers sought to
52 Ham et al, ‘Unemployment and the Social Safety Net’, p. 1117.
53 Bell and Mickiewicz, ‘EU Accession’, p. 144.
54 Boeri, ‘Heterogeneous Workers’, pp. 911-913.
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keep only the best labour when rationalising their labour resources, but had little 
guidance in screening labour on the basis of their past performance.55
ALMPs are not without their critics, for it is not clear that there is a causal relationship 
between their implementation and reductions in unemployment.56 To the extent that 
placed labour would have found work without help, it represents an inefficient use of 
resources, and this problem is exacerbated by the amount to which the most motivated 
rather than the most needy labour gains assistance. They are costly, so their use has to be 
selective for they do not give an immediate return,57 but in assisting only a segment of the 
total labour available for employment, others are ousted from their position in the labour 
market. Another problem is that labour that is known to have participated in such 
programmes may be stigmatised as problematic. There also appears to be relatively few 
of the long-term unemployed involved in ALMPs in the Czech Republic that probably 
arises from self-selection and a favouring of high profile, frictional unemployed labour 
rather than other types of unemployed with their attendant and entrenched social 
difficulties.58
The final criticism of such policies is that they can have contradictory effects, such as 
inhibiting wage restraint in view of the fact that workers participating in these schemes 
and undergoing retraining have an alternative to employment and so may have higher
55 Boeri, ‘Heterogeneous Workers’, pp. 905, 908; Chase, ‘Markets for Communist Human Capital’, p. 405.
56 Boeri and Burda, ‘Active Labour Market Policies’, p. 808; Rutkowksi, ‘Labour Market Polices’, p. 23; 
Gitter and Scheuer, ‘Low Unemployment’, [n.p.].
57 Fretwell and Jackman, ‘Labor Markets: Unemployment’, p. 162.
58 Sirovatka, ‘Role and Perspectives’, pp. 35-36.
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reservation wages to enter employment than if they were financially dependant upon the 
level of transfer payments.
Ultimately labour market policies only address the consequences of unemployment, but 
can benefit restructuring enterprises by facilitating labour shedding. Future 
developments on the labour market will depend on the institutional, and in particular the 
legislative environment of the government’s employment policies. This makes it 
necessary to understand the patterns of labour flows in the economy and how far 
restructuring is supported by this framework. A National Employment Plan was 
introduced in May 199959 as a supplement to the unemployment policies and social 
assistance already in existence. It is integrally linked to these and other policies on 
social, regional and educational issues but it is more broadly designed to supplement the 
overall growth strategy of the government in preparation for accession of the Czech 
Republic to the European Union.60 As the objectives for employment policy for 
European Union members are not binding and since the Czech Republic has to deal with 
some issues not relevant to existing member states, differences between the objectives in 
the Czech employment plan and those of current member states may be discerned. 
Overall the issues to be addressed are broadly similar, including the need to improve the 
existing skills and qualifications of the labour force, creating new jobs and facilitating 
movements into employment and improving matching between workers jobs and skills,
59 Ministerstvo Prace a Socialnich Veci, National Employment Plan (Prague: MPSV, 1999). 10 October 
2000. <http://www.mpsv.cz/scripts/lssz/narodni_plan/plan_eng.asp>, [n.p.]; Changing Labour Market, 
[n.p.].
0 Ministerstvo Prace a Socialnich V&ci, National Employment Plan, [n.p.].
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even under conditions of rising unemployment.61 However, it remains to be seen whether 
the necessary measures can be implemented whilst allowing enterprises in the Czech 
Republic to retain costs at a competitive level62
Regardless of the strategy by which labour market efficiency is to be attained, the main 
impact required is increased productivity. Privatisation is ineffective if it does not 
promote this change that will help sustain overall restructuring within firms. During the 
Communist era capital depreciation was very severe, and low and declining real wages 
encouraged substitution of labour for other inputs, making production highly labour­
intensive. Labour discipline was lax in state-owned enterprises as pail of an implicit 
contract between the workers and management to maintain full employment,63 with the 
result that “productivity was low as there were very many who were not doing anything” 
(Cisar 3, Retired Analyst). This mentality still persists into the transformation, so whilst 
the institutional environment has altered and “now people know they work for money and 
this is an incentive, compared to the past where they had to work legally” (Rozdat 
Systems 2, Production Manager), this has not been fully overcome.64 Instead, now, even 
with unemployment that “should make people increase their effort, there are still too 
many people who won’t work and who don’t want to work well” (Rozdat Systems 5, 
Financial Director).
61 Ministerstvo Prace a Socialnich VSci, National Employment Plan, [n.p.]; Konecny, Changing Labour 
Market, [n.p.].
62 Bell and Mickiewicz, ‘EU Accession’, p. 131.
63 Adam, Employment and Wage Policies, p. 36.
64 Sharon L. Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition: Politics, Economics and Society (London: 
RIIA/Pinter, 1991), pp. 243-244.
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Productivity improvements are necessary if restructuring in privatised firms is to be 
successful, and as one director responded
the biggest problem throughout the Czech Republic is low productivity. Our main 
aim is to increase productivity but since 1996 there has been about a 30% decrease 
in this department. Low productivity is the main problem for businesses trying to 
be competitive (Rozdat Systems 4, Technical Director).
Nonetheless, as described below, there are conflicting institutional influences to labour 
achieving these gains.
6.3 PRODUCTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT LEVELS.
Labour productivity in state-owned enterprises fell at the outset of transformation in 
Czechoslovakia, but unemployment levels were also low,65 indicating that surplus labour 
was being retained in firms in the transformation. It is essential to determine whether the 
low rate of layoffs is integral to the restructuring strategy of firms, such that this reflects 
productivity gains where managers are “trying to find the optimal number of staff.
65 Ham et al, ‘Czech Republic and Slovakia’, pp. 121-122; Gitter and Scheuer, ‘Low Unemployment’, 
[n.p.].
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Where people were made unemployed the least productive workers were got rid of’ 
(Rukopis Strojirny 1, Personnel Director), or if it is simply indicative of deferred 
restructuring.66
In Czech firms, unemployment is often not the only mechanism by which increased 
labour productivity has been sought, with an emphasis also placed on altering the 
effectiveness of the existing labour resource. With privatisation, improvements in 
technology and consequently labour productivity have been seen in many firms.
Evidence of this was highlighted for Rozdat Systems where there is
50% less staff than before but productivity is the same. The quality of staff is better 
and all the technical knowledge they must have is on a higher level. In 1991 there 
were around 500 employees and 7 computers. Now there are 320 employees and 
160 computers (Rozdat Systems 4, Technical Director).
An alternative trend was visible in Presnost KM where
a reduction in the classical production line led to a reduction in the share of workers 
with higher qualifications because the co-operation production that we have centred 
on since 1993 does not need workers with such high qualifications. Manual labour 
is more important here and so the qualifications structure has changed, although
66 Martin Godfrey and Peter Richards, ‘The Struggle Against Unemployment: Medium Term Policy 
Options for Transition Economies’, in Employment Policies and Programmes in Central and Eastern
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there are some production areas that need very highly qualified workers [and] 
decisions on unemployment have been made according to production changes in 
products so losses were not just in workers but in managerial positions too 
(Presnost KM 1, Financial Planning Manager).
The corollary of this where the operating environment does not support such changes can 
result in production patterns not being significantly altered, with labour not acquiring 
new skills and so remaining tied to traditional methods of production. A respondent in 
Cisar recognised this in their company, and felt that to overcome this
future changes are necessary in the technical equipment of the company. 
Investment in technology and machinery is needed and buildings need to renewed 
as modem technology will make production cheaper. We are still able to sell 
products in foreign markets as salaries remain low. However, the average age of 
the buildings is around 70 years old as investment in buildings has been minimal. 
The machinery is no better with its average age around 30-35 years. It is also a 
question of the perspective of the workers whose average age is 53 years. If people 
with a new perspective do not come, these will just leave the company and go to 
retirement and more people will not get qualified to work here in the short run as 
this is a long term process (Cisar 2, Machine worker).
Europe, edited by Martin Godfrey and Peter Richards (Geneva: ILO, 1997), pp. 1-18, p. 1; Boeri et al, 
Mediating the Transition, p. 82.
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Since it remains cheaper for the company to continue with labour-intensive production 
because of the differential in wage costs between the company and its foreign 
competitors, there is reduced pressure to improve labour productivity and become more 
capital intensive, even if this would bring long-term benefits to the firm. This is 
exacerbated by the cost and extent of technological improvements needed to overcome 
the technological lag that developed during Communism.
Efforts to improve productivity in Drazitest have also been made by altering the skills of
the labour force where the
management decided on unemployment on the basis of annual appraisals of 
productivity, so if it was low in some sector then they looked for ways to increase 
it, and one of these ways was to make some unemployed, but here this was the last 
option. Other alternatives for labour are for them to change qualifications, relocate 
to another department or change position within the teams in a given department 
(Drazitest 7, Personnel Manager).
These quotes importantly demonstrate for the case study films how neo-classical 
economic considerations do not necessarily prevail in restructuring, with the prevailing 
attitudes and institutional environment within which restructuring is occurring 
moderating contemporary decisions. Assessing these empirically observed restructuring 
outcomes should therefore be done from a perspective of embedded institutionalism to 
account for adaptations to their environment.
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In all of the companies studied, differences in training and qualifications of labour were
noted, for
until 1989 training, recruitment, and education of employees was different because 
then it was taking place during working hours and it was an obligation. Nowadays 
the stress is on the initiative of the employees if they want to educate themselves. 
The company provides any training required by law and this is contracted out to 
outside companies. It used to be the state that took control of training and had 
quotas for this. Everything was planned, even the growth of qualifications, and the 
company had to go by whatever the state told them to do (Cfsar 1, Trade Union 
President).
This has brought improvements because people now have greater incentives to undertake 
training67 since they “value work much more now and try to grow in their qualifications 
and building up their skills and knowledge to be better” (Brodchmel 1, Personnel 
Manager). This is because “now training is linked to quality norms” (Presnost KM 2, 
Co-operation Plant Section Head), so whereas
67 Jan Adam, Employment and Wage Policies, p. 76; Arvil V. Adams, Labor Markets and Market-Oriented 
Reforms in Socialist Economies, Presented at National Seminar on Labor Markets and Social Protection, 
Tashkent, June 7-11, 1993. 24 September 1999.
<http://www.worldbank.organisation/html/extdr/hnp/hddflash/hcwp/hrwp007.html>, [n.p.]; Estrin, ‘The 
Inheritance’, in Labor Markets and Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe: The Transition and 
Beyond, edited by Nicholas Ban* (Oxford: Oxford University Press/World Bank/London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 1994), pp. 53-76, p. 61.
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previously there was only “political” training and very little “professional” training, 
now the firm chooses labour that is already qualified for its specific activity but 
specialised training should also be given (Rozdat Systems 4, Technical Director).
However, difficulties remain with training, and productivity improvements are not 
assured because “it is difficult to find good specialist production that is very close to our 
demands for production” (Rozdat Systems 4, Technical Director). Another respondent 
illustrated the consequences of this, feeling that despite having
spent a lot of time on training, I have to be pessimistic over the results from this 
because what is most important is that the people want to change their behaviour. 
Going on a training course does not guarantee that they will change their behaviour 
or stereotypes but this depends on the person instead (Odraz KM 2, Marketing 
Manager).
Productivity within firms can also depend on the legal requirements of unemployment 
policies. The creation of a social security system was an integral element of 
Czechoslovakia’s new government’s strategy to encourage labour shedding amongst 
firms, with the Employment Act seeking to eliminate state paternalism by placing the 
emphasis on individuals to seek employment opportunities and permitting more direct 
targeting of social policy measures.68 For workers it replaced the “right” to a job with the
68 M. E. Beesley and S. C. Littlechild, ‘Privatization: Principles, Problems and Priorities’, in Privatization, 
Regulation and Deregulation, edited by M. E. Beesley (London: Routledge/Institute of Economic Affairs, 
1992), pp. 23-39, p. 26.
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“right” to be helped to find a job or retraining, and to receive income support during 
periods of unemployment,69 whilst giving employers the right to hire their own labour. 
The Act also specifies the criteria under which job contracts can be terminated,70 so 
managers were aware that although they had strategic considerations in making workers 
unemployed, “it was also necessary to abide by legal requirements” (Rozdat Systems 5, 
Financial Director). Consequently, in making workers unemployed, firms
had to inform the DLO of workers listed for unemployment and furnish them with 
details of the workers’ characteristics, education etc and only those the DLO agreed 
could be listed for unemployment (Rukopis Strojimy 1, Personnel Director).
In Brodchmel, which is strongly embedded within the local environment, in making 
decisions on unemployment, additional measures were introduced that went beyond the 
legal requirements. As such,
immediate managers and supervisors made decisions over who should be laid off 
but were then involved in discussion with the trade union. From this department 
and the trade unions, people were made aware of what the situation is and they 
were helped to find jobs and told of what benefits they can do. The company paid 
them to look for jobs, giving them one day off a week, which exceeds the legal
69 Ham et al, ‘Czech Republic and Slovakia’, p. 136; Nesporova and Uldrichova, ‘Employment Policies 
and Programmes’, p. 60.
70 Martin Kapl, Milan Sojka and Tomas Tepper, ‘Unemployment and Market-Oriented Reform in 
Czechoslovakia’, International Labour Review, 130 (1991), 199-210, p. 208.
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requirement that is only half a day, and in many cases they were offered manual 
positions elsewhere within the company (Brodchmel 1, Personnel Manager).
By contrast, in Drazitest such links were weak and efficiency concerns predominated, so
that
unemployment was mainly amongst those who were not a loss to the company.
There was some selection sensitive to social issues but there were limits to this too
and the management would not lay off a skilled worker here in preference 
(Drazitest 3, Supplies Manager).
Mobility of labour is another factor impacting on productivity changes and, as a result, 
the restructuring that occurs within privatising enterprises. In market economies, labour 
flows are supposed to be determined by the interaction of demand and supply, but there 
are often significant constraints on the flexibility of labour to move because of legal 
issues as well as personal constraints to leaving one place of employment or even 
residence for another. In the Czech case there are important reasons to suspect that 
disincentives to change will be stronger because of greater frictions. Communism 
espoused the value of, and guaranteed a job for life so that workers expected “the 
company will retain them until they retire” (Cisaf 1, Trade Union President). Although 
inaccurate to claim that no labour market existed under the previous system since 
“workers had much more freedom to change jobs than usually thought, ... their skills
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were non-transferable across jobs”,71 72this only operated on the margins in areas of critical 
skill shortages. It can therefore be difficult for some workers to understand the need or 
benefit to changing jobs. Additionally, despite little loyalty to a firm being engendered 
amongst the labour force,73 and a liberal policy on regional occupational mobility under 
central planning, labour mobility was in practice restricted by limited housing.74 It 
remains a problem that even when mobility is desirable and recognised as such by the 
workers,75 “problems with flats in the Czech Republic means that people cannot easily 
move to where good work is offered” (Rozdat Systems 5, Financial Director).
A related potential constraint limiting productivity improvements in firms is hidden 
unemployment. This should become obsolete as privatisation occurs and restructuring 
begins, but various forms of labour hoarding still occurs in privatised Czech enterprises.
The extent to which labour is hoarded within firms will reflect a balance between the
economic viability of the firm, and embedding through personal networks and retained
mentalities as in Brodchmel where
relationships within the company from the past are unhealthy and too tight.
Workers keep their friends and if a certain person needs to be unemployed and it is 
too hard to go and do this, they try to avoid or circumvent doing this. This is a
71 Tito Boeri, Transition with Labour Supply, 5th Nobel Symposium in Economics, 6 December 1999. 30 
September 2000. <http://www.cerge-ei.cz/events/sem-text/000210_t.pdf->, p. 14.
72 Jiri Vecernik, ‘Labor Force Attitudes in the Transition to the Market: The Czechoslovak Case’, Journal 
of Public Policy, 12(1992), 177-194, p. 186.
73 Jiri Vecernik, ‘The Emergent Labour Market and Job Prospects in the Czech Republic’, Prague 
Economic Papers, 4 (1995), 65-84, p. 66.
74 Nuti, ‘Fighting Unemployment’, p. 40.
75 Vecernik, ‘Labor Force Attitudes’, pp. 182, 187; Frydmanova et al, ‘Labor Markets’, pp. 28, 30.
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principle from the era of socialism that everyone has a “right to work” (Brodchmel 
2, Project Manager).
Other reasons for labour hoarding were that firms with excess labour can mobilise this 
with any given upturn in production, but the effect of such hoarding can be persistent 
unemployment where firms do not hire from the pool of unemployed labour in seeking 
additional staff,76 as well as being costly and not requiring labour to changing its working 
patterns to be more flexible in the new environment. Managers can be unwilling to 
release labour as a consequence of historical considerations because
an employee was specialised and had one qualification so some kind of rotation of 
workers is not possible. It is better to keep a professional worker with 
qualifications as there may be a job in the future because it is harder to employ 
someone else who first needs training (Brodchmel 2, Project Manager).
Alluded to explicitly in Cisar, a problem with this was recognised such that
if there is an area with particular products that is got rid of, workers and 
professionals will be laid off in this area. This decision cannot be reversed because 
the workers have been laid off and cannot go back to making these products any
76 Christopher A. Pissarides, ‘Labour Hoarding in Industrial Countries: Concept and Measurement’, in 
Employment and Unemployment in Economies in Transition: Conceptual and Measurement Issues (Paris: 
OECD/CCEET, 1993), pp. 47-57, p. 47.
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more as the workers are trained and skilled to do this and they cannot get these 
qualifications in the short run (Cisaf 3, Retired Analyst).
Further improvements in productivity do seem to be institutionally restricted in privatised 
Czech firms, in particular because of retained mentalities of labour and managers over the 
function of employment as being social as well as economic. Whilst there may not be a 
valid neo-classical economic rationale for the extent of labour hoarding and high levels of 
labour use in privatised enterprises, it appears that the formal and informal institutional 
environment does not support much additional change. Deferred restructuring in 
enterprises with employment levels remaining excessively high could therefore be a 
rational response to the institutional environment that owners, managers and labour 
within these firms operate under, with the benefits of this primarily social and political,
not economic.
The final aspect of institutions relating to labour that can influence restructuring is the 
industrial relations framework. This represents institutional influences operating directly 
on the incentives facing labour to transfer between functions in the labour market, and so 
can influence the effectiveness of post-privatisation restructuring changes introduced into 
firms that prompt labour to consider changing employment. It also affects restructuring 
because firms have to respond to legal as well as informal institutional influences as these 
relate to employment and wages. The transformation has weakened the position of 
labour in enterprises, particularly as the trade unions have lost their legitimacy and 
bargaining role with the emergence of private ownership.
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6.4 EVOLVING CZECH INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS.
Industrial relations under socialism operated quite differently from those of functioning 
capitalist economies. As industrial relations are contingent on underlying cultural 
conditions, directly transplanting existing but embedded institutional structures from 
other countries77 is inappropriate. Diverse and fragmented interests are prevalent in the 
transformational economies, so it is not certain that a recognisable model from another 
context can emerge here.78 However, as some of the main principles of industrial 
relations in capitalist economies are aims shared by the transforming economies; 
collective bargaining over wages and working conditions, protecting and motivating 
labour to work, and providing labour with a formal voice in the political system, 
similarities in the form of evolving industrial relations in the transformational economies 
and existing models is to be expected.79 There is additionally a demonstration effect 
from functioning models in Western Europe and guidelines from international 
organisations such as the ILO. In Czechoslovakia these factors were instrumental in the 
creation of a bipartite structure to bring together representatives of government,
77 Hans Slomp, Jacques van Hoof and Hans Moerel, ‘The Transformation of Industrial Relations in Some 
Central and Eastern European Countries’, in Industrial Relations in Europe: Traditions and Transitions, 
edited by Joris van Ruysseveldt and Jelle Visser (London: Sage/Open University of the Netherlands, 1996), 
pp. 337-357, p. 356. '
78 Sarah A. Vickerstaff and John E. M. Thirkell, ‘Instrumental Rationality and European Integration: 
Transfer or Avoidance of Industrial Relations Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe’, European 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 6 (2000), 237-251, p. 247.
79 Richard B. Freeman, ‘What Direction for Labor Market Institutions in Eastern and Central Europe?, in 
The Transition in Eastern Europe, 2: Restructuring, edited by Olivier Jean Blanchard, Kenneth A. Froot 
and Jeffrey D. Sachs, National Bureau of Economic Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1994), pp. 1-29, p. 19; Eckhard J. Dittrich and Michael Haferkemper, ‘Labour Relations in the Making: 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic’, in Industrial Transfonnation in Europe, edited by 
Eckhard J. Dittrich, Gert Schmidt and Richard Whitley (London: Sage, 1995), pp. 137-162, p. 138.
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employers, and trade unions, theoretically independent of each other, into one 
consultative forum.80
Privatisation has attributed specific importance to the tripartite structure and the 
agreements made within it,81 because the issues under discussion and policy content are 
dictated by the new economic and political paradigms of transformation. It is also 
important because it concerns issues that directly relate to labour and their incentives to 
change, since employees, as with other actors, embody particular retained mentalities and 
expectations from the era of central planning that have to be overcome if restructuring 
measures introduced into firms are to be carried out successfully.
6.4.1 Tripartism in the Czech Republic.
Between its creation in 199082 and mid-1995, representatives of Czech trade unions, 
business associations and the government met as the RHSD (Council for Economic and 
Social Accord) to discuss wages and other labour related issues, and produce annual 
General Agreements covering employment and wage policies.83 1995 saw its
80 Zdenek Janata, ‘Formation of a New Pattern of Industrial Relations and Workers’ Views on their Union: 
The Czech Case’, in Workers, Firms and Unions: Industrial Relations in Transition edited by Roderick 
Martin, Akihiro Ishikawo, Csaba Mako and Francesco Consoli (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1994), pp. 211- 
223, p. 212; Elena A. Iankova, ‘The Transformative Coiporatism of Eastern Europe’, East European 
Politics and Societies, 12 (1998), 222-264, p. 227; Martin Myant, Brian Slocock and Simon Smith, 
‘Tripartism in the Czech and Slovak Republics’, Europe-Asia Studies, 52 (2000), 723-739, pp. 723, 725, 
726.
81 Jiff Kleibl and Zuzana Dvofakova, ‘Industrial Relations in the Czech Republic’, Prague Economic 
Papers, 8 (1999), 220-232, p. 227.
82 Separate Czech and Slovak Councils were established from 1993.
83 Ivana Mazalkova, ‘The Trade Unions and the Transformation of Machinery Firms’, in Politics, Skills and 
Industrial Restructuring, Institute of Sociology Working Paper, 8, edited by J. Vlacil, I. Hradecka, I.
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replacement with the RSDP (Council for Dialogue between the Social Partners) when 
conflicts between the participants over the expectations and practical outcomes of the 
RHSD became unsustainable.84 The agenda was restricted to “legal labour relations; 
collective bargaining and employment, wages and salaries, safety at work and social 
affairs”,85 yet only two years later this was superseded by a reconstructed RHSD. In this 
new form its significance was much less prominent than when the RHSD was originally 
conceived.86 Though the unions gained little from such a weak structure, the election of a 
Social Democratic government in 1998 has given tripartism a higher prominence in social 
bargaining negotiations,87 so it continues to provide an institutional influence on 
restructuring decisions in enterprises.
Tripartism can describe a multitude of institutional arrangements “but it is also the case 
that different partners may hold differing conceptions at the same time”.88 This caused 
many problems to arise in the Czech system because of “ambiguity from the start over 
the role, significance and permanence of the new tripartite structures”.89 Legislative 
powers mean that the government is ultimately able to decide where agreement is 
reached, with some unwillingness to make all the agreements of the RHSD and RSDP 
legally binding or ensure their implementation, especially as transformation progresses
Mazalkova and G. McDermott (Prague: Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, 1996), pp. 49-65, p. 
49.
84 Myant et al, ‘Tripartism’, p. 731.
85 Kleibl and Dvorakova, ‘Industrial Relations’, p. 228.
86 Lajos Hethy, ‘Central and Eastern Europe: Economic Transformation, Social Cohesion and Social 
Dialogue’, in Economic Developments and Reforms in Cooperation Partner Countries: The Social and 
Human Dimension, edited by Reiner Weichardt (Brussels: NATO Economic Directorate and Office of 
Information, 1997), pp. 9-16, p. 14.
87 Myant et al, ‘Tripartism’, pp. 732-733.
88 Myant et al, ‘Tripartism’, p. 724.
89 Myant et al, ‘Tripartism’, p. 727.
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and there is a shift away from social to economic goals for employment policy in the 
Czech Republic.90 “General Agreements” to legislate for a minimum wage at least 50% 
of average wages as in the European Union were signed between 1991 and 1994,91 but 
the government had already broken the first within six months of it being signed, and by 
1994 even the unions regarded them as superfluous because of their limited legal 
authority and the rapid growth of the new private sector that has undermined the 
importance of unionisation and collective bargaining.92 Much of the reluctance by the 
Czech government now to continue tripartite discussions comes from its decreasing need 
to compromise with other actors in the enterprise sector, because its role as an employer 
has declined drastically with privatisation.93 It perceives tripartism to have simply 
evolved into a discussion forum where the reaction to any proposed changes in legislation 
that would impact on the broad areas with which the RHSD is concerned can be tested.94 
In keeping with its expectation that restructuring should be undertaken at the firm level 
by private owners, the government would prefer more decisions to be taken at the
90 J. E. M. Thirkell, K. Petkov and S. A. Vickerstaff, The Transformation of Labour Relations:
Restructuring and Privatisation in Eastern Europe and Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 
100; Roderick Martin and Anamaria Cristesco-Martin, ‘Industrial Relations in Transfonnation: Central and 
Eastern Europe in 1998’, Industrial Relations Journal, 30 (1999), 387-404, p. 394.
91 Alena Buchtikova, ‘Have Minimum Wages Hit Employment in the Czech Transformation?’, in Minimum 
Wages in Central and Eastern Europe: From Prostitution to Destitution, edited by Guy Standing and 
Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead, ILO-CEET (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 102­
115, p. 102.
92 Hethy, ‘Central and Eastern Europe’, p. 15.
93 Mazalkova, ‘Trade Unions’, p. 50; Igor Tomes and Vojtech Tkac, ‘Former Czechoslovakia’, in New 
Patterns of Collective Labour Law in Central Europe: Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland, 
edited by Umberto Carabelli and Silvana Sciarra (Milan: Giuffre, 1996), pp. 61-99, p. 91.
94 Mitchell Orenstein, ‘The Czech Tripartite Council and its Contribution to Social Peace’, in Parliaments 
and Organized Interests: The Second Steps, edited by Attila Agh and Gabriella Ilonszki (Budapest: 
Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies Foundation, 1996), pp. 173-189, p. 179; Myant et al,
‘Tripartism’, pp. 728, 732.
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enterprise level in accordance with the specific conditions there, rather than using a 
tripartite structure that imposes top-down measures onto issues related directly to firms.95
The continued existence of tripartite agreements in the Czech Republic appeal’s to be a 
function of inertia, an uncertain future against which the discussions may provide some 
counterbalancing influence, and the derived legitimacy gained by participation.96 Even if 
much of its tangible effectiveness is illusory,97 the existence of a tripartite arrangement is 
essential to maintaining social peace in the economy and between the participants, and 
providing a supportive institutional context for enterprise restructuring to occur.
Amongst all of the actors involved, maintaining tripartism is probably most important for 
the trade unions, as membership provides them with legitimacy as a credible institution 
under the new political and economic conditions. By giving them a direct, formal 
political voice within the economy, and an opportunity to represent their interests in 
relevant issues such as collective bargaining over wages from a position independent of 
the state and enterprise management,98 trade unions have to be considered as an 
institutional influence on observed restructuring outcomes. The nature and extent of this
95 Burianek, ‘Industrial Relations Still in Transition’, pp. 164,171-172; Kleibl and Dvofakova, ‘Industrial 
Relations’, p. 228.
96 Martin and Cristesco-Martin, ‘Industrial Relations in Transformation’, pp. 392-393; Anna Pollert, ‘Trade 
Unionism in Transition in Central and Eastern Europe’, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 5 (1999), 
209-234, p. 229.
97 Hirsi et al, Market Reforms, p. 6; Hethy, ‘Central and Eastern Europe’, p. 14.
98 Vladimir Vrtiak, ‘Management. Labour and Transition to a Market Economy in Czechoslovakia’,
Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations, 27 (Special Issue) (1993), 153-164, pp. 153-155; Anna Pollert, 
‘From Acquiescence to Assertion?: Industrial Relations in the Czech Republic, 1989-1995’, in Industrial 
Relations Between Command and Market: A Comparative Analysis of Eastern Europe and China, edited by 
Gerd Schienstock, Paul Thompson and Franz Traxler (New York: Nova Science, 1997), pp. 73-121, p. 89.
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influence are discussed below, with particular reference to trade unions within the case 
study enterprises.
6.4.2 Tripartism and Trade Unions.
Transformation weakens the position of labour representation, for economic growth 
requires wages to remain at a competitive level, or capital intensity of production to 
increase. One respondent suggested that
trade unions have been in existence for many years in Western Europe and the need 
for them in the Czech Republic has been shown in the last ten years (Rozdat 
Systems 4, Technical Director).
However, despite their continued presence in the Czech Republic, the impact of trade 
unions on restructuring decisions, particularly when these have a negative impact on 
labour, has been limited. Notwithstanding efforts to increase worker participation in 
decision-making since 1989, traditions of effective labour participation in enterprises are 
institutionally weak. Pivotal to the operation of the centrally planned system, unlike in 
democratic market systems where their interests often conflict with those of the 
government and employers, trade unions had only a “transmission belt” role as agents of 
the government, implementing political decisions on behalf of the Party." Consequently
99 Joseph L. Porket, ‘Czechoslovak Trade Unions Under Soviet-Type Socialism’, in Trade Unions in 
Communist States, edited by Alex Pravda and Blair A. Ruble (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986), pp. 85-105,
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it may prove difficult for workers representatives to be motivated and equipped to have 
their concerns heard within enterprises because of a lack of experience over how to 
accomplish this and its benefits.
Trade unions in principle are expected to have a formally institutionalised influence on 
restructuring, with employers required to generally aim to account for the trade unions as 
a partner organisation in the enterprise. Employers have to consult with, or inform the 
trade unions of their intended actions on certain decisions, specifically in the area of 
social policy, and on issues that concern the continued interests of employees, in 
particular those relating to the prognosis for the future strategic development of the 
enterprise.* 100 There was some evidence of this in the companies studied where 
respondents described how
by law there are obligations on how the employer is supposed to communicate with 
the trade union for example over what profit the company is making or changes in 
employment (Cisar 1, Trade Union President).
Consequently the firm has to be “involved in a collective contract with the trade union” 
(Brodchmel 1, Personnel Department), which resulted in one respondent commenting that 
the “management board has good communication with the trade unions as they are on the
p. 89; Martin Myant, ‘Czech and Slovak Trade Unions’, Journal of Communist Studies, 9 (4) (Special 
Issue) (1993), 59-84, p. 60.
100 Freeman, ‘What Direction’, p. 4; Mazalkova, ‘Trade Unions’, pp. 58, 62; Tomes and Tkac, ‘Former 
Czechoslovakia’, p. 74,
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same side in the company” (Brodchmel 3, Assembly Section Head). Another worker saw
a benefit from this for the trade unions in the transformation because
the trade union is now more important than before privatisation when it was on the 
same side as the directors. Now it is opposing the directors and trying to find how 
to make better solutions for the workers (Rukopis Strojimy 4, Machine worker).
The importance of this dialogue to labour in the case study firms though is ambiguous. 
Whilst labour can influence the impact of restructuring measures they implement, their 
influence on the decisions owners and manager make is much more restricted.
Of particular significance for the restructuring of labour relations in the post-communist 
transformation are the changes made to the Labour Code, which legally circumscribes all 
aspects of inter-enterprise relationships between the employees and their employers. It 
has been formally amended since 1989 to allow employers in the private sector to hire 
labour, permit dismissals, and end “collective agreements” in favour of negotiating 
methods used in liberal market systems. Minor amendments and a redrafted Labour 
Code passed in 2001 have been pursued to harmonise this with European Union labour 
market legislation.101 This is reflected in the work of the trade unions that is now “trying 
to get new laws to approach and follow European Union legislation” (Cisar 2, Machine 
worker). However, the unions have lost much of their decision-making power as 
provisions in the revised Labour Code restrict their ability to prevent dismissals, and
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circumscribe their role in decision-making processes in enterprises by limiting their 
influence on managerial strategies or decisions on restructuring.101 02
Much of this represents only a nominal decrease in power for trade union independence 
in state-owned enterprises prior to 1989 was only in an organisational and not a 
functional respect.103 Some strike action has occurred during the transformation, and this 
threat of action could prevent some firms from undertaking all the economically 
necessary restructuring desirable for the firm, if this would have a negative impact on 
labour. The frequency of such action though has been sporadic, with a lack of impetus 
and low expectations of its efficacy preventing this from being a technique of primary 
importance to the trade unions in the Czech Republic in constraining the management 
from taking decisions over restructuring with a detrimental effect on employment. The 
continued tolerance of a trade union presence in firms by management may be a tacit 
reflection of the fact that their true impact is limited, even where the interests of labour 
conflict with the overall intentions of the management or owners for restructuring in 
privatised firms.104
Similarly, to many employees the trade unions are not seen to offer a credible 
institutional constraint against owners and managers initiating restructuring measures
101 Chris Brewster, ‘Starting Again: Industrial Relations in Czechoslovakia’, International Journal of HRM, 
3 (1992), 555-574, pp. 567-568; Nesporova, ‘Recent Labor Market Developments’, p. 75.
102 Ludovit Cziria, ‘The Czech and Slovak Republics’, in Labour Relations and Political Changes in 
Eastern Europe: A Comparative Perspective, edited by John Thirkell, Richard Scase and Sarah Vickerstaff 
(London: UCL Press, 1995), pp. 61-80, pp. 72, 76; Pollert, ‘From Acquiescence’, p. 88.
103 Porket, ‘Czechoslovak Trade Unions’, p. 89.
104 Burianek, ‘Industrial Relations Still in Transition’, pp. 164,170; Martin and Cristesco-Martin,
‘Industrial Relations in Transformation’, p. 395.
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with unfavourable effects on labour in their enterprises. That the old unions remained 
supportive of the KSC until it collapsed cost them much of their credibility,105 whilst the 
new unions have often been unable to recruit new members through their inability to 
redefine their function successfully in the post-communist economy.106 The Communist 
era unions were succeeded by the Czech and Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions 
(CSKOS) as a co-ordinating body composed of representatives from individual unions 
holding to principles of autonomy, voluntarism and independence, protecting employees, 
and securing rights for the trade unions.107 Union membership has become voluntary, 
and with the emergence of a new private sector where there is no tradition of 
unionisation, their aggregate importance has declined substantially.108 According to one 
respondent,
in the past, trade unions had many rights and took part in decisions over everything. 
Now their role is different, their authority has reduced and they do most of their 
work in the social sphere. They cannot protect workers against unemployment and 
so have lost their authority (Rozdat Systems 3, Maintenance Supervisor).
105 Krastyu Petkov and John E. M. Thirkell, Labour Relations in Eastern Europe: Organisational Design 
and Dynamics (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 218; Michael Burda, ‘Unemployment, Labour Markets and 
Structural Change in Eastern Europe’, Economic Policy, 16 (1993), 102-137, pp. 113-114.
106 Burianek, ‘Industrial Relations Still in Transition’, p. 168.
107 Myant, ‘Czech and Slovak Trade Unions’, p. 62; Linda J. Cook, ‘Labor Unions in Post-Communist 
Countries’, Problems of Post-Communism, 42 (2) (1995), 13-18. Academic Search Elite. EBSCO 
Publishing. 7 October 1999. <http://www.global.epnet.com/hosttrial/login.html>, [n.p.].
108 Bob Mason, ‘Industrial Relations in an Unstable Environment: The Case of Central and Eastern 
Europe’, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 1 (1995), 341-367, p. 355; Pollert, ‘Trade Unionism’, p. 
211.
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Other workers gave this loss of legitimacy as justification for not belonging to the trade 
unions. One felt that membership
is not necessary because they cannot help me. Trade unions are less powerful than 
before 1989 and should take increased interest in workers problems over 
unemployment for example, but they do not do this (Rukopis Strojimy 7, Foundry 
worker).
Another respondent left the union in 1989, feeling that
there was no reason or advantage to being a member. You have to pay a 
membership fee for this and the trade union represents all the workers but in a 
global way and cannot really have any influence for the individual (Cisar 3, Retired 
Analyst)
This view is countered by the trade unions who argue that whilst
the trade union is responsible for all the workers in the company, not just the 
members, it offers some services and may advise the non-members, but for the 
members will do this for them and not just give advice (Cisar 1, Trade Union 
President).
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Formally
the trade union has to defend the rights of workers and annually sign an agreement 
on this with the management on issues such as social provisions and terms of wages 
(Rozdat Systems 7, Supervisor).
Nonetheless, even within the trade unions their changing role is recognised, with it freely 
admitted that the real reason for a change in their function and importance to employees 
“is mainly about money. There used to be a lot of tourist trips and we now have to cut 
back on these, but most of the work is done in the social sphere” (Rozdat Systems 7, 
Supervisor). Workers therefore do have valid concerns about the usefulness of the trade 
unions as a counter force to the restructuring measures introduced by owners and 
managers after privatisation.
Non-monetary compensations such as access to recreational facilities, health care and 
housing were provided by the enterprise during the Communist period. These had the 
advantage of equalising incomes and enforcing the obligation to work, but made it harder 
to link wages to productivity as benefits were available regardless of effort. Its equity, 
and the support of the trade unions ensured that the workers accepted it.109 An important 
change in the transformation has come with the increased monetisation of social 
assistance and delinking of its provision from the workplace so that enterprise managers
109 Adam, Employment and Wage Policies, p. 70; Anna Soulsby and Ed Clark, ‘Privatisation and the 
Restructuring of Enterprise Social and Welfare Assets in the Czech Republic’, Industrial Relations Journal, 
26 (1995), 97-109, pp. 97-98.
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no longer have to try and fulfil this role at the expense of economic efficiency.110 In 
particular, the creation of social security institutions rather than the use of full 
employment to deal with many social issues111 recognises that “[p]eople should be 
protected by social policy and not by structural policy”.112
Communist-era traditions of welfare provision have created groups with strong vested 
interests in social protection against negative impacts from the reform process that could 
hinder transformation if their interests are not considered.113 Non-wage benefits can be 
manipulated to achieve social goals, but this does not preclude a need to alter wages 
because these directly impact on incentives of labour and therefore performance. 
Retaining low monetary wages can restrict the need for firms to restructure production 
and undertake capital intensive production methods by enabling managers to retain larger 
quantities of labour than economically efficient.114 This final section therefore considers 
post-communist wage policies, for these contribute to the efficacy of restructuring by 
altering the incentives of employees to work, and for employers to retain or shed labour.
110 E.V.K. FitzGerald, Economic Reform and Citizen Entitlement in Eastern Europe: Some Social 
Implications of Structural Adjustment in Semi-Industrial Economies, UNRISD Discussion Paper, 27 
(Geneva: UNRJSD, 1991), p. 14; Michaela Erbenova, Vit Sorm and Katherine Terrell, ‘Work Incentive and 
Other Effects of Social Assistance and Unemployment Benefit Policy in the Czech Republic in the Czech 
Republic’, Empirical Economics, 23 (1998), 87-120, pp. 89-91.
111 Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead, ‘Minimum Wages in Central and Eastern Europe: Slippage of the Anchor’, 
in Minimum Wages in Central and Eastern Europe: From Protection to Destitution, edited by Guy 
Standing and Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead (Budapest: Central European University/ILO-CEET, 1995), pp. 
15-48, p. 25; Nuti, ‘Fighting Unemployment, p. 40.
112 Horst Siebert, The Transformation of Eastern Europe, Weltwirschaft an der Universitat Kiel Discussion 
Paper, 163 (Tubingen: Mohr, 1991), p. 12.
113 Jan Adam, ‘Transformation to a Market in the Former Czechoslovakia’, Europe-Asia Studies, 45 (1993), 
627-645, p. 637.
114 Ham et al, ‘Czech Republic and Slovakia’, pp. 98, 112, 121-122; David Tumock, The East European 
Economy in Context: Communism and Transition (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 142.
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6.4.3 Wage Policies.
Nominal wages have been slow to adjust in the Czech Republic despite rising 
unemployment. This indicates possible institutional obstacles or conflicting policy 
objectives constraining the operation of market forces,115 limiting restructuring because 
labour is responding to distorted signals. To the extent that wage inertia persists, labour 
will remain in industries that are not priority sectors under the new economic conditions 
until demand falls sufficiently and wages decline in response. Evolutions in wage 
policies are dictated by legislative developments, but affect restructuring within 
enterprises because labour then faces changed incentives to work given the new 
opportunities for remuneration.
Workers’ understanding of the composition of wages and the incentive effect of bonuses 
was skewed with full employment. A basic salary was automatically paid to those 
present at work, and a bonus for completing the minimum tasks set, resulting in the 
ensuing loss of the incentive function that bonuses have in developed market 
economies.116 Socialist wage policies constituted “a conscious endeavour on the part of 
government to utilise the economic functions for the sake of improving the performance 
of the economy and the material situation of the population”117 with wages notionally 
determined in accordance with three components. Firstly, a tariff system assigned every
115 Flanagan, ‘Wage Structures’, p. 852; Klara Foti, ‘Employment and Unemployment in the “Visegr&d 
Countries” and Slovenia’ in Changes and Challenges: Economic Transformation in East-Central Europe, 
edited by Pal Gaspar (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1995), pp. 69-88, p. 86.
116 Karen L. Newman and Stanley D. Nollen, Managing Radical Organizational Change (Thousand Oaks: 
Sage, 1998), p. 37.
117 Adam, Employment and Wage Policies, p. 67.
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job a particular grade. More grades existed for non-manual workers because of the 
greater complexity of tasks undertaken. Pay scales for a given grade varied according to 
the status of the industrial branch and size of the enterprise, with administrative staff on 
lower salaries than the technical managerial grades. Secondly, the amount of work 
performed for which payment should be made had to be determined, which led, thirdly,
to the establishment of work norms in order to ascertain workers contributions and the 
extent of their under- or over-fulfilment of their required tasks.118 Wage differentials 
actually responded more strongly to ideological impetus than economic justifications,119 
with absolute wage differentials according to education and training experience quite 
limited as a result of small differences in course curricula, an increasing mismatch 
between overly skilled labour and positions for unskilled labour needing to be filled, and 
the costs of education increasingly assumed by the state.
Fearing inflation, which would be detrimental to restructuring in enterprises and 
transformation generally by increasing costs to adjustment, the government continued to 
tightly regulate wages in enterprises with some state ownership until 1995.120 However, 
this could hinder change because politically dictated wage levels are unlikely to equate 
with that for the market-clearing level of marginal productivity.
118 Adam, Employment and Wage Policies, pp. 80-83.
119 Jiff Vecernfk, ‘Changing Earnings Distribution in the Czech Republic: Survey Evidence from 1988­
1994’, Economics of Transition, 3 (1995), 355-371, p. 357.
120 Klaus, Ceska Cesta (Praha: Profile, 1994), pp. 42, 43-44; Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead, ‘Wage Policy 
Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe: A First Assessment 1990-1996, in Paying the Price: The Wage 
Crisis in Central and Eastern Europe, edited by Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1998), pp. 13-80, p. 15.
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Deriving from the tripartite agreements, in 1991 employers gained the right to bargain 
with trade unions over wages according to two alternatives, provided that minimum 
national wages and other provisions on working conditions were adhered to.121 A 
collective agreement could be signed with the trade unions that included provisions on 
wages, making the enterprise liable for the national minimum wage, but giving it 
discretion over the wages paid to workers of higher tariff grades. Alternatively, the 
enterprise could elect to automatically honour the minimum wage tariff set by the 
government for each grade.122 From 1991, the government began setting limits on wage 
bill growth with financial penalties to discourage employers from exceeding these, even 
though wages were a small part of total costs and therefore unlikely to contribute to 
inflationary pressures on either the demand or supply-side.123 For the first half of 1992, 
wages were not regulated as no consensus could be reached over desirable levels of wage 
growth, but for state-owned enterprises limits were subsequently instigated under 
pressure from the IMF to attain economic stability throughout the economy. In 1993, 
agreement over wage regulation was again only attained in the second half of the year, 
with a return to the centralisation of wage tariffs.124 Though a minimum wage and wage 
controls were introduced to help protect the lowest paid sectors of the labour force, the 
abolition of wage regulation in 1995 was welcomed by reformers pressing for increased 
marketisation of reforms, but also by the trade unions who gained increased flexibility in
121 Alena Nesporova, ‘The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: Labour Market Trends and Policies’, in 
Structural Change in Central and Eastern Europe: Labour Market and Social Policy Implications (Paris: 
CCET/ILO, 1993), pp. 71-94, p. 91; Ham et al, ‘Czech Republic and Slovakia’, p. 118.
122 Buchtikova, ‘Minimum Wages’, pp. 104,106; Vaughan-Whitehead, ‘Wage Policy Reforms’, p. 20.
123 Vaughan-Whitehead, ‘Wage Policy Reforms’, pp. 49, 51, 53.
124 Ham et al, ‘Czech Republic and Slovakia’, pp. 106-108; Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead, ‘Wage Policy 
Reforms’, pp. 15,42.
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wage setting.125 As one respondent commented “the company needs a highly qualified 
labour force, but for this it has to be able to pay these people” (Cisar 2, Machine worker). 
The retention of wage controls in the state sector had prevented the management from 
using salary increases and bonuses to retain the most qualified labour or to induce some 
members of the workforce to leave or transfer to other tasks in order to attain higher 
labour productivity.126
Problems with wage regulation were compounded because the restrictions did not apply 
to foreign-owned and private firms, or those with fewer than 25 employees.127 This 
ensured a flow of labour out of the declining state industries into other sectors where 
higher education and experience were rewarded with better jobs and wages.128 One 
respondent described how this occurred throughout the economy as
a lot of smart people left and began their own business. Most were then successful 
but it was also because the big companies cannot give appropriate salaries to the 
very skilled workers. It was also because the companies can afford it but they are 
not interested in this because wages are tied up in the law and cannot change much. 
Good management can and should pay workers an appropriate wage because they
125 Jiri Vecernik, Markets and People: The Czech Reform in a Comparative Perspective (Aldershot: 
Avebury, 1996), p. 50; Vaughan-Whitehead, ‘Wage Policy Reforms’, pp. 60-61.
126 Joseph Prokopenko, ‘The Transition to a Market Economy and its Implications for HRM in Eastern 
Europe’, in Human Resource Management in Europe: Perspectives for the 1990s, edited by Paul S. 
Kirkbride (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 147-163, p. 158; Tumock, East European Economy in Context, 
p. 181.
127 CCET/OECD, Review of the Labour Market, pp. 17-18; Vecernik, Markets and People, p. 52.
128 Jana Hendrichova, ‘The Emerging New Relationship Between Higher Education and Employment in the 
Czech Republic’, European Journal of Education, 30 (2) (1995), 157-169. Academic Search Elite.
EBSCO Publishing. 27 August 1999. <http://www.global.epnet.com/hosttrial/login.html>, [n.p.]; Olivier
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know they will get a profit from this, but this does not exist in this company (Cisaf 
3, Retired Analyst).
Higher wages in the private sector though may incorporate a premium to compensate for 
the lack of job security or loss of non-pecuniary benefits compared with employment in 
the state sector, rather than being a device to attract labour per se.n9 This may cause low 
mobility between the state and private sector. Workers may proactively choose 
employment in the state sector if this is perceived to offer more stable employment tenure 
than in the private sector where
owners do not take care of employees very well. Salaries are not regular and it is 
very dangerous to work for them as the new owners don’t want to pay their 
workers. Odraz KM has been here a long time and although salaries are low, the 
company pays whenever it has the money. Some workers have returned to Odraz 
KM after going to work for smaller firms because although the salaries are lower 
they are nearly guaranteed compared to private firms (Odraz KM 3, Technical 
Designer). *
Blanchard, ‘Theoretical Aspects of the Transition’, American Economic Review, 86 (2) (1996), 117-122, p. 
117.
129 Iraj Hashi and Mehrdad Emadi-Moghadam, ‘Enterprise Behaviour in Transitional Economies’, Prague 
Economic Papers, 2 (1993), 331-345, p. 335; Robert J. Flanagan, ‘Wage Structures in the Transition of the 
Czech Economy’, IMF Staff Papers, 42 (1995), 836-854, p. 834.
308
Also, movement into the private sector could be discouraged by limited pecuniary 
rewards, as few in the labour force have the skills necessary to command premium wages 
there, but their accumulated job experience is still rewarded in the public sector.130
Wage liberalisation was therefore welcomed widely by employers and employees. Not 
only are “salaries more differentiated now, and skills as well as education matter now” 
(Drazitest 4, Researcher, but this allowed salaries to become part of the restructuring 
strategy of firms. Employers
want to give salaries that reflect qualifications and the quality of work. There is a 
need to overcome what was typical for the old system where it was very difficult 
for younger workers to get a good salary (Rozdat Systems 4, Technical Director)
When wages are linked to productivity, they include an incentive function, where
the main motivation for workers is money and the possibility to grow and to know 
that they have the opportunity to get higher positions if they are doing a good job 
(Drazitest 7, Personnel Manager),
which is beneficial to restructuring because it motivates labour to respond favourably to 
the changed working conditions, whilst simultaneously bringing benefits to the firm 
through higher productivity and efficiency gains.
130 Chase, ‘Markets for Communist Human Capital’, p. 405; Boeri and Flinn, ‘Returns to Mobility’, p. 30.
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6.5 CONCLUSION.
Institutionally, labour markets and the supporting industrial relations framework are 
essential to understanding observed restructuring outcomes in Czech enterprises after 
privatisation as these provide the context within which planned restructuring changes 
occur. Restructuring changes have to be implemented by labour and their incentives to 
adapt are determined by these legislative and institutional developments. However, in 
turn these mean that the potential choices of owners and managers are embedded into the 
institutional environment when restructuring impacts on the labour resource, which sets 
boundaries to economically desirable change.
Unemployment levels recorded in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic have been the 
lowest amongst all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe during the transformation. 
This has brought advantages to post-communist Czech governments because of the 
relatively low levels of expenditure required for easing the negative perceptions and 
effects of the transformation on labour. Since the transformation began, labour markets 
have increasingly responded to economic rather than political stimuli. However, labour 
mobility is still restricted in practice by factors such as housing shortages and uncertainty 
over real wages in a new job,131 which limits the overall levels of economic efficiency 
and growth that can be attained in the economy with restructuring after privatisation. 
Industrial relations also needed to be reconstructed during the transformation because of 
the changes to the organisation of production. Labour markets are being used to tackle
131 Rutkowksi, ‘Labour Market Polices’, p. 17; Boeri et al, Mediating the Transition, p. 20.
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issues of labour distribution throughout the economy to permit economic growth, but 
where wage growth is not linked to productivity, this risks inflationary pressures building 
up in the economy.132 Enterprises are beginning to separate social welfare provision from 
wages, and instead of full employment and job security policies, social security 
institutions have been established to protect the most vulnerable in society.133 Despite 
this, individual negotiations over terms and conditions and collective bargaining are 
limited to social issues, which now restrict the ability of workers to participate in 
collective action.134 Consequently the workplace has remained the primary domain of 
labour relations,135 indicating that there are some institutional precedents from the 
Communist period retained by labour that could conflict with the changes desired by 
managers and owners.
The labour resource is an important institution to be considered when understanding 
observed restructuring within firms, being an institution in its own right as well as being 
affected by institutions that impact upon it through labour markets and the broader 
industrial relations framework. Privatisation has decreased the formal power acquired by 
workers within enterprises but the broader context of enterprise restructuring still allows 
workers to retain some de facto control within enterprises because of weaknesses in 
ownership and management that prevents all economically desirable changes being 
implemented. Furthermore, the institutional context of labour relations and labour
132 Adams, Labor Markets and Market-Oriented Reforms, [n.p.]; Frydmanovd et al, ‘Labor Markets’, p. 33.
133 Adams, Labor Markets and Market-Oriented Reforms, [n.p.].
134 Pollert, ‘From Acquiescence’, pp. 76,105.
135 Anna Pollert and Irena Hradecka, ‘Privatisation in Transition: The Czech Experience’, Industrial 
Relations Journal, 25 (1994), 52-63, p. 55; Ariane Hegewisch, Chris Brewster and Josef Koubek,
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markets where the neo-liberal rhetoric of Klaus is not supported by the policies 
implemented also enhances the position of labour because retained mentalities over the 
extent of social assistance to labour further constrain managers and owners in shedding 
labour. Institutionalism therefore highlights an important tension for restructuring 
enterprises because formal institutions protect labour less now, but retained mentalities 
act as an informal institutional constraint on restructuring decisions. Observed 
restructuring outcomes therefore reflect the way this dichotomy is being resolved within 
individual firms, and how this interacts with the restructuring measures desired and 
implemented by owners and managers. This thesis has shown that there are institutional 
influences on all the actors involved with restructuring, and embedded institutionalism 
argues that these influences must be comprehensively understood to incorporate formal, 
informal, and enforcement aspects. In conclusion to the thesis, the final chapter discusses 
the impact of this embedded institutionalism perspective to assessing restructuring, and 
considers whether there is a unique Czech path of enterprise restructuring discernible 
from this perspective.
‘Different Roads: Changes in Industrial and Employee Relations in the Czech Republic and East Germany 
Since 1989’, Industrial Relations Journal, 27 (1996), 50-64, pp. 55, 62.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION: A “CZECH WAY”?
Having initiated reforms to effect the transformation from central planning to a 
market economy, Klaus’ government desired privatisation to be the cornerstone of the 
process. This was inspired by neo-classical economics that predicts new private 
owners will restructure their firms because privatisation creates the incentives for this. 
However, it has been argued in this thesis that more than simply changing ownership 
through asset transfers is required for this to occur, and privatisation to be an 
appropriate and successful strategy of economic transformation. Rather, sufficient 
incentives must exist to ensure restructuring occurs once ownership changes have 
been made. Reviewing the findings of the preceding chapters, this thesis concludes 
that neo-classical economics does not correctly predict the restructuring processes of 
privatised films in transformational economies. It has been shown from the case 
studies presented in this work that privatisation by itself is inadequate to promote 
restructuring, and consequently transformation, because of the presence and influence 
of institutions. Instead, the thesis argues that restructuring outcomes arise as a result 
of the extent to which firms and actors interact with, and are influenced by, these 
institutions. Embedded institutionalism has been developed in this work as an 
explanatory framework that can be used to account for the effects of institutional 
influences on observed post-privatisation restructuring outcomes.
An overarching view of the purpose and findings of each chapter from the perspective 
of embedded institutionalism is outlined below. Specific consideration is then made
of how embedded institutionalism differs from neo-classical economics to reinforce
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the appropriateness of the approach adopted in this work. Next, the chapter discusses 
an important conclusion of embedded institutionalism, illustrating how de facto 
control is the main determinant of the post-privatisation restructuring occurring, rather 
than de jure share ownership. This is followed by a wider assessment of the influence 
of institutions on observed post-privatisation restructuring outcomes.
Formal institutional structures can be altered quickly, but these need to become 
accepted and credible before they cause an alteration to informal institutions. Whilst 
the Velvet Revolution in 1989 represented a radical change from a power-political 
perspective, and despite formal changes in personnel and legislation, a lot of 
institutional and cultural continuity with the Communist regime persists in the post­
communist era in formal structures,1 and informally through behavioural patterns.2 
Understanding the impact of owners, managers and labour therefore represents a 
consideration of the influence of formal as well as the informal, and enforcement, 
aspects of institutions. It is shown that these are not only persistent, but that primacy 
needs to be given to the impact of informal institutions such as retained mentalities 
and consequent behavioural patterns arising from their impact.
Finally, it is proposed that the privatisation and consequent restructuring processes of 
formerly state-owned enterprises in the Czech Republic does not represent the 
emergence of a specific Czech paradigm. The Czech privatisation programme, in
1 David F. Good, ‘The Economic Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe in Historical 
Perspective’, in Economic Transformation in East and Central Europe: Legacies from the Past and 
Policies for the Future, edited by David F. Good (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 3-24, p. 4; A. D. 
Jankowicz, ‘The New Journey to Jerusalem: Mission and Meaning in the Managerial Crusade to 
Eastern Europe’, Organization Studies, 15 (1994), 479-507, p. 480; Paul G. Lewis, Central Europe 
Since 1945, Postwar World (Harlow: Longman, 1994), pp. 302, 303.
2 Attila Agh, ‘From Nomenklatura to Clientura: The Emergence of New Political Elites in East Central 
Europe’, Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, 47 (1994), 58-77, p. 58; Karen L. Newman and Stanley D. 
Nollen, Managing Radical Organizational Change (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998), p. 61.
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particular voucher privatisation where numerous small shareholders are created 
through a Walrasian-style auction, is distinct from the models of privatisation adopted 
in other post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Klaus’ ideological 
position of giving primacy to domestic ownership, and the consequent need to 
overcome barriers of limited financial resources and experience to participation, are 
specific to Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic, that could theoretically represent 
a distinct Czech model. However, this thesis argues that the design of the Czech 
voucher privatisation scheme simply reflects a response to the institutional 
environment within which it was introduced. Through embedded institutionalism, it 
is demonstrated that observed outcomes are a tangible reflection of the interactions 
between enterprises and their specific institutional environments, which causes 
restructuring outcomes to differ from those of other transformational economies, and
that this not a distinct Czech model.
7.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS.
Restructuring outcomes in former state-owned enterprises privatised by voucher in the 
Czech Republic differ from those predicted to emerge by neo-classical economic 
theory. This thesis has shown that conceptualising how and why these outcomes 
arise, and that the processes leading to these cannot be understood unless the 
influence of institutions is accounted for. To the overall detriment of its effectiveness, 
the government’s expectations for voucher privatisation remained guided by neo­
classical economic theory, which, as shown by the embedded institutionalism 
framework, is inappropriate because of the presence and influence of institutions. 
Empirical evidence from case studies has been used in this work to illustrate the
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nature and impact of institutional influences within firms on post-privatisation 
restructuring, demonstrating that observed restructuring outcomes in firms respond to 
socio-political as well as economic influences that vary temporally and spatially.
The first three chapters provided the foundation for assessing institutional influences 
within voucher privatisation firms from the perspective of embedded institutionalism. 
Having presented the methodological underpinnings of embedded institutionalism in 
the first chapter, the multifaceted review of the historical development of 
Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic in Chapter Two demonstrated the global 
institutional context that defines the parameters within which privatisation, and the 
subsequent restructuring arising within former state-owned enterprises, occurs. This 
is particularly significant because it illustrates the way in which historical factors 
impact on contemporary restructuring outcomes, which has been developed by the 
path-dependency aspect of the embedded institutionalism framework. The impact of 
institutional influences on the design and implementation of the Czech privatisation 
process was then discussed in the third chapter, where it is argued that the effects of 
institutional influences on the outcomes of voucher privatisation were not explicitly 
recognised, to the overall detriment of its effectiveness.
In the remaining chapters, the embedded institutionalism approach was applied to 
assess and understand post-privatisation restructuring, with particular reference to 
changes made in the case study firms. Empirical evidence from the interviews
conducted in these firms has been used to illustrate the observed outcomes and the
means by which institutions caused these conditions to arise, whether or not 
respondents within the firms acknowledge these. Of particular relevance to
316
understanding the outcomes of enterprise restructuring are the actions of owners, 
managers, and labour as addressed in Chapters Four, Five and Six respectively. Each 
of these groups simultaneously operates within their own institutional environment, as 
well as being institutions in their own right. It has been shown that all of these have 
to be considered if the whole spectrums of restructuring processes are to be accurately 
discerned. In each case, changes in their function within enterprises brought about by 
transformation and privatisation mean that the temporal dimension of embedded 
institutionalism is needed to understand some of their behaviour, because any changes 
in formal institutions may not immediately be translated into tangible responses in the
realm of informal institutions.
Of these three groups of actors, the study contends that managers have the greatest 
direct influence on the nature and extent of restructuring in privatising Czech firms. 
Institutionally contradictory corporate governance mechanisms currently exist, and 
this work concludes that this weakens the ability of owners to exercise control over 
their enterprises. Labour is an important, but usually indirect determinant of the 
restructuring that actually occurs in firms, being affected by institutional 
developments in the transformation as well as changes in the industrial relations 
framework. These dictate their feasible range of actions, as well as incentives to 
adapt to restructuring measures introduced, giving labour some de facto control over 
restructuring, albeit in a restricted sense.
In the following section a comparison between embedded institutionalism and the 
failings of neo-classical economic theory to predict post-privatisation restructuring 
outcomes in Czech voucher privatised firms is made. This underlines the validity of
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the embedded institutionalism approach as an explanatory framework for the observed 
post-privatisation restructuring in Czech firms.
7.2 THE INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONS.
An important distinction needs to be made between privatisation as a technical 
procedure through which ownership transfers are achieved, and the subsequent 
process of enterprise restructuring that is not assumed to be an automatic consequence 
of privatisation due to the existence of institutions. Rapid ownership transfers are 
achieved through voucher privatisation, which is a positive attribute of the programme 
that the government desired for political reasons. However, this thesis concludes that 
insufficient consideration was given to the implications of incentives for post­
privatisation restructuring that arise in response to the institutional environment. 
Institutions determine whether ownership transfers will result in sustainable 
restructuring that is beneficial to the enterprise, and if this can further the overall 
process of transformation within the economy, both being aspirations of Klaus for 
voucher privatisation.
Voucher privatisation in the Czech Republic represented a novel approach to asset 
transfers. Some consideration was given to the institutional conditions in its design, 
such as minimising the need for liquidity and supporting, functioning institutions to 
facilitate valuation and transfer of shares at the outset of the programme. However it 
remained premised on a neo-classical economic expectation that new, private owners 
would emerge to promote restructuring. The inconsistency of such a position has 
been revealed in this work by empirical evidence of restructuring in Czech enterprises
318
that shows ownership transfers alone are insufficient to promote the necessary 
restructuring changes. As a technical process, the privatisation programme centring 
on voucher privatisation was successfully structured to achieve the goal of rapid asset 
transfers. However, there are important institutional influences on the outcomes of 
privatisation that means the neo-classical economic foundation of voucher 
privatisation is inappropriate to predicting the resultant outcomes that will arise. It 
has been argued in this work that voucher privatisation does not take adequate 
account of the institutional environment in the Czech Republic into which it was to be 
applied, and that as a result the outcomes of privatisation are less favourable than the 
government expected.
Embedded institutionalism has been developed in this study as an alternative 
explanatory framework to neo-classical economics, where institutional influences are 
regarded as the determinants of observed outcomes, rather than market forces. 
Institutions are defined broadly in this approach, being understood to comprise 
formal, informal, and enforcement aspects. The inclusiveness aspect is
complemented by the acceptance of a temporal dimension in the concepts of path- 
dependency and embeddedness. This means that the influence of the past is not 
assumed to decline in proportion to the passing of time, but that both the past and 
current periods may embody institutional influences that shape the contemporary 
outcomes. Also the underlying behaviour and therefore decision-making of agents 
involved in enterprise restructuring is modelled as that of homo socio-economicus, 
where economic as well as cultural institutions are accepted as potentially impacting 
on enterprise restructuring. The inclusion of all of these aspects of institutions in 
embedded institutionalism is important because they combine to eliminate any
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predetermined judgement on the strength and validity of particular institutional
influences.
Using embedded institutionalism in this study argues that observed restructuring
outcomes in firms are shown to result from the interaction of various institutions that
are unique to any given enteiprise, and that these can only be fully understood with 
reference to this specific environment. This is in contrast to the unidirectional focus 
of neo-classical economic modelling of privatisation processes. This work has 
identified institutions that affect actual outcomes, and how their influence impacts on 
the subsequent restructuring. Responses obtained from interviews conducted in the 
case study firms have been used to illustrate how particular institutions within 
enterprises affect these outcomes. The crucial result derived from embedded 
institutionalism for assessing post-privatisation restructuring that distinguishes it from 
neo-classical economic perspectives concerns incentives. Embedded institutionalism, 
contrary to the frictionless markets premise of neo-classical economics, perceives that 
institutions are frictions that affect the specific restructuring that occurs, and the form 
this takes in privatised state-owned enterprises. In principle, voucher privatisation 
created many new owners of private property, but contrary to the predictions of neo­
classical economics, the reality is that they often lack the associated control rights that 
need to be conferred if ownership is to be effective. Instead, those with authority 
within the firms to undertake or direct restructuring measures, which arises because 
they have the incentives to undertake such changes, are most significant to determine 
the restructuring that occurs. The implications of the divergence between de facto and 
de jure control as transpires in many firms after voucher privatisation for restructuring
are discussed below.
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7.2 DE FACTO CONTROL AND DE JURE OWNERSHIP.
Responses from the interviews conducted in the case study firms illustrate that there 
are institutional influences at work that generate outcomes other than those expected 
in accordance with neo-classical economics. Voucher privatisation did formally 
achieve the transfer of assets from state ownership and established some type of 
“popular capitalism”, but such political benefits have not been consistently matched 
by economic gains as a result of institutional influences. In particular it is argued that 
those with de facto control within enterprises are in a stronger position to initiate and 
conduct restructuring than those with de jure ownership. A particularly important 
problem is that the ownership patterns arising from voucher privatisation 
institutionalised difficulties with restructuring since
the expectation of privatisation was that whoever is the owning company or 
individual would become clear, and that they would take care of the company 
and either close it down or improve it. This is the principal aim in transferring 
property from state to private ownership. These expectations did occur, but 
only later. This is a matter of the method of privatisation. Personally I prefer 
the German method of privatisation with the principle of selling companies to
individuals with finance. The Czech method was different and worse because
was there was not this possibility here (Cisar 4, Services Director).
This criticism was also endorsed by this respondent who argued that
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privatisation for the company was meant to bring new customers, new markets, 
new finance etc but this did not occur. Voucher privatisation was just a “theatre 
for the people”. There should have had more change than occurred. After 1989 
there were meant to be lots of small owners but this was a big mistake. Now 
even the government criticises privatisation. Privatisation was not for the Czech 
Republic but to make markets for foreigners. It would have been better if there 
had been a slower, step-by-step voucher privatisation programme without the 
immediate change from one owner to lots of smaller owners, where there are 
not really any owners. As such, all the small parts cannot succeed (Rukopis 
Strojimy 8, Quality Director).
As both respondents indicate, difficulties arise from voucher privatisation because of 
the lack of strategic owners with the resources to undertake restructuring. Dispersed 
ownership generates constraints against owners exercising control effectively, often 
resulting in incumbents gaining de facto control of privatised firms. Crucially, 
voucher privatisation has led to dispersed ownership that is enhanced by a weak 
ability amongst many shareholders to effectively exercise governance within firms, 
and dictates the restructuring that ensues. This means that even though solutions to 
the dispersal problem can be sought from consolidating share holdings, particularly 
through the involvement of IPFs and other institutional investors for Czech firms, 
many new owners are institutionally constrained from credibly exercising governance. 
They can lack the ability to do this because of limitations in finance, experience, and 
personnel. In other cases, cross-ownership and continued state-ownership of 
institutional investors are symptomatic of the lack of incentives facing new 
institutional owners to perform economically desirable restructuring because they
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have conflicting interests. The extent to which the creation of new owners represents 
the emergence of an economically valuable private sector is therefore questionable.
In the absence of an appropriate corporate governance system for Czech enterprises, 
often only quasi-private firms are emerging.
Problems arise largely because principal-agent problems are not always overcome 
within firms privatised by voucher. Limited experience and the persistence of 
disguised state-ownership in practice restrict the ability of new owners to undertake 
restructuring. Although owners may try to perform some restructuring, to fully 
understand the observed restructuring it is essential to also consider the actions of 
managers and employees as institutional influences. State ownership does not require 
governance to be formally specified, and so managers are ineffectually constrained by 
the principals in state-owned enterprises. This study maintains that this provides a 
strong institutional legacy on the behavioural patterns that transpire within state- 
owned enterprises following voucher privatisation. Incumbent managers will act 
rationally in their own interests, and in the absence of credible new owners, undertake 
to convert their fonner status within enterprises so that the de facto control attributed 
to them becomes the most important determinant of how restructuring occurs.
Managers are partially constrained in newly privatised enterprises, even where the 
new owners do not offer any credible discipline against them, because the economic 
environment has altered to become closer to that of a market economic system. In 
particular, with the move towards a hardening of budget constraints, persistently 
uneconomic performance in enterprises is not viable. Furthermore, managers have to 
be able to motivate the labour force to implement changes that bring efficiency gains
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in production. With the demise of state socialism, the formal influence of labour 
representation within enterprises through the trade unions has declined, although the 
aggregate effect on the importance of labour’s influence within enterprises is 
ambiguous. Developments in labour and industrial relations associated with 
transformation also support the pre-eminence of managers within restructuring firms 
because of a weakening of the formal position of labour in enterprises subsequent to 
privatisation. Although trade unions are included in national tripartite discussions, the 
decentralisation of social assistance away from enterprises has strongly constrained 
their traditional function in state-owned enterprises. Where unions have been unable 
or unwilling to redefine their role as has been seen widely in the Czech Republic, 
employee representation is usually of limited effect against managers and owners. 
Having attained primarily only formal representation within state-owned enterprises 
from the trade unions as instruments of the KSC, this could be less important than it 
first appears, but the strength of labour resistance to restructuring measures that are 
detrimental to their position in enterprises has been negligible in the Czech
transformation.
Even accounting for more rapid increases in recent years, unemployment levels 
recorded throughout the transformation period in the Czech Republic have been low, 
but this appears to have been at the cost of less restructuring than economically 
desirable for establishing a functioning market economy occurring in firms. These 
unemployment statistics offer another indication of the predominant influence of 
actors holding de facto control within firms, rather than shareholders with a direct 
economic interest in efficiency gains. To understand and appreciate fully the overall 
nature of restructuring within privatised Czech enterprises, reference again has to be
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made to institutional influences. Favourable starting conditions for transformation in 
Czechoslovakia, in particular the highly centralised political and economic structures 
inherited from the peiiod of central planning interacted with the liberalisation of 
labour and product markets to restrict the adverse effects of economic liberalisation 
on employment, at least until the mid-1990s. In addition, enterprises have retained 
much of their function as providers of social security assistance. This arises in 
combination because of a lack of complementary institutions and relative 
underdevelopment of legislation to provide social support away from the workplace, 
as well as expectations that remain for employers and employees over the type and 
extent of social provisions that should be extended to labour. This is seen in the 
persistence of labour hoarding, whether through excess labour use and maintaining 
low capital intensity of production, or by maintaining low wages that preclude the 
need for rationalising labour use within enterprises, causing low unemployment 
figures. Full employment was a political aim of the Communists that had the effect of 
institutionalising social protection within enterprises, but now employers can be 
unwilling to revoke this and employees to renounce the perceived rights they expect 
under the increasingly difficult and uncertain socio-economic environment of
transformation.
This study has argued that the success of privatisation in promoting restructuring is 
determined by the extent to which institutions interact to challenge prevailing 
behaviours whilst also allowing an embedding of favourable changes within firms. In 
the Czech Republic, institutional influences mean that incongruence between neo­
classical theory and the outcomes of privatisation exists. Although respondents
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differed in their overall assessment of its benefits, there was widespread recognition 
that changes in the ownership of firms was necessary after 1989
because the state could not operate everything with what belonged to all 
belonging to no-one. Privatisation in general was inevitable, as the state could 
not operate these firms as it had done previously (Drazitest 1, Quality Director)
and similarly, “privatisation had to occur because at the time there was no other way 
to help the company and keep it alive” (Rukopis Strojirny 5, Assembly worker).
Of greater significance is the effectiveness of privatisation, with one respondent 
simply noting that “the decision to privatise was a good one but the question is 
whether the methods of privatisation were good” (Drazitest 1, Quality Director), and 
another commenting “certainly privatisation was good. It would have been better in 
other ways but it was necessary for the company. What will happen in the future 
cannot be predicted” (Rukopis Strojirny 2, Operations Director). For assessing 
privatisation, it is this future aspect that is most important, since the subsequent 
restructuring of firms is the desired objective of the programme.
From this study it has become apparent that the most enduring legacy of central 
planning, which also affects post-privatisation restructuring is that of retained 
mentalities, particularly deriving from expectations of state intervention in the public 
and private spheres. This is supported by the continued subordination of economics 
to socio-political concerns in the formal institutional environment. The interaction of 
institutions can therefore reinforce and encourage the persistence of institutions, but
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formal structures do not have to be matched by concurrent changes in informal 
institutions, especially perceptions, and the enforcement aspect of institutions.
7.3 INSTITUTIONAL PERSISTENCE.
Although several respondents claimed there are “no legacies of the past” in the 
current operation of their companies (Rukopis Strojimy 1, Personnel Manager;
Rozdat Systems 6, Supervisor; Drazitest 4, Researcher), this work has shown that in 
understanding the restructuring outcomes in firms, such a position is untenable. As 
the discussion in preceding chapters has shown, institutional influences are path- 
dependent and embedded. In addition to the institutional environment within which 
firms operate, there are real legacies from the past that persist into the present and 
influence the current outcomes of privatisation and restructuring, and therefore can 
also be expected to continue in the future. Regardless of whether these are accepted 
by actors within the firms, this study has shown that it is these legacies that prevent 
the privatisation process operating as expected when it was originally conceived along
neo-classical economic lines.
Throughout the preceding chapters, the interview responses have indicated that rather 
than changes made to fonnal institutions, it is informal institutions that are most 
influential in detennining the precise nature of measures adopted, and the consequent 
restructuring outcomes after privatisation. In this section, a number of responses from 
the case study interviews are used to illustrate instances of restructuring and the 
perceptions of respondents that demonstrate this conclusion. Highlighted as the main 
constraint on change is learned behaviour and mentalities that means “privatisation
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was hard and still is because of a “generational problem”. People were not prepared 
for such a change as occurred” (Rukopis Strojimy 2, Operations Director), as “the 
period before 1989 was too long. In 1989 people were not ready to change with these 
events as people saw everything as common goods” (Rozdat Systems 2, Production 
Manager). Other respondents commented that factors enhancing this reluctance to 
change were that the “legacies of communism are not easily erased” (Brodchmel 4, 
Quality Manager), causing a “slow pace of learning after 50 years of certain moral 
and political principles. We cannot make all the necessary changes in a short period 
of time because of a mentality problem” (Drazitest 1, Quality Director).
In Rukopis Strojimy on respondent explicitly recognised this institutional constraint, 
commenting that
technically the factory continues as normal. The machinery is fine but the main 
problem is with peoples’ mentality and how to make products that people 
actually want as previously they were just passed onto a state company to be 
sold, but this is a problem common to all private firms (Rukopis Strojimy 8, 
Quality Director).
A director in another firm held a similar perspective, and spoke of how
some of the activities here are the same as before. Certainly there are legacies 
from the past as the mentality of people is hard to change. It is a pity that the 
changes in 1945 occurred. It would have been better if privatisation was not 
needed at all because to introduce this so that it is fair to everyone and based on
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good economic principles is actually impossible to do (Drazitest 6, Business 
Director).
In the absence of credible new institutions it is hard to change existing behavioural 
patterns, which can make restructuring more difficult. One respondent believed that 
inconsistencies in the legislation hindered feasible structural improvements 
throughout the economy, since
privatisation could lead to restructuring but it needs appropriate legislation such 
as laws to make starling up large enterprises easier. The conditions for starting 
new businesses are more discriminative then helpful. Coming from a 
Communist background, people do not have experience with other firms in 
Western states. If there were no holes in the legislation it would have been 
better (Drazitest 2, Production Director).
Others admitted that the legislation is not credible, so that “there are laws relating to 
the company, but if these are not strictly demanded then they are not really obeyed” 
(Presnost KM 4, Financial Director). One firm had direct experience of such 
problems because
many companies in the market do not offer an honest service and we have to 
deal with companies that offer bribes. If you try to be honest it is difficult but 
without orders, the company is not profitable (Drazitest 4, Researcher).
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However, a positive aspect arose in this case with the company moving to a more 
consumer-oriented position so that it “doesn’t need to bribe companies for orders but 
just offer more services for the money charged on a project” (Drazitest 4, Researcher) 
to maintain its market position.
Whilst path-dependency and embeddedness are real and important constraints on the 
actual changes that occur, their impact is neither deterministic nor unidirectional. 
Rather, it is necessary to appreciate that both potentially influence restructuring in any
firm since
the past always influences the future situation. I have to say that there are not 
just negatives from the past but also positives extracted from the past that are 
the foundations for future developments. Generally it can be said that what is 
important or really matters is to take the positive aspects and to distinguish from 
the negatives and to use the positive aspects in the future (Cisar 4, Services 
Director).
Of particular importance is that difficulties in the transformation are not seen as 
inevitable because of institutional influences and legacies. The expectations 
generated under Communism influence the perception of what changes are necessary 
and how these can be accomplished. This created some positive aspects as
some people even before 1989 expected change and did not believe in 
communism. They began working hard and caring about their jobs more, and 
tried to improve and grow professionally. Others didn’t care about
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privatisation, and didn’t think about the future or attempt to change and grow. 
Some gave 100% even before privatisation and would work overtime because 
they really cared about their job. People had to personally decide whether to 
use the time even under communism productively at a personal level. Some 
people did not want to grow during communism and were getting good money, 
while others did use their time in a productive way even though they did not get 
paid for it. Deep in the older generation’s mind are the capitalist principles of 
before 1948. Successful people have used them since 1989 when they just 
“woke up” as if this was “in their genes”. Communism was too short a time to 
forget these principles (Drazitest 4, Researcher).
Nevertheless, the effect of past experiences affecting mentalities is that there are 
constraints on introducing even desirable changes. One respondent summarised the 
effects of this, saying that
in 1989 it was obvious that the Czech Republic was on the border between East 
and West. A picture of Czech industry is of a chained dog set free but it is not 
very well developed and so will go back to what it knows from before. Voucher 
privatisation can be compared to the social revolution and nationalisation of 
property as seen in 1948 (Rozdat Systems 1, Managing Director).
Not only is there a persistence of institutions, but this respondent recognised the 
institutional similarities between the widespread, but state-driven, nationalisation of 
the Communists and voucher privatisation. This indicates that there could be an 
expectation already engendered within the population of the impact of a widespread
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change in property ownership from such historical precedents. In conclusion 
therefore, this final section mobilises embedded institutionalism to consider the issue 
of distinct Czech aspects of the privatisation and restructuring processes observed in 
former state-owned enterprises privatised by voucher.
7.4 IS THERE A “CZECH WAY”?
Principally with reference to the voucher privatisation scheme that stresses the 
involvement of domestic financial institutions and capital, some commentators have 
referred to the way in which privatisation in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic 
has been conducted as the “Czech way”.3 In this study it is argued that what is 
“Czech” about the privatisation process does not concern the design of the 
programme, but the nature of restructuring responses in enterprises that the transfer of 
property rights was supposed to promote, and how this has occurred under the 
actually prevailing conditions. The diversity of restructuring choices taken in 
privatising enterprises suggests that rather than there being the “Czech way”, 
enterprises and actors involved in restructuring simply respond to the numerous 
institutional influences that provide the specific institutional context for each 
enterprise.
This study has demonstrated that institutional influences cannot be ignored if 
observable privatisation and restructuring outcomes are to be understood.
3 See for example Vaclav Klaus, Ceska Cesta (Praha: Profile, 1994); Michal Dlouhy, ‘Czech 
Privatization: A Ten-Year Overview’ Privatisation International, 140 (2000), 26-27. 9 November 
2000. <http://www.whitecase.com/memo_czech_privatization_dlouhy.html>, [n.p.]; Quentin Reed, 
Corruption in Czech Privatisation: Dangers and Policy Implications of Neo-liberal Privatisation,
Ur
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Methodologically, the use of neo-classical economic theory in modelling the effects 
of privatisation on restructuring is invalidated in transformational economies. In this 
work, preference is given to the embedded institutionalism approach as being a more 
appropriate framework, with the implication that this is the way in which observed 
responses in enterprises should be perceived and understood in other transformational 
economies. However, comparable outcomes within firms will not necessarily be 
replicated in other firms, and even less outside of the country, because privatisation 
and restructuring outcomes arise in response to a firm’s unique institutional
environment.
Conceptualising privatisation and subsequent restructuring through embedded 
institutionalism indicates that a definable Czech paradigm does not exist. Instead, an 
evaluation of privatisation and restructuring processes and their outcomes in all 
transformation economies from the standpoint of embedded institutionalism
demonstrates that these are a reflection of institutional interactions between
enterprises and their own environments. Each restructuring outcome reflects a path- 
dependent and embedded response to formal and informal institutions. This ensures 
that even if observed outcomes are not consistent with the projections of neo-classical 
economic theory, they can still be understood as rational responses to their context.
This thesis therefore concludes that the post-privatisation restructuring visible in 
companies are the particular, observable patterns of restructuring it has adopted in 
response to the historical and contemporary institutional environment within which is 
it situated. In considering institutional influences, this study has shown that there are
Princeton University/Central European University Joint Conference on Corruption, Budapest, 30 
October - 6 November 1999. 4 August 2000. <http://www.coc.ceu.hu/reed.html>, [n.p.].
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a number of legacies and myths for the Czechs to draw upon and generate their own 
response to privatisation, ranging from the pre-Communist era, the distinct phases of 
Communist rule, especially normalisation, and the country’s extrication from 
Communist rule and the resultant path of post-communist development. There is a 
persistence of institutional influences that has a temporal dimension, and a primacy of 
control over ownership that determines the influence of different actors on the 
restructuring outcomes that arise. The inference that rather than there being a “Czech 
way” of privatisation and restructuring, and by extension, transformation, but instead 
standard socio-economic responses to the prevailing institutional environment was 
confirmed by this director. Referred to the way in which his company endeavours to 
“take positive aspects from dealing with foreign clients and put this with the Czech 
way of dealing with and solving things” (Cisar 4, Services Director), essentially 
summarised the Czech approach to post-privatisation restructuring in companies by 
observing that “we belong to Europe and can bring our own “Czech” solution”.
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APPENDIX 1: OBCHODNI CESTA GROUP COMPANY STRUCTURES
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APPENDIX 2: CISAR, BRODCHMEL AND DRAZITEST COMPANY 
STRUCTURES
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APPENDIX 3: CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY
Identifying institutional pressures that work to determine enterprise restructuring 
choices and their impact on privatisation and restructuring is integral to the 
appropriateness of embedded institutionalism as an explanatory framework in this 
study. Interviews were conducted to determine how respondents perceive aspects of 
the privatisation and subsequent enterprise restructuring processes, in particular their 
impressions of restructuring decisions taken, and the motivation or constraints on 
these changes. The responses are used to discern institutional processes and how 
these have influenced restructuring choices for privatising firms in the Czech 
Republic. Although the design of the voucher privatisation scheme was motivated by 
neo-classical economic theory with expectations of efficiency gains and subsequent 
owner-driven restructuring, such outcomes have not arisen, and this thesis attempts to 
understand why.
A research schedule comprising core questions for the interviews was constructed to 
ascertain how theoretical predictions contrast with the experience within privatising 
enterprises, in order to try and understand institutional influences that produce the 
actually observed outcomes. The topics covered included:
• the respondents’ overall experiences and impression of privatisation in 
Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic generally, and specifically in their
company;
• changes in managerial and ownership functions and tasks;
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• industrial relations issues, particularly relating and to employment, wages and 
trade unions; and
• structural adaptations of the enterprises to privatisation.
The interviews were semi-structured in format, each beginning with a discussion of 
the respondent’s background and personal experience with privatisation. In every 
case, the topics outlined above were then discussed, but the actual content and 
direction of the interview depended upon the respondent’s experience, knowledge and 
willingness to discuss particular issues. Respondents were encouraged to consider the 
situation in their company or function before and after privatisation, and to provide 
comparative assessments in their interpretations and impressions. All of the questions 
were phrased in an open-ended format, with additional questions asked where 
comments needed further clarification, or if the responses prompted discussions on 
enterprise-specific situations that were not covered by the question schedule. A 
native Czech speaker translated the interviews in most cases. As well as avoiding 
linguistic barriers, discussing the interviews afterwards allowed for aspects of non­
verbal communication and cultural and behavioural nuances to be understood and
accounted for in interpreting the responses.
Within each company, respondents comprised a cross-section of directors, managers, 
and workers. This was arranged in order to obtain a wide range of responses that 
could illustrate different facets and interpretations of the processes and contemporary 
outcomes of privatisation and restructuring. Directors and top managers were 
interviewed because they are directly involved in decision-making. Workers were 
also included because their perspective on the decisions taken and the effects within
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the firm is useful in determining the extent to which these decisions were 
communicated to and implemented within the firm, and practical difficulties to 
achieving this. For each company approached to participate in the study, this 
justification for a cross-section of employees to be interviewed was given, and the 
details of key respondents were made part of the agreed conditions of access.
Although there is an implicit subjectivity in the comments and interpretations of the 
complex, multidimensional reality of restructuring processes, this is not seen as a 
limiting factor in extrapolating from the comments to ascertain institutional pressures 
acting on enterprises. Using the same topics with each respondent, and sampling 
employees across age and function compensates for differences in the depth of 
coverage in each interview by permitting additional reinforcement and validation of 
responses within companies. Embedded institutionalism aims to account for a range 
of institutions and their different dimensions. A range of interpretations of their 
formal and informal expression and impact as provided by the interviews is thus 
essential to this approach.
To ensure an appropriate sample of respondents, it was requested that potential 
respondents were of different ages, with a variety of educational backgrounds and 
length of service within the company, and representing different functions within the 
company. Table A.l summarises the respondents in each firm used in the study 
according to these characteristics.
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Table A.l: Summary of Respondents
4
rnterview: Rukopis Strojiny Rozdat Systems Odraz KM PFesnost KM Drazitest CisaF Brodchme
*
1
Personnel Director 
Mid 50s 
Secondary
education, entire 
career in group.
Managing Director 
Mid 50s 
Secondary
education, entire 
career in group.
Managing
Director
Late 50s 
Apprentice in 
Presnost KM, 
entire career 
in group.
Financial
Planning
Manager
Late 30s. 
Secondary
education, entire 
career in group.
Quality Director 
Late 50s 
University 
education, 
most of career in 
Drazitest.
Trade Union 
President
Mid 60s 
University 
education, 
started in 
company in
1959.
Personnel 
Manager 
Early 50s 
Secondary 
education, 
entire caree 
in company
-4
2
Operations Director 
Early 40s 
University
education, entire 
career in group.
Production
Manager
Late 50s 
Secondary
education, entire 
career in group.
Marketing
Manager
Mid 40s 
University 
education,
entire career 
in group.
Co-operation 
Plant Section 
Manager.
Early 30s. 
Secondary 
education, entire 
career in group.
Production
Director.
(Vice President 
Board of 
Directors)
Mid 50s 
University 
education, 
entire career in 
company.
Machine 
worker. 
(Department 
trade union 
Chairman).
Late 50s 
Company 
apprentice, 
entire career in 
company.
Project
Manager 
Late 40s. 
Secondary 
education, 
entire caree 
in company
3
Mechanic
Late 50s 
Secondary
education, entire 
career in company.
Maintenance
Department
supervisor
Mid 30s 
Secondary 
education, entire 
career in company.
Technical
Designer
Mid 20s 
University 
education, 
started in 
company in
1998.
Assembly line 
worker. 
(Trade union 
representative.) 
Early 50s. 
Company 
apprentice, 
entire career in 
group.
Supplies Manager 
Late 40s. 
Secondary
education, entire 
career in company.
Retired Analyst 
Early 60s. 
University
education, entire 
career in 
company.
Assembly 
Section Hea
Mid 50s.
Secondary 
education, 
entire caree 
in company
4
Machine worker 
Early 50s 
Company
apprentice, entire 
career in company
Technical Director 
Early 40s 
University
education, entire 
career in group
Secretary 
Late 30s 
Secondary 
education, 
started in
company in 
1997.
Financial
Director
Mid 40s. 
University
education, entire 
career in group.
Researcher
Mid 60s. 
University 
education, entire 
career in company.
Services
Director
Early 40s.
University 
education, entire 
career in 
company.
Quality
Manager 
Late 30s. 
University 
education, 
entire caree 
in company
1
i
5
Assembly worker 
Late 40s 
Secondary
education, entire 
career in company.
Financial Director 
Late 30s 
Secondary
education, started 
1994
- -
IT Analyst
Early 40s 
University 
education, entire 
career in company.
- -
•»
r
6
Machine worker 
Late 40s 
Secondary
education, entire 
career in company.
Supervisor
Mid 40s 
Company 
apprentice, entire 
career in company.
-
Business Director. 
(President Board 
of Directors)
Mid 40s. 
University 
education, entire 
career in company.
- -
•; 7
i
Foundry worker 
Early 20s 
Secondary
education, company 
apprentice.
Supervisor, 
(Departmental 
Trade Union
Chairman)
Mid 40s 
Company
apprentice, entire 
career in company.
- -
Personnel Manager 
Early 40s 
Secondary
education, started 
in company in 
1994.
- -
8
Quality Director 
Early 50s 
University
education, started in 
company in 1997.
- - - - - -
yiDirectors 3 3 1 1 3 1 0
pManagers 0 1 1 2 2 0 31 ' Workers 5 3 2 1 2 3 1
’_ Total 8 7 4 4 7 4' 4
(i
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The number of respondents interviewed varied between firms, depending upon their 
willingness to participate and the availability of personnel, with some interviews 
having to be conducted outside of working hours. In most firms, selected respondents 
were dictated by the company, but in Cisaf and Brodchmel the top management 
would not directly arrange and thereby endorse the participation of any employees in 
these interviews, although they agreed to interviews being undertaken. In these cases, 
contacts had to be established with each respondent directly.
Whilst not permitting direct comparisons between the cases, the considerable 
variations in the characteristics of participants across the firms is not seen as a 
problem with the methodology for this work. The responses from the interviews 
reflect the perspectives of enterprise insiders and their interpretations of the processes 
that resulted in the restructuring outcomes that are visible in privatised enterprises. 
The wide range of respondents, with unique perspectives, especially in relation to 
their position within the company and integration with the institutions that define the 
feasible range of choices makes them valuable in identifying and assessing 
institutional pressures facing restructuring enterprises. This facilitates a balanced 
assessment of institutional influences on enterprise restructuring in the case study 
firms through embedded institutionalism.
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APPENDIX 4: KEY PRIVATISATION LAWS.
Act 103/1990 Zakon, Kterym se Meni a Doplhuje Hospodafsky Zakonik.
Act 111/1990 Zakon o Statnim Podniku.
Act 298/1990 Zakon o Uprave Nekterych Majetkovych Vztahu Reholnich Radu a 
Kongregaci a Arcibiskupstvi Olomouckeho.
Act 403/1990 Zakon o Zmirneni Nasledku Nekterych Majetkovych Kfivd.
Act 427/1990 Zakon o Pfevodech Vlastnictvi Statu kNekterym Vecem Na Jine 
Pravnicke Nebo Fyzicke Osoby.
Act 458/1990 Zakon, Kterym se Doplhuje Zakon 403/1990, o Zmirneni Nasledku 
Nekterych Majetkovych Kfivd.
Act 500/1990 Zakon Ceske Narodni Rady o Pusobnosti Organu Ceske Republiky ve 
Vecech Pfevodu Vlastnictvi Statu kNekterym Vecem Na Jine Pravnicke Nebo Fyzicke 
Osoby.
Act 87/1991 Zakon o Mimosoudnich Rehabilitacich.
Act 92/1991 Zakon o Podminkach Pfevodu Majetku Statu Na Jine Osoby.
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Act 229/1991 Zdkon o Uprave Vlastnickych Vztahu k Pude a Jinemu Zemedelskemu 
Majetku.
Act 513/1991 Obchodni Zakonik.
Act 248/1992 Zdkon o Investicnich Spolecnostech a Investicnich Fondech.
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